S. Hrg. 100-522, Pt. 4

THE INF TREATY

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES

FEBRUARY 22, 23, 24, and MARCH 3, 1988

PART 4

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
83-403 WASHINGTON : 1988

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, DC 20402

S381-12

83-403 0 - 88 - 1

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THE INF TREATY

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1988

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.

The committee met at 10:01 a.m., in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Claiborne Pell (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Pell, Adams, and Pressler.

The **Chairman**. The Committee on Foreign Relations will come to order.

We have today the privilege of hearing from outside witnesses, individuals with an interest in the treaty. I wish we could have received all of those who wanted to appear, but we could not. We have done the best we could, and I would urge the witnesses who are here, if they could, to abbreviate their statements because this is just the first panel of the morning, of the day.

The witnesses have been asked to limit themselves to less than 10 minutes of testimony. Then we can have time for questioning afterward.

For the first panel with us today, we have Rabbi David Saperstein, Codirector of the Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism; Archbishop Roger Mahony of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops; and Dr. Arie Brouwer, General Secretary of the National Council of Churches.

Why don't we start out with Rabbi Saperstein.

STATEMENT OF RABBI DAVID SAPERSTEIN, CODIRECTOR, RELIGIOUS ACTION CENTER OF REFORM JUDAISM, WASHINGTON, DC, ON BEHALF OF THE UNION OF AMERICAN HEBREW CONGREGATIONS, CENTRAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN RABBIS, AND THE NATIONAL JEWISH COMMUNITY RELATIONS ADVISORY COUNCIL

Rabbi **Saperstein**. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to address you this morning on behalf of a large segment of the organized American Jewish community.

In addition to my own organizations that comprise the Reform Jewish movement, consisting of 1.3 million Reform Jews throughout the United States, I also represent today the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council, the coordinating umbrella of 13 national Jewish organizations and 114 local Jewish community councils throughout the United States.

While not all of them have taken formal positions on the INF Treaty, they have authorized this umbrella organization to speak on this treaty, and did so by an overwhelming vote of hundreds of its delegates with only two dissenting votes last week at its annual national convention.

I welcome this opportunity to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee because I believe that the Jewish experience is of particular relevance to your deliberations.

Precisely because of the enormity of the nuclear danger, there are those who would close their eyes to it and deny that humankind is capable of so infinite a folly as that which these wretched weapons make possible. Alas, while other people see merely as vague possibility the evil unleashed by technology misused, for us this is already tragic memory.

No people knows better than we how close to the surface the demons are buried, how casually they may be disintered and come to consume us all.

Samuel Pizar, a Holocaust survivor, while addressing the Israeli Knesset, made this very point when he said:

> To us, the Holocaust was not only an indelible memory of horror; it is a permanent warning, for in the shadow of the flaming gas chambers where Eichmann's reality eclipsed Dante's vision of Hell, we have witnessed a pilot project for the destruction of humanity, the death rattle of the entire species on the eve of the atomic age, of thermonuclear proliferation—the ultimate, final solution.

We know that man is capable of the worst as he is capable of the best, of madness as of genius. We know that the unthinkable is indeed possible. Here, with the authority of the numbers engraved on our arms, we cry out the commandment of 6 million innocent souls—"Never again."

> From where, if not from us, will come the warning that a new combination of technology and brutality can transform the planet into a crematorium?

His words, Mr. Chairman, reach to the heart of concern over the nuclear arms race. If good people who are alarmed about an increasingly destabilized nuclear arms race do not act to prevent it, these bombs may one day be used, changing for eternity life as we know it.

We must, therefore, begin by recognizing that the unbelievable can happen. Let us not recreate the mistakes of the past, when the world would not believe Auschwitz existed until the smoke ceased to rise from its chimneys.

Mr. Chairman, it has long been obvious that we must reclaim mastery over our weapons, that it is we, the citizens of this planet, who must set the strategies on which our fate depends, rather than allowing our technology to dictate these strategies. And the INF Treaty is a first step in precisely that direction.

Let us acknowledge that the INF Treaty is not only an important step in the right direction, but has established several historic breakthroughs: The range of onsite inspection and verification; the actual reduction of arms and elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapons; the asymmetrical reductions based on the equivalent effect of the reductions, not on arbitrary equal reductions of equivalent numbers of weapons from asymmetrical arsenals.

Mr. Chairman, the Jewish community wholeheartedly supports the INF Treaty in its current form. We oppose any amendment or reservation that would require renegotiation of the treaty because we believe that, while no treaty is perfect, this one enhances American security and can lead to more sustained efforts to reverse the nuclear arms race.

We urge this treaty to be passed by this committee and this Senate, with a resolution of ratification as expeditiously as possible, because we believe that the world looks to us to see our commitment on this issue.

Ever since President Kennedy asserted that peace is, in the last analysis, basically a matter of human rights, we have understood that there is an intimate connection between the two.

As we address this INF Treaty, what, then, of human rights? Indeed, the American Jewish community shares with this committee a compelling interest in the status of human rights in the Soviet Union, and particularly in the Soviet fulfillment of the promise, recorded in Article XIII of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and implied in the Helsinki accords, that all people have the right to leave any country, including their own. How is that we, despite our profound disappointment in the human rights record of the Soviet Union, nonetheless so enthusiastically endorse INF?

In our view, indeed, the two issues—nuclear arms control and human rights—are each of such towering importance that to link them formally would be to commit a grave error. When one addresses such crucial concerns of basic moral principle and fundamental interests, improvement in one area should not be made contingent on the other. Treaties which protect human rights ought not be made contingent on improvements in nuclear arms control, nor should strengthening our strategic interests through reversing the nuclear arms race be contingent on human rights improvements.

This linkage should be contrasted to making those aspects of United States-U.S.S.R. relations in which we have a lesser interest dependent on improvements in either human rights or arms control or other issues of basic principle—hence, the continued determination of the United States to maintain Jackson-Vanik and make improvements on trade dependent on emigration performance.

For these reasons, we urge the committee to incorporate strong language on behalf of human rights, including the right to emigrate, into its resolution of ratification, in the form of a type 2 understanding requiring notification of the Soviet Union without requiring Soviet concurrence. For the reasons described above, we would oppose any type 3 amendment or reservation on these issues, which would require renegotiation of the treaty with the Soviet Union.

There are those who argue that, if the Soviet Union so blatantly violates human rights accords, why should they be trusted to maintain arms control accords. There is clearly some truth to this. But there are systemic differences between arms control treaties and human rights treaties.

We can fully verify this treaty. Violations of arms control agreements can be deterred by the threat of abrogating the treaty and of taking concommitant steps to offset the impact of such violations. A violation of a human rights treaty cannot be deterred by a

United States "in-kind" response, which would offset the Soviets' violation.

Thus, while human rights violations breed distrust of Soviet intentions and integrity which may impede a positive long-term realignment of our relationship, it need not delay progress in those areas of arms control where verification and reciprocal remedies are available to us.

Most importantly, we believe that there is a positive relationship between improvement in arms control and in human rights.

No one can be certain of what motivates the Soviet leadership. We can only note the trends of the past and draw inferences from them.

As a number of experts on the Soviet Union have noted, the plight of dissidents in general and the Soviet Jewry in particular tends to improve during periods of détente and cooperation.

When relations between the two countries are most strained, human rights restrictions increase and emigration is restricted. When we cooperate, restrictions have been eased and emigration increases.

The Soviet leadership seems to have recognized that the benefits from improved relations with the United States will never be fully realized in an atmosphere of criticism sparked by increasing human rights violations.

Although the period of glasnost, which has been coextensive with warming United States-U.S.S.R. relations, has resulted in modest improvements in human rights and rates of emigration, we note with alarm a disturbing pattern of more restrictive emigration since the December 1987 Reagan-Gorbachev summit. But we take hope by the news reported in the media today that the Soviet Union may be easing some these restrictions.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we believe that the INF Treaty can be a first important step down a path to a world not threatened by nuclear holocaust.

Let us always remember that, when we enter into arms reduction agreements with the Soviet Union, we are not conferring a benefit on that nation. We are, instead, acting out of our own compelling self-interest, and we believe in the interest of all humankind.

Through this committee's commitment to the passage of the treaty, through its commitment, through separate avenues, to assert the need for improvements in human rights, we believe that you serve the interests of humankind. The hopes of humanity are vested in this treaty and in your deliberations.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Rabbi Saperstein may be found in the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Rabbi Saperstein.

Now we are privileged to hear from Archbishop Mahony of Los Angeles, in behalf of the Conference of Catholic Bishops.

STATEMENT OF MOST REV. ROGER MAHONY, ARCHBISHOP OF LOS ANGELES, TESTIFYING ON BEHALF OF THE U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, WASHINGTON, DC

Archbishop **Mahony**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My name is Roger Mahony. I am the Archbishop of Los Angeles and the chairman of the Committee on International Policy of the U.S. Catholic Conference.

I speak on behalf of the U.S. Catholic Conference, the public policy agency of the Roman Catholic bishops of the United States.

On behalf of the U.S.C.C., I begin by expressing our sincere gratitude for the invitation to present our views on the moral considerations that we believe should guide your evaluation of the INF Treaty and post-INF arms control policy.

I have submitted a written statement, and I request, Mr. Chairman, that it be included in the record.

The **Chairman**. I would add here, without objection, that the full statements of all of the witnesses today will be inserted in the record, as if read.

Archbishop **Mahony**. Thank you.

In this statement, I will just highlight the main points.

With this testimony, we urge you to ratify the INF Treaty without crippling amendment and without undue delay. We do so as teachers and pastors, not technicians or political leaders. We do so with deep respect for the technical complexity of the INF Treaty in all its political and strategic dimensions. But, as teachers and pastors, we also recognize that no question of foreign affairs surpasses the nuclear arms race in terms of moral content and importance.

In our 1983 pastoral letter, "The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response," we examined in considerable detail the moral and religious aspects of the nuclear arms race. It is the responsibility we feel for continued assessment of the meaning, morality and direction of nuclear policy which brings us to testify today.

Because we believe the arms race must be reversed through mutual, verifiable arms control agreements, we urge you to ratify the INF Treaty as a modest, but important, step toward progressive disarmament.

We recommend ratification because, in our judgment, this treaty is a significant achievement in itself and is significant as one part of a larger political and strategic process.

As many have already noted, the treaty's real significance lies in the fact that it does not merely limit, but actually reduces, nuclear armaments. The global elimination of all United States and Soviet ground-launched INF missiles creates, as Pope John Paul II said, "a new situation."

While the actual numbers of missiles eliminated are relatively modest, the very fact of their elimination gives us hope that we are on the road to reducing nuclear weapons to a level sufficient to deter and ultimately to eliminating them completely.

A second reason the treaty is significant in its own right is that its asymmetrical reductions should improve the balance of theater nuclear weapons in Europe and, in doing so, reduce the possibility of an early, or first, use of nuclear weapons.

Finally, this treaty is significant because it offers unprecedented verification requirements. This complex and intrusive process should allay any serious doubts about the ability to monitor compliance. It should serve as an important precedent for the even more intrusive verification provisions that will be required for agreement on strategic and chemical weapons, and it should contribute to the slow process of creating the climate of trust which is a condition of progressive disarmament through negotiation.

The importance of the real asymmetrical cuts, the diminished threat of nuclear use, and the verification provisions should not be underestimated. But it is clear from these hearings that the real significance of the treaty involves its part in a larger political and strategic context.

The treaty is the product of and a factor in a larger process of nurturing a more positive relationship with the Soviet Union. Certainly, arms control and disarmament are not the whole of peace, nor are they the whole of United States-Soviet relations.

Regional conflicts and human rights issues are just two of the many sets of problems which demand resolution as a prerequisite to the more stable, peaceful relationship with the Soviet Union that should be our goal.

The U.S.C.C. will continue to focus its attention on these essential conditions of peace.

But, while the INF Treaty is only a part, it can be a significant part in a more stable and peaceful superpower relationship.

Finally, we applaud this treaty and urge its prompt ratification precisely because it has reinvigorated the arms control process after more than a decade of growing doubt over its future.

Our conditional acceptance of deterrence in moral terms is intrinsically tied to the concept of arms control. That linkage has been inadequately fostered in recent years, and needs to be reconstructed.

What kind of progress on arms control do we envision?

We urge that the INF Treaty be the beginning of a process that will lead to rapid progress on a strategic arms agreement and on agreements that could help defuse and diminish the NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation.

We sincerely hope that it becomes the model for much deeper cuts in nuclear weapons, especially strategic arsenals. The asymmetrical reductions and strict verification provisions of the INF Treaty should serve as important precedents for the much more complicated START talks, in which considerable progress has already been made.

Movement toward strategic arms reductions should coincide with a more vigorous pursuit of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

The INF Treaty and a positive START agreement have brought renewed attention to the East-West confrontation in Europe. In the "Challenge of Peace," we said that the moral imperative to control and ultimately end the nuclear arms race was not intended to make the world safe for conventional war. In the judgment of many experts, the removal of the Pershing II and Cruise missiles will not increase the threat of conventional war in Europe.

Nevertheless, their removal and the possibility of significant strategic reductions highlight the need for more vigorous pursuit of agreements to stabilize conventional forces at much reduced levels.

Conventional arms and troops reductions would require corresponding action on tactical nuclear and chemical weapons as well.

To summarize, our position is as follows:

No. 1, we accept nuclear deterrence, not as an end in itself, but as a step toward mutual, verifiable disarmament.

Second, the INF Treaty is a modest, but important, first step toward achieving deep cuts in nuclear arsenals and, as such, should be ratified without crippling amendment or undue delay. It offers real, asymmetrical reductions in potentially destabilizing weapons, and thereby diminishes the possibility of their early or first use. It reinvigorates the arms control process at a critical juncture and contributes to a more positive United States-Soviet relationship.

Third, the INF Treaty must be a point of departure to mutual, verifiable arms control measures that make deep cuts in the strategic weapons, ban all testing of nuclear weapons, outlaw chemical weapons, and reduce conventional forces to a new balance at the lowest levels possible.

As Pope John Paul II said recently of the INF agreement, "If the Washington agreement constitutes a beginning and a benefit to the international community, may it also represent for it a point of no return."

We pray that the INF Treaty is a point of no return for the arms race, and it is in this spirit that we offer this testimony before you today.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Archbishop Mahony may be found in the appendix.]

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much, indeed, Archbishop Mahony.

Now we will hear from Dr. Brouwer of the National Council of Churches.

Dr. Brouwer.

STATEMENT OF ARIE R. BROUWER, GENERAL SECRETARY, NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES OF CHRIST IN THE U.S.A.; ACCOMPANIED BY ALAN GEYER

Dr. **Brouwer**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am General Secretary of the National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., and an ordained minister of the Reformed Church in America.

I am pleased this morning to be accompanied by Dr. Alan Geyer, professor of political ethics and ecumenics at Wesley Theological Seminary and a long-time adviser to the National Council of Churches on matters of peace and disarmament.

The National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. is the principal ecumenical organization in the United States through which 32 Protestant, Orthodox, and Anglican church bodies, with a combined membership of 44 million Christians, make a common witness to their faith and work together to serve the churches and the world.

While I do not purport to speak for all members of the communions constituent to the National Council, I do speak for our policy-making body, the governing board, whose 260 members are selected by those communions in numbers proportionate to their size.

The National Council of Churches has a long history of concern for defense and disarmament issues. Our major policy statement on disarmament was adopted in 1968, and reaffirmed in 1977.

In it, we called for a major and sustained effort, in conjunction with other nations, for substantial and rapid progress toward arms control and general disarmament through international agreement.

We, therefore, welcome and support this Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty as a significant step in this direction, the first in this decade, which has seen the largest growth ever in the world's arsenals.

At its September 1987 meeting, the executive committee of the governing board welcomed the agreement, which led to the INF Treaty, as "the first time an agreement is within reach, which would not only limit but eliminate some of the most destabilizing weapons * * * [and] signal the opening of a new age of trust and confidence-building which will lead to the further reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear arms."

Our work through the National Council of Churches for peace is particularly in the area of trust and confidence-building. We carry this out through programs of information and education, which are detailed in the written statement submitted to your committee.

We are also concerned with the task of moral leadership. With reference to this treaty, in March, the heads of most of our member churches will issue a joint pastoral letter specifically in support of ratification of the INF Treaty, to be read in local church services around the country.

In addition to this, the National Council of Churches has led the way in developing exchange and dialog with people and churches in the Soviet Union. These exchanges began in 1956, when the National Council of Churches paid its first official visit to churches in the Soviet Union.

In the three decades since, thousands of church people have traveled to the Soviet Union, while Soviet church delegations have frequently come here as well.

In 1988, we know of approximately 8,000 people who will journey to the Soviet Union to help celebrate the 1,000th anniversary of the coming of Christianity to the Russian people.

We believe that these experiences and relationships are helping to change the way Americans and Soviets perceive each other and are, therefore, making a contribution toward reducing the tension between our two nations.

We recognize that the INF Treaty has several limitations, but we appreciate its several strengths and, therefore, urge its ratification.

It increases security in Europe by removing some of the most destabilizing nuclear weapons. It demonstrates a new will to negotiate verifiable agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union, and we believe it has particular significance in establishing momentum for what we hope will become a long process of arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union.

We look to you, Mr. Chairman, and to this committee and to the U.S. Senate for sustained leadership in helping to develop a national security policy, which is based on a realistic vision of common security.

We can no longer doubt that the nuclear arms race has made the security of all nations indivisible. There is growing recognition among our churches that nuclear deterrence cannot provide an adequate basis for common security and that the drive for space defenses is both illusory and dangerous to our security.

We, therefore, hope that the INF Treaty ratification will open the way to successful negotiations on the following measures:

A mutual halt in the further production and deployment of strategic offensive and defensive missile systems;

Deep cuts in existing strategic nuclear arsenals;

Reductions in both battlefield nuclear weapons and conventional forces;

A ban on space weapons; and

A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Moreover, we hope that this renewal of diplomatic momentum will soon lead to a ban on chemical weapons.

The INF Treaty, as it stands, does have some serious limitations, but we believe that its strengths and its potential for increasing the momentum toward future arms control calls for its ratification.

The achievement of this treaty is important to many people in this Nation and the Soviet Union for another reason.

The National Council of Churches, with other organizations in this country and abroad, is deeply committed to human rights and religious liberties throughout the world, including in the Soviet Union.

The last 20 years shows clearly that in times of reduced tension between our two countries there is the best chance of improvement in human rights in the Soviet Union.

Ratification of this treaty will contribute to building the political climate within which improvements in human rights and religious liberty in the Soviet Union and elsewhere can take place.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, it should be noted that bilateral United States-Soviet agreements take place within the whole family of nations, all of whom have a tremendous stake in their outcome.

In this regard, I would like to say a word about the United Nations.

The National Council of Churches 1968 policy statement, to which I have already made reference, calls for the strengthening of the United Nations as a peacekeeping and peacemaking agency. We regret that the United States has opposed many disarmament initiatives in the United Nations.

– We urge this committee and the U.S. Senate to support the United Nations' Third Special Session on Disarmament in May and June of 1988, and to pledge and ensure maximum financial support for the United Nations; to review the U.S. voting records on arms control issues at the United Nations; and to urge the administration, as a reflection of its leadership on the INF Treaty, to change its policy regarding the United Nations as an appropriate forum for disarmament discussions.

Again, Mr. Chairman, we applaud this treaty and President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev for achieving it. We urge its ratification without amendments which would require renegotiation.

We see it as a significant step toward developing real security for us and the world's peoples.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Brouwer may be found in the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, indeed, Dr. Brouwer.

What I would like to do this morning is take advantage of the presence of each of you and not ask the normal questions about one weapon versus another or the technicalities about the regime that is brought into effect, but to look at the moral aspects of it.

One thing I have always been struck by is the view of the Catholic Church that there are just wars and unjust wars. I would like to carry that a step further.

Can there be just weapons and unjust weapons? In other words, can you have just wars but fought with unjust weapons?

What would be your response to that thought?

Archbishop MAHONY. Well, I think with our modern technology we could say "Yes" to that question, unfortunately. The very nature of some weapons precludes their being targeted and limited to strictly military types of targets.

I think that is one of the grave concerns that we have about nuclear weapons, that, in fact, by their very nature they become, in most instances, counterpopulation, and, therefore, we believe immoral.

We believe that the technology to further improve guidance systems and reliability and targeting, while that might be a step in the right direction, in effect it can work to intensify the arms race contrary to the general development of people.

The CHAIRMAN. Just thinking back to World War II, we would say that that was a just war that we fought. But from the German viewpoint, I am not sure that they would admit that it was an unjust war.

How do you handle that schism?

Archbishop MAHONY. Well, of course, the goal of the war itself and the intention are where the moral analysis needs to begin.

In the German context, their goals were such things as world domination, as discrimination against certain classes of people, the total disregard for the human dignity for each individual, as shown especially in the Holocaust.

So, we would say that the intention and the goal in the Second World War, as well as in the First World War, simply do not meet the moral requirements for a just war.

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if another description of a just war is that it is a defensive war; in other words, if you are on the offensive, it is usually, we would consider, I think, unjust.

Archbishop MAHONY. Well, traditionally there could be instances where an offensive action would be justifiable. But today I think you are right, that to justify war, all the conditions must be met, including that it be defensive.

We outline this in our pastoral letter. But, by and large, it is the intention and the limiting of the action necessary to achieve the goal, which is required.

But, as you rightly pointed out, in the Second World War, not only were there immoral, illicit, illegitimate goals, but there were also actions taken by both sides that would not be justified.

For example, the carpet bombing of Dresden, the saturation bombing of London, and other such tactics, regardless of their goals, we would consider immoral.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there any comments that either of the other two panelists would care to make in this?

Dr. BROUWER. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

I would like particularly to underline the phrase that Archbishop Mahony used, "weapons that by their very nature."

It is our belief that with nuclear weapons we are dealing with weapons that have the capacity for ultimate destruction. When one is dealing in ultimate terms, one is dealing in religious terms, and, therefore, the capacity of these weapons for destruction of human life and the creation, as we know it, drives political powers to speak in terms of ultimate security. Therefore, to exceed the possibility of human control and to continue the momentum toward seeking ultimate security by ultimate destruction, all the stakes are increased to the point that this becomes a religious issue, in which we take our ultimate security in these weapons and then we bring these weapons to the place of idolatry.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Rabbi Saperstein.

Rabbi SAPERSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, your instincts are those of a Talmudic rabbi, for the Talmudic rabbis made the differentiation not between just wars and unjust wars, but between defensive wars and the rare exceptions where offensive wars were permitted.

Any defensive war was a war of commandment, a war of obligation in which everyone had to fight in. It could be initiated when attacked by the king, as a military ruler of the ancient nation of Israel.

Offensive wars however exempted several kinds of people—those who had just been married, those who were building a house, those who had planted their crops, and it could be fought only with the permission of the Sanhedrin, the great court of sages, in order to limit any type of offensive action.

The other point I would make is this. In the Jewish tradition, beginning in Deuteronomy, we have had for 3,000 years what was the first Geneva Convention. It recognized that wars would be fought. But, there were certain stipulations, including that they should not be fought with weapons that would have certain impacts: First, that would make it impossible to negotiate a settlement; second, that would destroy civilians as well as armed personnel; and, third, that would destroy fruit-bearing trees.

The Talmudic scholars several hundred years later expanded the notion of fruit-bearing trees into all kinds of necessities of life.

In other words, weapons had to allow life to continue afterward.

On that basis, the use of nuclear weapons inherently would violate every one of those standards by which the Jewish tradition measures the justifiability of the use of weapons.

This is why the Jewish community has pushed so hard to find other ways to affirm our strategic needs, rather than dependence on nuclear arms.

The CHAIRMAN. And yet, I remember that to this time, we are the only nation of the world that has used nuclear weapons offensively.

When we did use them, there was a certain sense of relief. I don't recall any religious leaders rising up and saying that it was immoral.

Am I correct?

Archbishop MAHONY. Well, I could not give you the exact quote, but certainly Pope Pius XII during the postwar period, as well as others in many places in the world, did raise a voice and say that the direct targeting of populations simply is not tolerable, regardless of the objective.

The CHAIRMAN. We think not only of nuclear weapons, but don't we think also of gas and bacteriological weapons as being unjust weapons, if we want to characterize them as that?

Archbishop MAHONY. That's right.

Rabbi SAPERSTEIN. Again, on this same basis, we have the benefit of hindsight. The technology is leaping ahead by such quantum steps, such geometric progressions, that it is often hard to assess, as we are developing it and as it is first being used, the implications of the use of that technology. But with a little bit of hindsight, we can learn the lessons from the past, to see the actions we took in a different perspective, to help create guidelines that will make it more difficult to replay those same errors in the future.

The CHAIRMAN. Just to carry that thought on a little bit further, you had in World War II, with Adolph Hitler, a man who was able to play a particular tune on people's hearts, which turned perfectly nice people, decent people, the Germans, many of them, into beasts.

This same phenomenon could occur right here in our own country, I would think, or other countries if some other master of this technique, such as Hitler was, in turning human beings into beasts, came down the road.

Do you see any way that that could be stopped in the future?

Any of you may respond.

Archbishop MAHONY. I would simply say that any leader of a people has the capability of either calling that population to the high ground, the high road, or with the proper communications can call that community to the lower road as well.

I think that in our form of government here, especially like with your committee, we have the capability of presenting the broader picture and calling people to the higher road.

This is why I am hopeful that your committee will not only report out favorably on the technological and political aspects of this treaty, but will point to the moral direction in vision that it gives this country.

The CHAIRMAN. Could a charismatic of the Ku Klux Klan, for example, evoke the same dreadful streaks that were evoked in perfectly decent Germans by Adolph Hitler?

Archbishop MAHONY. Not if our system of individual rights is protected.

You have to remember that Adolph Hitler was only able to continue on his course because of the total destruction of human rights and human liberty.

People who dared speak against him were just simply eliminated.

If that system prevailed anyplace, then it could happen.

Rabbi **SAPERSTEIN**. There are differences historically between the experience in the United States and Europe that would make it more difficult, but not impossible, for that to happen.

In Europe, there had been a history, going back for 1,500 years, of state-sanctioned anti-Semitism, of religiously sanctioned anti-Semitism, of academically sanctioned anti-Semitism.

This Nation, begun on the principles of the philosophy of the Age of Reason that rejected those more ancient strands of thought that Hitler was able to draw on, that resonated in the national memories of the peoples that he led, they are absent here.

They were rejected by the rationale of schools of philosophy.

But it does not mean that it can't happen here. It does not mean that the irrational forms of anti-Semitism and hatred of blacks and other minorities could not be mobilized into support for such efforts.

But the lesson of the Holocaust was that if good people remain silent while evil is done, if good people remain silent while new technologies are used whose only purpose is to destroy humanity, then we lay the seeds for the destruction of the world.

That was the lesson that we have brought in the Jewish experience to the nuclear arms race. If we remain silent while these new technologies are applied in strategies that will increase the chance of their being used, then we do indeed lay the seeds for destruction of humanity.

Dr. **BROUWER**. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I would make two points.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Yes, Dr. Brouwer.

Dr. **BROUWER**. First, I think it is important to notice in connection with the phenomenon of Adolph Hitler in the Second World War that a part of his power came from trying to dehumanize other people, and establish the superiority of one group of people over another group of people.

That is a lesson that we are still trying to build on in the National Council of Churches and believe for the future well-being of the human race we need to continue to build on it. Therefore, we place a great deal of emphasis on the importance of the theology of the enemy, understanding the dehumanizing forces that are then enlisted for political processes. But a first step toward destroying a person physically is to destroy that person in one's mind and spirit.

Therefore, we place great value on seeing all human beings, in this case people in the Soviet Union as well, as the children of God, created in the image of God, and, for that reason, we have placed great stress on the personal exchange program, so that people in this country and that country can see one another as human beings and know one another not in stereotypical ways, but in personal ways.

The second point is related to our considerable stress on the emphasis and importance of common security, that we cannot be concerned any longer in this world of ours with the national security of the United States only.

We need to be concerned for the security of all peoples in all nation states. That is the only way our own security can have any possibility.

The CHAIRMAN. That is why it is such a pity that the Baruch plan of the late 1940's or early 1950's—I forget which—was not accepted, where he would have made the nuclear weapons available only to an international body.

In connection, incidentally, Dr. Brouwer with the list of churches which belong to your organizations, which I noticed, the member communions of the National Council of Churches of Christ, that is really just about every Protestant church, isn't it?

What exceptions are there?

Dr. BROUWER. Mr. Chairman, forgive me, but the definition of "Protestant" is a very elastic one, and can include many dozen more. But we do say that most of the historic, the traditional historic Protestant churches in the United States are members of the National Council of Churches. But the list could run to more than 100, more than 150, I suppose.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me put it another way.

Are there any exceptions, any Protestant churches that are not in communion with the National Council of Churches?

Dr. BROUWER. One of the major Protestant churches, evangelical churches, which is not a member is the Southern Baptist Convention, for example.

But we are in active conversation and we do many things together.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

I was very struck, Archbishop Mahony, by your important thought that there must be a climate of trust because, without a certain climate of trust, nothing can move ahead.

What we have to recognize here is it is to the advantage of the Soviets and to the advantage of us to move along this road, and if the treaty is to be firm, to be effective, it has to be beneficial to both sides.

I have asked some witnesses in the past and would like to ask you now, can any of you recall any treaty that has been honored by a nation in violation of its own interest, except for Great Britain in World War I and World War II, when, because of its treaty with Belgium and its treaty with Poland went in against its interests at that time?

With that exception, can any of you recall a treaty that has been honored to the detriment of the nation honoring it?

[Pause.]

The CHAIRMAN. I think you will find that there is none historically. And yet, we are always urging our negotiators to come home with the bacon.

We don't realize that it has to be good for both sides.

I would ask another moral question, just taking advantage of your presence here.

Do you think that one could be a good Communist Party member and a good Christian, or a good Communist Party member and a good Jew?

What would be the reaction of each of you?

This is a question I have often asked Communists in the Soviet Union?

Archbishop MAHONY. Well, speaking from the Catholic tradition, by definition, we do not see them as compatible, because, by definition, a Communist comes from an atheistic point of reference, with the state as the highest good. We come from a different perspective, of the individual person and the dignity of the individual human being as the highest good.

So, I would not see those as compatible.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Dr. Brouwer.

Dr. BROUWER. The word "Communist," of course, is used in very many different ways.

The CHAIRMAN. I am using it in the sense of under party discipline.

Dr. BROUWER. I'm sorry?

The CHAIRMAN. Under party discipline, as a member of the party.

Dr. BROUWER. I would agree with Archbishop Mahony's statement, that ideologically it would be an absolute contradiction.

It is important to note, I think, in that connection that our relationships with the churches in the Soviet Union have underlined for us a very, very important fact; namely that the number of members of churches in the Soviet Union is far, far greater than the numbers of members of the Communist Party.

So my care in stating it is that we would not want, under any sense, to say that because communism is inconsistent ideologically and philosophically with Christianity, therefore Christians and Communists need to be at war with one another.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, no. I am not saying that.

My question is much simpler. Can a good Christian, for example, be a good Communist?

Dr. BROUWER. I understand your question. The answer to that is "No." But it is never just a one-word answer when the question is as difficult as that.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Rabbi Saperstein.

Rabbi SAPERSTEIN. If you are asking in terms of membership in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, then I think Archbishop Mahony's answer is a very accurate one.

Let me just give you one concrete example that affected the Jewish community, which addresses this question of the relationship of the state and the individual.

In other words, do the rights we have vest to us because we are citizens of the state, as the Soviet system would argue, or do they vest in us because we are God-created individuals, as our own Nation would assert?

In the early 1970's, when Soviet Jews wanted to emigrate, the Soviet Union hit them with a very large exit tax. The theory of that exit tax was to repay the state for the investment the state had made in education.

Many of us, seeing it through the filter of our own political systems, thought that was just random harassment. But, in point of fact, it makes sense in the Soviet system. If the state is the ultimate political entity, then the state invests in education of the citizen so that the citizen can pay back the state. If people abrogate that agreement midway, they have an obligation to pay it back in another form.

In this Nation, we educate people because we believe that education is essential for them to fulfill their God-given potential to exercise fully their individual rights.

So, we have two profoundly different systems. Since the American system is based on values that the Judeo-Christian perspective gave to Western civilization, I think that the inherent contradiction that Archbishop Mahony mentioned makes that reconciliation difficult.

The **Chairman**. I think that there are also certain habits of behavior. I have lived behind the Iron Curtain and travel there frequently. I think that certain peoples tend to be more prejudiced, anti-Semitic, if you like. To my mind, the Slavs take the cake in this regard.

I can remember after World War II, being in charge of a consulate general behind the curtain, and there was a minipogrom going on there.

These are the habits that have to be changed.

Perhaps I am wandering a little far afield. I would like to get back to my basic question. How do we prevent another person coming along and exercising the same siren's song that Hitler did to our people, to the British or the French, prejudice against blue-eyed people, or Jews, or Negroes, or people with brown hair? How do we make people immune to those siren calls when they come down?

Archbishop **Mahony**. One thing that comes to mind immediately is the emphasis here in our country that we should be placing on the dignity of human life and each human life and the human community.

You have to recall that the breakthrough that Hitler and his propaganda were able to achieve was the way in which camouflage language was used, to legitimize the taking of human life.

That is, that regime was able to obscure people's understanding—for example, never was reference made to killing innocent Jewish people. It was always framed in language like "dealing with the Jewish question," and all kinds of camouflage language.

The same thing happened with the massive destruction of the mentally retarded under that regime. It was all handled and communicated in language that never spoke the truth of what was happening.

I think that is why in our own country, in our leadership role in the world, we must continue to bring what we call the consistent ethic of life to all aspects of our political and moral leadership; so that we do not allow camouflage terms in language to lead us astray.

The **Chairman**. It is also not just the language. It appeals to the prurient instincts in our fellow human beings.

Archbishop **Mahony**. That's true.

That is why I would hope that we would continue to have good political leadership that is able to emphasize that dignity.

Rabbi **Saperstein**. It would seem to me, if we are to prevent that from being replayed in this country, it requires a four-step program.

Step No. 1 is to educate our people much better about the fundamental nature of our political system, its assertion of basic human rights, about its creation of mechanisms to enhance and protect those rights.

Second is to strengthen policies that preserve human freedom and preserve human rights here in the United States and for us to be a leader in strengthening policies for human rights around the world.

Third is to educate people on the lessons of the Holocaust.

One of the tragedies of human history is that we make mistakes and we don't study and learn from them, and we make them again and again and again.

I think what technology tells us is that this is the first generation that cannot afford to make the same mistakes humanity has made before, because the price we will pay through a nuclear holocaust is simply too large.

So, the lesson of Hitler, the study of the Holocaust in our school systems—more and more of our school systems are putting in courses of study about the Holocaust on the secondary level; many of our universities are doing it; there are growing numbers of people studying it—learning the lessons of Hitler and the Holocaust can be an indispensible component in preventing a repetition here.

Finally, I would also point out that in addition to this dehumanization of humanity and suspension of fundamental rights, Hitler also rose to power in a climate of economic upheaval, of a 20-percent unemployment rate, of people who were out of jobs, who were out of hope, who were filled with anger, frustration, and despair. He was able to tap and manipulate that frustration.

In doing so, it points out a lesson of the Talmud again, that the sword enters the world because of justice delayed and justice denied.

It is time for us in this country to eliminate those seeds of unrest in our own Nation, seeds of frustration and despair by providing all of the deprived people of this Nation and of the world with the opportunity to live a minimally decent standard of living; to have a sense of hope, of betterment for their children, so that the frustration and despair will not be a tappable resource for the fanatics and the extremists who always look to such frustrations to generate political support.

The **Chairman**. Thank you.

Dr. Brouwer.

Dr. **Brouwer**. Essentially the same points I would express in a somewhat different way, I suppose.

First, the religious approach, the affirmation that all people—all people—of whatever color or creed are the children of God, created in the image of God, and are, therefore, of equal worth in the eyes of God and in the eyes of one another.

The second point is ethical, the teaching of Jesus, that we are to love our neighbors as ourselves. I believe that concern about human rights in other parts of the world cannot be separated from the importance of human rights, employment, and opportunity here in this country as well.

Third is human contact. It is much, much more difficult to destroy someone if one is dealing with reality rather than with stereotypes.

I say, again, that we have tried to live that out in programs of exchange with not only people in the Soviet Union but people all over the world.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you very much for those responses.

I would add, also, Dr. Brouwer, having been at the San Francisco conference that created the United Nations, that I share your enthusiasm for it. I regret that we have not lived up to our obligations as much as we should have in the past, and agree with you that we should do all that we can to strengthen it.

I believe you will find that this year we are doing better than we did last year and the year before, which is not saying all that much.

But I thank you and have enjoyed very much this diversion, perhaps, away from the nitty-gritty of the INF Treaty, into these broader realms. I think these broader realms are dreadfully important in order to understand what we are trying to do.

I thank you, Archbishop Mahony, Dr. Brouwer, and Rabbi Saperstein, for being with us.

Thank you very much.

Rabbi SAPERSTEIN. Thank you.

Archbishop MAHONY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. BROUWER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. We now come to our second panel, consisting of Mr. John Joyce, president of the International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen; Rev. William Sloane Coffin, president of SANE/FREEZE; and Ms. Nancy Neuman, president of the League of Women Voters.

I am glad to say that Ms. Neuman is here. We are starting with this panel a little bit early. Mr. Joyce and Reverend Coffin have not yet arrived. But I would ask Ms. Neuman if she would go ahead with her testimony.

I would add my own personal regard for the League of Women Voters. I noticed over the years how they take a problem, examine it, work with it a bit, and come up usually with a pretty good recommendation and solution.

STATEMENT OF NANCY M. NEUMAN, PRESIDENT, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, DC

Ms. NEUMAN. Thank you.

I am Nancy Neuman, president of the League of Women Voters, and I am pleased to be here to voice the support of more than a quarter of a million members and supporters of the League of Women Voters and of concerned citizens across the country for ratification of the INF Treaty.

President Reagan has said that with the treaty, "We took a step * * * that may be the most important taken since World War II to slow down the arms buildup."

We believe the Senate must now take the next step and overwhelmingly approve the INF Treaty.

We are now at an important crossroads. The new Soviet willingness to negotiate seriously on arms reductions, as shown by the INF Treaty, presents us with a historic opportunity to move toward a more stable and lasting peace.

The INF Treaty represents a historic opportunity to reduce the threat of nuclear war by cutting the number of nuclear weapons and by eliminating an entire class of weapons from United States and Soviet arsenals.

The INF Treaty represents a historic opportunity to adopt precedent-setting onsite verification provisions that will increase confidence and set the stage for mutual cooperation on future arms control treaties.

The INF Treaty represents a historic opportunity to lessen nuclear tensions in Europe and to increase U.S. national security by reducing the risks of escalation to nuclear war.

If these opportunities are taken, we will all, not only Americans and Soviets, but also people around the world who are dependent on good relations between the superpowers for their own survival, we will all live in a safer, more secure world.

But if the Senate fails to approve this agreement or if the Senate insists on "killer" amendments to the treaty, we face a bleak future.

If we turn our backs on this agreement, we face the mounting distrust of our allies. If we turn our backs on this agreement, we face an arms race that will increasingly weaken our national economy if it does not lead to nuclear disaster.

If we turn our backs on this agreement, we will have lost a chance to build a stable and lasting peace.

The choice is clear, between a safer and more secure future and the risks of an escalating nuclear arms race based on fear and distrust between the superpowers.

As you know, the League of Women Voters of the United States is a nonpartisan, citizens organization with members in more than 1,200 State and local leagues in all 50 States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

Throughout our 68-year history, the league has been at the forefront of the political debates that have shaped our Nation at the State, local, and Federal levels. We are a political organization that studies issues and takes a stand on issues.

We never support or oppose candidates for public office. But the league does not hesitate to let public officials know what we believe is in the public interest. We come before you today to express our very strong support for speedy adoption of the INF Treaty.

The league's interest in international relations goes back many decades. But within recent years, league members have become increasingly concerned that something has gone fundamentally wrong in the way the superpowers view national security policy.

Seemingly locked in an escalating spiral, the United States and the Soviet Union have built more and more offensive nuclear arms.

Deeply concerned about a view of national security that is limited to military policy—missiles, tanks, and high levels of military spending—leagues across the country have undertaken to educate themselves and their communities about national security policy.

Since 1982, leagues have researched the trends, held numerous public seminars and forums, and debated military and arms control policies and defense spending priorities.

As a result of these study processes, league members reached consensus on the basic shape of national security policy. They affirmed that national security has many dimensions and cannot be limited to military policy alone. They affirmed that a strong economy and the Government's ability to meet social and environmental needs are key elements of our national security.

And they affirmed that arms control measures are essential to reduce the risk of nuclear war and increase global stability.

League members also agreed on factors that should be used in evaluating arms control agreements.

Among these factors are equity, verifiability, and continuity.

Tested against these factors, the INF Treaty is clearly a good agreement.

Tested against a broad definition of "national security," one that includes the strength of our economy and our ability to meet social needs, the INF Treaty clearly sets our Nation on the right course.

This treaty lays the foundation for new agreements, reducing strategic nuclear arsenals and conventional weapons. Our trading partners have long recognized that military spending can reduce national strength.

Japan and the NATO allies spend much less than we do on military forces. If the United States and the Soviet Union can build on the critical elements of the INF agreement, we may be closer to the day when the productive capacities of our two nations can be unleashed from the arms race and directed toward meeting human needs and improving the quality of our lives.

The INF Treaty is the first nuclear arms control agreement that actually eliminates an entire class of weapons, rather than placing limits on future deployment.

It is important to note that these reductions in missile forces are not equal, but they are equitable. The Soviet Union will eliminate twice as many missiles as the United States. The Soviet missiles carry four times as many warheads as the United States missiles.

U.S. verification and compliance concerns are fully addressed by the INF Treaty. The treaty contains precedent-setting onsite verification and weapons destruction provisions, provisions that increase confidence and set the stage for mutual cooperation.

In addition, in the interest of ensuring Soviet compliance, the treaty is "front loaded" to eliminate short-range INF weapons within 18 months of treaty execution. All short-range INF weapons subject to this provision are Soviet weapons, thus providing an opportunity for the United States to assess Soviet compliance before any United States weapons are dismantled.

The INF Treaty provides for each country to inspect facilities on the other's territory or that of its allies, to verify treaty compliance. This onsite verification is the most intrusive method of treaty verification to date. Past agreements have relied on satellites and other external devices for verification.

While we understand that the Senate must carefully review the treaty before giving its approval, we are opposed to amendments or other conditions that would require renegotiation of the treaty or that would significantly delay its implementation.

While such conditions may be offered in good faith, the effect of their adoption would be to scuttle the treaty and substantially reduce the chances of attaining even more significant arms control agreements in the future.

If individual Senators believe that the INF Treaty is not a good agreement, they should vote against it. However, if Senators believe that it is a good agreement, we urge that they attach whatever clarifications or understandings that may be necessary or advisable in a form that does not endanger ratification of the treaty.

In the next few days and weeks, you will have the opportunity to vote on the INF Treaty. The League of Women Voters urges that each Senator vote for the treaty and against "killer" amendments that would delay implementation or require renegotiation with the Soviet Union.

The INF Treaty represents a cautious, but important, step toward United States-Soviet cooperation to reduce the threat of nuclear war. It is a step our Nation must take to secure a safer world for ourselves, our children, and our grandchildren.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Neuman may be found in the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, indeed, Ms. Neuman.

I would like to turn to Senator Pressler for a moment.

Senator PRESSLER. I want to thank our witnesses this morning. Many Senators, myself included, have to go to a funeral this morning. Unfortunately, one of the leading staff people that we had in the Capitol passed away in a very unfortunate manner.

I will stay for a bit longer, but will soon have to run down to the funeral.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, and I hope you will say a prayer for me, too.

Mr. Joyce, please proceed.

STATEMENT OF JOHN T. JOYCE, PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL UNION OF BRICKLAYERS AND ALLIED CRAFTSMEN, TESTIFYING ON BEHALF OF THE AFL-CIO, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. JOYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your invitation to appear before the committee. We certainly are appreciative of the opportunity.

My name is Jack Joyce. I am president of the International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen, a member of the AFL-CIO Executive Council, and, more to the point of this committee's hearings, chairman of the AFL-CIO Committee on Defense.

It is in this capacity, on behalf of the AFL-CIO, that I come before the committee this morning to provide you with our thoughts on the treaty.

I have just come back from the AFL-CIO Executive Council meetings in Miami, where it was my privilege to submit to the council the defense committee's report on the INF Treaty.

I also submitted for the council's consideration a resolution on the treaty. On February 16, the council approved the resolution, and it is now the policy of the federation.

If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like to summarize the AFL-CIO policy for the committee at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. As I said earlier, the statements will be inserted in full in the record.

Mr. JOYCE. Very good.

The statement, the resolution, and the report I will leave with the committee. Let me just summarize our view by saying that the AFL-CIO considers the treaty to be a good treaty, which merits the consent of the Senate.

We feel that it serves the security interests of the United States and its NATO allies.

The AFL-CIO therefore urges the Senate to ratify the treaty.

As I think you are probably aware, Mr. Chairman, the AFL-CIO has long been a proponent of a strong national defense.

Five years ago, the AFL-CIO expressed the opinion that the best kind of arms control treaty is one that does not set limits or ceilings on weapons up to which point the United States or the Soviet Union can arm themselves.

It is our view that the best kind of arms control treaty is one that causes actual cutbacks and reductions in the level of arms in the world's arsenals.

Within this view, Mr. Chairman, our feeling is that the treaty is the best kind of arms control agreement. It does not set a ceiling. Rather, it establishes a floor and establishes it at absolute zero. So, it eliminates an entire class of nuclear weapons.

Although the treaty deals with only 3 percent of the nuclear arsenals on the American and Soviet sides, it establishes two precedent-setting principles that could very well open the way toward real progress in both strategic and conventional arms control.

The first of those principles is that of asymmetrical or disproportionate reductions. The treaty requires these to achieve equivalent numbers of weapons on each side—the number in the case of the intermediate-range nuclear forces being zero.

These reductions will not adversely affect NATO's deterrence capability.

The second principle that we think is important not only in terms of this agreement but for the future is that of intrusive verification, onsite inspection. The INF Treaty marks the first time that the Soviets have agreed to these principles, and these are principles which the AFL-CIO has called for in our resolutions on this question in the past.

In urging Senate approval of the treaty, the AFL-CIO is under no illusion that this agreement will remove the impetus to the arms race or achieve dramatic reductions in military spending. We remain steadfast in our conviction that the cost of a strong national defense should be borne equitably by all sectors of our society, and that the burden should not fall disproportionately on the backs of the working men and women.

We also recognize that, though it is a good arms control treaty, the INF agreement cannot stand on its own. It is imperative that progress be made on talks bearing on the levels of strategic nuclear forces and on talks governing the conventional levels of forces facing each other in Europe.

It is within a framework of the other two arms control agreements—one on strategic weapons and one on conventional forces—that the INF Treaty will best serve American national security interests.

Fortunately, we feel the INF Treaty provides two tools—as I mentioned, asymmetrical reductions and intrusive verification—that will be useful in building agreements on strategic and conventional forces.

We cannot really conceive of any successful arms control agreement in the future that did not embody and strengthen these new fundamental principles of arms control.

We are especially concerned about the status of conventional forces in Europe. There is now an urgent need to reach agreement on achieving balanced conventional force reductions so that NATO will not be compelled to build up its conventional forces after the implementation of an INF Treaty.

Of particular concern to us is our ability to mobilize and sustain armed forces in times of war. The problems affecting our capacity as a nation to project our military power under wartime circumstances are, we feel, acute. And those problems, those pressures, will only become more urgent in the days ahead as our conventional forces become more important in deterring a Warsaw Pact attack on NATO and in preserving security and peace in Europe.

We urge ratification of the INF Treaty, with the Senate's understanding that it is the first step toward a goal, but only a step. Its ultimate value, as I have been suggesting, will be determined by whether comparable progress can be made in the reduction of conventional and strategic forces.

So that, in sum, is the position of the AFL-CIO on the INF Treaty. I would like, as I said at the outset, to submit to the chairman of the committee full copies of our report and resolution.

If there are any questions on our position, I would be happy to respond to them, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement and report of Mr. Joyce may be found in the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, indeed.

We will now hear from the Reverend Mr. Coffin.

STATEMENT OF REV. WILLIAM SLOANE COFFIN, PRESIDENT, SANE/FREEZE, WASHINGTON, DC

Reverend COFFIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

On January 25, speaking before this distinguished committee, Secretary Shultz testified, "We succeeded because we stayed the course. This took political courage. In Europe, the so-called peace movement took to the streets to try to block U.S. deployments. In the United States, the FREEZE movement, in effect, wanted to reward the Soviets for deploying first by letting them keep their advantage and removing any incentive to negotiate reductions."

Actually, it was the peace movement that first suggested the double zero option in Europe. Bruce Kent in England was the most notable one to do this.

When, in October 1981, the West Germans and Dutch proposed it at a NATO meeting in Gleneagle, Scotland, it was Secretary Weinberger who turned it down.

Why did the administration change its mind?

I submit it was because by cutting off funds, Congress sent the administration a less hawkish message, which was not lost on the Russians, who hate the role of supplicant to the deaf, and because Congress, in turn, was prodded by the people.

So, I would like to take this moment to thank this committee and the Congress for the wisdom shown in its restraint and also to note, once again, how often people furthest from the seat of power are nearer to the heart of things.

If truth be told, the best explanation for the INF agreement was given by Abba Eban, who once observed, "Nations really do the right and wise thing, but only after exhausting all alternatives."

But enough of past history. What of the present and the future?

Today, in the metaphor of the five-continent initiative, the world is as a prisoner in a cell, condemned to death, awaiting the uncertain moment of execution.

We have fallen perilously far behind in the schedule we should have kept had we been serious about saving the planet.

So we are for the INF—"we" being the approximately 175,000 members of the two merged organizations, SANE and FREEZE.

The treaty may represent a small step, but it is in the right direction, and can become a worthy one if it leads to more significant steps.

The modernization of nuclear weapons destabilizes common security, our own included. Therefore, urgently needed are verifiable treaties banning flight tests, as well as the tests of nuclear warheads, else the headlong race to a first-strike capability will continue unabated on both sides.

We also need to return to its bottle the evil genie, SDI, for, as Clark Clifford has written, "We can have star wars or arms reduction, we cannot have both."

We must test the sincerity of Soviet offers to reduce by 50 percent all ICBM's and to negotiate a reduction in conventional weapons, which are hardly "conventional" in terms of their financial cost and destructive power.

Finally, to offset the threat of unemployment, conversion plans must soon be mandated, either by Executive order or by congressional legislation.

I believe a decisive moment in our national life is at hand. The consequences of success and failure alike will be monumental. Those conversant with Russian history know that reformers, such as Mr. Gorbachev, come rarely, and rarely last long. And, after every reformation, comes counterreformation.

As it is far from comforting to consider his successor, should Mr. Gorbachev fail, it behooves Americans to act promptly.

"Glasnost" makes life more interesting, but not better. Not until he can revitalize the economy with money saved through arms reduction and put more consumer goods on the tables of Russian families will Mr. Gorbachev receive from them the enthusiastic support he enjoys from the presently better off intelligentsia.

In the world at large, it is increasingly apparent that geoeconomics is replacing geopolitics.

We have only to look across the Pacific at 80 million Japanese, who, since World War II have not tested a bomb, bared a bayonet, nor landed paratroopers on some Third World island; yet they are the chief creditor nation of the world.

We, on the other hand, with arsenals brimming, are now the chief debtor nation of the world.

What has gone wrong is clear. Our defense is less security-oriented than it is weapons-driven.

Additional weapons add nothing to our security. They only increase the economic pain of budget deficits. And, while we may be No. 1 in global military bases, in naval fleets, in nuclear bombs, and warheads, we are presently No. 5 in literacy rate, No. 8 in life expectancy, No. 14 in available safe water, No. 18 in infant mortality rate. A black child born in Washington, DC, would have a better chance of reaching age 1 had that child been born today in Costa Rica. And we are No. 20 in school age population per teacher.

It is always a challenge to read the signs that declare that the status quo has outlived its time. Established habits of thought tend to prevail over recognition of emerging realities.

Today, innovation, not coping, is the order of the day. The world has made a quantum leap scientifically; it has yet to make one politically.

We in SANE/FREEZE hope that the U.S. Senate will ratify, without amendment, the INF Treaty and that, without delay, it will go on to take bold steps toward world disarmament and so help the world to achieve what has eluded it for so long—a just and lasting peace.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Reverend Coffin may be found in the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, indeed, Mr. Coffin.

I would like to press each of you in connection with the possibility of any category 1 or 2 what we call declarations or reservations.

For example, Ms. Neuman, should there be something there about women's rights, or would you want to see it reported out by the Senate in its pristine form?

Ms. NEUMAN. We would prefer it not to be linked to women's rights and that it be reported out in its current form.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Reverend Coffin.

Reverend COFFIN. Oh, I don't think the Soviets ought to be allowed to link it to homelessness in this country, so I would not link it to anything in their country or anything in our country. I think it ought to come out pristine.

The CHAIRMAN. You would then keep it pristine. All right.

Mr. Joyce, what would be your view? Should there be something there about workers' rights, for example?

Mr. JOYCE. No.

We would like to see it kept on a clean track of its own. We have a separate track where we are concerned about addressing the conventional force equation. But we see that as a separate item to be addressed.

The Chairman. I would agree with you.

Reverend Coffin. May I just add one further thing, Senator?

The Chairman. Certainly.

Reverend Coffin. When you asked that, my assumption is that the 1972 ABM Treaty would be interpreted according to let's say the doctrine of original intent, that that should not necessarily be linked. But I would hate to see us gain one treaty by losing another.

The Chairman. Right. But, as you know, there may be efforts made to attach views on the interpretation of that treaty to this treaty. My hope would be that they could be kept separate.

Would that be yours?

Reverend Coffin. I would think so.

The Chairman. I was struck in your testimony, which is good, strong testimony, with the point you made that Gorbachev has asked his people to work harder and drink less, but it has not yet produced anything in the way of results.

I wonder if you could enlarge on that a little bit. What do you see happening in the next year or two if results do not occur?

Reverend Coffin. Well, I would refer you to what I think is a very important book by a Russian-Jewish dissident, who landed here in the United States in 1976, by the name of Yanov. The book is called "The Russian Challenge."

In it, this anti-Soviet, Jewish, refusenik, points out that should Gorbachev fail, the likelihood that the right in Russia, which he traces back to the 19th century, the religious right and the secular right, could easily, or possibly at least, would take over, and we could see fascism in the Soviet Union after Mr. Gorbachev the likes of which we have not seen in this century.

So, I think we ought to do everything that we can to help him. To say let's wait and see is a luxury we just cannot afford.

The Chairman. Have you read his book, "Perestroika"?

Reverend Coffin. "Perestroika," obviously will make life better, if he can get it through. But those bureaucrats are wall to wall over there. His problem with them is simply enormous.

The Chairman. I am just curious if any of the three of you read the book, "Perestroika"?

Reverend Coffin. Yes.

The Chairman. What was your reaction to it, Reverend Coffin?

Reverend Coffin. Well, it was interesting. It was good. I wish him well.

The Chairman. Did you come to the same conclusion that I did, that he must have written it himself because it is rather poorly written, sort of a stream of consciousness writing, with no professional overview?

Reverend Coffin. It did look as if an editor at Harper & Row could have helped him.

The Chairman. Yes. But I felt it was his own book, with his leapfrog backward to Lenin, and then building up on Lenin, with virtually no reference to Marx and very few to Stalin. It was Lenin, Lenin, Lenin, Lenin, right down the line.

That is my only question for the moment.

Senator Adams.

Senator Adams. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I particularly wanted to be here this morning because the panel represents three organizations for whom I have a great deal of respect.

I happen to agree with your position also that the treaty should be ratified without amendment or reservation, and I think it will be very difficult to move this treaty rapidly. So, I hope we will have your assistance.

Reverend Coffin, I have read "Perestroika," and would ask you this.

Do you think that he is trying to create the Lenin new economic plan in order to have a base among both the bureaucracy and to a degree the intellectual portion of the Soviet Union?

Reverend COFFIN. I think the Soviets are very much like the Roman Catholic Church. When they make changes, they have to say, "As we have always taught." And so, it is imperative for him to root his changes in some kind of real, solid Marxist tradition.

But I think it shows that Marxism is today about as pluralistic as Christianity.

Senator ADAMS. The three of you represent groups that might be thought—as the chairman's questions indicated, that one of the concerns that we both share stresses the belief that there should be linkage.

It is my understanding from the testimony of the three of you that you all believe that this treaty should be left in its form and that we should not attempt linkage through category 1 or category 2 reservations which require renegotiation with the Soviets.

Is that correct?

Ms. NEUMAN. That is correct.

Senator ADAMS. Reverend Coffin.

Reverend COFFIN. My only concern, which I know you share, is what about that ABM Treaty of 1972. But I think, as I listen to the Soviets, they are counting on the treaty being ratified, and then they are counting on the Congress to hold the line, the Nunn line, let's say, on the ABM 1972 Treaty.

That is what I would hope would happen, too. That would be the only place where I could see any point in linkage.

But, basically, I don't like the idea of linkage.

Senator ADAMS. Mr. Joyce.

Mr. JOYCE. We would not favor any linkage of the treaty with any other issue.

We would hope, however, that recognition would be given to the change in the equation that would take place if and when the INF is adopted and implemented.

We are concerned about the very large imbalance that exists in conventional forces. We recognize that there are qualitative distinctions that certainly would not require us to be thinking of matching anybody, man for man or tank for tank.

There is still such a disproportionate strength in the conventional area that we think it would be imperative that that be addressed.

We would not like to see that linked to the treaty itself. We would rather rely on the good commonsense of national leaders to address that as a separate, but important, item.

The CHAIRMAN. What was that quality of the national leaders?

Mr. JOYCE. Good commonsense.

Senator ADAMS. Thank you all very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank all of you very much, indeed, for being with us.

Is there any valedictory statement that any of you would like to make?

Reverend COFFIN. I think at some point that we may need a longer historical view to establish things. I really think it important to recognize, if true, that we got this treaty not by staying the course, as Secretary Shultz says, but when we began to show some wisdom in restraint. That gave the Soviets the idea that now would be the time for an initiative because there is a recognition on the other side.

They do not want, as I said, to play the role of a supplicant to deaf people. I can remember years ago saying to Milstein, to General Milstein, why don't you just unilaterally remove your SS-20's? You don't need them. They don't belong there. It was a great mistake to put them there in the first place, and then we could have a good chance of not putting in the Pershing II's and the Cruise missiles.

His response was kind of heartbreaking. He said, "I know exactly what you mean, but your Government would take it as a sign of weakness."

So, when they saw over here not a sign of weakness but wisdom and restraint, then they began to respond.

I think that is a very important thing to show, if the record can show it, that this is what led to this kind of treaty, because that may be a clue as to what kind of treaties we can anticipate in the future—if we continue showing the wisdom of restraint.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Ms. NEUMAN. We would not like to see this INF Treaty used as a smokescreen for future violations of any previously agreed to treaties, such as the ABM, or a means of stopping future negotiations in strategic arms.

I have seen people on television proclaiming that somehow there will be no nuclear weapons after this treaty is ratified. That is very misleading.

We do see it as a beginning, as a start.

The CHAIRMAN. As a step. The elevator is stopping, and this brings it down a tiny bit, but not very much. Yet it is in the right direction.

Ms. NEUMAN. We appreciate your convening this hearing and listening to the citizen's point of view. We think that it is the citizen's right and responsibility to discuss these issues and to educate the public. Most of the time, the discussions are in acronyms and jargon that the average citizen cannot understand. Your first panel was talking about the importance of education, to keep us from dictatorship and other nefarious things.

So, we really appreciate being here.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, indeed.

Reverend COFFIN. I pledge to you, Senator Adams, as well as to you, Senator Pell, that we will knock ourselves out to get all the support that you deserve to get this INF Treaty passed.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much, Mr. Joyce, Reverend Coffin, and Ms. Neuman very much.

The committee——

Voice From the Floor. Mr. Chairman, before you adjourn, may I address you?

The **Chairman**. No. The committee is now recessed.

If there is a document or something you would care to leave with us, Madam, we would be glad to accept it. If you have a document that you would like us to have, please leave it with us and we would be glad to read it.

Voice From the Floor. I don't have a document. I did submit one, but I don't have one.

The **Chairman**. Thank you.

I will chat with you afterward.

The hearing is recessed until 2 o'clock this afternoon, when we will have some more citizen witnesses.

[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m.; the same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The committee met at 2 p.m., in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Claiborne Pell (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Pell, Cranston, Kerry, Adams, Helms, Boschwitz, and Pressler.

The **Chairman**. The Committee on Foreign Relations will come to order.

Our first panel today of public witnesses consists of: Mr. Jerome Grossman, president of the Council for a Livable World; Ms. Anne Cahn, director of the Committee for National Security; Dr. Edward Teller, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; Mr. Burt Pines, senior vice president and director of research, Heritage Foundation.

And we would start out initially with Mr. Grossman, an old friend of the committee and certainly mine. And I think Senator Kerry would like to introduce you.

Senator **Kerry**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I welcome all the members of this panel, a distinguished panel. But if the other members would forgive me, I would just like to say for the record that Jerome Grossman is not only an old friend that I have known, I think, for about 19 years now; he has made enormous contributions to the politics and the political dialog of our State and of the country, and I am delighted to welcome him here.

He really has been a force in the arms control effort and movement and has made many different contributions over the course of those 19 years to new thoughts about arms control. And he really does come here as an expert, and I am delighted to welcome him today.

The **Chairman**. Thank you, Senator Kerry.

Mr. Grossman, if you would proceed. And as I mentioned to the witnesses, if they could restrict their testimony to about 10 minutes, and the full statement will appear in the record in full, and that will give us time to ask questions, which we would like to do.

Mr. Grossman.

STATEMENT OF JEROME GROSSMAN, PRESIDENT, COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD

Mr. Grossman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you particularly, Senator Kerry. It has been a pleasure to work with you over the years. I appreciate your kind words.

The President has forwarded to the Senate for its advice and consent the treaty on the Elimination of United States and Soviet Intermediate-Range and Shorter Range Missiles. Council for a Livable World, one of the Nation's oldest and largest organizations specializing in nuclear arms control, endorses the INF Treaty with enthusiasm.

It is a remarkable achievement, which should be approved by the Senate without amendment. All humanity is grateful that the superpowers are finally beginning to meet their responsibility to reduce their nuclear arsenals, a responsibility spelled out in a number of treaties, including the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in which, 20 years ago, the United States and the Soviet Union declared their "intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament."

Although the INF Treaty is militarily modest, reducing nuclear arsenals by only 4 percent, it is politically potent because it expresses the worldwide public opinion that the nuclear arms race is a clear and pressing danger to the human race.

The treaty is politically potent because it opens the way to a series of superpower agreements which could end the nuclear arms race:

First, a 50-percent reduction in strategic nuclear weapons is most desirable. So excessive is the nuclear overkill that American and Soviet arsenals can be drastically reduced without risking security.

Political, military, and psychological wisdom strongly points toward the reduction. The time appears propitious on both sides. The reduction would dispose of unneeded weapons and be militarily stabilizing. It would be a major step in reversing the arms race because it would transform our relationship with the Soviets.

Second, an end to all nuclear testing can and should be negotiated. The technology exists for effective verification. A comprehensive test ban would forestall the development of new generations of nuclear weapons and help stabilize the superpower relationship. It would help control proliferation and the potential danger of nuclear terrorism.

Third, production of all weapons-grade fissionable materials should stop. Senator Helms has raised an important issue by calling for the destruction of nuclear warheads, and particularly the nuclear fissionable material. Although we do not believe his suggestion is appropriate for this treaty, we call upon Senator Helms to join us in urging all nuclear powers to end production of all weapons-grade fissionable material.

We have more than we can use now and there is no point in producing more when we propose to reduce, not increase, the number of nuclear weapons.

Fourth, all battlefield nuclear weapons should be eliminated. The INF Treaty does not eliminate nuclear weapons with a range up to 500 kilometers. This third zero is necessary to prevent battlefield officers from turning a conventional conflict into nuclear war. On this issue, we agree with our German allies, who dread local use of such weapons.

Furthermore, it makes no sense to deploy a new generation of Lance missiles and nuclear artillery shells when we should be moving in the opposite direction.

Last, nuclear arsenals should be reduced to minimum deterrent levels. At the Washington summit, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev said: "A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." If this is so, we should not prepare for it.

Both sides should reduce to a minimum deterrent, to minimize the dangers of war by accident, unauthorized use, or miscalculation. A minimum deterrent would reduce the capability of either side to launch a crippling first strike.

The precedent-setting verification and compliance provisions of the INF Treaty, which clearly protect the national interest, will make these future landmark agreements possible, regardless of who is in the White House.

It is appropriate at this time to give credit where it is due for this breakthrough. President Reagan made the original creative suggestion for the zero-zero solution in 1981.

General Secretary Gorbachev made concession after concession to satisfy our perception of our security needs. But the unsung heroes are in the worldwide peace movement, which brought world attention to the awful dangers of nuclear war.

In the United States alone, there are 8,000 peace groups in 50 States—a mighty rise from 1,000 in 1980. These peace groups stimulated grassroots pressure on the House of Representatives and the Senate, pressure which helped to bring about a remarkable series of congressional actions on nuclear arms control.

Arms control is no longer the monopoly of the executive branch. Many Senators from both parties played important roles in the political and educational process, and we salute them.

In celebrating the INF accord, we should remember that there have been other hopeful beginnings in previous administrations which did not develop beyond single agreements. Nearly every administration since World War Two has tried to make a fresh start in nuclear arms control. Each new President has wanted to put his stamp on the process.

In the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations, we lurched from détente to paroxysms of anti-Soviet rhetoric and self-defeating policies. We must break out of this cycle.

An important new factor is the superpowers' economic condition. Military strength must be balanced against the needs of the economy that sustains it. The economies of the United States and the U.S.S.R. have declined dramatically in relation to their competitors and even in absolute terms.

Military spending excesses must stop. Preparations for war have cost the United States $2 trillion since 1981, $21,000 for each American household. Preparations for nuclear war have cost $427 billion; for conventional war in Europe, $736 billion; for conventional war in Asia and the Persian Gulf, $588 billion.

The money seems to disappear down an enormous sinkhole, with little evidence of increased military security. An insolvent economy will dissolve national strength. If America continues the arms race with the Soviet Union, Japan will win.

Today public opinion tends to define "national strength" as ultimately based on economic potency, and the superpowers are both broke, if not in debt.

We urge all Senators not to use the INF Treaty as a vehicle to address other arms control issues, United States-Soviet differences, or military budget considerations. Amendments, no matter how well intentioned, are likely to disrupt the ratification process.

Ratification itself, a complex and difficult process, ought to be our prime consideration. Arms control opponents are working hard to obstruct the INF Treaty and to derail any hope of completing a START Treaty in 1988. If the treaty is not ratified or if it is weakened by amendments, prospects for future arms control will be bleak.

We view INF as a first step toward far-reaching reductions on nuclear arms and agreements to prevent a new arms race in space and to reduce conventional weapons in Europe.

We hope you will also support these goals and will find appropriate legislative vehicles to further them, but we urge you not to do so through amendments or reservations to the INF Treaty.

We urge you to help build a bipartisan majority to resist amendments and to support further agreements made possible by the Reagan-Gorbachev initiative. Once INF is ratified, the Reagan administration may be able to conclude a START agreement with the Soviet Union, perhaps by the time the spring summit is held in Moscow.

We urge the Foreign Relations Committee and the entire Senate to consider a START Treaty this year. Even though there are only a few months left in the congressional session, even though this is the last year of the Reagan administration and the November elections are fast approaching, the processes of Government should continue and the Senate should give the most prompt consideration to a START Treaty.

By far the most significant aspect of the INF Treaty is the revival of hope, hope that our species is not condemned to self-destruct. We have a moral and ethical responsibility to ourselves and to the planet to preserve life.

We refuse to accept the inevitability of nuclear war. We are morally outraged that our species, carrying its divine spark of consciousness, is threatened by its own perverse actions. But a species capable of producing William Shakespeare, Leonardo da Vinci, Albert Einstein, and, yes, Larry Bird, must find a way to save itself.

What humanity hath wrought, humanity can undo. And the INF Treaty may be the first step in the undoing.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Grossman may be found in the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much indeed, Mr. Grossman.

Next we will hear from Ms. Anne Cahn, director of the Committee for National Security. Ms. Cahn.

STATEMENT OF ANNE H. CAHN, DIRECTOR, THE COMMITTEE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

Dr. CAHN. Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in support of ratification of the INF Treaty. I am the director of the Committee for National Security, which is a nonprofit public education group that strives to build an informed constituency for sound national security policies.

Our committee is made up of 130 prominent citizens, including former senior Government officials, scientists, and business leaders. Equally important, our programs outside of Washington bring us into frequent contact with hundreds of civic leaders around the country. Many have expressed their approval of this treaty, and we feel our testimony also reflects their sentiments.

The INF Treaty appears to be a very good deal. The Soviets will dismantle over 3,000 deployed and nondeployed weapons of intermediate and shorter range that have been in the Soviet arsenal for the last 30 years. The United States removes about 860 deployed and nondeployed intermediate-range weapons of a type that NATO has had in place since 1983.

In essence, what do we get? The elimination of a longstanding Soviet monopoly in intermediate range weapons that pose a unique threat to Europe.

And what do we give up? A few hundred warheads aimed at targets redundantly covered by our 12,000 strategic warheads.

I believe the military importance of the INF agreement should not be overestimated. The treaty eliminates 2,000 nuclear warheads, but the United States and the Soviet Union together deploy about 25,000 warheads on long-range strategic delivery vehicles, and the military advantages will be wiped out by the Soviet buildup that could take place if SDI is deployed or START not completed.

Thus, the treaty's primary value is political. By agreeing to the dual-track decision in 1979 and following through on both its tracks, deployments and negotiations, NATO passed its severest test in many years. The United States proved its leadership by addressing alliance and Japanese concerns, and a useful basis has been laid for a healthier United States-Soviet relationship.

The significance of these gains should not be underestimated. Ratification would indeed be a political plus, but failure to ratify would be more than a political minus. It would hold up START, disastrously undermine relations with our allies, sour the United States-Soviet dialog on other issues, and throw us into an arms control dark age.

Senators contemplating category 3 amendments, those that require renegotiation with the Soviet Union, should understand that a revision would cost the United States more than it would gain.

Beyond its military and political value, the INF Treaty sets some useful precedents for the arms control process. We can point to four:

First, the exclusion of French and British systems from the negotiations removes a nagging issue that has dogged United States-Soviet negotiations since SALT I.

Second, from the start of the INF discussions the administration properly insisted that the Soviets could not be permitted to reduce weapons in Europe by shifting deployments to another theater. Thus, the treaty does not benefit the British at the expense of the Japanese. We should keep future agreements equally free of regional loopholes.

Third, the INF Treaty establishes an important precedent for a verification regime that includes onsite inspections. This is not completely new, of course. During the Carter administration the Soviets had agreed in principle to such inspections for a comprehensive test ban. Also the Stockholm agreement which entered into force in 1987 includes provisions for onsite observation of troop maneuvers by inspectors from East and West.

However, the INF Treaty establishes a far more extensive onsite inspection regime than was ever before contemplated.

Last but not least is the INF Treaty's disarmament precedent—the elimination of an entire class of weapons. This is frankly the most novel and far-reaching aspect of the accord. It probably cannot be duplicated with any of the systems under consideration at this stage in START, but it should not be dropped from the memory bank when future administrations shape their arms control strategies.

We are more skeptical, however, about the value of some of the precedents that the administration often cites. First is the lesson that persistence or hanging tough produced a favorable INF accord. Administration officials would have us believe that all we have to do is to say "No" to get the Soviets to say "Yes."

In fact, the United States also needs the courage to say "Yes." In START, unfortunately, we see little such willingness to compromise. The American negotiating position is that the Soviet Union should accept deep cuts in its strategic offensive forces, while the United States has a free hand to proceed with testing and even early deployment of a space-based strategic defense.

While the Soviets might temporarily go along with an ambiguous compromise on strategic defense, we would err to presume that the Soviets will accept a permanent arrangement that they regard as inconsistent with their most basic security concerns.

Second, we would warn against the temptation to point to the onsite inspection procedures of the INF Treaty as a precedent for a more extensive anytime, anywhere regime for START verification. While onsite inspection has political appeal and can serve certain specific uses, it is not a panacea for our justifiable nervousness about potential Soviet cheating.

Even with the elaborate layers of baseline, portal closeout, elimination, and short notice inspections included in the INF Treaty, the verification regime is not foolproof, as Secretary of State Shultz has acknowledged. General Welch, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, testified there are obviously areas of some uncertainty.

We cannot guarantee that small numbers of missiles will not be concealed. Nevertheless, the administration has concluded that the treaty is effectively verifiable. As General Welch told your committee on February 4, even if the Soviets were to attempt to cheat, the United States could catch them before such cheating would pose a significant military threat.

This is a perfectly acceptable standard for verification in the view of the Committee for National Security, but it does not constitute the effective verification regime demanded by hardliners in the Reagan administration. Welch's standard is precisely the one established by previous administrations for adequate verification, that required that "any Soviet cheating which would pose a significant military risk or affect the strategic balance would be detected by our intelligence in time for the United States to respond effectively."

We expect no less from a START Treaty.

Up to now, we have discussed the political, military, and arms control implications of the INF Treaty. But the considerable accomplishments of that accord will be futile in the absence of limits or reductions in strategic offensive weaponry.

Therefore, let me say a word about next steps in arms control. A year ago, CNS offered a proposal to break the current strategic arms deadlock. The key to such an agreement lies in constraining the President's strategic defense initiative in return for reductions in strategic offensive forces.

One approach would be to promise continued adherence to the ABM Treaty for at least a certain period of time. The major problem is to define adherence to the treaty, however, and not merely to settle on an appropriate number of years for guaranteed non-withdrawal.

The Reagan administration's October 1985 reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty is inconsistent with the letter and the intent of the treaty. The United States must return to the correct traditional interpretation.

The United States and the Soviet Union must work out specific agreements on the application of treaty terms to SDI-related technologies. This is possible.

The ABM Treaty prohibits testing and development of space-based components of an ABM system at the point where it can be verified that an ABM capability has been demonstrated. The United States and the Soviet Union should be able to agree on verifiable criteria that clearly distinguish between permitted testing on non-ABM capable devices in space and prohibited testing of ABM capable devices.

This clarification would allow the United States to go ahead with virtually all of the experimentation needed to assess the potential of critical SDI technologies, while assuring the Soviets that the United States was not achieving the ability to deploy space-based defenses without a further lengthy period of weapons development.

In conclusion, I would say the jury is still out on the Reagan administration's arms control record. The administration will either be remembered as the first to negotiate deep meaningful cuts in strategic weapons or as the worst squanderer of historic opportunity.

The conclusion of the INF Treaty brings the President back to a longstanding bipartisan tradition, the primacy of arms control in United States-Soviet relations.

The new leadership in the Soviet Union presents us with a perplexing new openness that we have not fully appreciated or acknowledged. Americans have become so accustomed to cold war sentiment that it is hard to conceive of a mature, pragmatic United States-Soviet relationship that encompasses a broad agenda of political, economic, and other issues. But that is just what the new Soviet leadership offers us.

Consider General Secretary Gorbachev's statement to his 1986 Party Congress: "We can never be secure while the United States feels itself insecure."

An objective assessment of the other side's sense of security has long been the missing element in our national security planning. It was certainly missing when the Reagan administration unilaterally decided to exceed the SALT II limits, pursue a space-based defense against strategic weapons, and continue nuclear testing in the face of a Soviet moratorium.

It is time for a good measure of new thinking on our side as well. Let us open this window of opportunity as far as it will go.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Cahn may be found in the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Ms. Cahn.

We are privileged to have here with us today Dr. Edward Teller. Welcome.

STATEMENT OF DR. EDWARD TELLER, LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY AND HOOVER INSTITUTION, STANFORD

Dr. TELLER. Mr. Chairman, I am deeply grateful for the opportunity to appear here to talk about an extremely important topic, the ratification of the INF Treaty.

Let me start out with a simple unqualified statement: I hope that the INF Treaty will be ratified. I also am very much aware of the importance of what is said during the ratification procedure, and I am even more aware of the importance to the START negotiations of everything said and done here.

I have made a number of somewhat detailed remarks, in my prepared statement. I will confine my comments here to a few absolutely essential topics that I believe may not have received sufficiently clear emphasis.

The first of those is something that we just have heard about. I would like to emphasize it in full measure: The need for an American bipartisan policy in regard to preventing war. To enter negotiations with a sophisticated opponent, an opponent who must not be underestimated, in any other way than with a mutual and strong agreement about our aims and about overall strategy, is apt to lead to difficulties in the future. Such lack of agreement has led to difficulties in the past.

We must have agreement as to what we want. What that agreement should be is much too difficult a question to settle in a few minutes. But the general direction of my ideas is that I would like to see a bipartisan policy that involved agreements on arms control and arms reduction and at the same time included well-conceived, rational defense. To my mind and to the minds of a number of people who have worked on it diligently in the recent past, the strategic defense initiative provides that kind of defense.

If there is arms reduction, that makes defense easier. If there is strategic defense, that makes circumvention of the treaties less meaningful. The one and the other can and should reinforce each other. At the same time, one must not exclude other possibilities. To my mind, the effectiveness of either approach can be greatly improved by supporting both approaches.

The strategic defense initiative, as seen by those who actually are working on it and by a few like me who have been working on it not 4 or 5 years but 30, means not only defense, but international cooperation on defense, not only some improvement but real stability.

Those approaches are old ideas. Both were embraced and wonderfully advocated by the great President of our country. He has advocated both defense and arms reduction. That was an obvious reasonable step, though possibly not the only one, toward a bipartisan policy. It is this bipartisan policy that I advocate, so that Soviet leaders should not have the opportunity to play some Americans against other Americans.

In order to solve the problems of stability, bipartisan policy is needed. But even that may not be enough. A past great effort toward bipartisan foreign policy resulted in the Atlantic alliance, and that of course is the great element of stability that made the world on the whole a peaceful place for the middle of this 20th century.

The maintenance of the Atlantic alliance, the resistance against any forces that might disrupt that alliance, seems to me an equally important requisite. I am therefore very hopeful that in pursuing START we keep our NATO allies and our other friends, such as the Japanese, informed at each step. We should be able to proceed in such a way that there can be no question of disunity in the free world when the next treaty comes to ratification.

There is a last point, a technical point to which I claim I have a technical answer. The strategic defense initiative, which appears to be concerned with missile defense and defense against nuclear aggression, is in reality more than all of that. It is defense, by means of the best advanced technology, directed toward stability rather than mass destruction. This can be and is being done. That defense, which covers all of the approaches, is what we should and must aim for.

American foreign policy has been incredibly effective, not only in creating NATO but in helping our former opponents to a new life. They now contribute to the real stability of the world. It is this spirit of reasonable bipartisan policies, including both real defense and the real reduction of aggressive arms, that I hope you will be able to promote in a very effective way by ratifying this treaty and by doing so with the right words and in the right circumstances.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Teller may be found in the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Teller.

We will now hear from Mr. Pines, the senior vice president and director of research at the Heritage Foundation.

STATEMENT OF BURT PINES, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION

Mr. PINES. Chairman Pell, thank you very much. Ranking Member Helms, thank you very much. I appreciate this opportunity to comment today on the proposed United States-Soviet INF Treaty.

As negotiated and as signed, I believe the treaty is seriously flawed. Now, a great number of witnesses before this committee already have explained INF's military flaws. I intend to focus on its political flaws, how it aids the Soviet Union and how it threatens our ties with our NATO allies.

The first of these political problems is the strong possibility that ratification of this treaty could bring the euphoria which ignites a new spirit of détente. I fear that this could blind us to the dangers that still lurk in the world.

Despite Gorbachev's soothing rhetoric, there has been no evidence so far that Moscow has changed any of its foreign policy or strategic aims. Tactics differ strikingly, but the goals remain the same: To drive a wedge between the United States and NATO's European members, to denuclearize Europe, to neutralize Germany, and as a result to dissolve NATO.

We must remember that the spirit of INF and the spirit of glasnost is not the Kremlin's first peace offensive, it is not the Kremlin's first new look, not the first united front, not the first thaw, not the first spirit of Rapallo, not the first spirit of Geneva, not the first spirit of Camp David.

The second political problem with INF is that removing intermediate-range nuclear weapons from Western European soil would also remove one of the most important concrete links coupling the security of the United States with that of Western Europe.

Without those missiles in Western Europe, it is said by many West Europeans that America's pledge to defend its NATO allies would be less credible. Decoupling, as it is sometimes known, decoupling is indeed a primordial fear of many West Europeans.

The Pershings and Cruises, of course, were not deployed specifically to couple U.S. security tighter to Western Europe's. Deployment was to offset the Soviet SS–20's. Yet the unintended beneficial result of deployment was to link more tightly together both sides of the Atlantic.

Moscow understands this. NATO commanders understand this. For some reason, Washington apparently does not. In this sense, Moscow's deployment of its SS–20 was an enormous blunder, because it brought American INF bases to Europe. It is a blunder, however, from which the Soviets could recover because of this treaty.

Well, is this so bad? After all, the INF agreement simply restores the European nuclear balance to the status quo ante, the situation of 1979, and we were pretty satisfied, after all, with the 1979 balance of theater nuclear forces.

Well, it is bad for two reasons: First, even though it was somewhat inadvertent, the result of sending intermediate-range U.S. missiles to Europe has given NATO commanders added flexibility, thus strengthening the alliance militarily. Withdrawing the missiles therefore weakens the alliance, and there is no way we can avoid that fact.

Second, history cannot be erased. We cannot pretend that we can return to 1979 as if intervening events never occurred. Although removing INF from Europe leaves the United States coupled as tightly to Western Europe as it was before 1979, it is not as tight as it is right now with the Pershings and Cruises in place.

Psychologically, therefore, it is a serious mistake to pull the missiles out. The West Europeans will be justified in feeling that the United States is pulling away from them a bit.

Now, this I believe is the reality of the present situation. How do we deal with it? Let me offer a few observations.

One, if INF cannot be renegotiated and if ratification by the Senate is inevitable, then we must assure that the ratification process carefully scrutinizes the emerging United States-Soviet relationship.

These hearings, Mr. Chairman, other Senate hearings, and those in the House must define the limits and dangers of this United States-Soviet relationship. By these hearings, we must make certain that we know to what we are agreeing, why we are agreeing to it, and what we expect from ourselves and from the Soviets.

We must not permit ourselves to repeat the mistake of the hurried ratification which characterized SALT I, which in its wake, as we all know too painfully, left serious ambiguities.

And these hearings must educate the U.S. public about the fundamental issues raised by INF and INF's effect on the American commitment to NATO's defense. Just as the public learned from two congressional hearings in the past year an enormous amount about Robert Bork and about administration policy toward the Contras, so the public should learn about the nature of the U.S. commitment to NATO and the threats which NATO faces.

The main point of these hearings should be to educate the American public, to signal Moscow, and to reassure NATO that America understands the dangers inherent in the new superpower dynamic, and that the United States will not abandon NATO.

Second, we should recognize that, despite the flaws with INF and despite the haste in concluding the agreement, the United States deserves credit for bringing Gorbachev to the negotiating table.

Deployment of the Pershing II missiles and the Cruise missiles probably took Moscow by surprise. Soviet ability to block the neutron bomb in the mid-1970's surely gave the Kremlin confidence that it could veto major Western weapons decisions.

Moscow must have been surprised, too, by Ronald Reagan's success at winning support for the modernization of the United States arsenal, building the B-1 bomber, the MX missile, the 600-ship Navy.

The lesson in this is clear: We can deal with Moscow, but only if we deal with Moscow from strength.

Third, the United States must work on finding ways to strengthen United States-NATO ties, to prevent the appearance of decoupling. To compensate for the eventual withdrawal of INF systems from Western Europe, we should begin taking, as NATO commander John Galvin urges, "buttressing measures."

This means modernization of the 3,250 nuclear artillery shells, gravity bombs, and other tactical weapons which remain in NATO and are allowed to remain in NATO. Other compensatory measures include assigning U.S.-based bombers armed with air-launched Cruise missiles to NATO, deploying nuclear sea-launched Cruise missiles in NATO waters, and assigning additional ballistic missile submarines to NATO.

To coordinate our efforts with NATO in the wake of the INF agreement, the United States should call for a NATO summit. Atop the agenda should be a discussion of how the alliance can offset the loss of INF through improvements in conventional forces and through nuclear arms permitted by the accord.

To signal further its commitment to NATO, Congress should abandon any attempts to restrict allied participation in the strategic defense initiative. Congress, for example, should reject proposals to restrict the foreign role in the SDI program entirely to projects which cannot be filled by U.S. firms. Rather, a broad allied role in SDI should be encouraged.

Fourth, we must devise a political structure and a political strategy to accompany INF. We must ensure that the Soviet Union is viewed in perspective. This means that we must describe to our countrymen how the U.S.S.R. remains a military threat to the United States to the West, and Third World countries.

We must explain that Gorbachev is not the first Soviet leader to sing seductively of freedom and peaceful coexistence. We must expose Soviet disinformation efforts vigorously, to demonstrate to Americans and West Europeans that the Soviets, despite their sweeter rhetoric, remain on the ideological offensive.

We must expose more vigorously than we have in the past Soviet violations of its treaty promises. If we continue to be reluctant to do so, we cannot expect Americans or West Europeans to be realistic in their assessment of Soviet promises in the future.

We must insist on strict linkage between Soviet strategic agreements and improved Soviet behavior in selected areas, such as improved human rights inside the Soviet Union or reduced Soviet support of terrorists or an end to Moscow's troublemaking in the Third World.

And we must speak often and speak publicly about the enormous problems involved in conventional force reduction. It is not easy to reduce conventional forces. Policymakers, the press, the public, must understand the situation sufficiently not to be fooled, for instance, by a Soviet offer to withdraw Soviet troops from Eastern Europe in exchange for an American pullout from Western Europe.

We must devise a litmus test by which Moscow can prove that there really is a Soviet new reality. We can echo, for instance, Ronald Reagan's call for Gorbachev to tear down the Berlin Wall, or that there be a public repudiation of the Brezhnev doctrine, or that a definite timetable be announced for Soviet troop withdrawals from Afghanistan and that troops begin withdrawing.

To sum up, Mr. Chairman, the events of the past year or so that culminated in the INF Treaty pose a new challenge to NATO. It is a major challenge. To assure that the alliance will survive intact, a number of military measures are needed.

As important, a political strategy and deft tactics are needed to ensure that INF does not launch us on another détente joyride and to ensure that INF does not weaken NATO.

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pines may be found in the appendix.]

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much, Mr. Pines.

In your testimony just a couple of minutes ago, you said we must insist on strict linkage between the Soviet's strategic agreements and improved behavior in selected areas.

The question I would like to ask you is, If certain arms control issues or measures are in our national security interest, why should we link them to other issues when we may lose them?

Mr. **Pines**. Because, Mr. Chairman, we are not talking simply about a narrow national interest. We are talking about our relationship with the Soviet Union. And just as Dr. Teller said, SDI really means defense, period.

We cannot trust the Soviet Union to live by any of its agreements until the Soviet Union demonstrates it can trust its own people. We cannot trust the Soviet Union to abide by what it promises us unless the Soviet Union will abide by what it has promised its own people.

We know that nothing we can do with the Soviets can be 100-percent verifiable. Therefore, we have to rely on the Soviet Union to a certain extent.

What the Soviet Union does in human rights gives us strong signals whether or not it is a trustworthy member of the human community or not a trustworthy member.

The **Chairman**. That was not my question. My question was why link two extraneous things together? If we can achieve progress in arms control, is that not good in itself?

Mr. **Pines**. It is good in itself if we can be certain of verification. But since verification requires trust, we have to link that with whether or not we trust the Soviet Union. How the Soviet Union behaves in the world depends on that trust.

If the Soviet Union agrees, as they have just a couple of months ago, to sign an INF agreement with us and almost at the very same time Soviet radio is telling its people the United States Army laboratory deliberately has invented AIDS to spread through the Third World, should we trust them? Can we trust them to live up to their treaties while, when they are signing treaties with us, they are spreading lies about us?

I think it all holds together, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. I think both sides have been guilty of certain hyperbole of words. But I come back to my basic point, if any of the others would care to answer it: Do you think there should be linkage or do you think this treaty should stand on its own feet?

What would be your view, Dr. Teller?

Dr. **Teller**. Mr. Chairman, you know and I know and all of us know that there is linkage. What people do in one area is not independent of what they are doing in another area. Individually, we are probably looking at these linkages in different ways.

I was born in Hungary. I mention this not to lend substance to my words, but perhaps even to detract from them. I may be prejudiced because of the sad experience Hungarians have had over the centuries with Russia.

The linkages are realities. They exist. The linkage manifested itself in SALT II, where an attack on Afghanistan prevented ratification.

Of course there is linkage. I for one—rightly or wrongly, having looked at these questions as a scientist, as a man who has come from Eastern Europe, as a man who has vigorously participated in American preparedness and thereby in American foreign policy for the last half century—have with lots of hesitation come to the conclusion that we should not trust glasnost. We should behave in a limited and cautious manner as though we trusted it. We should try to do that.

Maybe my way of looking at linkage is wrong. Maybe one of the opposite ways is right. But the linkage is there, and we will not and we cannot throw away part of our experience in order to bolster one or the other prejudices.

My personal approach, as I tried to explain to you, is careful, doubtful, but yet positive: Try to find the various elements in agreement and in defensive preparedness that will make the horrible repetition of a world war as unlikely as ever possible.

The CHAIRMAN. As President Reagan said, "trust but verify."

Mrs. Cahn.

Dr. CAHN. It seems to me arms control agreements are not something we should give to the Soviet Union when they behave in a way that we like, or that we should take away when they behave in a way that we do not like.

It seems to me there is only one reason for the United States to engage in an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union or with any other country, and that is if it is in our best national security interest to do so.

I think that the INF agreement is in our best interest, and therefore we ought to conclude it.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you,

Mr. Grossman.

Mr. GROSSMAN. I do not think there is any doubt that Dr. Teller is right when he says that the relationships between individuals and countries are linked in a whole variety of ways, but I do not think that that contributes very much to our answer.

What we try to do is to sort out those points of conflict and those areas in which we both have a common interest, and those areas of conflict which are susceptible to solution. And that is the reason why I can be for the INF Treaty while keeping in mind the great differences on a great many issues between the East and the West.

So, the fact that we have many deep differences with the Soviet Union does not preclude our settling certain superinterests which involve the great powers such as our mutual interest in preventing nuclear war. I would like to emphasize that I do not trust the Soviets with nuclear weapons. I do not trust anybody with nuclear weapons. I do not trust the United States, England, France, no way. So, trust is not a factor here.

What is involved, as Dr. Cahn said, is establishing a system that will enhance our mutual security. Trust is not an element in my thinking.

Mr. PINES. Mr. Chairman, if I could add one thing about linkage.

You know, I think one of the real glories of the United States is in fact we have always had a wide, broad perspective, and we have stood for something. We have stood for linkage.

We have heard over and over in the past couple years in the Senate and House that our policy toward southern Africa is based on linkage. Although it may be in the United States interest to trade with South Africa, we are told we should not trade in South Africa, in fact, unless South Africa does something regarding its internal policies. We have established linkage.

We are told although it is in United States interest to maintain a very strong regime in South Korea, we are told that we must push South Korea toward internal reforms. That is linkage.

I think that the United States has always stood for a kind of linkage, and it should certainly apply to the Soviet Union more than to any other nation. Just for the record, I do trust the United States with nuclear weapons. I am sorry Mr. Grossman does not.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

My time has expired.

Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Dr. Teller, it is always an honor to have you appear before Members of Congress, and especially this committee. I enjoyed our chat on the telephone the other day, and I hope your arm is mending satisfactorily.

Dr. TELLER. My arm is mending much more than other parts of my body. I hope my brain can keep up with it.

Senator HELMS. Well, your brain is keeping up just fine. Yes, sir.

But we welcome you here, and I am sure all of us listened with interest to your statement which was, not your prepared statement, but very similar to it except the prepared statement contained even more detail, and I want to emphasize that your prepared statement, along with your extemporaneous statement, will be a part of the record, and I hope that it will be made available to all Senators, and I know it will.

Dr. Teller, you made clear that the INF Treaty needs for the SDI to be developed and tested before the treaty becomes a meaningful document.

Is that a fair assessment?

Dr. TELLER. I believe that coupling the INF Treaty or any disarmament treaty with existing defenses, where these defenses in turn should be international, this is a kind of fabric which I not only trust, but I can hope can be brought into a state where all of us, independent of party affiliation, independent of approach, can trust it so that we can act together.

Yes, I believe that treaties alone will not be much more valuable than nonaggression pacts. But treaties and a technical backup will be really effective.

Senator HELMS. Thank you very much.

Obviously agreeing with you about the strategic defense initiative, we both feel that a shield is better than a sword.

Now, let's have a hypothetical case. If the SDI cannot be developed and tested in the near term because of technical or budgetary reasons or political reasons or actions with the Congress, what would you then recommend with respect to the ratification of the INF treaty?

Dr. TELLER. I believe, in fact, I know that SDI will not be delayed or held up for technical reasons. I know that the technical possibilities are there in a concrete and realistic form. I do not think that a budget item that is little more than 1 percent of our military expenditures is impossible from a budgetary point of view. It may be that some politicians will want to hold up SDI for reasons that I never could fully understand. I cannot believe that the American people want to delay SDI. I believe the political reasons to stop SDI will not be supported by the forthcoming elections. And therefore, I do not see how we can be maneuvered into a position where SDI will be delayed.

There are very real indications that the Soviets are now creating a defensive shield of their own. If unilaterally we decide that, while the Soviets defend their people, we do not defend our allies and our people—if we want to enter into that insane regime—then rejection or ratification of INF will not matter.

Senator HELMS. Thank you.

One other thing that is developing or appears to be developing is the argument and the debate in the Senate about the so-called broad versus the so-called narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty and its consequences for SDI.

Of course, all of that has to do with SDI, as you know.

Now, would you favor any amendment to this treaty that would involve the Senate in the issue of this broad-versus-narrow interpretation not only, bear in mind, of this treaty but playing off onto and into the ABM Treaty?

Would you favor an amendment—do you think they ought to leave that alone?

Dr. TELLER. My father was a lawyer. I have great respect for the law. I also am somewhat familiar with the pitfalls associated with an ambiguous law or an ambiguous treaty.

I would favor any clarification, not amendment but clarification of the INF Treaty which will render it clear cut so that broad-versus-narrow interpretation will not arise.

Of course I favor an amendment which says the treaty should not enter into full force except if past treaties are respected, or at least are gaining respect. I know how difficult it is to write a treaty. I warn against any language that agrees, makes agreements about weapons or defensive instruments not yet invented. It is difficult to say something with complete clarity even when the object is known. I know what glass is, but if I were a cave man and had never seen a piece of glass, I might vote for a law against objects that can be broken and that will cut people. That would be a foolish limitation.

I am afraid that there has been much too loose language in treaties. Anything that can make the language of INF or particularly the language of START more precise, less ambiguous, is much for the better. There should be no opportunity for senseless debates between old and new interpretations ever getting started.

Senator **Helms**. Thank you very much.

Senator **Adams** [presiding]. Mr. Grossman, I want to say welcome to the committee. It is my understanding that you are in support of the treaty, and that it be ratified without amendment.

Mr. **Grossman**. I am, sir.

Senator **Adams**. Dr. Teller, I have just one question, and then I will go to my Republican colleagues.

I am Senator Adams, and I will turn it over to the chairman again in a moment.

Dr. Teller, we had Dr. Brown in to testify, former Secretary of Defense and former head of Livermore Laboratories.

Dr. Brown indicated in response to my questions, as did some of the other witnesses that an SDI can be penetrated by offensive missiles if an effort is made. He did not define the missile but said that production of offensive weapons is the cheapest and most effective way to overcome an SDI rather than to build another one.

What is your position on that?

Dr. **Teller**. Thank you for a question that to my mind is most welcome.

Harold Brown is an old friend. Harold Brown I have known as a man who can do what he promises to do. More than that, he has done in the past many things that he has definitely said are impossible; yet he did them.

Harold Brown is a man, to my mind, a little bit overly conservative. Of course, any defense can be penetrated. Of course, against any aggression there is an effective defense. Which will be more effective? We cannot know. But I welcome your question not only because it mentions an old friend, Harold Brown, but also because it gives me the opportunity to tell you that we have defensive measures underway that are really remarkable feats of simplification and miniaturization, relatively small and narrowly guided objects that I would not have believed possible 3 years ago, but that are now being created under my eyes.

We are not going to know whether defense is possible or not, and to what extent it is possible unless we try. If we now negotiate with the Soviets and come to the conclusion that we shall not try, then I believe that is the end. The Soviets will not be deterred by legal questions about narrow and broad interpretation. Therefore, we should not set foot on the slippery slope of trying to differentiate between what can be done and what cannot be done, where we put preconditions on what the results of our efforts shall be.

We must not limit research, and we must not limit initial deployments because only initial deployments will show whether that research has really led to a valid defense.

Senator **Adams**. Mr. Grossman, is it the position of your council that the beginning of deployment of SDI or defensive weapons would cause an escalation of the offensive weapons and the arms race?

Mr. **Grossman**. Oh, most definitely, and we think it would be a grave error to condition the INF Treaty with any progress or lack of progress on star wars, also called SDI, and it is our position that continued testing, any testing and any deployment of SDI would make it impossible for the INF Treaty to survive, and for future agreements also cutting down the numbers of nuclear weapons, and to our mind, therefore, enhancing American security. I think that SDI would eliminate that.

And while I am responding to your question, I would respectfully appreciate a reply, if he feels like responding, to the challenge that I laid down to Senator Helms when I praised him for his very creative suggestion, that the warheads and the fissionable material in the warheads that are not going to be destroyed by the INF Treaty, be destroyed, which is what he suggested earlier in the hearings. My challenge to him was to expand his idea, that very creative idea, and stop the production of all fissionable material, because it is clear that if we have a sufficient surplus, that we can destroy the warheads, as Senator Helms suggested, that we can destroy the warheads that we are taking away from the INF forces, and also the fissionable material, that we have plenty of that stuff, and that we do not need any more.

And I have been checking with my friends and associates at MIT and other laboratories, and they tell us that the plutonium and the tritium is coming out of our ears, and there is no need to keep producing it. And respectfully, if Senator Helms wishes to comment, I am sure the Nation would appreciate it.

Senator ADAMS. Senator, do you want to continue that on my time, or it is up to you.

Senator HELMS. Well, I suggest that we just have additional time there.

In the first place, Mr. Grossman, and I say this respectfully, I would prefer to speak for myself instead of having you interpret what I said.

Actually, what I pointed out was that the President and the Vice President and the Secretary of State all said publicly after this treaty was signed that warheads would be destroyed, and I said they would not, under the terms of the treaty, and I had a series of questions of various witnesses pointing out that no warheads will be destroyed.

I have not suggested anything about the destruction of plutonium or any other fissionable material. Others have.

It is interesting that the loudest proponents of this treaty who have appeared before this committee have declared that we have a deficiency of fissionable material. I do not know whether they are right or you are right, but let me ask you a question.

Are you in favor of nuclear power?

Mr. GROSSMAN. I take no position on nuclear power.

Senator HELMS. Well, you said——

Mr. GROSSMAN. Besides, I am talking about weapons grade fissionable material, Senator.

Senator HELMS. Well, I understand that, but I just want to know the implications of your position and the position that you suggested that I should take.

Do you want to do away with all uses of nuclear power?

Mr. GROSSMAN. No, I do not.

Senator HELMS. OK. But I have not made any suggestion. I have asked questions, and I shall continue to ask them, and I have pointed out the contradictions in the testimony by various people who are very loud in the advocacy of this treaty. This treaty, sir, is as full of holes as a piece of Swiss cheese, and the American people, thanks to C-SPAN and others, are beginning to see that it is not the model instrument that it has been portrayed as being, even here this afternoon.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Adams**. I thank you very much.

Senator Boschwitz.

Senator **Boschwitz**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would direct my question to Dr. Teller.

You have a twofold approach to the treaty, and in addition, you say it should be bipartisan, and that if we built defenses, that would give us greater opportunity to perhaps further reduce offensive weapons and more safely do it and have greater stability.

Many people declare, as Mr. Grossman apparently does, that the SDI will be ineffective. You have stated earlier, I think, in response to the questions of one of the Senators, that you feel it will be effective, that your overall assessment of the SDI is that it will be effective.

I wonder if you could give a somewhat more technical answer with respect to the SDI and its likelihood of effectiveness, and in which regard, whether it is kinetic or whether it is directed energy, and so forth.

Dr. **Teller**. More than 30 years ago I believed that defense against ballistic missiles is very difficult and would probably not prove to be effective. I started from the negative.

In the intervening years of many discussions and continuing work, I got convinced that defense is much easier than it appeared at first. And my doubts about defense have been reduced one by one.

In answering your question, the earliest, most obvious means of defense, hitting a missile with a missile has proved to be effective in an incomplete way. It is incomplete because the missile that was to be hit now has the possibility of taking evasive action or of hiding itself. But a more difficult defense is also being worked on. We are now at a point where the deployment of small and inexpensive kinetic energy weapons probably will make it possible to destroy the boosters while they are still accelerating or while they are discharging their warheads.

By miniaturizing, by simplifying, we made it not only possible but also apparently practical to do such things. The possibility is no longer in question. The practicability is. I have already mentioned kinetic-energy weapons, the most simple case. Those weapons are going through shifts to smaller, more effective apparatus and to better electronics and more modern methods so that their functions are unified and solidified and the defense will be effective.

The second big class is the directed-energy weapons, particularly the lasers. If deployed on the ground, which means taking into account the difficulties of penetrating the atmosphere, the answer is they also look highly promising. We have considerable evidence of massive Soviet efforts not only on research but including serious deployment of those ground-based directed-energy weapons.

A third extensive class of defensive weapons is space-based directed-energy weapons. About these, I tended to be doubtful. I still am somewhat doubtful. But having had the experience that one after the other my doubts have had to be reduced, I now begin to see an obvious valid point: Development brings about more development. We know today that at least in principle the x-ray laser, a popped up directed-energy weapon works. To what extent the engineering, the practical details work, we do not know. The principle was established through a small SDI program. A really small fraction of the budget was used for that particular approach.

I would say that the majority of the efforts now pursued in SDI, shows great promise. A smaller portion, to the extent of my evaluation, shows less. The hopeful ones are the simple kinetic-energy weapons, the ground-based laser, and to some extent the popped-up directed-energy weapons.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. I wonder if you would expand a little bit about what the Soviets are doing, at least what you know they are doing, and what kind of an effort they are making with respect to SDI, because certainly I feel that we would and the free world would be placed in considerable jeopardy if they were to achieve that and we were not.

What do we know about what they are doing?

Dr. TELLER. We know without a shade of a doubt that they have a powerful and effective system to protect Moscow. We have nothing that compares with it.

We know that the system can provide and almost certainly has provided them with experience to deploy and man similar systems elsewhere.

We know that they have a powerful surface-to-air missile, the SA-12, which, because it is launched from mobile carriers, could be deployed throughout the Soviet Union and work in a way similar to the Moscow defenses. That could be available to them in a very few years.

We know that they have an effort which is probably at least 20 years old on ground-based lasers shooting through the atmosphere. We know of initial deployments.

We have not deployed. They have. How extensive and effective these deployments are, there is question about it. I believe that the American public is incompletely informed about this dangerous situation because what little has been observed, and even that little is very impressive, is overclassified. The American public is not allowed to know about it.

We know that in the case of the x-ray laser, which is the one radically new proposal, the original proposals came from the Soviet Union. There are a number of independent lines of evidence which make it probable that they are years ahead of us in this important field.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Mr. Chairman, may I just as a followup ask Mr. Grossman, who apparently opposes the SDI, I gather; am I correct in that?

Mr. GROSSMAN. Yes, you are correct, sir, I do oppose the star wars.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. How do you deal with the fact that the Russians are very aggressively pursuing a capability in defense? Are you willing to allow them to go forward and unilaterally achieve this?

Mr. **Grossman**. All of the capabilities that Dr. Teller pointed out on the Soviet side are correct, and they are capabilities which are allowed to them under the ABM Treaty and——

Senator **Boschwitz**. But you oppose our doing the same, is that correct?

Mr. **Grossman**. I do not, sir. I do not. The U.S. Government had the opportunity of doing the same thing, of putting a defensive system around Washington, and one other site at one time, and they rejected——

Senator **Boschwitz**. One site.

Mr. **Grossman**. One site, and they rejected that. They still have the opportunity to do it. They felt that it was not effective.

The position of our organization and my personal position is that we do believe that low-level research should go on with regard to an SDI or star wars program, but we oppose testing and we oppose deployment, and we oppose the extension of the system into space.

Senator **Boschwitz**. So that you oppose our doing what the Soviets have already done according to Dr. Teller. This is certainly not low-level research they are doing.

Mr. **Grossman**. Well, to my knowledge, they are not doing any more than I have defined as what I would be willing for the United States to be doing. And if they are doing what the Reagan administration has suggested doing on star wars, I am quite willing to let them waste their money. I just want to have our Government stop wasting its money.

Senator **Boschwitz**. Oh, so you are against our Government doing it, but you do not mind if they do.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. **Grossman**. I am against our going beyond low-level research. I do believe we should stay up with the state of the art but not test, not deploy.

Senator **Boschwitz**. I must say, Mr. Chairman, I do not know what all those things mean. Low-level research is OK, but we should stay with the state of the art. I think that is an inconsistency.

The **Chairman** [presiding]. Thank you.

Senator Pressler.

Senator **Pressler**. I would identify with those remarks. I think Moscow is very well protected today.

But in any event, there seems to be a kind of interesting intellectual syndrome here, and I would address this to Mr. Pines of the Heritage Foundation.

Now, in your testimony in which you are critical of the treaty—and I apologize if I did not hear all of it because I have two or three other committees meeting, and constituents, and Notch Babies coming to see me today—what is your bottom line recommendation on how a Senator should vote on this treaty, yes or no?

Mr. **Pines**. I would recommend a Senator vote no, but or yes, but, and——

Senator **Pressler**. Well, that is impossible.

Mr. **Pines** [continuing]. And that is not trying to be a bit too clever, Senator.

Senator **Pressler**. But what is your recommendation?

Mr. PINES. We should be as clear as Dr. Teller has said and as I said, that we know what this treaty is committing ourselves to.

Senator PRESSLER. But based on what you know about it today, how would you——

Mr. PINES. What I know about it today, if I were as honored as you were to be elected, I would vote "no."

Senator PRESSLER. All right, fine.

Mr. PINES. I think that you should demand from the executive branch much more than your predecessors demanded in 1972 of ABM and SALT I. You should demand from experts much more than was demanded in 1972.

Senator PRESSLER. Yes. Well, let me finish my question.

And you would vote for amendments to the treaty; is that correct?

Mr. PINES. That is correct.

Senator PRESSLER. I guess we are going to hear from Henry Kissinger tomorrow, and he has stated everything that is wrong with the treaty—he marches through all the things that are wrong with it—but in the end he urges that it be ratified, that it would be even worse for the Western alliance if we did not.

And a lot of groups that are questioning this treaty tell us Senators everything that is wrong with it, but then in the end, they say, "well, vote for it." I noticed in your written testimony, at least, you did not actually come down and recommend a "no" vote. You told us what was wrong with it, or maybe I misread it.

Mr. PINES. I appreciate the question.

Senator PRESSLER. But I hope that when you send mail out to your members and so forth, that you say what your bottom line is. I find so many groups who come here to question the treaty end up recommending, if you push them, that well, we had better vote for this and try to correct any problem in the START Treaty. We are in some kind of an intellectual syndrome, and I call it the Henry Kissinger syndrome. I do not know what he is going to say tomorrow. He has contended it is a very bad treaty, but he thinks we should vote for it because it would do more damage to the alliance not to.

And that is a problem under our constitutional system. For example, if this President negotiates a START Treaty in his last 2 months of office, we are put into an awkward position in that we want to support the President, but that is the way our system works. I think that the Senate should do its duty anyway in terms of the quality of the treaty.

But would you not agree with me that those who are critical of the treaty have been caught up in this kind of an intellectual syndrome?

Mr. PINES. They seem to be saying that it is a very bad treaty, yet vote for it, just like saying SDI would create a more livable world, yet vote against it. I mean, it is the same kind of paradox, I think, of thoughtlessness you find in both cases.

Senator PRESSLER. All right, good.

Dr. Teller, I would like to follow up on Senator Boschwitz' question because I found it fascinating. You said that Moscow is very well protected, and that is something that we do not hear very often.

How is Moscow very well protected compared to Washington, DC?

Dr. TELLER. Washington is unprotected. The estimate——

Senator PRESSLER. Would you pull your microphone down a little bit so we can all hear this? I cannot quite hear you.

Washington is totally unprotected compared to Moscow?

Dr. TELLER. A famous Soviet defector was informed about the Moscow defense in I believe 1978. I have no reason to doubt his statements, and of course, no reason to believe it precisely either. But according to his unclassified report, the Soviet estimate in 1978 was that the Moscow defenses at that time were better than 50 percent effective. They also planned an upgrade of the Moscow defenses which in the meantime has been executed. Our system of attack has remained unchanged.

The estimate that Schevchenko got, rather, the estimate that he got from internal Russian authorities in 1978 was that after the upgrade, the Moscow system would be better than 95 percent effective.

I am trying to answer your question in a meaningful way by giving you the numbers, giving you their origin, and of course, leaving it to you to what extent you choose to believe these or doubt these.

Senator PRESSLER. Dr. Teller, on page 4 of your testimony you discuss some matters regarding the SS–25's. We have had some discussion which indicates the SS–25 would continue to be flight tested at intermediate ranges under the terms of the treaty.

Some have suggested this would permit the Soviets to upgrade the SS–25's at INF ranges without any limitation. Does this provision pose a possible loophole that should be addressed?

Dr. TELLER. What is the question?

Senator PRESSLER. Well, do you see this as a loophole in the treaty?

Dr. TELLER. I do not believe that a treaty of this kind can possibly be without loopholes. I would say even if they could not test it, they probably would still use it.

I consider these treaties useful because they decrease the number of aggressive weapons. I do not consider them instruments that will solve a problem.

Only in conjunction with defensive measures and with political measures will they solve the problem. So, I am in the unfortunate position where I do not see how I can answer your precise question in a precise way.

Senator PRESSLER. Let me ask you what your bottom line recommendation is. I know you have said we need to clarify the treaty, we need to do a lot of things. Probably nothing is going to happen that has not already happened, and so if you were recommending today to a Senator how to vote, would it be "Yes" or "No" on this treaty?

Dr. TELLER. Sir, if I would have the enormous responsibility as a Senator to vote on this treaty, I would vote "Yes." And I would say that, having voted "Yes," I would then know that I had to redouble my efforts to make the Atlantic alliance more firm, and that I had to redouble my efforts to bring about a bipartisan valid and reasonable way to prevent war, one that is based upon defense just as much as on arms reduction.

Senator **Pressler**. Would you not say this is part of the syndrome of people saying this is a very bad treaty, but we are going to solve the problem in the future, on the START Treaty or something like that? Is there not a great inconsistency there?

You have told us many things about the Russians today and in the past. You have told us about the defenses around Moscow that are relevant to this. You have told us about concerns about the treaty. But yet you say vote "Yes"?

Dr. **Teller**. Sir, nowhere in this document did I say that this is a bad treaty. I did not say it is a good treaty. I did say that a treaty of this kind is by its very nature open to criticism, and I did say that this treaty, backed up by a bipartisan foreign policy, based on both arms reduction and defense, would be good. In fact that would be excellent. That would be in the tradition of the Marshall plan, of the Western alliance. That is the kind of thing that could make the world a better place for my grandchildren to live in.

It is these positive things I am saying, and I am not saying anything bad about that treaty, because I do not know how one could bring about a better one except by careful bipartisan effort.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much, Senator Pressler.

Dr. **Teller**. May I, Mr. Chairman, may I ask to be excused? I have to catch an airplane, and I deeply regret to have to leave now.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much for coming. Thank you very much indeed.

I would add, we have another panel. I do not want to cut any members short. I will forgo my questions.

Mr. **Grossman**. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. I did not mean to interrupt you, but I promised that I would try to get this in the record.

I have in my hand a statement that 111 major national organizations would like to submit to this distinguished panel for their consideration. It strongly endorses the agreement with the Soviet Union known as the INF Treaty.

The **Chairman**. We will insert it in the record without objection.

[The material referred to appears in the appendix.]

The **Chairman**. Senator Helms.

Senator **Helms**. Mr. Chairman, if I could have about 5 minutes. I recognize there is another panel, but I want to say to Mr. Pines that not only do I welcome you here today, but I appreciate the work that the Heritage Foundation has done and is doing in providing factual material on the INF Treaty.

Now, the problem that I have had from the outset is that so many groups and so many individuals have been taking a position on this treaty, for or against, without knowing anything about it. By actual count, there were 52 Senators who endorsed the treaty, said it was a grand document, before it was even delivered to them.

Now, I do not know whether others may believe that is a fulfillment of the responsibility under the Constitution to advise and consent, but I have my doubts about it.

I was especially interested in your strong suggestion for a NATO summit in the wake of this INF Treaty. Now, the very fact that we have signed the agreement has, in my judgment, shaken the confidence of NATO in our, that is to say the U.S. steadfastness.

Various comments have been made about how everybody in Europe loves this treaty, which is not precisely what I have run into with correspondence and conversations with various military leaders and others. And the largest publication in France, Figaro, has raised a lot of questions, as you know.

Now the NATO leaders come over here and they go through the motions of saying how much they like the treaty or the agreement.

But as you pointed out in your remarks, in your prepared statement, the removal of the nuclear deterrent destroys both the military and the psychological situation. I think I want you to amplify just a bit, if you will, on this question: Do you think that NATO will turn toward significant improvements in conventional forces, or will NATO instead choose more détente with the Soviets as an obviously easier alternative?

Mr. PINES. Senator, that depends upon what we do in the next 12 months.

Probably everybody on your panel is a strong supporter of the North Atlantic Treaty. I am a strong supporter of the Atlantic alliance. Those of us who have been supporting it for a long time, for a long time have been waiting for our European allies to take some leadership.

They will not. It is the nature of the alliance. Thus we have to provide the leadership in the next 12 months to make certain that in fact they do not see INF as an abandonment of them.

If they see it as an abandonment, they will see it as a green light to try and make their own accommodation with the Soviets. We see the beginnings of this, of course, already in the low countries and in West Germany.

Now, how do we send the right signals? The kind of ratification you conduct on this treaty is an important first signal. I believe that a NATO summit is an important second signal.

We owe it to our NATO allies for the President and the highest levels of the administration to sit down with their counterparts and explain where we think we are going with the Soviet Union. This treaty, we are told over and over, even by my fellow members of this panel, with whom we disagree on most things—we are told over and over, this is just the first step.

Well, if it is a first step, what is the second step going to look like? What is the third step going to look like? Where do we expect to get with these steps? Our NATO allies' opinions are important in this. We should tell them what we think.

Third, they should be consulted. Part of the tragedy of the INF process was we did not consult our allies at all. We met with them periodically to tell them what we were doing with the Soviets. Sometimes they even read that in the newspaper. Our allies, once again, have to be consulted with.

And fourth, we have to sit down at the summit to reassure them that we will be taking the military steps needed to keep the peace, because as important as an agreement may be, the only thing which has kept the peace for the longest period in this century has in fact been our willingness to stand and defend NATO. This has got to be done at a summit.

If we do not do this, if we do not send these signals and this ratification goes through very quickly and hurriedly, Europeans would have every reason to believe that we are disengaging from Europe, that we are decoupling. That may not be what we want to tell them, but that is what they are going to see.

Senator HELMS. Now, a further complication is everybody is talking about increasing the conventional strength, and I have not had one witness to appear before this committee, including the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who was able to even give a ballpark figure on what that would cost the American taxpayers.

Now, am I alone in hearing the apprehensions from leaders in NATO, or have you heard the same thing?

Mr. PINES. Privately, NATO leaders and leading officials of West European governments tell us at the Heritage Foundation that they are very much against this treaty, for the reasons I have outlined. They are terrified of what it is going to cost them if they have to in fact increase their military to the point where it is a credible defense against the Soviet conventional invasion.

Are we ready to send a quarter of a million more Americans to Western Europe? Maybe we are, but if we are we had better speak very candidly of it and what it is going to cost us and in fact, what domestic social programs are going to have to be cut to pay for that.

They are very, very worried about what it is going to do to their economy and where they are going to get the manpower.

As I said in my prepared remarks, we have to speak realistically about the conventional side of the ledger. We should not be fooled, for example, by a Soviet proposal for the Soviets to withdraw all of their troops from Eastern Europe if we withdraw all of our troops from Western Europe.

At first glance that may seem like a good deal, until you realize that their troops are no more than a few miles away from returning to the battlefield and we are separated by an ocean.

The Soviets have been trying for 45 years to get us out of Western Europe, and the Soviets' conventional force proposal of mutual withdrawal would do it. West Europeans are very worried about the conventional cost.

Senator HELMS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Thank you, gentlemen and ladies, for being with us.

We now come to our next panel. Admiral Moorer, who was scheduled to be here, could not be. Testifying on behalf of the American Security Council, however, Rear Adm. Robert Spiro, Jr., vice president of the American Security Foundation, will be testifying in his place.

And we have Dr. Betty Lall, Council on Economic Priorities; and Dr. Martin Colman, director of communications of the American Resistance International.

Welcome, Mr. Colman, Admiral Spiro, and Dr. Lall. Why do we not start out with Admiral Spiro and then proceed from there.

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. ROBERT H. SPIRO, JR. (USNR, RET.), FORMER UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL

Admiral SPIRO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to the members of the committee for giving me an opportunity to testify on the pending INF Treaty. I am appearing before you as a representative of the bipartisan American Security Council and as a former Under Secretary of the Army during the Carter administration.

Adm. Tom Moorer, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and vice president of the American Security Council, wanted to be here and should be here today, but unfortunately he is in Europe, and he asked me to represent a group of over 1,000 retired admirals and generals that he assembled, and we have a petition to present to the Senate on behalf of that group.

The treaty before you is one that my retired flag officer colleagues and I have given a good deal of consideration. Ever since I was on active duty in World War Two, I have firmly believed, Mr. Chairman, in a bipartisan defense and foreign policy.

I have often stated my concurrence with the late Senator Henry Jackson's belief that in matters of national security the best politics is no politics.

I sincerely wanted to support this treaty, but after careful consideration I must tell you that I believe it is not in our national security interest. The major items I want to present to you are two combined petitions. The first petition is signed by 2,074 retired flag officers opposing any arms control agreement that would lock the United States into strategic or military inferiority.

And the second petition is signed by over 1,000 senior retired flag officers, and it urges opposition to the INF Treaty.

The group of 1,000 senior retired military officers are a diverse group of educated and experienced officers who share very strong reservations about the INF Treaty in its present form. As retired officers, they are free to speak their minds honestly and openly.

With an average level of military service of 32 years, each officer—and having reached the highest levels within their respective services, these more than 1,000 officers represent more than 32,000 years of thoughtful military experience.

They are men and women of peace. They have survived America's wars during the past three generations. Most of them have been in battle. They have experienced the horrors of war and want no further part of war and injury and death for themselves or their children or grandchildren or their countrymen.

I am one of that group, Mr. Chairman, a reserve officer who volunteered for service as an enlisted man on December 27, 1941. I served 4 years with the war, the last 19 months at sea on a destroyer without a night ashore in the Pacific theater, concluding that service in a devastating kamikaze crash on my ship in April 1945.

I then served another 32½ years in the Naval Reserve before retiring as a flag officer.

But with my fellow flag and general officers, I know that the only road to peace is through strength. Irresolution, weakness, unpreparedness, and lack of will inevitably lead to war.

We, the 1,000 officers of the Coalition of Peace Through Strength, believe that the proposed INF Treaty as negotiated and presented to the Senate, is very seriously flawed and is dangerous to the security of the United States.

President Reagan on March 12, 1987, gave this unambiguous assurance to the Congress: "That Soviet compliance with past arms control agreements is an essential prerequisite for future arms control agreements. Strict compliance with all the provisions of arms control agreements is fundamental and this administration will not accept anything less."

A CIA-sponsored study conducted by Dr. Joseph Douglass—I believe he appeared before this committee last week—described Soviet arms control policy in these words: "The only arms the Soviet Union seeks to control are United States arms. Arms control to the Soviets is a strategic military and intelligence operation that is in opposition to Western concepts of arms control in nearly all respects. Cheating is deliberate in Soviet arms control policy, and it is planned even before agreements are signed."

Adm. Tom Moorer, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, asserts that: "Prior to the 1972 SALT I Treaty, the Soviets violated 24 of 25 summit agreements." Since then, the General Advisory Committee of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has found material cheating on nine current treaties and four international agreements.

Gen. Bernard Rogers, who served most of this decade as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, believes that U.S. intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Western Europe are an essential link between NATO's conventional forces and its strategic nuclear ones.

Once the only European-based missiles which can reach the U.S.S.R. are removed, he fears the Soviet Union can increasingly blackmail Western Europe into doing its will, leaving the United States isolated and impotent.

The French Defense Minister Andre Giraud purportedly said last fall that the French see the INF Treaty as a nuclear Munich.

Admiral Moorer further asserts that the Soviets have outspent the United States on both strategic offensive and defensive weapons by over $500 billion from SALT I to 1985, and are now way ahead in missile defense.

While Soviet words, Mr. Chairman, are currently soft and reassuring, Soviet intransigence in Nicaragua, Cuba, Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan continues unabated. And while a few individuals have been permitted to emigrate from the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union continues flagrantly to violate human rights, despite the Warsaw Pact which its representatives solemnly signed more than a decade ago.

The two chief merits of the INF Treaty claimed by proponents are asymmetrical reductions and onsite verification. Regrettably, both these pillars of the treaty can, we believe, be circumvented by the Soviet Union with relative ease.

We believe the treaty in its present form is unverifiable and unenforceable.

We are also concerned about the treaty's data discrepancies. We believe that the arms control process has dramatically increased the threat to U.S. security. We are deeply concerned about the lack of a U.S. grand strategy of national security.

This treaty and others that may be negotiated in May and beyond must weigh carefully the totality of U.S. national security. Arms control treaties are vital to security, but they are only a part of the total consideration which the Congress, the President, and the American people must take into account.

Thus, sir, on behalf of the Coalition for Peace Through Strength, I present to this committee and to the U.S. Senate our petition, approved by more than 1,000 retired flag and general officers, urging three things:

One, the adoption of a national strategy of peace through strength;

Two, termination of the ABM Treaty to build SDI; and

Three, rejection of the INF and START Treaties.

We request your careful consideration of our views. Thank you, sir and members of this committee.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Spiro maybe found in the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much indeed.

Dr. Lall.

STATEMENT OF DR. BETTY LALL, DIRECTOR OF ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION, COUNCIL ON ECONOMIC PRIORITIES, NEW YORK, NY

Dr. LALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Betty Goetz Lall. I am the director of the arms control verification project for the Council on Economic Priorities, a public interest research group based in New York. I am former staff director of one of your subcommittees, on disarmament many years ago under Senator Hubert Humphrey, and it is a great privilege and pleasure to be back before this committee.

I am pleased to present to you the views and recommendations of the Council on Economic Priorities on the treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the elimination of their intermediate- and shorter range missiles. The council supports the ratification of the treaty for the following reasons.

One, the treaty constitutes a major breakthrough on verification. It introduces for the first time major onsite inspection provisions as part of the verification process in the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, and Czechoslovakia, as well as in the United States and five of its allies in Western Europe.

In past treaties, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to rely only on their national technical means to assure adherence to the agreement. In the INF Treaty, United States personnel may visit as many as 84 specific places in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and East Germany to check for treaty compliance. Similarly, the Soviet inspectors can visit 24 sites in the United States and its territories, another 12 places in West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom where weapons have been installed.

The chart attached to my testimony gives details on all of the places subject to onsite inspection in these countries and what kind of weapons activity will be subject to inspection at those places.

Inspectors will check first to determine that data supplied, for example, by the Soviets on items to be eliminated are accurate. Once a facility or base has been closed, U.S. teams may observe that all treaty-prohibited activities have ceased. Third, U.S. teams will witness the destruction of the weapons—missiles may be launched for purposes of elimination. Others will be crushed, burned, flattened, or broken up through explosive demolition.

A fourth type of inspection will consist of visits on short notice to assure that bases and facilities used for weapons have been cleared of all such military items and activities.

Fifth, continuous monitoring of one specific production facility on each side may occur for 13 years to provide confidence that secret prohibited production cannot take place.

The implementation of these and other treaty provisions further provide the potential for reducing distrust of Soviet intentions toward the United States and its NATO allies.

Two, the implementation of the treaty will require a high degree of cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Inspectors from the two countries will be meeting and traveling together as teams throughout the 3-year period of implementing the main treaty provisions, and thereafter for up to 13 years. They will also observe the destruction of each missile, launcher, storage facility, and many other items associated with the weapons to be eliminated. Then, over a period of 13 years, inspectors may check a maximum of 185 places on Soviet, GDR, and Czechoslovakian territory to determine compliance with the treaty.

This will impose on both sides, particularly on the hitherto secrecy-addicted Soviets a high degree of cooperation, understanding, and good will to achieve success in the many tasks involved in carrying out the treaty's provisions. The newly created Special Verification Commission provides additional impetus and scope for continuous cooperation as opposed to the Verification Commission established for the ABM Treaty which met only infrequently.

The verification arrangements under the treaty mark an important breakthrough inasmuch as they envisage intrusive onsite inspection. This procedure will not only be effective in and of itself, but can help develop mutual confidence between the United States and the Soviet Union. This will in turn help to lay the foundation for the yet more intrusive arrangements which will be needed if agreement is reached to reduce strategic nuclear weapons.

Three, while the number of nuclear weapons involved is a small percentage of the total United States and Soviet stockpiles, the elimination of the ability to deliver over 3,000 nuclear warheads by the Soviets on the people of Western Europe and other countries in Asia not only constitutes a significant step toward reducing the threat of nuclear war, but perhaps of equal significance, the elimination of these categories of nuclear weapons from Western and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union will help to reduce tensions in our relations with the U.S.S.R.

Four, the successful completion of the ratification of the INF Treaty would provide a strong impetus for the completion of the

START negotiations. These would reduce by 50 percent the large stockpiles of strategic nuclear weapons which particularly threaten the destruction of the people of the United States and the Soviet Union. Some of the INF verification measures can be applied to the elimination of strategic weapons. For example, onsite monitoring or conversion of plants producing strategic weapons should be considered.

Five, it is especially noteworthy that the treaty has the unqualified support of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. In previous arms control negotiations, key military leaders have often conditioned their support for an arms control treaty by requiring offsetting commitments by the President for increased spending for other weapons. In the case of this treaty, our understanding is that no such conditions have been imposed.

The Council on Economic Priorities also believes the following points are relevant to the debate and should be considered. These are based on our analysis of the treaty which we are sending to the members of the committee. It is a separate document you will be receiving shortly.

First, with respect to responsibilities for monitoring the INF agreement, we note the possibility from testimony of the Secretary of Defense that the Department of Defense may undertake the monitoring function by setting up a Defense Inspection Agency. Such a function, however, is by statute lodged in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and therefore, ACDA should be associated with the verification of the treaty.

We believe and urge, therefore, that ACDA should share the monitoring function with the Department of Defense and as necessary with other agencies.

Two, we note that changes in the protocols of the treaty can be executed by the parties simply by agreeing to them, presumably through the Special Verification Commission. They would not be considered as amendments to the treaty, and thus would not be submitted to the Senate for its consent. We suggest, however, that any changes be discussed with and brought to the attention of the appropriate committees of the Congress. It is important for bipartisanship in the arms control area to work toward a high degree of cooperation on these treaty implementation matters between the Senate and the executive branch.

We deplore all efforts to change basic provisions of any treaty unilaterally by either the executive branch or the Senate. We therefore urge strict compliance with the Constitution's provisions in this regard.

Three, over time the INF Treaty will save money for the taxpayer. U.S. bases will be closed. Troops managing these bases may be able to return home. The weapons to be destroyed obviously will no longer have to be maintained.

We believe the savings from removing maintenance costs alone over an expected 15-year operational life cycle for these weapons should save between $5 and $10 billion. The lower figure is a 1981 estimate. Inflation may have doubled it. The net savings from the INF Treaty must take into account the cost of monitoring the treaty. The Secretary of Defense estimated a cost of $100 to $200 million in the 1988 budget for a monitoring agency, including the cost of missile destruction. It is not clear, however, what might be total costs of verification over the period of the active elimination of weapons.

Four, the warheads of the missiles to be destroyed will not be eliminated. Under the terms of the INF agreement, the fissionable material and the physics package will be subject to reprocessing and reuse. In any new treaty such as the START agreement now being negotiated, the United States and U.S.S.R. should eliminate the nuclear warheads involved.

Secretary of Defense Carlucci testified that "verifying the destruction of the physics package"; that is, the fissionable material, "would be an absolute nightmare." The executive branch should begin to devise effective ways to dispose of the radioactive waste, render it nonlethal and develop alternative safe and beneficial uses for the material. If the fissionable material in the Pershing and Cruise missile nuclear warheads is to be saved as planned, then the U.S. Government should reduce by a corresponding amount budgetary figures to procure fissionable material for weapons during the current and coming years.

There surely is no need to produce additional fissionable material at this time. The budget should reflect this. We must use this treaty as an opportunity to begin to rid ourselves of nuclear warheads and the fissionable material in them.

Five, it is important to note that the treaty does not in its verification provisions allow inspectors to roam anywhere they wish. Rather, the verification is strictly controlled. The treaty partners must first assure themselves that the weapons are placed in specific areas and only those areas. Following this, inspectors can only go to areas specified in the treaty protocol and memorandum of understanding, and then only within limited time periods. Should a party later believe weapons are stored in any way outside the permitted areas, this will be an issue for the Verification Commission to take up.

Six, the Soviets have named several places where elimination of their weapons will take place. The United States has not, however, to my knowledge yet specified its elimination facilities. This appears a significant omission which ought to be clarified if possible before the treaty ratification is complete. Are the weapons, for example, to be returned to the United States or destroyed at their bases in Europe?

In closing, the Council on Economic Priorities commends the United States and Soviet Governments for completing a significant step both in confidence-building and toward reducing the threat of nuclear war. It urges the Senate to give its consent to ratification and encourages the two parties to complete other negotiations toward these crucial ends.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Lall may be found in the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Dr. Lall.

Now Mr. Colman.

STATEMENT OF MARTIN COLMAN, DIRECTOR OF COMMUNICATIONS, THE AMERICAN RESISTANCE INTERNATIONAL, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. COLMAN. Thank you, Senator.

I come before you today to express several concerns about the INF Treaty. However, let me preface my remarks by stating that I am not calling for the Senate to reject the treaty. Instead, I intend to address an aspect of the treaty that has been heretofore largely ignored and through which the intent of this treaty can be greatly strengthened. Additionally, nothing of what I am about to suggest would require a "killer" amendment, nor would it require any renegotiation with the Soviets. Instead, I will be advocating greater compliance and increased stability through reinforced agreements. I may in fact, parenthetically, be addressing some of the concerns that Senator Pressler asked about before about people who are supporting the treaty but have all the reservations about it.

While an increasing number of questions are being raised as to the compliance and verifiability of the INF Treaty, there are some that are suggesting that the real significance of this treaty is not its military but its political value, that it includes some great symbolism. If that is in fact the case, then what I am about to suggest is all the more imperative.

There exists a compliance agreement in which both we and the Soviets have had certain obligations that are essential for all of our relations and agreements. We have also agreed not to undertake new agreements which would undermine the existing accords, and further, to implement the agreed provisions. I refer, of course, to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Helsinki 1975, Final Act. It was in the Helsinki accords in which we and the Soviets solemnly took upon ourselves very clear and explicit obligations which govern our entire relationship in the areas of human rights, science, culture, commerce, and most significantly, peace, and disarmament.

The great misperception about the accords is that this is just a human rights agreement. Not so. This is an umbrella agreement which established a framework under which the 35 states, which includes the Warsaw Pact and NATO, determined an entire category of principles that controls all of our mutual dealings. We agreed, for example, that peace and respect for human rights are not two separate issues but multifacets of one single, interdependent issue. It was agreed not only by us but by the Soviets that nations that have the restraint of their people through respect for freedom to protest, speak, write, assemble, and petition their government, among other rights, were less likely to be aggressive. We have in fact agreed that the best verification procedure is an open society.

Try to name, for example, the last time that two major democracies declared war on each other.

I have attached for the convenience of this committee quotations from the accords which clearly establish this case. This is not linkage. As the Soviets have agreed, these are multidimensions of a single issue which profoundly and regularly impact each other.

Accordingly, it should be noted that successor and subsidiary agreements such as the INF were envisioned by the accords. It was in Helsinki that the United States and the Soviets for the first time signed an agreement which included all the NATO and Warsaw Pact states that specifically prohibited the use of force and occupation of territory; it mandated the peaceful settlement of disputes; they pledged themselves to peace and disarmament and established a regime of confidence-building measures such as troop movement notifications which the Soviets violate, and exchange of observers, which are harassed and sometimes shot and killed as in the case of Major Nicholson.

There is an important aspect to this treaty which is so far dangerously ignored. This is the first time since the Helsinki accords were signed that we have a new agreement which affects the primary issues covered by Helsinki. Helsinki was a security agreement. This is the first one since. We are, in fact, negotiating for something that has already been bought and paid for. To enact the INF now, while ignoring CSCE, the Helsinki accords, in the face of the massive Soviet violations of CSCE, is to undermine the Helsinki process; it is to decimate the underlying agreement; it is to demoralize the human rights movements of the East bloc and to distance ourselves from our allies and demonstrate that there is a reward, not a penalty, for violation of an agreement with us. And the reward is more agreements.

Most importantly, a vote to ratify this treaty while ignoring CSCE is a vote against Helsinki. I must point out here that this would place us, the United States, in clear violation of the accords which we are obligated to enforce in all of our dealings, even unilaterally.

To separate these issues now and ratify the INF in the face of these massive violations is to choose between Helsinki and INF. Further, I am not suggesting that we renegotiate anything with the Soviets. All we need in this matter was negotiated in CSCE.

Therefore, what I recommend to this committee requires nothing that the Soviets have not already agreed to. It would enhance the prospects for peace and security, treaty compliance, and overall better relations. My recommendation, therefore, to the Senate is to set the implementation date of this treaty, once it is ratified, to coincide with the President's public certification that the Soviets are in full compliance with all the terms of CSCE. This only requires a statement by the President which could take the form of a Senate declaration attached to the treaty mandating the President to act, requiring no new negotiation with the Soviets or any change to the treaty.

Is there really a credible argument that we should not insist on compliance with related agreements prior to accepting that party's signature once more? The importance of supporting what can be achieved by compliance with CSCE is demonstrated by the verification controversies already underway with INF. We are told that rejecting this treaty would upset our European friends whose arms we twisted to support it to begin with, and it would of course put a chill on East-West relations. Abandoning Helsinki by ignoring it in this process will cause much more lasting harm to the alliance and to Soviet perceptions of United States policy.

We can hardly expect others to depend on our word or respect our values when we readily abandon them ourselves. Full CSCE compliance and having the ability to verify in concert with confidence-building measures, as the accords refer to it, could eliminate the numerous problems with the treaty. As this committee is already aware, our foreign policy establishment has gone to extreme effort to certify and reaffirm nearly anything the Soviets tell us. I refer, of course, to the controversy over the memorandum of understanding and the number of counted and countable missiles, their locations, the numbers that may or may not have already been destroyed.

To paraphrase what Assistant Secretary Richard Perle has said, "There are many very easy ways in which the Soviets could hide missiles and violate the treaty without us ever knowing it."

In my view, if our NATO allies now seek to cut their own deals to cover themselves with the Soviet, the blame will rest in Washington and nowhere else. To encourage the neutralist tendencies in Europe could be a mistake of incalculable proportions. This treaty is being sold to the American people as an instrument through which an entire class of weapons are being eliminated worldwide. The question is does it really do that, and if it does not, will the American people support the treaty when we discover we have been deceived?

I am concerned that this may eliminate public support for legitimate arms control. Among these issues are the SS-24's and SS-25's which are completely left out of the treaty, simply because the Soviets have told us they are longer range missiles. This does not mean they are not nuclear missiles for Europe. It only means they can be fired from a greater variety of locations from deep within Soviet territory, making them even harder to verify.

We know they can be and may already have been retargeted for Western Europe. Therefore, it may be that we are participating in an American missile elimination process while supporting a Soviet missile modernization program.

If amendments are to be considered for this treaty, then including the SS-24's and SS-25's is an important confidence-building process.

I have enumerated below two more recommendations having to do with the vital issues of conventional forces in Europe. As well, they do not amend the treaty would be declarations only affecting our administration's behavior.

My final recommendation to this committee is to create an incentive for the Soviets to comply. I believe it is axiomatic that since so much of this treaty depends on interpretation and trust, that any violation would constitute a violation of the entire underlying meaning of the treaty. Therefore, the treaty should automatically terminate upon any violation. Once again, this would only be in the form of legislation obligating the President to serve termination notice with the treaty, no amendment required.

I must add that there has been, to my remarks I would like to add that there has been some indication that there are many people considering adding a resolution, not to the treaty, but accompanying resolution expressing our dismay over Soviet behavior with Helsinki, a nonbinding sense of Congress resolution. I must add that I would adamantly oppose, and I know many people associated with our organization and others would adamantly oppose any resolution or any statement of any type that has no binding effect on the process.

We have witnessed since Helsinki was signed, we have witnessed this administration and previous administrations and the Congress, I must say with all due respect, issue resolutions and proclamations criticizing the Soviets for their violations. These have the effect of exciting dissidents in the East bloc, exciting the peace activists, many of whom are dead, some in exile, and the rest in the gulag, because they risked their lives believing that we meant what we said, that we would stand up for these values. They risked their lives, and we have abandoned them.

I would suggest only that we have things which are binding, which affect us and affect our behavior, and nothing that makes human rights groups feel good.

Thank you, Senator.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Colman may be found in the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Colman. Following up on your point there, I guess the most flagrant example of that was the Hungarian aborted revolution, when we inflamed and incited the Hungarians and then sort of let them down. I remember being on their border at that time trying to help.

Mr. COLMAN. A very good point, Senator. Yes.

Admiral SPIRO. Mr. Chairman, may I take a point of order. In my prepared statement on page 3, line 9, there is an inexplicable error. And I would just want to correct it. "Warsaw" should read "Helsinki." And I am sorry. I do not know how that happened.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. In that same thought, on the matter of human rights, we all agree we should do everything we can to convince the Soviets to increase their performance in that field.

Now, do you think that if we turned down the treaty that that will give us more leverage with the Soviets, and that it will improve their human rights performance?

Mr. COLMAN. Is the question to you?

The CHAIRMAN. The question is to Admiral Spiro.

Admiral SPIRO. Yes, Senator, I think it would. There has been some discussion this afternoon about so-called linkage. And this gentleman just said it is not linkage. But it is similar to it.

It seems to me that when a bank is considering a commercial loan they consider it not only the value of the property and other considerations but the character of the borrower.

This is true in marriage contracts and is true when people are running to be President of the United States. It seems to me the matter of trust is vitally important in this consideration. And it is for that reason, among others, that the group that I represent feels strongly that that is an important consideration.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think you have answered the question. The question was, do you think that by not passing the INF Treaty, not ratifying it, that we have increased our leverage with the Soviets for human rights performance.

Admiral SPIRO. Categorically, sir, it would seem to me that it would.

The CHAIRMAN. Would all three of you have the same view? Would you, Mr. Colman?

Mr. COLMAN. I would put an asterisk with this, Senator. I think that with the INF Treaty you have an enormous opportunity to hold a very big carrot out to the Soviets.

You have a big opportunity to say to Mr. Gorbachev that if glasnost is real, implement it. It is a standing agreement. Do not just turn down INF, go ahead and ratify it.

As long as it coincides with the President's, no independent agency or international body, just the President's word that they are fully complying with Helsinki. If he thinks it is promising enough, let us have truth in labeling.

The CHAIRMAN. But do you agree with the theme that our leverage is increased by not ratifying it?

Mr. COLMAN. Not ratifying it as it stands, without any setting the date for compliance or whatever? I would say the leverage is greatly increased by not ratifying it as it stands.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Lall.

Dr. LALL. I would respectfully disagree with those interpretations.

I believe that when we negotiate agreements with the Soviet Union, we should decide about each one, whether such an agreement is in our own self-interest, our own national security interest, and in the interests of our allies.

And when we come to the conclusion that it is in our interests to go ahead, then we should go ahead and not link an agreement with something else. That is like saying the treaty was not in our interests, therefore, we should not go ahead with it unless it is linked.

I think with respect to human rights we need to keep on a lot of pressure, we need to bring it up every time we can. We need to make it clear to the Soviets that they earn an awful lot of ill will in this country and that there are other areas which we cannot go ahead on because of their performance on human rights, and make it clear they must show continued improvement.

I do think it is encouraging that over the past couple of years there has been some improvement. And not to the extent we want, but we have seen some.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct. Admiral, you presented us with a petition here of about more than 2,000 retired admirals and generals who oppose any arms control agreement that would lock the United States into strategic or military inferiority. I think any of us would agree to sign any resolution opposing that.

Of that 2,074, you say that more than 1,000 oppose the INF Treaty specifically. Were all the 2,000-plus asked to sign the anti-INF petition?

Admiral SPIRO. Yes, sir, I believe that that was the case. And at the time, by the time we went to press, so to speak, more than 1,000 had signed the second.

Some misunderstood and thought that by signing the first they were agreeing to the second and said, I will not bother.

The CHAIRMAN. Then more than 1,000 declined to sign it or did not sign it?

Admiral SPIRO. Yes, sir. Or have not as of the date of the printing of this.

The CHAIRMAN. And just out of curiosity, did the 1,000 people who signed the anti-INF Treaty do so on the basis of a description provided by opponents of the treaty, or on the basis of independent analysis of the treaty text?

Admiral SPIRO. I did not administer that, sir. But it is my understanding that neither was done. That they were simply asked on the basis of the public presentation of the treaty and the debate surrounding it. And the newspaper reports and so on.

Do you favor this INF Treaty? And that more than 1,000 at the point of printing had said we oppose.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. No further questions. Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. Admiral Spiro, I dislike having people put words in my mouth, and I know you do too. Let me just ask you, do you agree that this proposed treaty locks in the United States into a position of inferiority to the Soviets?

Admiral SPIRO. That is my understanding, sir, yes.

Senator HELMS. Well, this question has been put to me more and more in recent days. If all of this is true, can we risk our national security on the hope that the Soviets will not cheat on the treaty? What is your answer to that?

Admiral SPIRO. Well, sir, I think I tried to make myself clear on the matter of faith and trust, if indeed, as I have asserted, that the Soviets have violated, prior to the 1972 SALT I, 24 of 25 summit agreements. And there has been cheating on nine current treaties and four international agreements.

It seems to me that that is pretty solid rational evidence that in these matters we cannot trust the Soviet Union. And to put our security on the line based upon our inability to trust, it seems to me, is the utmost in folly.

If the Soviet Union has violated, or has refused to conform to the Helsinki accords, as this gentleman——

Senator HELMS. They have.

Admiral SPIRO. Which they have. And I think which we all admit. It seems to me we cannot ignore that in putting our trust in an agreement that puts us at great risk. Because by conventional superiority the Soviets are far stronger in Europe than we.

Senator HELMS. I find myself wishing sometime when I hear all the declarations and I know they are made in good faith and good spirit, declarations that, "Oh, we must not have linkage."

I find myself saying, "Well, one, I wish they could talk to Alexander Solzhenitzyn." Now, I have not talked to Solzhenitzyn about this treaty, but I have spent a considerable amount of time from time to time, in addition to correspondence with him.

And I would like for them to ask the children of Afghanistan who picked up those booby-trapped toys dropped by the Soviet Union, ask those children whether you can trust the Soviets or not.

The survivors of KAL 007, which plane I was almost on that night by the way, ask the families of those people whether you can trust the Soviet Union. Now, I must dissent respectfully to those who say there must be no linkage. Because if you cannot trust them, what have you got really? You have got nothing.

Now, on a technical and certainly more specific basis, do you believe that the ratification of the INF would cause the diversion of United States SLBM's, the sea-launched ballistic missile systems, from targets in the Soviet Union that now threaten the American people, divert them to Warsaw Pact targets now covered by United States INF forces?

Admiral SPIRO. Of course, as a reserve officer, I am not privy to any of that information. And I guess I could not divulge it if I were.

But it seems to me that the answer to your question, logically and philosophically, is "Yes."

Senator HELMS. Now, nobody likes nuclear weapons. I cannot think of anybody who does.

But is it fair to say, is my interpretation of what you are saying in effect is that when all the PR, all the Gorbachev smiling and the getting out on Connecticut Avenue and the smiling and the waving is stripped away, do you think this treaty actually would increase the risk of war?

Admiral SPIRO. My civilian profession has been that of a professor of European history and a dean and a president of universities later on.

And all that I have studied in a lifetime as a somewhat European scholar would indicate to me that this is indeed the case. That the risk of war by virtue of making a treaty that in our judgment, in my judgment, is based upon some false premises, is not verifiable, regrettably, based upon data that is not verifiable and probably not accurate, I think this would enhance the opportunity and the probability of war.

Because I subscribe to the theory that deterrence, peace through strength, which is our motto, is a very rational proposition. We cannot have peace through weakness.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Colman, if I may turn to you for a moment. I believe I recall that there is or was an independent group in the Soviet Union that monitored the Helsinki accords. Is that your understanding?

Mr. COLMAN. Yes.

Senator HELMS. What is its status today?

Mr. COLMAN. They have all, without exception, all the independently monitoring groups have been repressed. Every single one of the leaders has spent time in jail or in prison or long-term gulags. Most have been subjected to psychiatric drugs and torture.

But most importantly among them is a group called the Group to Establish Trust Between the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R., which a number of years back was founded by, among other people, Sergei Petovin, who is a bona fide peace activist.

He at one point put together an exhibit, a Hiroshima exhibit, in his apartment criticizing nuclear weapons, destruction of nuclear weapons and all the rest. He was arrested, he was tortured, given psychiatric drugs and drugs which raised his blood pressure to the point where he almost lost his eyesight.

And all the other people who had signed the Group to Establish Trust declaration were all persecuted in one way or another. Olga Gametkova, I believe, was 6 months pregnant when she stood trial for her hooliganism by signing a document which said that we have to eliminate the possibility of nuclear war and reduce missiles in Europe.

All of these groups have been decimated. Those few that we have made enough stink about, just because of the narrow human rights concern, we have gotten in exile. Some of them are here, some of them are in Europe.

But that leaves, from our view what is important for U.S. security, is that leaves all those groups to keep finding new leaders who are willing to risk their families and their lives and be tortured day after day, simply because they asked for peace, simply because they have asked for compliance with the Helsinki accords.

Which I must parenthetically add on this issue of linkage is not linkage at all. It was an underlying security agreement, which dealt with all of these issues.

Senator **Helms**. Well, you have talked about the Helsinki accord and the violation by the Soviet Union. Let us talk just a minute about what the United States has done to support our obligations under the Helsinki accords.

First of all, Congress has passed resolutions condemning the Soviets for Helsinki time and time again. Copies of these resolutions are then given to the Soviets and to Eastern bloc human rights activists by KGB plants. And this is done to encourage the activists and bring them out into the open, because the activists think the resolutions passed by Congress actually mean something.

Now, do you have any further comment about the effect of these resolutions that we pass and send over there?

Mr. **Colman**. Yes, Senator. My organization was founded by Vladimir Bukovski, who is its president. We were founded by groups of exiled East European dissidents.

And all of them have suffered, all of them have suffered simply because they thought we believed in our values. And they thought they could campaign for peace. Bukovski himself spent 12 years in a psychiatric gulag simply because he asked for glasnost. A lot has changed.

But we do not back up our words at all, because on the same day that you have the Helsinki Commission issuing a report about all the abuses, you will have the Secretary of Commerce issuing new agreements with the Soviet Union undercutting our efforts. We give rewards for their noncompliance.

Words to the Soviets are like water off a duck's back. We are telling the wolf not to eat the chicken. And we are leaving him in the pen to eat them.

It is absolute nonsense, if we are not going stand up for these values, it seems to me that it is a terrible, terrible blight on our policy and our policy development for us to encourage others to stand up for these values there and take enormous risks that we do not take, and they do that and they suffer. And we are nowhere around to back them up.

As Senator Pell points out, in Hungary, that was the biggest, blatant example in the 1950's. But we keep doing it. We are always doing it. And we make ourselves feel better that we stand up for these things, but it stands up fine if you are in a democracy where words count and values count and ideas count, and you have a conscience to live with.

But I do not need to run over with you the long list of Soviet violations of everything. And this is not partisan. We all realize what the Soviets do. We have to make sure that whatever we do, if we cannot control their behavior, at least we should be able to control our behavior.

And the Helsinki accords explicitly state that we must enforce the accords. By ratifying this agreement without mentioning Helsinki, we are undercutting Helsinki. It is the first time a security agreement has come up regarding security in Europe since Helsinki, which was the framework, the foundation for all the security agreements in Europe were in Helsinki. And now we are going to undercut it by ratifying a treaty without even mentioning.

And what I have suggested here does not require going back to the Soviets. It only requires simply holding back on exchanging the ratified documents until such time as the administration can come to grips with truth in labeling.

Do we deal with this nation and respect their signature when their signature is being violated? And if any of us were in the gulags, suffering and being tortured and being given these psychiatric drugs simply because we asked for peace, there are people in the Soviet Union who are just as concerned about these as people here.

And to not, do any of us feel safer knowing all the peace activists are in the gulag? And if we do not support them, then we are undercutting ourselves. And for them, if any of us were there, would we not feel undercut by seeing this new treaty with the Helsinki accords torn up before them?

Senator HELMS. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Admiral Spiro, what percentage of the retired officers asked to oppose the INF did so, in your view? About half?

Admiral SPIRO. I do not know those figures, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Right.

Admiral SPIRO. I am not a staff member of the coalition, I am a civilian in military reserve clothing. And I do not know that figure.

I do not think that any appreciable number, I do not know of any who said, "Well, I am just of a different mind." Probably there are some. These are independent-minded officers, now retired, and they are completely free, as I pointed out, to take any position they wish.

But I cannot give you, I will be glad to get that for the committee, if you wish.

The CHAIRMAN. No, that is all right. But you ought to realize that all six of the active-duty generals and admirals who testified before our committee, the Joint Chiefs CINC/EUR, all support the treaty.

That is about 100 percent difference from the position that your men are taking.

Admiral SPIRO. Yes, sir. I realize that full well, and I cannot explain it. Admiral Moorer, for example, is a former, as you know, distinguished former chief, and there are many other members of the Joint Chiefs out there who are taking a different point of view.

The CHAIRMAN. But the people with the responsibility, the present Joint Chiefs, do not take that view.

Admiral SPIRO. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Of the people who oppose it of the retired officers, what percentage were reservists, what percentage were regular? Do you happen to know?

Admiral SPIRO. No, sir. Not many reservists make flag rank. I think in the Navy there are about seven, and seven at any given time. So most of these are formerly active-duty regular types of all the services.

The CHAIRMAN. Right. Thank you very much indeed. Without any further questions, the committee is recessed until 2 o'clock tomorrow when our witness will be Dr. Kissinger.

[Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, to reconvene at 2:02 p.m., February 23, 1988.]

THE INF TREATY

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 1988

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met at 2:02 p.m., in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Claiborne Pell (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Pell, Sarbanes, Cranston, Dodd, Kerry, Sanford, Adams, Helms, Lugar, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Murkowski, and Evans.

The CHAIRMAN. The Committee on Foreign Relations will come to order.

We are indeed delighted that Dr. Kissinger, who has had such a distinguished record in the Government, serving his country, is with us today. He participated in the negotiation of the Paris Peace Talks, SALT I. I know when he was at the United Nations how impressed I was with his negotiations on the Law of the Sea, a master of what one might sometimes call creative ambiguity, and we welcome him here with very real enthusiasm indeed.

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, I would simply join you in welcoming Dr. Henry Kissinger. The hearings would not be complete without testimony from Dr. Kissinger. I know that we all look forward to his testimony and to his ongoing comments in the press and other public fora.

It is great to have you here with us today, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Please proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY KISSINGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE

Dr. KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, Senator Cranston, it is a great privilege for me to appear here.

Before I read my statement, may I ask the chairman's permission for the following. I thought that I should focus on the limited issue, on the desirability of the ratification of the INF Treaty. Then toward the end of last week I received a very thoughtful letter from the chairman describing to me the range of concerns of the Foreign Relations Committee about the future of NATO, East-West relations and related issues. I then began to answer it and wrote a very long statement which unfortunately did not get finished until last evening, and which I am submitting tomorrow to the Armed Services Committee.

But with your permission, I would like to send it over as soon as it is typed this afternoon, to be incorporated also in your record, because I think it has a fuller statement of my overall views than I covered in the statement that I have submitted to you.

The **Chairman**. Without objection, that will be done.

Dr. **Kissinger**. Would you like me to read my statement, or would you like to go straight to questions?

The **Chairman**. How long is your statement?

Dr. **Kissinger**. Not very long.

Mr. Chairman, I accepted your invitation with some ambivalence. For many months I have expressed grave reservations about the political and strategic implications of the pending agreement, first directly to responsible officials, in the end, publicly. I will sum up my doubts below.

Nevertheless, my concerns cannot be removed by the refusal of the Senate to ratify the agreement. On the contrary, failure to ratify or attaching conditions requiring renegotiation would generate a crisis in the Atlantic alliance which in the end would almost certainly lead to the unilateral withdrawal of U.S. missiles from Europe and undermine the cohesion of the alliance.

My reservations can be summed up as follows:

A, the pending agreement does not reduce in any significant degree the Soviet capacity to devastate weapon with nuclear weapons. ICBM's, SLBM's and airplanes can carry out the missions assigned to the SS-20's and the shorter range weapons. It is also important to keep in mind that the warheads now on these missiles will remain in being.

B, the American capacity to retaliate against Soviet aggression with nuclear weapons based in Europe is substantially reduced, if not eliminated. This view is, I believe, shared by all former NATO commanders.

C, since NATO is an alliance of 16 nations confronting the threat of a single state, the reliance for deterrence on United States weapons based far away creates a psychological and political imbalance which is greatly magnified by Soviet superiority in conventional forces.

D, the INF agreement removes from the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany the missiles which can retaliate against the source of aggression and leaves only those short-range nuclear missiles which would, if used, destroy solely German territory and population. This reality has generated pressures within the Federal Republic against modernization and, in effect, for the denuclearization of Germany. These pressures are likely to increase and become a permanent feature of German domestic politics. The seeds for strain within the alliance are thereby sown because other NATO countries cannot be expected to run risks in defense of German territory which the Federal Republic is not prepared to run on its own behalf.

I would have preferred the process of nuclear disarmament in Europe to begin at the short range end of the nuclear spectrum. It would in my view also have been better if the INF process had taken place in stages. One could have begun with a reduction on the order of 50 percent, and made the removal of the remainder dependent on a withdrawal of substantial conventional forces from Central Europe.

But that is not the situation the committee confronts. Failure to ratify the treaty or insistence on amendments requiring renegotiation would not cure the defects I have discussed. It would, on the contrary, magnify all difficulties.

The removal of American intermediate-range missiles from Europe is now irreversible. The process of negotiation and the fact of a completed agreement, coupled with the associated briefings has destroyed the public support in Europe for their deployment. Were the Senate to reject the treaty, European governments would undoubtedly be forced by public opinion to insist on the removal of American missiles. The withdrawal of American missiles would thus become a unilateral act without any quid pro quo.

A, confidence in American leadership would be severely undermined. Neutralist sentiment in Europe would gain impetus. The pro-Atlantic element would be further demoralized. The Soviet strategy of dividing the Atlantic Alliance would be enhanced.

For all these reasons, the Senate should consent to ratification.

At the same time, I hope that the Senate would exercise its constitutional advisory role to the following effect:

Future steps toward arms control should be coupled with measures to remove the Soviet conventional superiority overhanging America's allies. It should be made clear that this cannot be accomplished by vague Soviet hints of asymmetrical reductions. At a minimum, the United States must obtain a complete Soviet scheme which lays out what it understands by asymmetry.

B, verification procedures which may be adequate for the INF agreement are almost surely insufficient for the next stage. Verification procedures must deal with three issues: One, the magnitude of a violation necessary to threaten the strategic equilibrium; two, American capabilities, national or as created by the agreement, to monitor potential violations; and three, potential countermeasures.

Onsite inspection is not an end in itself. It must be assessed in relation to the above criteria. It must also be kept in mind that verification cannot make a bad agreement good. It can only make a good agreement enforceable.

C, some relationship must be established between arms control and Soviet political conduct. Clarity must be obtained about parallel Soviet political conduct, especially as to dispatch of arms and surrogates to regions far from Soviet territory, such as Angola and Nicaragua.

D, the strengthening of Atlantic unity must be the highest priority. It requires attention to four components: A common strategy for the decade of the nineties and the next century which includes a relationship between conventional and nuclear weapons and between so-called tactical and strategic forces; two, a common Atlantic diplomacy toward the East, at least with respect to arms control; three, agreement on burdensharing; and four, coordination of actions outside the NATO area, or at a minimum, a mechanism to deal with disagreements.

Mr. Chairman, the longer statement which I will send over later today or first thing in the morning deals with these issues in greater detail, and I am sorry for my misunderstanding of what I was supposed to deal with here and that it prevented me from completing it earlier.

Thank you very much for this opportunity.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Kissinger may be found in the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, indeed, for being with us.

As I have said, we look forward to your fuller statement which will be made part of the record.

I think your being with us is really part of the process of arriving at a sensible conclusion, and if you had not testified or expressed an opinion on it, I think we would all have been very disappointed.

You said, I believe, in Newsweek once that the zero option proposal is an example of American leaders abandoning the European leaders who stake their political positions on American proposals for the nuclear defense of Europe.

Would that be correct?

Dr. KISSINGER. That the zero option proposal—would you repeat that sentence again?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly. I was just distracted by the lights.

You said that the U.S. zero option proposal is an example of American leaders abandoning European leaders who stake their political positions——

Dr. KISSINGER. Correct. Yes, I have stated that.

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if you would enlarge on that.

Dr. KISSINGER. I have stated that.

The CHAIRMAN. But since all the European leaders, or most of them, are supporting this treaty, I am wondering how that jibes with your thought that they feel abandoned.

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, I think that the evolution of the deployment of American intermediate-range weapons in Europe shows the degree to which domestic considerations have tended to influence political thinking in the Atlantic alliance and have gradually created a situation where, in my view, many of these leaders have maneuvered themselves into a position in which they now feel they have no choice except to stand by proposals they never thought would be accepted.

Originally the idea of placing intermediate-range weapons in Europe was based on the desire to counteract a large deployment of Soviet SS–20 missiles. That was probably a conceptual mistake to begin with because the American intermediate-range weapons were not, strictly speaking, an answer to the SS–20's. They were never aimed at the SS–20's.

The reason, if one had thought the thing through, as it was not really probably done on both sides of the Atlantic, one would have come to the conclusion that American intermediate-range missiles in Europe were needed, if at all, in order to compensate for the declining credibility of the American general nuclear deterrent in an age of growing Soviet nuclear forces and multiple warheads. And the deployment of these intermediate-range missiles in Europe had the operational consequence that the Soviet Union could not attack Europe even with conventional forces without running the risk that these intermediate-range missiles would be used because they probably could not imagine that we would permit them to be overrun without using them. And they could not attack those missiles without also attacking the American strategic forces, because otherwise they might have suffered an unacceptable level of damage just from European-based weapons.

In other words, the nuclear defense of Europe and the United States was coupled.

Many European leaders who may not have thought this thing through in all that detail nevertheless favored the deployment of American missiles because it gave them the sense that in some way or other, even if they could not specify it, it tied our defense, our nuclear defense options to theirs.

In order to overcome the enormously violent demonstrations which were unleashed by pacifist, neutralist and pro-Soviet groups against these missiles, they felt the obligation to imply that they were there for arms control purposes and would be subject to negotiation. This was the origin of the zero option which I have opposed ever since it was put forward in 1981 for the reason that I—not that it would not work, but I was afraid that sooner or later it might work.

Now, these European leaders have staked a great deal of domestic capital and most of them are those leaders who have been associated with pro-American positions all along. They now face a domestic situation in which the opponents of the original deployment feel justified by the evolution of events, and their own supporters are dubious.

Now, they do not want to be in a position of attacking the United States and thereby undermining the credibility even further if one has to make a distinction here between the Federal Republic and the nuclear-armed states, specifically Great Britain and France, my analysis of Great Britain and France is that they were so shaken by the Reykjavik potential agreement that they would rather see America remove its nuclear weapons than have us go after their own, which they were afraid we might do after Reykjavik.

And the Germans, it is the pro-Atlantic group that has the most serious doubts and is also in the most difficult position to make them explicit. Nobody can ask to have the United States keep weapons in Europe that America has declared dispensable. This is the problem. And at this point it is also no longer possible, so I am not arguing for reversing the decision.

The **Chairman**. Thank you.

Dr. **Kissinger**. Sorry to have given such an extended answer.

The **Chairman**. In that regard, and with regard to ratification of the INF Treaty, which is what is before us, that rather narrow question, as I understand your testimony, you are not overly enthused about the treaty, but now that it has been signed, your view is it should be ratified, is that correct?

Dr. **Kissinger**. That is correct.

The **Chairman**. Right.

Now, do you believe it should be ratified without any category 1, 2, or 3, any amendments, reservations, and retained in a pristine state, or do you think it should——

Dr. **Kissinger**. I think it should be ratified without any amendments that require renegotiation. I would welcome or I would at least examine on their merits an expression of the Senate's view with respect to subsequent steps that might be taken in negotiations to avoid a situation in which a fait accompli comes before the Senate in a way that produces the sort of discussion we are having today.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you would recommend its ratification without what we would call category 3 amendments.

Dr. KISSINGER. I hate to admit it, Mr. Chairman. I do not know these terms. Without——

The CHAIRMAN. In the SALT treaty that you negotiated, I think they used the words categories 1, 2, and 3 for the old declarations, reservations and amendments. And so I guess what we are talking about here would be an amendment.

Dr. KISSINGER. I would not favor reservations that would require renegotiation. I would not object to the principle of the Senate expressing its views. Or course, I might disagree with the views the Senate expresses, but I would not object to the procedure.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Now, on another subject a little bit, last week a question arose during Dr. Rostow's testimony as to your views on the ABM Treaty interpretation question. Ambassador Smith testified to our committee some months ago that the delegation was instructed to gain Soviet approval to the traditional narrow interpretation. Ambassador Smith indicated you assured him the delegation "carried out its orders," and that you said he could testify to that effect.

Now, does that mean that you support the narrow or the broad interpretation?

Dr. KISSINGER. Frankly, I have attempted to avoid getting into this question because the only way I could answer it responsibly is to review the whole record.

My recollection, unsupported by examining the record, was that we attempted to get the narrow interpretation and could not get Soviet acceptance, but let me state my view with respect to the contemporary, current situation.

I favor an American SDI program. I believe this SDI program should be defined in a more precise manner than it has been and related to an overall strategy, but I favor the principle of an SDI program. I believe that that issue cannot be settled by reinterpreting a treaty that was negotiated 15 years ago.

I believe that the better course would be for the administration to state what it intends to do, notify the Soviets of what it intends to do, and see how they react to it in terms of the treaty, and either adapt the treaty that exists and see whether the Soviets would abrogate it.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

My time has expired.

The ranking minority member, Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Well, it is good to see you again, Dr. Kissinger.

Dr. KISSINGER. Nice to see you.

Senator HELMS. I appreciate your making available in advance a copy of your statement. I read it with great interest. It sounded to me like you were saying for a fat lady, this treaty does not sweat much. [Laughter.]

Let me go over a few points just to emphasize the record.

You stated that you have grave reservations about the proposed treaty.

Dr. KISSINGER. Correct.

Senator HELMS. And those reservations that you have stated include, among others, the following: The agreement does not reduce in any significant degree the Soviet capacity to devastate Europe with nuclear weapons, is that right?

Dr. KISSINGER. That is correct.

Senator HELMS. And you say that the Soviet ICBM's and the SLBM's and airplanes can carry out the missions assigned to the SS–20s and the shorter range weapons.

Dr. KISSINGER. Correct.

Senator HELMS. And you say that the warheads on the missiles will remain in being. That is to say, they will not be destroyed.

Dr. KISSINGER. Correct.

Senator HELMS. And I would point out parenthetically that for a great while during the euphoria about this treaty, the President and the Vice President and the Secretary of State all were saying that the warheads would be destroyed.

You said in your statement that the United States capacity to retaliate against Soviet aggression with nuclear weapons based in Europe is substantially reduced if not eliminated.

Dr. KISSINGER. That is my view.

Senator HELMS. Mine, too.

Dr. KISSINGER. I mean, there are people who argue that there are dual-purpose weapons, but I have my doubts about that.

Senator HELMS. So do I.

And you said that the fact that the United States strategic forces are far away creates what you called a psychological and political imbalance which is magnified by the Soviet presence of superiority in conventional forces.

Dr. KISSINGER. Correct. If NATO were one nation, then the location of the strategic forces would be of purely technical significance. And that is the situation in the Soviet Union.

The place of origin of Soviet nuclear weapons aimed at Europe is not a major matter. The place of origin of nuclear weapons in the defense of Europe is a very important matter because if these weapons are in a different nation and out of any control of the countries concerned or out of any situation in which they would become more or less automatically operationally involved, it creates a psychological imbalance.

Senator HELMS. Now, you say that the INF agreement removes from West Germany only those missiles which can retaliate against the Soviet Union and leaves only those short-range missiles which would explode on German territory and kill the German population, right?

Dr. KISSINGER. That is creating the problem with respect to modernization in the Federal Republic, correct.

Senator HELMS. And you said in your statement that this will have a permanent impact upon West German politics, creating pressures for the total denuclearization of West Germany.

Dr. KISSINGER. Correct.

Senator HELMS. And finally, according to my notes, you say that this political situation would create a "strain within the alliance."

Dr. **Kissinger**. It is a strange kind of strain because nobody is prepared to make it explicit at this point.

Senator **Helms**. Correct. It certainly would create a strain within the alliance.

Is not West Germany, to be blunt about it, the key to NATO's stability?

Dr. **Kissinger**. It has been so conceived in the whole postwar period.

Senator **Helms**. And would not the denuclearization of West Germany permanently cripple the effectiveness of NATO?

Dr. **Kissinger**. Well, the denuclearization of the Federal Republic would almost inevitably lead to a kind of "neutralism" which is the modern word for nationalism in Germany because the denuclearization of Germany makes sense only if it is coupled with a no-first-use doctrine, which then establishes the principle that NATO would prefer to be defeated with conventional weapons rather than use nuclear weapons would also create a situation in which the Federal Republic would not permit the use, either the stationing or the use of weapons on its territory, the risk of which it shifts to other countries, and it would create a strain that may not be visible at first but that in the long term would prove disintegrating of the Atlantic alliance.

I am not saying that this has all happened yet. I am saying the trends are there.

Senator **Helms**. And I agree.

What you see here, Dr. Kissinger, is an example of the importance of arms control negotiations, and I believe you made all these points to the people in high places perhaps prior to the signing of the treaty. I do not know about the timing of your discussions with various people.

Now, these negotiations have brought us together. Sometimes we agree and sometimes we do not. We always agree to disagree agreeably.

Dr. **Kissinger**. Correct.

Senator **Helms**. And it is always a pleasure to see you.

We agree on the defects in the treaty, and furthermore, as I read your statement and listened to you, I did not hear you ascribe any merits to it, so we have a lot in common.

However, you go on to say, and you repeated it a time or two in response to Chairman Pell's questions, that failure to ratify the treaty would not cure its defects, and I think we can agree on that.

But let's turn it around. Would ratification of the treaty cure the defects?

Dr. **Kissinger**. No, ratification of the treaty will not cure its defects, but it will create a basis from which we can then deal I hope constructively with the challenges that the treaty has presented to the Atlantic alliance and to remedy some of the difficulties that it has caused.

Senator **Helms**. Or to put it another way, now that we are 2 or 3 months enceinte, you cannot declare virginity any more.

But I take it that the major reasons you oppose the merits of the treaty, but support ratification, is what you said, that the removal of the Pershing II's is now irreversible?

Dr. **Kissinger**. I believe we would find that if a minority of the Senate, more than one-third but less than a majority, which would happen in the case of nonratification, refused to ratify the treaty, that the European governments would ask us to withdraw them anyway.

Senator **Helms**. Without any quid pro quo?

Dr. **Kissinger**. Without any quid pro quo.

Senator **Helms**. And I suppose you mean we would take our missiles out because of political pressure in Western Europe, but that the Soviets would keep their missiles?

Dr. **Kissinger**. Well, I do not think they need the SS-20's any more.

Senator **Helms**. Well, they have got the SS-25's.

Dr. **Kissinger**. Well, the SS-25's they will keep in any event.

Senator **Helms**. That is correct, because they are not covered by the treaty.

Dr. **Kissinger**. Therefore, their capability to threaten Europe—this is why I said I think their capability to threaten Europe is essentially unimpaired.

Senator **Helms**. I appreciate your candor. You have always been that way.

Now, I know you are aware, Dr. Kissinger, of the many reports in the media and before this committee by previous witnesses concerning the controversy within the intelligence community about the number of SS-20's which the Soviets have produced and deployed.

But specifically, are you aware that the majority of our intelligence agencies believe the number of SS-20's produced to be far in excess of the number declared in the memorandum of understanding of last December? There is a reported wide range of estimates, but a common agreement, except for the State Department and the CIA, that the Soviets have at least, at least, 300 more SS-20's than declared in the MOU. You are aware of that, are you not?

Dr. **Kissinger**. I am aware that some elements of our intelligence community hold this view, but I am not aware that it is a majority. I simply know the views. I am not aware that it is a majority.

Senator **Helms**. Well, I can assure you that it is a majority.

Mr. Chairman, I see that my time is almost up, so I will not begin another question on this round. Thank you very much.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much, Senator Helms.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Kissinger, I listened with interest to the misgivings and concerns you expressed about the treaty in response to the line of questioning that was just pursued and in fact that are set out in your statement.

But let me ask you this question, which you have addressed to some extent. Suppose I took your misgivings at full value and that led me to conclude that the treaty should not be ratified. What would be the consequences of not ratifying the treaty?

Dr. **Kissinger**. But I am not asking you to come to that conclusion. In fact, I am recommending against it. I think that nonratification of the treaty would not cure the doubt that has developed in the minds of those in Europe who originally supported the INF deployment. It would strengthen the argument of neutralists and other opponents of American policy.

It would further demoralize the political situation and raise serious doubts about the American ability to conduct a consistent foreign policy. And for that reason, while I wish we had pursued another line, such as for example the "walk in the woods" agreement that Mr. Nitze made, I now favor, for the reasons I gave—that is, I do not recommend that you come to the conclusion which you indicated.

Senator Sarbanes. Were you supportive of the "walk-in-the-woods" approach at the time that it surfaced?

Dr. Kissinger. Well, it never came to a point in which I was asked to be either supportive or unsupportive. My general view would have been, if I had been asked, which I was not, my general view would have been that I am against reducing anything to zero in Europe, that I would have favored a 50-percent reduction of Pershing's and GLCM's.

The only criticism I would have had of the walk in the woods had I been asked of it is the total elimination of the Pershings. But I would have had no problem, I believe, with the principle of it.

Senator Sarbanes. And you did not indicate your position at the time?

Dr. Kissinger. I do not remember that I did, "No."

Senator Sarbanes. Coming back to the previous question on the onsequences, you said that ratifying the treaty could prove disintegrative of the Atlantic alliance.

Dr. Kissinger. Correct.

Senator Sarbanes. What would be the impact of not ratifying the treaty in that very regard?

Dr. Kissinger. What would be the impact of not ratifying the treaty?

Senator Sarbanes. You earlier said that ratifying the treaty could prove disintegrative of the Atlantic alliance.

Dr. Kissinger. No. If I said that, I misspoke. I said not ratifying the treaty would be disintegrative of the Atlantic alliance.

I think negotiating the treaty has created certain strains in the alliance that are serious, even though they are not very explicit. I do not believe they can be cured by nonratification.

And I think nonratification would be truly disintegrative of the Atlantic alliance today, not ratification.

Senator Sarbanes. Is it likely, in your view, that failure to ratify the treaty would result in a situation in which the INF weapons of the West would be removed while and the Soviets would be able to retain theirs?

Dr. Kissinger. Correct.

Senator Sarbanes. So that we would end up in a situation where they had their missiles, but we did not have ours; would that be the case?

Dr. Kissinger. One of two things would happen. It would be entirely up to the Soviets. Either that would happen or the Soviets would make a big demonstrative gesture and remove their SS–20's without inspection and get the credit for having made a sacrifice for peace while the United States has gone the opposite way.

So, whatever happened, it would not be favorable to us.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Well, either of those developments you would regard as more negative for Western interests than the problems you see connected with ratifying the treaty, is that correct?

Dr. **Kissinger**. Correct.

Senator **Sarbanes**. To what extent does your concern about the treaty relate to a broader concern about the West's overall strategic doctrine, particularly in the wake of Reykjavik?

Dr. **Kissinger**. My basic concern is related to the overall strategic doctrine and to a certain incoherence between declaratory policy and action policy. And it is accentuated by the events at and since Reykjavik.

Senator **Sarbanes**. What do you see as being the essence of that problem?

Dr. **Kissinger**. Well, I think the essence of the NATO problem has several components. One is that since the early days of NATO there has been a very heavy reliance on nuclear weapons.

In fact, it started with the doctrine of massive retaliation, which relied on nuclear weapons exclusively. Nevertheless, there was a demand for the stationing of substantial American forces on the continent, even though in terms of the military doctrine that was being pursued they were not particularly necessary.

The reason they were there was as a kind of tripwire, to guarantee that the United States would have no choice except to engage itself, since the European allies had enough experience from their own practice of allies left in the lurch that they did not want to put us into that position. So therefore there has always been a gap between the conventional deployment in Europe and the doctrine which was underlying it.

Now, in the fifties, up to the middle sixties, this was not a huge difficulty because the United States had a vast nuclear, first an atomic monopoly, then a vast nuclear superiority.

But as the Soviet capacity in nuclear weapons increased, the credibility of the United States risking general nuclear war in the defense of Europe was inevitably going to decline, not because American leaders are unreliable, but because nobody should choose suicide as the only form of military strategy.

But NATO has never been prepared to bite that bullet. And to me, the intermediate range missiles in Europe had the principal consequence of establishing a link between the ground defense of Europe and the nuclear defense of Europe. From a strictly military point of view, they were dispensable; from a psychological point of view, less so.

Now, their removal requires that the NATO doctrine be clarified and that we come to some understanding of what we are trying to accomplish, because otherwise we will repeat exactly the same argument with the short range nuclear weapons that went on originally with the intermediate-range nuclear weapons.

And too much of the debate now is in terms of who wants to shift what risks to what side of the Atlantic. This is the fundamental problem.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Well now, the President this morning said that an attack on Munich would be the same as an attack on Chicago. Are you telling the Europeans they ought not to believe that?

Dr. KISSINGER. I am telling the Europeans that I have every confidence in Ronald Reagan meaning this seriously. But the defense of Europe is a long-term project, and it does not follow that the defense of Munich must be pursued with a strategy that guarantees a universal cataclysm.

I welcome the statement. I think we should make clear that the destiny of Europe and the destiny of America are indissoluble. But that is the beginning of wisdom, not the end of it.

How you implement that statement is the test before us.

Senator SARBANES. Well now, you have recommended in the past that if the Europeans do not spend more on defense, we should take a significant number of our troops out.

Dr. KISSINGER. What I recommended was as follows. I said I would prefer a larger conventional defense of Europe, but if we are going to be suspended between forces that are too large for a tripwire and too small for a conventional defense, then we should do one of two things: We should either get the approval of the Europeans that part of the forces in Europe can be used for third area conflicts in which we are not then trapped into keeping them in Europe, as we were forced to in the 1973 crisis, where we had to fly all around Europe to resupply an ally. Or else in which two of the five divisions be returned to America as strategic reserves.

But this was in the absence of the nuclear redeployment we are now undertaking under the INF agreement. I think under present circumstances, if we follow the INF redeployment with a redeployment of American conventional forces, the crisis of confidence in Europe would become unmanageable.

Senator SARBANES. Would not the decoupling effect of the removal of troops in fact be greater than any decoupling effect of the INF Treaty?

Dr. KISSINGER. If you took out all troops, this certainly would be true. But I am not here recommending that we take out any conventional forces. I think the decision we have taken with respect to nuclear forces makes it in my view politically impossible to withdraw any conventional forces.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Sarbanes.

Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Kissinger, you have argued, and I think persuasively, that we ought to ratify the treaty. But you have offered, as you say, a number of reservations. But I wonder if the initiation and course of the treaty negotiations, which you have not been enthusiastic about, were not inevitable, given the whole course of events from the time of the 1979 NATO political decision, the dual-track approach.

The Soviets did not follow the first track; namely removing the SS-20's, and therefore the credibility of NATO required the deployment of the Pershing II's and Cruise missiles in Europe starting in 1983. And I think the strains that you suggest with regard to NATO were probably there prior to 1983.

I suppose one could argue, as you have in other forums, that there have been strains really throughout the alliance's history.

Dr. KISSINGER. Strains in the alliance are not new. They have existed for a long period, and partly because of the inconsistencies that I have mentioned in reply to Senator Sarbanes.

I believe in retrospect, although I did not, in fairness, think so inevitably in 1979—I started thinking so starting about 1981—I think the dual track decision was a mistake. I think the intermediate-range missiles should have been put there on their merits and been coupled with both conventional and nuclear disarmament or arms control in Europe.

But you are quite right, what happened was an inevitable result of proposals, which in my view were probably made largely for domestic considerations. It was easier to tell one's public that one was prepared to withdraw all these weapons, especially as one never believed the Soviets would accept such a proposal.

Senator LUGAR. I think that is an important statement. I think we have tried to make the point that what is done is done; we ought to ratify this treaty and use it as a basis for consideration of other modernization and arms control decisions.

But I simply raise the point to gain the answer you have given: Even if in 1979 the two-track decision was a mistake, it occurred.

Dr. KISSINGER. I think we are sliding dangerously into the following situation. When NATO was formed, weapons decisions were made on the basis of security considerations. Then later on, arms control negotiations might or might not start, and then existing weapons deployments were used in the bargaining that followed, as is the case today with many of the strategic forces.

In the late seventies, it developed that the Soviets began to assert a right to comment and intervene in unilateral NATO weapons decisions. And even though the SS–20's had already been deployed without any challenge by the West, NATO felt obliged to adopt a double-track decision, which meant that they would first negotiate with the Soviets, which delayed the deployment by 4 years to begin with.

And it then created the premise that these two weapons were equivalent, which they are not, and led almost inevitably logically to the zero option. And we now see it is happening with respect to short-range weapons which nobody ever conceived were the subject of prior approval by the Warsaw Pact, whether we can modernize weapons that were already in Germany, that had been put into Germany without the slightest opposition by anybody.

And gradually, the Soviets may be getting a veto over our deployments through these domestic processes in the West, not just in the United States.

Senator LUGAR. Well, even if one were to agree that the 1979 decision was a mistake, is it not also true that it would have been difficult to gain that degree of accord in NATO in 1979 necessary to deploy intermediate-range nuclear forces?

Dr. KISSINGER. That is true, that is absolutely true.

Senator LUGAR. Without the two-track.

Dr. KISSINGER. I do not know what I would have done had I been in Government at the time.

Senator LUGAR. This was one of the strains in NATO at the time.

Dr. KISSINGER. I am speaking as an outsider and as an analyst.

Senator LUGAR. But in any event, that occurred. Then in 1983 we faced very great problems, which you will recall. You were back and forth to Germany. Many of us were.

Dr. KISSINGER. I think that the administration and the German Chancellor showed tremendous courage and deserve a lot of credit for persevering in their course.

Senator LUGAR. That was highlighted again last week with the visit of Chancellor Kohl and the public toast of Secretary Shultz, wherein he congratulated the Chancellor for remaining steadfast.

But again, during conversations with the Chancellor, there emerged the implications that the dual-track approach adopted with respect to deployment and prospective elimination of intermediate-range nuclear forces might again be employed on the issue of modernizing NATO's tactical or battlefield nuclear systems, that support by the Chancellor for this needed modernization program would be conditioned on an express U.S. willingness to negotiate reductions in or the elimination of this category of weapon systems.

I mention of this because it is so important that we grasp the significance of your conclusion regarding the potential pitfalls of another "dual-track approach" to tactical or battlefield systems.

Dr. KISSINGER. I am very uneasy with what I see happening. First of all, I think 3 years ago Chancellor Kohl would have agreed o modernization of the Lances. It would not have been any domestic issue at all. It would have happened.

In fact, they agreed to it and many people were not even aware that that decision had been taken. Now, I noticed in some testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, one of the German witnesses who is for the modernization nevertheless felt hat it had to be tied into an arms control package that was geared o the removal of some of the nuclear weapons, plus some other onsiderations.

And before we know it, we are going to have slid down the road gain where the principle of zero in the short range field is accept-d for some undefined quid pro quo, and then we are well on the way to the denuclearization of Germany, which I think is a disaster for the West.

I would urge the greatest care at this time in going down that road.

Senator LUGAR. I would agree.

Let me just ask this question. With regard to our European allies, What is your own judgment about their willingness to defend themselves at this point?

Dr. KISSINGER. I think one of the potentially good results of Reykjavik and the INF agreement, neither of which I would have recommended is that the defense-oriented Europeans are now more willing to consider a common European defense effort, and to push European unity into the field of defense.

I think the challenge to the United States is to be receptive to his effort. The United States has so far favored European economic unity but has been less willing to support defense unity, out of ear that this might be disruptive of the Atlantic alliance.

In my view, European economic unity is likely to be inherently ompetitive with the United States. In defense, I cannot conceive of an Eastern threat to Europe in which Europe would not be better off with American support than without American support. So, it is likely to bring us together.

And I hope that the United States supports efforts to strengthen the United States-European union and efforts by France and Britain to coordinate their nuclear efforts. This would be some way to restore balance to the Atlantic relationship.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Cranston.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you.

We welcome you once again, Dr. Kissinger, and we are delighted to have you here.

Dr. KISSINGER. Thank you.

Senator CRANSTON. You think that the INF Treaty would make any significant difference in the long term, absent interim restraint and limits ultimately on strategic weapons? So, would it be advisable for us to promote interim restraint pending agreement on the START Treaty?

Dr. KISSINGER. Interim restraint on American strategic programs?

Senator CRANSTON. On American and Soviet both.

Dr. KISSINGER. Strategic programs? I must say, Senator, that I have not thought about this, and I do not know what specific programs would be involved.

I personally favor single warhead mobile missiles, and I would hate to see the United States give those up. They do not add to the instability of the situation. In fact, they would contribute to the stability of the situation. So I would be reluctant to give up that option.

Senator CRANSTON. Do the Soviets look upon it as contributing to stability?

Dr. KISSINGER. Single-warhead weapons? Well, they are developing mobile single-warhead missiles, and it would be odd if we are not permitted to do what they have already done.

Senator CRANSTON. I am only questioning, if you say it would contribute to stability if we do it, how would they view it? Is this a contribution to stability or not?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, to the extent that our strategic land-based force is now becoming vulnerable, which I believe it is, they would of course prefer the situation in which we would remain in a position of vulnerability. But I do not think that single warhead mobile missiles, or indeed mobile missiles, even if they are multiple warheads, add to the threat to them.

They add to our security.

Senator CRANSTON. In the early 1970's, when the two superpowers had roughly the same strategic power or were moving toward parity, the United States was seeking reductions in its strategic arms without requiring that NATO redress the conventional disparities which existed then. You advanced that policy at that time, and that was supported by our NATO allies.

Recently you wrote that: "In the future, reduction of strategic forces must be synchronized with a substantial reduction of conventional forces." So, what I want to ask you is, what has happened to change your view? Has the conventional situation deteriorated so much from that point of view in the 1980's that a fundamental shift in United States and NATO arms policies is needed and linkage is now necessary?

Dr. **Kissinger**. In the early seventies we were not actually negotiating any significant reductions. We were negotiating ceilings on forces. SALT I established the ceiling approximately where it was in the unilateral programs of the two sides, and there were no significant reductions envisaged at the time.

Moreover, in the early 1970's we had multiple warheads and they did not yet.

In the current situation, I believe we face the problem that it is becoming harder and harder to visualize what a security advisor or Secretary of Defense or Secretary of State or Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would tell a President the objective of a strategic nuclear war initiated from the United States would be in response to a conventional attack, and therefore, I believe that we are heading into a situation in which the overhang of the Soviet conventional forces on the territories adjoining them is becoming a more serious problem than it was in the early seventies.

In 1973, at the time of the Middle East war, there was an increase in the readiness of our nuclear forces. At that time we had, I forget, we still had a very vast superiority in warheads over the Soviet Union. In the early nineties this would not be the case. Our land-based forces would probably be vulnerable to a Soviet nuclear attack and without a reciprocal ability to hold theirs hostage.

So, I believe that we now need to address the conventional imbalance in a way.

Now, in my statement to the committee, I said that at a minimum before we proceed, we have to know what the Soviets understand by the asymmetrical reductions they are proposing. I am not saying the negotiation has to be completed. I am saying we have to get a conceptual understanding of what it is they understand by asymmetrical reductions. When the Soviet delegations were here for the summit, I asked one or two of them, and they said we have to trade airplanes for tanks.

Well, this will continue the process in which our ability to respond from Europe is being eliminated. And that would worry me greatly. I would like to know what it is they have in mind before we take the next step.

Senator **Cranston**. Well, interim restraint on strategic weapons might help because without it the Soviets can build many more SS-25's, they can retarget some of them or target some of them on Europe, defeating the purpose of the INF treaty, and that presumably would not be delightful from the point of view of the NATO alliance.

Dr. **Kissinger**. No.

Senator **Cranston**. So some type of strategic ceilings could contribute——

Dr. **Kissinger**. I would have to know what it is that is supposed to be restrained before I could make a judgment on it.

Senator **Cranston**. Yes, of course you would.

One question, if we did seek to link conventional progress to fulfillment of a START treaty, that could cause a long delay in getting to it with START. Gorbachev, as you know, has made some interesting statements about a desire to redress the imbalance and to make asymmetrical adjustments in Europe in conventional forces.

Do you have any suggestions as to how, with some reasonable dispatch and swiftness, we can come to grips with that and explore and find out how serious those statements really are?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, of course, I was working when I was an academician on arms control since its beginning. But I think more students of arms control will agree that studies that have been made have concerned almost exclusively nuclear matters, and that the conventional issue has not been addressed with equal seriousness.

I have only, myself started thinking about it recently, and I received some briefings, for which I hold no brief, but which I found rather impressive, which suggested that the imbalance in Europe is such that reductions of less than 5-to-1 in our favor in the conventional forces would actually make the situation worse. I have not made these studies myself, but they were done by serious people.

Now, even if one negotiated specific reductions, one would have a massive problem of verification, and one would have to determine what is one talking about? Do these forces have to be disbanded, do they have to be moved to another part of Soviet and Western territory? Any force that is reduced in Germany or in Western Europe would probably have to be demobilized. I mean, there is no place you can put them in Germany or the low countries that would provide an adequate buffer.

So, these are very serious questions, and this is why in my statement I said that if we could agree as to a concept without yet having negotiated it that gives us an idea of what such a balance would look like, one could proceed with START, which is different from what I wrote in my article.

Senator CRANSTON. You are talking of concept and not a concrete negotiated agreement.

Dr. KISSINGER. Yes, but I would like the Soviets to table a proposal of what they mean by conventional arms control. Where are their units going to be, who does away with what? And if we hear that we have to take all our strike aircraft out of Europe in return for *x* number of tanks, then we have a problem that we are dealing here with an attempt to neutralize Europe rather than to establish a balance.

I would like to know how they conceive it. Then we can have a debate.

We do not have to—every detail—I mean, to negotiate the details will take a long time.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Mr. Chairman, I came in late. Let me yield to Senator Evans because he has been here. Senator Boschwitz came in late, too. [Laughter.]

But do not forget me. Come back.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Evans.

Senator EVANS. Are you speaking for Senator Boschwitz?

Senator KASSEBAUM. Yes, I was. I was afraid he would jump in.

Senator EVANS. I thank you, Senator Kassebaum and Mr. Chairman.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. What about me?

Senator EVANS. Yes, of course. I always defer to my colleague.

In your statement you mentioned that some relationship must be established between arms control and Soviet political conduct. Clarity must be obtained about parallel Soviet political conduct, especially the dispatch of arms and surrogates to regions as far from Soviet territory such as Angola and Nicaragua. That is at the bottom of page 2.

Dr. KISSINGER. Yes.

Senator EVANS. Could you elaborate on what you mean by "some relationship" and be more specific as to what you think that relationship ought to be in terms of future steps in arms control, or any reservation that ought to be attached to the INF Treaty itself.

Dr. KISSINGER. Now, let me make an observation that may be uncharacteristically humble, and you may not hear many of them in the course of the testimony.

When you are an outsider commenting on these things, you are not in a position to give detailed answers to all of these questions. I will give you an answer, but if you do not like my answer, that does not mean that if the President and the Secretary of State give an instruction to come up with an answer to this question, that 15,000 people in the State Department and 20,000 people in the Defense Department might not come up with a better answer than I can come up with by myself. I offer that as a theoretical possibility. [Laughter.]

Senator EVANS. That did not sound very humble.

Dr. KISSINGER. No. [Laughter.]

The problem seems to me to be this. Historically we face in the Soviet Union a country that has, both under tsars and commissars, has constantly expanded. It is impossible to find a 50-year period of history in which it has not expanded in some direction. And if you get a historical atlas and compare the Soviet empire or Russian empire at the end of any century starting with 1603 when the Romanovs came in, you can find this expansion.

So, how to establish an equilibrium between a country that is 11 times ours and its neighbors is an inherently difficult problem and is at the heart of security issues.

Now, I am not insisting that one begins with its neighbors, and I know that many people say, and correctly, that Russia and the Soviet Union have often been invaded; and therefore they have a peculiar sensitivity on the issue of security. But Angola and Nicaragua are about as far away from the Soviet Union as you can get in this world, and it is my understanding, I am told by governmental people whom you have a better opportunity to question than I, that a billion dollars worth of arms was sent to Angola last year, plus Russian military personnel, and $600 million of arms were sent to Nicaragua.

I hold no brief for these figures, but they have been told to me by authoritative people whom I believe.

Now, this cannot be reconciled with any normal defensive objective of the Soviet Union. And so it can only be reconciled with an attempt to undermine any equilibrium or to preserve any position that they have achieve once they have achieved it by whatever method.

I consider the sending of Soviet arms to Nicaragua an unfriendly act. It serves no conceivable Soviet security interest other than weakening the American position in Central America and in the Western Hemisphere. Angola is more complex, but it is also far from any normal Soviet area of strategic concern.

What I am looking for is something like the Chinese approach to the Soviets. If I understand the Chinese approach to the Soviets, they are saying we do not care what suit you wear, Mr. Gorbachev, and glasnost is your problem, not our problem. We have three problems with you: Soviet troops in Afghanistan, Soviet troops along our border, and Vietnamese troops with Soviet weapons in Cambodia. One of these has to be solved before any progress can be made. All of them have to be solved to have normal relations.

I would like a debate in our country of what our genuine political and security concerns are and what it is we can reasonably expect the Soviet Union to do. And if my answers to those questions are not adequate, then let somebody else come up with it. But it cannot go on that everything on our side of the line is subject to undermining and everything on their side of the line is sacrosanct without sooner or later leading to a confrontation which is in nobody's interest.

That is my concern.

Senator EVANS. In terms of timing would you have this done now or in conjunction with the INF Treaty ratification or subsequent to that? And in terms of type, would these negotiations be better carried on, or the debate that you suggest be better carried on in public, in private negotiations with the Soviets, or part of each?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, I do not think it can be, it cannot be linked to the INF agreement because of the reasons that I have already given, although I would certainly personally welcome it, if the Senate saw fit to express its view that the political issues need to be dealt with side by side with the weapons issues, I believe that might be helpful as a nonbinding expression of a Senate consensus.

Now, should it be done privately or should it be done publicly? I think on both. Now, there is a ritual in which so-called third area conflicts are on every agenda of every Secretary of State and of every summit meeting, but my impression is that they are almost never pursued with the intensity and precision that the arms control negotiations are pursued, partly because they do not lend themselves to as concrete formulations. But I think they should be.

In dealing with the Soviets on the subject, I always thought that, on the governmental level, a private communication by the President and/or the Secretary of State in which they express with some considerable precision their conviction that this process of constant political offensives must lead to a confrontation sooner or later and that we could easily slide into a world crisis that way, would at least test whether a serious dialog on that subject is possible rather than simply put it on an agenda and then see what happens.

Senator EVANS. I thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Dodd.

And I would add at the end of Senator Dodd's 10 minutes there will be a 5 minute recess.

Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and Dr. Kissinger, we welcome you back to familiar settings before this committee.

In the November and December 1979 issue of Survival, a publication of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, you wrote a piece called "NATO the Next Thirty Years," and in that piece you spoke of the future of NATO. You explained that NATO was facing a crisis because the Soviet Union had reached parity in strategic arms and had a decided advantage in theater nuclear forces.

You said, and I quote from the piece "It is also necessary that either the Soviet nuclear threat in theater nuclear forces against Europe be eliminated (which I do not see is possible)"—that was a parenthetical remark—"or an immediate effort be made to build up theater nuclear forces."

As you know, of course, we built up the INF forces in the mid-seventies. Your statement indicated that absent the Soviet SS-20's, we would not need Pershing II's and GLCM's.

Dr. KISSINGER. No, I did not say that because I never heard of—did I use those words?

Senator DODD. No, no, I am sorry. I mean, that was an interpolition that absent those, that we would not need the Pershing II or GLCM's.

What I would like to know is what leads you to conclude that eliminating our INF missiles would bring about decoupling now if it was a either/or situation then?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, this was not an article, this was a transcript of an extemporaneous speech I gave to a conference in Brussels, and I think you will agree that when you read that speech, that 99 percent of it deals with the declining credibility of strategic nuclear forces, and an appeal to Europeans to face the facts of the eighties and nineties. The 30 years was given by the editor of that journal. I made no such claim, I hope not, anyway, in the speech.

I have been asked that question before, so I have had a chance to look at my speech. I think the reference to the SS-20's and to what is now called INF was a parenthetical comment and was not even remotely central to my argument, which indicated that I had not thought through the problem.

I would say that starting in 1981, when I had thought more about the problem, I took the consistent position that in the sixties and seventies we still had a considerable strategic superiority, at least until the middle seventies, and then we had a period of grace because thinking does not adjust to strategic and technological realities as rapidly as it should. So, we still got credit for having a strategic superiority.

But starting in the eighties, it was obvious, at least to me, that the strategic nuclear threat based on weapons that were based in the United States or at sea would no longer be adequate, and that the INF would be at least an intermediate measure to create a certain automaticity in our response and therefore create a hesitation in potential aggressors.

So, there was a 2-year gap in which I had to elaborate my own thinking. After that I believe I took a fairly consistent position.

Senator DODD. Well, I did not know what the background was, and I appreciate your explaining that.

Dr. KISSINGER. This was a speech made I think toward the middle of 1979 and then was——

Senator DODD. November-December is when they published this. It is late in 1979.

Dr. KISSINGER. Yes. It was made obviously somewhat earlier, but it is a transcript of it.

Senator DODD. Let me quote another transcript to you, and I know this is dangerous to do, particularly from "Crossfire."

Dr. KISSINGER. That is from "Crossfire"?

Senator DODD. The "Crossfire" show, and I have raised this with others to hear their responses, but I quote you from that TV program. You said:

> The presence of the Pershings and the Cruise missiles in Europe established an organic relationship between the defense of Europe and the defense of the United States. That is, the Soviets cannot be sure if they attack Europe with conventional forces that we would permit our weapons to be overrun without using them.
>
> Now the defense depends on weapons that are not seen, that are far away, where we are negotiating a 50-percent cut in them.

One of our earlier witnesses here, Walter Slocombe, testifying before the committee, said the following. He said "The idea that it makes a lot of difference for the Soviets where the warheads that strike them come from is typically a Western one," meaning, of course that it makes no difference for the Soviets whatsoever.

Mr. Slocombe, I might point out, was responding to a point by General Rogers, but it also clearly applies to your argument, and let me just add a point here. We have 300,000 U.S. personnel in Western Europe with dependents, our NATO forces.

An attack against them would be an attack against us, why is that any less of a coupling. In fact, arguably an even stronger one since U.S. personnel would be directly involved as long as they remain there. Why does that not keep that coupling together even in the absence of the ground-launched Cruise missiles and the Pershings?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, Walter Slocombe is a man of extraordinary intelligence whom I have known since he was a student at Harvard and I was a young professor there, and for a brief period he either worked on my staff or as a consultant to my staff.

I think the difference here is between whether you look at this problem from the point of view of systems analysis or from the point of view of political decisionmaking. If you look at it from the point of view of systems analysis, you look at NATO as one strategic area, and within that context, it does not make any difference where the weapons are located, assuming that there is a uniform readiness to use them. If you look at it from the point of view of political decisionmaking, however, then you do not look at NATO as a single area, and you know that there is not a uniform readiness to use them.

The utility of the INF weapons stationed in Europe was as follows. Certainly one should not put the issue in terms of total credibility and total incredibility. It will move through many shades of gray before one gets into a black-and-white situation. One therefore talks about relative weights.

I think a situation will arise or has arisen or is about to arise—this is again one of those gray areas—in which honesty requires one to say that the decision, if anything, it is left to a formal political decision with a lot of time, it will not be easy to make an argument for the use of strategic nuclear weapons, especially when they have been designed, partly, frankly, under congressional pressures, in such a way that they are not useful for military targeting but largely for bringing about cataclysmic outcomes.

Certainly the overrunning of American forces would create a presumption that we will do something, but Secretary McNamara has said that he had made a private decision—he said so publicly—never to recommend to the President the use of strategic nuclear weapons, or for all I know, of any nuclear weapons. There have been many flat statements to that effect. Chancellor Schmidt has said publicly that he had made the private decision to surrender before anything like this happened.

Now, these are facts that one has to keep in mind. The presence of the intermediate-range weapons in Europe was a crude way by which a Soviet leader, looking at them, had to calculate that whatever foolishness the Americans might commit, they would not permit those weapons to be overrun without having authorized somebody to fire them. If they were fired, even if they attacked these weapons, then, and even if they got 95 percent of them, the remaining 5 percent would do huge damage in the Soviet Union, that they could not accept while leaving the United States undisturbed, and therefore they could only attack those weapons while also attacking the United States.

And that, I am assuming, they were no more ready to do than we were the reverse, although I must say their weapons are more designed for military operations than ours are, and this is another factor that must influence our perception.

This is why I paid such particular attention to the INF forces.

Senator Dodd. Just a quick response to this. But then implicit in your response there is the notion that a President would be far more likely to use Pershing II's than strategic weapons.

Dr. Kissinger. No, implicit in this response is that the Soviets looking at it would figure that he had delegated the authority to use them to the NATO commander, even if this was not necessarily the case, and that therefore add to the deterrent effect.

Senator Dodd. Thank you. My time has expired.

The Chairman. Thank you very much.

We will now take a 5-minute recess.

[A brief recess was taken.]

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Kansas, Mrs. Kassebaum.

Senator Kassebaum. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Kissinger, I would like to ask a couple of questions on verification and compliance.

You were instrumental in negotiating SALT I and really ever since then we have been concerned about verification. We have argued the merits or demerits of the Standing Consultative Commission. Under the INF Treaty there is a call for the Special Verification Commission.

I found quite interesting what you said in your statement regarding new verification procedures must deal with three issues, and then you lay them out. I was wondering what, in your view, you would recommend in handling the compliance issues in the future.

Do you think that the verification, the new Verification Commission, as it is structured, has some merit? Or do you feel that basically we are going to have to have the ability to know what we want to do with it once we feel there is noncompliance?

Dr. KISSINGER. Let me make a general observation. As I have viewed these arms control negotiations, every agreement is sold to the Senate and to the public with the proposition that there will be very fierce insistence on compliance and that the administration will be extremely vigilant. And this is very sincere.

Then opponents of the agreement often use verification as an issue, first to question it, when it is up for ratification, and afterward to try to find violations. Now, some of these violations are genuine violations and some of them are technical violations.

And so very soon a defensive cast of mind develops in the administration in office when it is confronted with technical violations to the effect that it is being harassed. Then the whole debate goes off the deep end. Because there are some violations that are not threatening to the agreement, and not intended to be.

I remember one apparent violation that occurred when I was in Government where the Soviets were building in every missile field one additional silo. And that amounted to about 60 silos.

Now, that looked like a violation. On the other hand, they were saying this was a command-and-control silo. And I would have to go on television and express my doubts.

Then somebody would say, "Would it not be nice to have a Secretary of State who does not defend the Soviets?" My view was that if the Soviets wanted to violate the agreement, they would not build one silo in each field. And what would they do with 60 additional silos?

So, our debate ought to be more bipartisan on this issue, and ought to have clearer criteria of what we are talking about.

Now, it seems to me we ought to make a study in each agreement that is made and it ought to be part of the ratification procedure in which one understands what magnitude of violation is needed to affect the strategic balance.

Now, in the INF agreement, it is rather difficult to do that, because I do not believe the Soviets have a huge incentive to cheat on the SS-20's, since they can achieve their objectives in so many other ways.

But let us talk about START. What magnitude of violation is needed? What inspection mechanism, what do our intelligence agencies believe, our existing intelligence mechanisms? Can they catch that violation? And third, what do we do if we catch a violation?

Theoretically, we take it to the Standing Consultative Commission, or whatever it is called. But the fact is, nothing ever happens really there. So, it depends what the Soviets think you can do unilaterally.

With respect to the INF, while I do not think that the Soviets have a high incentive to violate, I also do not think we have any means of retaliating, because if they deployed SS-20's again after some time, no European country would permit us to put Pershings and GLCM's back into Europe. So that we have practically no equivalent countermeasures left. These are things to analyze.

Now, with respect to this new procedure, we have to take care that particular slogans do not become a substitute for concrete action. We have talked ourselves into the importance of onsite inspection. And we think this is a great success that we have achieved, some onsite inspection.

I must tell you, I am not so sure this is necessarily the case. Onsite inspection should be judged like any other method, on what it actually adds to our national means. Now, you take the INF inspection. As I understand it, we can only look at those areas they have designated as base areas. We cannot look at the others.

Now, if you have a very large house and it is suspected of being a weapons depot, and somebody says you can look at those 3 rooms but you cannot look at the other 25 rooms, have you made progress toward onsite inspection especially if you cannot even challenge the original data they give you and go into areas which they have not designated as base areas?

Second, is the question of bureaucratic management. It is my understanding that we need about 600 to 700 people to operate this system. They have to report to somebody. And this somebody has to report to somebody.

And how are you going to get it to the attention of the top people who have to make the assessment? And how can you keep it from the endless controversies that arise between those who want to maintain the agreement and therefore lean over backward in one direction, and those who want to scrap the agreement and may lean over too far in the other direction?

I do not want to be misunderstood. I am not against onsite inspection. But we ought to analyze onsite inspection the same way, there is nothing sacrosanct about it.

I would analyze it in the same way I analyze national inspection. Does it meet the three criteria that are put forward here? Or any other criteria that we might set up?

And are we running the risk now that we may get 50 percent START agreement? Now, with INF, all we need to do is to find out that there is no weapon, but how do you count 50 percent? It is a much more stringent system.

Now, do we need 5,000? And how do we build them into our decisionmaking system? I think this requires some careful thought, and I would be interested to get an intelligence analysis of the degree to which they think, by what percentage do they think the onsite system of INF adds to our national capacities.

I do not know what the answer is, whether they think it is significant or not.

Senator **Kassebaum**. Adds to our national capacities for what?

Dr. **Kissinger**. For finding SS-20's, our overhead reconnaissance, or whatever other means we have.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I would only say that I think there are about 300 inspectors. I do not think it makes a whole lot of difference.

Let me ask you, when you say we are limited, and that indeed is true, would we be comfortable having that many more of our bases open to inspection?

Dr. KISSINGER. Absolutely not. I am not attacking on-site inspection. I am just saying what we ought to keep in mind is that verification cannot make a bad agreement good. As I said, it can only make a good agreement enforceable.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Nearly everybody has felt that actually the type of verification procedures that were worked out for INF really could not be transferred to START.

Dr. KISSINGER. That is right. But I do not know what the alternatives are.

Senator KASSEBAUM. And no one else seems to either, at this point.

I have a question on conventional, but I am afraid to start it at this point. So, I will just yield back my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Kassebaum. Senator Kerry?

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I join my colleagues in welcoming you.

I would like to explore, a question raised in your answer to Senator Cranston. I think you said to him that the conventional force balance in Europe is substantially worse now than it was in 1973.

Dr. KISSINGER. No. I would argue that the impact of the conventional force balance is more serious than it was in 1973.

Senator KERRY. Now, when you say the impact you mean the impact——

Dr. KISSINGER. That is in 1973 we could probably tolerate a greater degree of inequality in conventional forces because we still had a much larger number of warheads than they did. And their strategic buildup was not nearly as complete as now.

At that time, they still had dug many holes that they had not filled yet.

Senator KERRY. Well, it is time that the Soviets have had some significant increases, that they have modernized and we certainly understand the degree to which they have modernized.

But at the same time, we have introduced the F-16, the F-15, the multiple-launch rocket systems, we have had the best sensor system in the world with the AWAC's. This is in contrast to 1973, when we had significant troop problems by virtue of the war in Vietnam, where we were concentrating our forces. There were drug problems, race relation problems, equipment shortages, and so forth.

All of that having changed and our own generals, admirals, et cetera, arguing that there is now functional equality, I wonder where you feel that equality? Where specifically is this imbalance?

Dr. KISSINGER. ~~Well,~~ I believe there are a number of factors to be considered.

One, the Soviet Union has a geographic advantage, which is inherent in geography. They have interior lines of communication, and therefore they can shift their forces between their various fronts much more easily than we can.

Second, it is, at least every military person that I have talked to, plus the studies that I have seen, for example, at the Rand Corp., in which the war games, various outcomes indicate that on any hypothesis the Soviets would make very significant territorial gains, even in a purely conventional combat, even assuming generalship is equally good on both sides.

Third, there is the problem that history has shown that conventional deterrence is a very chancy enterprise. For hundreds of years there have been wars in Europe between countries that were thought to be evenly matched, which nevertheless did not keep either side from starting a war.

In fact, Germany achieved big victories in World War I and defeated France in World War II, even though the total number of its forces was less than that of its opponents. And the reason for it was that they concentrated their forces at the strategic points.

So, for all of these reasons, I agree with the view of almost every military commander that I know, as well as the studies of the Rand Corp., that the Soviets have a significant conventional edge in Europe, even granting that we have done a good job since building and strengthening it. And I do not want to use 1973 as a baseline.

My argument about 1973 was in relation to our nuclear alert, and to the reason why the threat of general nuclear war was more credible in 1973 than it will be in 1993.

Senator KERRY. But what you are saying essentially relies on conventional as the critical ingredient in an equation of deterrence or stability.

Dr. KISSINGER. We have to strengthen conventional capabilities. I would not like to make these sharp divisions between conventional and nuclear.

I think we have to develop some concept of war fighting for nuclear weapons, if we are going to rely on nuclear deterrence. Otherwise, we may produce a cataclysm of some effect.

Senator KERRY. Let me step beyond that for a moment and ask you this. You referred to the ability to retarget and to shift other weapons in a number of your answers today.

Dr. KISSINGER. I did not use those words, but you are correct. That is what I implied.

Senator KERRY. That is the essence of what I heard you saying.

Dr. KISSINGER. You are correct.

Senator KERRY. Is it therefore in your view desirable for the United States to try to negotiate interim restraints on additional launchers or targeting in order to deal with that question?

Dr. KISSINGER. I have been asked that question before. And I gave perhaps not too clear a reply. It is an idea that I have not heard. I heard it with respect to SDI. And I favor SDI. Or I favor some version of SDI.

With respect to strategic weapons, it is my impression that the Soviets have developed a family of new weapons, SS-25's, SS-24's, while the ones which we really need are either mobile Minuteman or mobile MXs or Midgetman do not exist yet.

So I would be extremely reluctant, in fact I would oppose any attempt to restrain mobility of our side.

Senator KERRY. Well, I am not suggesting restraining mobility. But I am asking whether——

Dr. KISSINGER. Interim restraints on numbers?

Senator KERRY. On numbers.

Dr. KISSINGER. I frankly have not thought about that. On offensive weapons, so far as I know, we are not planning to increase our numbers.

Senator KERRY. Well, in the absence of that, if the Soviet Union can retarget, let us say, using SS-25's or others, as they could anyway, I mean they could do it before, they could do it now.

Dr. KISSINGER. That is right, that is not new.

Senator KERRY. But in the absence of that, which would be the center of a START agreement, does this treaty down the road have any meaning, if you do not get those restraints or get a START agreement?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, I will tell you candidly, as one of the people who was active in seminars that developed arms control, I really think that all of arms control theory should be rethought.

It has developed a sort of mechanical quality where all reductions are considered of equal quality. I have attempted, for example, to put the numbers of the 50-percent reduction into outcomes. I mean, what forces would then exist?

I think all of you who have done it or who can get it done will find that the ratio of warheads aimed at our missiles will increase rather than decrease, and therefore I ask myself, what are we trying to accomplish?

Is this simply a theological exercise in which we prove to ourselves that we can do it? Our aircraft are reduced, our submarines are reduced, but the antiaircraft defenses and the antisubmarine defenses are not reduced. But the antimissile defenses, we are told, have to be reduced.

Now, can somebody take a step back and analyze where we are trying to go and what we are trying to achieve before we start rushing into numbers exercises?

Senator KERRY. I agree with you completely about the current START instructions. They may not improve our security if they result in almost a 10-to-1 ratio of their missiles against our land-based missiles that would take us back in time. I am not sure if you agree with that.

Dr. KISSINGER. My calculations show about 5-to-1. But it does not make any difference. It makes it worse. It makes the vulnerability of, I agree with it, in the current START negotiations increase the vulnerability of our land-based missiles.

And therefore it is not self-evident to me what has been accomplished, and second, if at the same time we say we are going to rely on those missiles to defend Europe, we are creating a big gap in credibility.

Senator KERRY. Mr. Secretary, my yellow light is on. I do want to follow up on that. So, I would like to maybe wait for a second round.

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, I am sorry. I am giving such long answers.

Senator KERRY. No, you are not. It is very helpful for the record. I would just like to come back to it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Boschwitz.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome, Mr. Secretary.

I would like you to go off on a different course for just a moment. You said that the Russians, spending in 1987 600 million dollars' worth of arms, which is a figure that you said was given to you——

Dr. KISSINGER. It was given to me by authoritative sources.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. You said it was given to Nicaragua, and that was an unfriendly act. You also said that it served no national defense purpose and so forth.

And you also spoke about Angola and the $1 billion that went down that way. I wonder if you would assess for me how serious and how realistic you feel Mr. Gorbachev has been about withdrawing from Afghanistan? Certainly the considerations are much different there.

Dr. KISSINGER. It is a good question. I find it hard to answer because my instinct would be that it would be totally unprecedented for them to withdraw from a country.

And therefore, while I have serious doubts about the agreement we are discussing here, I would consider a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, under conditions that do not facilitate their ultimate domination, I would consider it a significant event.

They certainly talk as if they are going to withdraw. Which also is a tribute to our determination in supplying the freedom fighters there. We will know in a few weeks how serious he is. It has gone further than I thought it would.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. I agree. You know, it seems strange that a country that would expend those kind of funds so far away from home would suddenly be really serious about withdrawing from a country——

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, it could be that the adjoining Moslem areas of the Soviet Union become too restive under the impact of it.

It could be that the casualties are too heavy. It could be a regrouping. It could be that they may even believe that they could hold on to a dominant position there. But it is an unusual step.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. In talking about the Pershings and GLCM's and the fact that the Russians would have to calculate that the Americans would do something rather than allowing those weapons to be overrun, that that was a serious deterrent that you could not equivalently get from something that is based in North Dakota or Montana.

I wonder how you would characterize the other weapons that we have? Submarine weapons, what would their calculations have to be? Or the F-111's in Great Britain. Would the same type of calculation be made—they are not the cataclysmic type of weapons.

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, first of all, the submarines cannot be seen. I think they would calculate that the likelihood of using submarines is the same as the likelihood of using Minuteman or MX's, that it would require a Presidential decision with respect to any prudent President would take a reasonable amount of time.

The "advantage," in quotation marks, of the land-based missiles in Europe was that the rate at which they would have to be fired was dependent on the speed of their own operations. So that the danger of their being overrun would determine the probability of their being fired.

This is not true of submarines. It is also not really true of the F-111's in Britain, which for these purposes are also outside the combat theater. Moreover, these F-111's in Britain are all on one base. And it is easier to get rid of one base than of dispersed mobile missiles.

But certainly I do not say they are of no deterrent value.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. But the fact that they are easier to get rid of because they are on one base must also serve as a deterrent?

Dr. KISSINGER. That is true. I think the F-111's constitute some deterrent advantage. But they were always there.

I mean, we cannot have it both ways. We cannot say those weapons were of no significance, and second that their removal is a major contribution to arms control.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. But the fact that a different type of decision-making process is necessary to use them makes a different type of deterrence, I think would be your argument.

Dr. KISSINGER. Correct.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Dr. Edward Teller was here yesterday, and unfortunately not all of my colleagues were here to hear him.

But he, in a way, conditioned his advice to us, in voting "yes" on the treaty, on the further development of SDI and also added that fewer weapons made the SDI in effect more effective, more valuable, and that he therefore spurred us on with respect to combining the research and development necessary for the SDI.

I wonder if you would comment? You commented to some degree.

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, I would not make the SDI conditional on this agreement. On the other hand, I would not abandon SDI as part of the START agreement. Nor would I abandon SDI de facto.

I think a combination of deployment restrictions and testing restrictions will, in fact, lead to a de facto abandonment of SDI.

We need a definition of what it is we want to accomplish with SDI. I think the concept that we can get a perfect population defense against an allout Soviet attack is so far in the future, if it is attainable at all, that it leads to a needless debate as to feasibility.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Dr. Teller, I might say, agreed with that. He said that there is no perfect offense or perfect defense.

Dr. KISSINGER. But there are many intermediate objectives.

For example, I was briefed by one group that was opposed to SDI that was trying to tell me, and again I hold no brief for their numbers, I am giving you what I was briefed. They were trying to tell me that if the existing Soviet arsenal were aimed at the now foreseeable SDI, the SDI would be overwhelmed.

I then said, "let me understand what you mean by overwhelmed." I said, "What happens if they launch 1,000 warheads?" "Oh, we would get 99.9 percent or maybe all of them."

This went on until we got to about 4,000 warheads. The defense was degraded in that analysis only from about 6,000 warheads on. Now, if one could get the Soviets into a position where the only nuclear war they can fight is one in which they have to launch 5,000 to 6,000 warheads, that is a different decision from one in which they can blackmail us with 1 or 2 or 5. This is what we need to analyze.

Incidentally, the Soviet Chief of Staff said that at the level of 6,000 warheads, an SDI defense could be quite effective, which tends to support that.

Now, it seems to me that we can probably all agree that if we could achieve a defense for our strategic forces this would add to stability. The question is, What degree of defense should one get for the civilian population?

I find it very difficult to imagine that a democratic leader can tell his public that their total vulnerability and the capacity of an adversary to exterminate them is the permanent assurance of their security without demoralizing them.

Now, against what level of attack? I would think at least against third country attacks and against sort of blackmailing attacks. I am willing to grant that an absolutely allout attack, but if you can force an opponent into a position where all he can do is this allout kind of suicidal attack, I think this is something one at least ought to study.

When our election is over, perhaps we can have a serious bipartisan effort to look at various levels of strategic defense. Because giving it up seems to be a fateful and very irreversible decision.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. I quite agree, Dr. Kissinger. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Boschwitz. I think everybody has had a chance to question except for Senator Murkowski. Senator Murkowski.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I too, welcome you before the committee.

In view of the many, many years that you have been dealing with the Soviet Union, and the very prominent position that you held as one who has negotiated on behalf of the national security interests of our country, I wonder if you would share your evaluation of how the Soviets look at the issue before us, the ratification of the INF Treaty, from the standpoint of their own interest, their own security.

Do they see this as a sign of America's strength or weakness? Is it more a matter of perhaps the new General Secretary's efforts to portray himself as a leader of the world who objective it is to ease tensions?

I wonder if you could share from your experience what you assume they, the Soviets, feel about our position and the likelihood of where the United States will be in relation to the Soviet Union, recognizing we all like to have a superior position in nuclear or nonnuclear capability for our national security interests. Could you just generally——

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, as I have said perhaps too often, I wish this particular treaty had never been made. And I do this because I think it gives more benefits to the Soviets in the long term than to us. So obviously they want it ratified.

But to deal with the immediate question, I would suppose that if this treaty now failed of ratification, it would be a setback to Gorbachev. And one would then have to calculate how they assess this, because they might think we will be forced to withdraw our weapons anyway. And they can then play the game of either keeping theirs there or pulling theirs out as a unilateral act, whichever gives them greater propaganda advantages.

The more fundamental question or issue that is raised by your question is, What do we have to do, I mean is Gorbachev really interested in an improvement in relations? And what does he understand by improvement of relations?

Now, I think certainly the Soviet Union needs a respite. And it is surely in their interest to have a period in which they can reduce some military expenditures. But it is also the case that it seems to me very dangerous to gear American foreign policy to the personality of a single Soviet leader.

Every Soviet leader has renounced the policies of his predecessor. So, even if you assume the best intentions in Gorbachev, which I do not, but even if you did, you would still have to ask yourself what are his successors going to do and what is the objective situation that they and the successors to our President will inherit?

Second, there is no doubt that Gorbachev is undertaking a huge program of economic and some limited political reform. He does that because he recognizes that if the present trends continue the Soviet Union will be the most developed of the underdeveloped countries, and will have the greatest difficulty of maintaining its position as a superpower. He is not doing it in order to get along better with us.

For that reason, he wants a respite. Now, Americans, because we have never been exposed to irreconcilable hostility, because we have never known irrevocable disaster, have a tendency to believe that peace is the normal condition and is perfectly self-evident, and that everybody around the world comes to the same conclusion as a Midwestern American would about the nature of peace.

And ever since World War II, we have been waiting for a Soviet leader who would be peaceful. And if you read the literature, every time a new Soviet leader appeared, we would pronounce that he would be more interested in the domestic evolution.

But as I have stated previously, the Soviet leaders are the heirs of a country that has had expansionism, maybe based on insecurity, almost as an organic part of their system. It is not a polite thing to say. But nobody has ever wanted to be like the Russian political system.

The Russians have never been able to impress people with the majesty of their conduct or the excellence of their institutions the way, say, the Chinese could in their area. So, they have usually never felt secure, unless they had troops on both sides of their borders, which is uncomfortable for their neighbors.

Now, I find it difficult to imagine that Gorbachev will volunteer concessions that the military and the KGB object to at a time when he already has to ask so much of the Communist Party and the planning mechanism in adjusting their preconceptions. So, a lot depends on what we ask of him.

Therefore, it is necessary that the United States has some concept of what we mean by balance of power or peaceful conduct or whatever you want to call it.

The idea that here is a wonderful fellow who, if we only keep him happy, will automatically move the Soviet Union toward peace, or if we do a lot of arms control with him, that I think is potentially dangerous.

Senator MURKOWSKI. My second question, Dr. Kissinger, is in regard to the verification issue. And I believe you responded to Senator Kassebaum on a portion of that question.

But as a member of the Intelligence Committee as well, who is holding oversight hearings on this subject, we are left with the dilemma of making a determination of the adequacy of our verification on the SS-20 to determine whether or not the Soviets may be, indeed, cheating.

And the question realistically of how much money should we throw at the verification to have some degree of satisfaction that the verification is adequate, as opposed to inadequate.

However, the other alternatives of exposure, such as the submarine threat, the threat from the SS-25, all these are given self-evident realities, but yet we have a responsibility to address the adequacy of our verification effort.

And I have some discomfort with presentations made for the Intelligence Committee with regard to, how much do you spend to get this percentage of verification? And what is relevant to the overall threat?

And I wonder if you could give us some guidance or comfort in that regard to what is really an enigma in the sense of evaluating it.

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, I have heard, I guess, many of the presentations that you have, being on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. And I have heard the same spread of opinion that I am sure you have heard.

On the one hand, I do not see any huge incentive that they have to cheat. On the other, they may do it just to keep in practice for other agreements. [Laughter.]

I do not see what they gain. But it is anomalous that there should be this big spread.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Really, we are going to build buildings, spend money, hire people, to observe to our satisfaction that they are not cheating.

But if they were not cheating or something else, the exposure of a nuclear threat from other type missiles is evident.

Dr. KISSINGER. Yes, that is the reason why, their incentive to do it other than to see how one can get around that system, does not seem to me self-evident.

But there is, when you start with a disputed data base, it is very difficult. I suppose the argument would be made that even if they are hiding some, if they cannot exercise them in the field and if they cannot give training with them, their capacity will soon be degraded.

Senator MURKOWSKI. That is true. But what difference does it make if you have an equal threat from other missiles?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, no. In terms of does their removal remove any significant threat, I have said in my statement that I do not believe it does.

Senator MURKOWSKI. No, it does not. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Dr. Kissinger.

The **Chairman**. Thank you. Everyone has now had a first round of questioning. We will go on to the second round. And because his Governor is with him, the ranking member would like to start out with his 10 minutes right now, and then I will follow him.

Senator **Helms**. Mr. Chairman, as always, you are very thoughtful, and I appreciate it.

Dr. Kissinger, what I am about to say is in no way an attempt to sermonize you or anybody else. But I am obliged to note that we have had a plethora of witnesses coming before this committee who have said, in effect, what you have said, that this is not a good treaty. But that we ought to ratify it. Otherwise there would be dire consequences in NATO, and so forth.

I run headlong into what my father said to me two dozen times, if he said it once, and that was that "There is no right way to do a wrong thing." Furthermore, the Constitution does not require us or confer upon us the responsibility of anything but looking at the treaty.

For example, the Secretary of State came before this committee and he said, in answer to a question by a Senator:

> It would be a terribly severe blow to NATO and the members of the alliance should this treaty fail in ratification. They have made this clear in statements through the heads of most of the governments of the NATO countries.
>
> They have made it clear to us in private conversations, as well as in their public statements. Someone earlier today here at this table, one of the Senators made reference to Helmut Schmidt and what he had said about the effect of the failure to ratify and the dire consequences that would have in his judgment for the map of Europe.

Now, the Senator who asked that question was Senator Zorinsky. The year was not 1988. It was 1979. The Secretary of State was not Shultz, it was Vance. And the treaty was not the INF, it was SALT II, which was never ratified.

Now, I do not want to embarrass you. But incidentally, Secretary of Defense Brown said the same thing. Here is what my good friend, former Secretary of State Kissinger, said:

> Yes, I think NATO would survive the nonratification of SALT II because our allies in NATO are tied to us by their self-interest.
>
> On the other hand, I agree with the Secretary of State, for whom I have a high regard, that nonratification would have an unfortunate impact in many European countries and would raise serious questions about the stability of our governmental process. But so would a perceived military imbalance. That is our problem.

I commend you on that statement, because you gave in that answer both sides. Now, you did say in your testimony and in response to questioning that the Europeans would require the dismantling of the Pershing II's, even in the absence of a treaty.

And I believe you said that, in reference to the demonstrations and all of the hoo-hah that goes on, which of course is orchestrated in large measure around the world by the Soviet Union.

Now, let me just say, let us suppose just a minute, suppose the United States made it clear that any decision by any European country to remove the Pershing II's would carry with it the U.S. response of saying, "Look, we will have to withdraw our troops from your country."

As a matter of fact, it seems dangerous to me to have our troops committed in countries that do not have adequate deterrence.

As a matter of fact, I asked General Rogers and Richard Perle this in a very pointed way last week. I said, "Should U.S. troops remain in Europe, or those parts of it, where the third zero, that is total denuclearization is achieved, either by future treaty or policy, or this one? And if not, should the Senate consider addressing the issue by amendment, reservation, and so forth?"

Well, they were very, very strong in their response. They said, "Absolutely not." We ought not to leave our people over there in such a situation. Now, obviously, I would like to ask you if there is much difference between SALT II and the INF, much difference between 1979 and 1988?

Because the message is the same, the song and dance is the same. Witness after witness coming here in advocacy of this treaty have said, "Oh, it will destroy NATO." Well, that is what they said in 1979. The treaty, SALT II, was not ratified. And I do not think NATO collapsed.

Maybe we ought to give our friends, the leaders of the European countries, an alternative. Do they want us to help them or not? And I recognize it is in our interest as well as theirs to preserve NATO.

But I just do not think that NATO is going to collapse if this treaty is not ratified. Or if it is not amended or modified to make sense, because it is now full of holes as a piece of swiss cheese.

Dr. **Kissinger**. I think there is a difference between SALT II and the INF Treaty. I was much less strong, in fact I did not use, you quoted me correctly. I stated both sides of the issue then.

Senator **Helms**. Yes, you did. And I commend you for it.

Dr. **Kissinger**. Now, there is this difference. SALT II concerned only weapons that were under U.S. control and stationed either in the United States or at sea. Therefore, the deployment of these weapons had not carried any political cost or risk for these European leaders.

So whether we reduced them or not might have had a symbolic significance, and their interest in it was because of the idea that had developed that this was needed to ease tensions. But otherwise, it did not have the same implications.

The INF agreement, on the other hand, involved significant decisions that were taken in the face of massive domestic opposition. That domestic opposition had been overcome.

And then in a period in which there was no particular pressure for the removal of those weapons within European countries, the United States developed a theory where they became dispensable. First at Reykjavik and later in the implementing negotiations.

Now, we have the situation where people like Kohl and Woerner, to take the Federal Republic, who paid a heavy price, not only had to give up those weapons but also weapons; namely the Pershing I's that had always been stationed in the Federal Republic. Until recently they had been there uncontested for 15 years. And they had agreed to both of these decisions.

Now, if we suddenly reverse ourselves once again and say the first position was the right one, I think we are putting them into a nearly impossible situation.

Senator **Helms**. Well, forgive me, though. There is one element in the equation that you have not referred to, and that is the people of Germany and the people of France.

They would have to know that they would have to do without the support of the United States.

Dr. **Kissinger**. I would say this, Senator Helms. If the German Government had asked us to remove these weapons without provocation, then your response would be absolutely the one we should take.

When, however, they first put these weapons in, then reluctantly with great American persuasion, let us take them out and added their own weapons to it. And then less than half of the Senate but more than a one-third votes against ratification, they are left in a very difficult position.

I do not think we would be morally justified to say, "Now, if you do not accept the latest version of American strategic thought we are going to take our ground forces out too."

I think this would create an impossible situation. If, unprovoked, they were to ask us this, then I think your response would be absolutely correct.

Senator **Helms**. Well, I think the mothers and fathers of this country would welcome an indication from all of us that we are not going to leave our troops over there in an untenable position where they can get shot and killed. That is the point I am making.

Dr. **Kissinger**. I would welcome an expression of the Senate that the denuclearization of the Federal Republic would carry those consequences. The third zero option, I think that would be a very appropriate thing to do.

Senator **Helms**. I would just say in conclusion that I am struck by the identical nature of the exhortations that we have got to ratify this treaty when we heard the same thing in 1979 and NATO did not collapse.

Now, here we are hearing the same thing in 1988. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. I will waive my time, and we will go to Senator Sarbanes.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Dr. Kissinger, just picking up on the point that you and Senator Helms have been discussing, it seems to me in predicting the consequences of nonratification of SALT II, one ought to note that the reason that the treaty was not taken up in the Senate was because of the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan.

Now, it is interesting that those of us who assert that SALT II would never have been ratified in any case are the same ones who want to take a very hard line on this position.

But it seems to me that with SALT II, what the United States was able to say to the Europeans and to the rest of the world was that we were prepared to go forward and consider this matter, but then the Soviets undertook this brutal aggression in Afghanistan, and that took the treaty off the calendar.

And it seems to me, in terms of anticipating the consequences of nonratification, that totally transformed the situation.

Dr. **Kissinger**. Quite correct.

Senator **Sarbanes**. And in this instance, if a similar thing were to occur, we would have an entirely changed situation to deal with.

In fact, given the emphasis you placed in your testimony upon resolving political disputes and addressing regional problems, and the point you make that it is the political differences that are at the basis of the conflict and not the arms themselves, I gather that you think a response of that sort is appropriate. Do you not?

Dr. KISSINGER. If there were a major political challenge, a response not to ratify the treaty, would be highly appropriate.

Senator SARBANES. Comparable to what happened in Afghanistan at the time of SALT II?

Dr. KISSINGER. Yes. I would think it would be very appropriate.

Senator SARBANES. So it seems to me there is a great difference between these two situations.

Dr. KISSINGER. I agree.

Senator SARBANES. And in looking back at the SALT II experience, what we have to recognize is that the reason presented to our European allies for not ratifying or even considering the treaty was Soviet aggression in Afghanistan.

Dr. KISSINGER. Correct.

Senator SARBANES. Earlier you made a sort of flat statement that I am a little bit concerned about leaving on the record.

In speaking of compliance with the agreement, you said that the Soviets might put their SS–20's back in, but that we could not expect Western Europe to allow us to put the Pershings and the GLCM's back in.

I do not quite understand that, or how you can so flatly assert that. It seems to me, if the Soviets were to clearly violate this treaty, and reintroduce their SS–20's, contrary to the prohibitions therein, it would constitute a very powerful basis from which to argue, if you chose, that something comparable to the Pershings or the GLCM's, an updated version, whatever it may be at that time, ought to be reintroduced in Western Europe.

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, of course, here we are in a totally speculative area.

Senator SARBANES. Yes, it is hypothetical.

Dr. KISSINGER. In my judgment, it is unlikely that the Soviets will violate this agreement in a flagrant manner. So that it will always be highly ambiguous whether they are violating it.

But I also believe that the political preconditions for reintroducing these weapons are nonexistent on the Western side. But this is a question of judgment, and it depends on how threatened the Europeans feel, how insistent we would be to reintroduce the weapons, and what the Soviets might threaten to do if they were reintroduced.

Senator SARBANES. Would you not think our argument for reintroducing them would, in some senses, be stronger than the argument for putting them in was in the first place, given that the Soviet action was clearly contrary to an agreement?

Dr. KISSINGER. I believe, and here we are in the area of pure conjecture, that this agreement and this sequence of events that has led to it, has brought about a sea change in the German domestic political situation, and that therefore we will see over a period of 5 years some very significant evolutions in German domestic politics. I think there will be a greater emphasis on national concerns, greater emphasis on dealing with the East on a national basis, and in the context of this, I think it will be very difficult to reintroduce nuclear missiles in the Federal Republic. And absent that, it will be very difficult to reintroduce them anywhere else except perhaps Great Britain.

But I could be wrong. We are in the area of total conjecture and analysis of political trends.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Let me ask you this question.

Do you worry that United States-Soviet agreements, arms agreements in particular, contribute to some illusory notion of détente which impedes the West from taking realistic policies in other areas of the relationship?

Dr. **Kissinger**. No, I worry that arms agreements become a substitute for political thinking. If arms agreements were linked to a process of political accommodation, or related or part of a process, unlinked, of political accommodation, I would have no problem with them.

Second, I believe, as I have said, that much of arms control theory that is now being applied is dated and that we need a new approach, we need some new concepts. It does not mean I have them, but we are recycling the theories of the late fifties and early sixties in totally changed circumstances. But I am not opposed to the concept of these negotiations.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Well, I am not suggesting you are, but I am struck by the assertions we have heard from some that really do not relate to the terms of the treaty.

We had somewhat similar presentations in SALT II. It was the view of some that the treaty would create a psychological attitude about detente which would then somehow prevent the West from taking other steps which were called for under the circumstances, even though they were not precluded by the treaty.

Dr. **Kissinger**. Certainly there is such a school of thought. There are two schools of thought, two contradictory schools of thought. There are some people who believe that any arms agreement is desirable because it creates a good atmosphere, and there are other people who are against any agreement because they think it will create illusions, and I believe that an agreement must justify itself on its merits and not on its symbolism one way or the other.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Do you think the arms agreements you reached in the seventies raised this problem of creating some illusory notion of détente?

Dr. **Kissinger**. Well, of course, it was a totally different period. We had the Vietnam protests in this country. We had Watergate, although not when we reached the first arms agreement. We thought it was important to demonstrate to the American public that its administration was capable of reaching agreements that eased tensions.

Now, there was, of course, considerable opposition on exactly the ground that you gave, that it created an illusory impression of détente, but the idea that Richard Nixon would be excessively trusting of anybody, especially Russians, seems to me unrealistic.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Well, I do not quarrel with that point, although it seems to me to look at it from the point of trust really misses the mark. I have never understood why these agreements have to presuppose anything about trust. In fact, they are actually based on the concept of not trusting, on the understanding that they have to be verified and will not require reliance on some up front judgments.

Dr. **Kissinger**. You know, Senator, obviously one always thinks that what one was involved in had merit or one would not have done it in the first place. But I had to speak at some conference about the Nixon Presidency, and I had read so much about the illusions of détente that I had begun to believe it myself. So I started reading what we all said in that period, and I think if you review what we said, those really were pretty sober statements.

But at any rate, leaving aside the merit of the policies in which I was engaged, in this period we have, any administration of whatever party has an obligation to demonstrate to its public that it is sincerely concerned with easing tensions. It has an equal obligation to demonstrate to its public that the easing of tensions must be related to concrete conditions that in fact improve the situation and are not simply an aspect of a psychiatric treatment of Soviet leaders.

And how to walk this path is the real task of statesmanship, whatever previous or current administrations are doing.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

The **Chairman**. Thank you.

Senator Kassebaum.

Senator **Kassebaum**. Dr. Kissinger, you mentioned at the end of your statement that the strengthening of the Atlantic unity must be of highest priority, and that you felt that common diplomacy toward arms control was the most important component of this policy, and I certainly agree very much with that.

You also in answer to some other questions earlier said that it was important for us to understand how the Soviets conceived the whole strategy of arms control, I suppose, or particularly in the light of conventional force reduction.

But I would like to ask you if you could elaborate on what you believe the goal should be for conventional arms control policy, and if you believe that the alliance, the Western alliance itself has an approach to an arms control, conventional arms control initiative?

Dr. **Kissinger**. Insofar as my own analysis is concerned, I have just begun thinking about it really in a serious way, and I have gone out to the Rand Corp., and I have gone to various places where studies have been made to see what studies exist so that I can begin engaging my own thinking and reaching my own conclusions on the subject, and therefore, I am not really in a great position to make any clear proposals.

Now, with respect, however, to our European allies, I have a very uneasy feeling with that third zero option. On the one hand, you have Europeans who are really looking for an excuse to get rid of the short-range weapons, or at least reduce them, and we only have 80, so we are not talking about a very large number.

Now, in order to stop this, people say, "Well, it has got to be part of conventional arms reduction and part of an overall scheme." The next thing you know, Gorbachev will make some symbolic move, like taking out the two divisions from Czechoslovakia that were never there before 1968, and then people will say, "OK, now, you have got your proposal." So we are no longer justifying modernization in terms of security; we are justifying it in terms of its contribution to arms control.

There was one witness before the Armed Services Committee who wants to take out 4,000 tactical nuclear weapons in order to modernize the 80 Lances, and then make these 80 Lances dependent on some conventional arms reduction. Well, if we do that, we are well on the way to the denuclearization of Germany with all the consequences that this implies.

Now, I am not saying that every one of those 4,000 tactical nuclear weapons is sacrosanct, and if the NATO commander told me that he can do with 500—in our period we took out 2,000 as a unilateral American decision because we could not see any conceivable use for them. So, I am not saying that they cannot be modified, but we have to be careful that in the name of arms control, we do not gradually approach zero in all nuclear categories without knowing that the conventional adjustments that are being made are of any real significance.

The only systematic study I have seen is one of the Rand Corp., and I know they have unclassified versions and probably also have, obviously, classified versions, and they have come to the conclusion that the ratio has to be 5-to-1.

When you have said that, and then you start probing, okay, 5-to-1, 5-to-1 what? And where does it go? Well, I think they have come to the conclusion that it has to be tanks and artillery, that almost nothing else is verifiable.

Then should it go beyond the Urals, should it go into the Western Military District, and where do our units go, and what happens to the European units which are not then totally demobilized? These are questions that have not been thought through yet.

Senator **Kassebaum**. And you are saying that before we really start down this path——

Dr. **Kissinger**. Absolutely.

Senator **Kassebaum** [continuing]. We should have a careful strategy in mind on both sides, I suppose, or understanding at least what the Soviets want.

Dr. **Kissinger**. Well, what worries me is that we are talking, we have talked ourselves into a national psyche that any removal of any nuclear weapons contributes to the security of the world, and so once you start down that road, any reduction of any nuclear weapon is desirable, 50 percent cut, INF, and one no longer analyzes what the situation will be afterwards and whether that in fact has improved our security.

Yes, the answer is we should know exactly what we have in mind by a fair conventional balance. And obviously that has to take into account the Soviet point of view.

Senator **Kassebaum**. I have always believed in many ways that was the essence of arms control anyway, that having some degree of understanding where we were, each side——

Dr. **Kissinger**. I must tell you, as somebody who has been involved in negotiations, once you get into a negotiation, you sometimes forget what you started out doing, and they begin to drive themselves, and you get negotiable proposals, and you suddenly get stampeded.

Senator **Kassebaum**. Just one other thing.

You were in the Government in 1973 when we started on the MBFR which focused on force reductions. Now, as you say, there tends to be a belief that we should move toward tank and other types of the conventional forces.

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, first of all, it was not a very high priority in negotiation and did not absorb an excessive amount of our brain power, I hate to tell you.

Senator KASSEBAUM. And it has gone on ever since then, I guess.

Dr. KISSINGER. And it was stuck on abstruse issues on how you count, what the level was, but at that time we were talking of manpower, and I am sure in retrospect that that was the wrong approach because there is no way you can check on manpower except in very gross categories.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Kissinger, I apologize. There is a rollcall vote going on, so I am going to go over now. I think Senator Boschwitz wants to ask some questions, and then will you recess——

Senator BOSCHWITZ. I am going to go, as well.

Dr. KISSINGER. Do you want me to wait?

The CHAIRMAN. Would you, please?

Senator Dodd and Senator Kerry have gone over and will be right back. They do have some questions.

I apologize to you, but we have no choice. We will recess until Senator Dodd and Senator Kerry return.

[A brief recess was taken.]

Senator DODD [presiding]. The committee will reconvene.

I would like to tell you, Dr. Kissinger, we are in the process now of beginning a filibuster of some kind, so we are apt to have votes happen with some frequency here. Senator Pell will be back momentarily, and he has allowed his junior subcommittee chairman to Chair the Foreign Relations Committee here momentarily.

I will try and complete in one round. If not, I will try to be brief in the second round so we can move along. I know Senator Kerry has some questions as well.

You have stated and restated your position today that you believe this to be a flawed agreement but that the consequences of its rejection would be far more serious than those of ratification.

Having said that, I have two questions. One is, the obvious question that comes to mind is what would you have done differently 6 or 12 months earlier in this area and I know it is always easy to be the Monday morning quarterback, but just try and give us some sense of where you think we probably should have gone so that we would have avoided some of these flaws. That is question 1.

Question 2, if it is flawed, is it flawed to such an extent that we are left in a weaker position with our allies, both politically and militarily, what does that portend in terms of future arms control since it has been historic that this country understandably always wanted to negotiate from strength. When we have had a sense of military insecurity, we have been far less inclined to enter into arms control agreements. We have only done so when we have at least had the sense of being secure, the confidence of being secure, that we were willing to move into that arena.

This flaw that you have identified, has it put us in a position where it jeopardizes future arms control agreements, including the START talks?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, with respect to the first question, you may or may not know that in my memoirs, at a time when George Shultz was at Bechtel, so I had no conceivable ulterior motive, I wrote that if I could appoint one man to any position in this country, it would be George Shultz. He is a man for whom I have had and still have the highest regard, and anything I say should be taken in that context, that this is something on which serious people can disagree, can have honorable differences of opinion.

My assessment is different from his. So, it should be in that context.

Senator DODD. I understand that.

Dr. KISSINGER. Now, where I think we got off the track is that it started with a very absolutist rhetoric vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, and then under the impact of a variety of causes has changed to a rhetoric that is sometimes indistinguishable from what the various committees for nuclear disarmament around the world are advocating. The antinuclear rhetoric of the administration, the attempt to prove that they were really peacefully inclined has led to an extreme oscillation of position.

I think it got off the track at Reykjavik when we negotiated from a Soviet paper without adequate preparation.

What would I have done? You never can tell what you would have done if you had had responsibility. I would like to think that I would have proposed something along the lines of the walk-in-the-woods formula with a difference from the walk in the woods that, as I understood it, that formula required the elimination of all Pershings. I might, I probably would have proposed cutting them in half, cutting everything in half, the Soviet deployment, the American deployment, and make the next 50 percent dependent upon a substantial reduction of conventional disarmament, a substantial achievement of conventional disarmament.

I think it would have been a better course. I do not believe that the very quality on which the administration most prides itself, that they are the first to have reduced two categories to zero, I think this is an undesirable objective because it implies that zero in all categories is attainable, and it is not attainable.

Senator DODD. The second question is——

Dr. KISSINGER. Oh, the second question is, Is it so seriously flawed that we are now weaker?

Senator DODD. Weaker politically and militarily, and what does that mean in terms of future arms control agreements?

Dr. KISSINGER. For me, it has been a painful process to attack people who have been friends and with whom I have been closely associated.

I believe that militarily we are somewhat weaker; that politically we have paid a big price in elaborating a differential between the nonnuclear and the nuclear members of NATO, and between the United States and Europe, a flaw that determined diplomacy can hopefully repair, but it will require a lot of effort to get us back to where we were, and it is a fact that we have to face.

Senator DODD. You said something earlier that I agree with, that we are using formulas and approaches that we have been using for the last 20 or 30 years.

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, I would like to refer to the colloquy with Senator Kerry. You take the 50-percent reduction, and there is no argument against proceeding with it, but I asked myself, we are putting this tremendous effort, years of negotiation, and at the end of which, if a man from Mars came and said "Now, tell me in what way is the situation better now, what would you really say other than that you have made an agreement?"

It is not better in the relationship of the two forces to each other. It makes it probably even harder to threaten general nuclear war as a retaliation to an attack on NATO, and since we are the ones that are more dependent on nuclear weapons than the other, that is an unequal approach. The best that is being said for the INF agreement is that the existing weapons in Europe can do everything INF was going to do.

I do not happen to agree with that, I think it leaves us somewhat worse off. But if it were true, then what have you achieved? Why is making an agreement that is defended as irrelevant symbolically so important?

Now, I have not come up with a better idea, but I think all the people that worked with such dedication 30 years ago to come up with important theories, that equivalence ought to do it now again. But what it is, I do not know.

Senator DODD. Well, I think is an excellent question, and you have posed it in another way, so maybe you could expand on this a little bit in the time remaining, that the emphasis that we place on nuclear weapons deals with the symptoms of the problem that exists between ourselves and the Soviets, and not the fundamental disease. I think you may have even used the analogy of the symptoms and disease that you have talked about.

Dr. KISSINGER. No, it is correct.

Senator DODD. Why is that so? Could you expand on that thought a bit? What is the distinction?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, I think fundamentally we are in a curious situation. If you look at the future, in the year 2010 there are going to be five or six major power centers in the world. There will not be two superpowers. But the process of getting there is going to produce enormous dislocations.

Now, during these dislocations, the Soviets may be tempted to keep getting marginal advantages according to traditional diplomatic practice and their history. If one of these explodes and leads to a conflagration, at the end, both we and the Soviet Union will be weaker in relation to these other emerging power centers than we would be before it. So that a thoughtful, semiphilosophical debate of how we are going to get to the year 2010 and what kind of a world this is going to be would seem to me essential. And yet everybody shies away from that discussion because they do not really know how to conceive it, and partly because it runs against the American historical tradition which is hostile to equilibrium.

And in a world of five or six powers, that is what you have to do.

Senator DODD. A suggestion that I think you made in one article I read was to look at the world in the year 2010 and determine what you want it to look like and work backward from that.

Dr. KISSINGER. Let's work backward from there, correct.

Senator DODD. My time is up. I will come back with just a couple more questions, but Senator Boschwitz is next.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. I did not read that article about 2010. I would very much like to have it.

Dr. KISSINGER. I think it was 2000 is what I used.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Pardon me?

Dr. KISSINGER. I said 2000, but it was—he quoted it correctly. I think he gave me 10 more years.

Senator DODD. Rudy, would you mind just doing this?

Senator BOSCHWITZ. I will yield back to you.

Senator DODD. I have just a couple of questions. Why do we not each finish up and then let the good Doctor who has spent 4 or 5 hours go on. And that way we will not tie everyone down.

I think Senator Kerry has a line of questions.

I would like to pursue this a bit because I think it is so important that we further understand as we are about to ratify one agreement, but I would like to make sure we know how one step leads to the next and what follows on after that.

I think it is vitally important that we have a deeper appreciation of what is going on in the Soviet Union. Ambassador Garthoff, one of our earlier witnesses, a Sovietologist, and a competent one let me quote him. He said the Soviets are coming to the conclusion that their interests, and I quote him here, "are congruent with world order."

Now, I interpret him to mean by that, that the Soviet Union is moving to become sort of a status quo power rather than a revolutionary power.

I wonder what your assessment is. Is there that kind of a sea change occurring, that we are going from a revolutionary power to a status quo power such as the decision to pull back in Afghanistan?

Dr. KISSINGER. First of all, I want to know how Garthoff can possibly know to what conclusion the Soviets are coming. It is certainly their necessity to have a period of peace and quiet, and if possible, reduced expenditures. That I do not question.

From our point of view, the issue is whether, on what terms that is to be achieved.

I would not be surprised if the Soviet Union did not have a clearcut idea of what they had in mind, and after all, I talked this week to an eminent Soviet visitor who is one of their leaders in their economic reform, and he described their reform program to me, and this is a stupendous undertaking. I would not be at all surprised if their top leadership were reluctant simultaneously to conduct great crises now.

That does not mean, however, that 5 or 10 years from now, if we in the meantime have produced neutralism in Europe, impotence in Asia, a vacuum in the Middle East, that they will not exploit it.

Therefore, I think it would be safer if we gave them difficult problems that were not incompatible with their self-respect. For example, I do not think that the zero option was a law of nature.

Supposing we had said to them from the beginning we are deeply concerned about this conventional problem. We are willing to make realistic agreements with you, but you have to give—we have to settle the conventional and nuclear thing simultaneously. We will pay the first 50 percent up front in the nuclear field.

Why would we assume that that would necessarily have been rejected? Why is it impossible to start a dialog that says that along the analysis that I made previously of what the world will look like in the next century and what we have to do now to determine who can do what to whom, where? And sooner or later we will have to come to some such accommodation either by confrontation or by negotiation. And that is what I have in mind.

Has the sea change occurred? The problem is, assuming Gorbachev intends to be conciliatory, whatever that means, he already has led to brutalize the central planning mechanism to introduce a price mechanism. He is de facto reducing the importance of the Communist Party by reducing the importance of the central planning mechanism because that is where their strength lies.

Why should he tackle the KGB and the military when he is under no necessity from our side to do so? And this is, I am talking of missed opportunity much more than I talk of actual mistakes.

Senator DODD. It strikes me the Soviets do not shoot craps. There are not many casinos that I am aware of in the Soviet system, and they are not inclined to probably place all of their or a good percentage of their future in areas where it is very iffy whether or not they are going to emerge successfully.

Dr. KISSINGER. They are very careful analysts of what they consider the objective factors of international relations.

Senator DODD. But I presume in their own domestic efforts as well would probably provoke the same kind of reaction. And so while they would not be inclined to ever admit this, that I presume as they step out into some areas of total unfamiliarity for them, they are probably far more concerned about the future success than they are willing to admit.

So, here they are in a political situation, an ideological one, an economic one where they are in tough shape, very tough shape almost at every level and run the risk of becoming really a third-rate power very quickly.

Dr. KISSINGER. But what are they going to do——

Senator DODD. Are they going to give up the one thing that maintains them in that status, and that is their military strength? Are they really going to be willing to sacrifice and so reduce their military capacity that they run the risk of both economically and militarily ending up in an inferior situation?

Dr. KISSINGER. It would be unlikely. I do not think the Soviets have a category for dealing with people who are trying to understand the hell out of them. I think they have a category for understanding balance of forces, objective factors, realistic, fair propositions. But when I keep reading that we want to show them farms in the Middle West and swimming pools. What do we expect them to do? I mean, what is he supposed to do, come home to the Soviet Union and say I saw a swimming pool in backyards, and now we are going to do what?

I think it is not a good basis for solving relations between societies that have such a hugely different historical experience. Even assuming the best intentions.

Senator DODD. I agree.

Well, I have taken a great deal of your time. You have been very informative and helpful.

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, thank you.

Senator DODD. I appreciate it immensely.

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I have completed all of my questions, and I thank you for your patience.

I thank Senator Kerry and Senator Boschwitz as well for being this patient.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Senator Boschwitz.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. We are losing the crowd out there, but nevertheless, it is an interesting afternoon.

I find the idea of multiple power centers in the year 2000 or 2010, and I remember now that 2000 was—it was a Newsweek article, really fascinating.

Who do you see as the five or six superpowers? Obviously the Chinese?

Dr. KISSINGER. Japan.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. As a superpower.

Dr. KISSINGER. Yes, Japan.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. But can it be super both militarily as well as economically?

Dr. KISSINGER. Yes, I think so.

China, well, let's say it is major power centers. Let's not get hung up on the word "superpower."

Senator BOSCHWITZ. OK.

Dr. KISSINGER. Japan, China, India, Western Europe, United States, Soviet Union. Those are major power centers.

Then we keep ignoring the Western Hemisphere, but Brazil and Mexico have the potential of being very significant countries, and for us it is going to be a major experience when Mexico emerges on our border with 100 million population as a country that conducts foreign policy not from the position of a very inferior country but with aspirations to some equality. And the same with Brazil.

So, we will be living in quite a different world in the 21st century, even though neither of those two countries will have quite the status of Japan and the others.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Let me return for a moment to the tactical difference between the ICBM's and the INF weapons. As you pointed out one difference, the Russians would have to have a different perception of when they would be used and how easily they would be used, particularly if the INF weapons are in their path and would be overrun.

How do the shorter range—and there are only a few of them, as you say—or the battlefield nuclear weapons, how do they factor into that kind of thinking?

Dr. KISSINGER. I think it is an illustration of the difficulty we have as a nation, and the alliance has to keep its various policies in gear. In the same year in which we are withdrawing the weapons that can reach the Soviet Union and the Pershing II's and the

GLCM's and that can reach Eastern Europe through the Pershing I's, a big debate has started about modernizing the Lances.

Now, obviously, to Germans, rightly or wrongly, this looks as if we want to improve the weapons that can kill only Germans and remove the weapons that are targeted at East Europeans and the Soviet Union. And that has given rise, perhaps unfairly, to the impression that Germany is being singularized, as their phrase goes, singled out for nuclear risk.

Now, the traditional neutralist, seminationalist, dubious-about-NATO people are picking this up with a vengeance, and I find it interesting that Chancellor Kohl, when he was here, really asked for a delay in this policy, and that some members of his party were reported in the New York Times to have said, "We will not even touch this issue until there is a new President because we do not want the new President to change his mind again."

The difference is that these short-range weapons do not threaten Soviet territory directly, and therefore, while they are still an obstacle, they are a lesser and of a different category than the INF weapons would have been.

Senator **Boschwitz**. Clearly they are a lesser obstacle than the INF weapon, but would the Russians not have to factor into their thinking that once these type of weapons are used, short range, intermediate range, whatever, that the escalation from that point could almost not be prevented, and so would it not be?

Dr. **Kissinger**. Well, you know, this is a question of judgment. They might figure that, or they might figure that once they are used, there will be such a rush to surrender that escalation becomes impossible.

It depends whether they believe Schmidt or whether they believe the theorists of escalation.

But I do not really think that the real danger is a Soviet allout attack heading for the Rhine. The real danger is a perceived unbalance of forces which will tempt the Soviets to take the Berlin issue up again, for example, or to use a Middle East crisis to impose on Europe measures that amount to de facto neutralization.

I noticed that when Shevardnadze was in Bonn, he refused absolutely to consider any attempt to make Berlin a part of the Federal Republic or to let the Federal Republic speak for Berlin, even though this would be an easy way to confirm the status quo in Germany. But obviously they want to keep that lever open.

Senator **Boschwitz**. You have pointed out many, many problems with this arms treaty, and you said you wish that it had never been negotiated, I believe at one point. You note that the Russians have given away far less than we, even though perhaps——

Dr. **Kissinger**. More.

Senator **Boschwitz** [continuing]. Even though perhaps more in numbers, because in a way, they have given less because they are more easily substitutable, the SS-20's.

Dr. **Kissinger**. That is my view.

Senator **Boschwitz**. I understand.

And then we have all noted, and you have also discussed the fact that START is even more difficult a treaty to negotiate. So, I ask you, and Senator Kassebaum asked you also what you wanted to see with respect to conventional forces.

I ask you what the proper course of action, or what do you want to see with respect to nuclear forces? What kind of agreement could there be that does not encounter the same kind of difficulties that you are outlining for us so vividly today?

Dr. KISSINGER. Of course, I do not know the exact state of the negotiations, but I have the greatest difficulty imagining how they can possibly negotiate a serious agreement by the end of May, if you consider all of what you have heard here about the verifications of one single-weapons system that was reduced to zero? How can they have a verification system negotiated that reduces things by 50 percent?

I would be much happier with, for example, an agreement that banned multiple warheads and had—or multiple warheads on land-based weapons. And then the numbers would not worry me so much because it would be much harder with single-warhead, mobile missiles, I would think a first-strike capability is almost out of the question.

So, I would rather spend a little more time and come to some radical conclusions. Also, with single-warhead mobile weapons, it would be easier to conceive a discriminating use of these weapons in response to local aggression because the beginning would not necessarily mean that the next step will be and assault on the retaliatory forces.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. What about the verifiability of the MIRV's?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well I have not studied that, and one would have to—of course, to some extent we face this problem now because the START agreement, as I understand it, is putting limits on the total number of MIRVed vehicles. So, we must have some capacity of checking those vehicles like the SS-25's that are supposed to be single warhead, to make sure they remain single warhead, because otherwise they might put the SS-20 warheads on the SS-25's, and they have three warheads, since the weapon is more or less the same.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. So that the difficulties that we have with all of these types of treaties at least leads you to suggest that perhaps an elimination of the MIRVs, of the multiple warheads, would be a more stabilizing type of approach.

Dr. KISSINGER. That would be a radical change.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Have you thought through what other kind of approaches we might pursue?

Dr. KISSINGER. I really have not, "No."

Senator BOSCHWITZ. May I ask a final question?

Dr. KISSINGER. I do not know that anybody else has. I am not familiar with any alternative views on the subject.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. It is very difficult. It is very appealing, the idea of reducing the weapons, and yet the vulnerabilities of it all, how does——

Dr. KISSINGER. I just want to keep emphasizing, we ought to ask the question at the end of an agreement, in what way we are better off than we were before, not by abstruse criteria as to number of warheads that have been destroyed, but in what concrete way—are fewer people under threat, are fewer weapons under threat, are fewer allies under threat? And if none of this changes, then we have spent a lot of years on esoteric exercises.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Well, how does the SDI play into the alternatives? Is this——

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, SDI, there is no doubt that it complicates the issue. On the other hand, I think the absence of SDI will in time lead to nuclear pacifism. I just do not see how a President can keep telling his people that they are totally exposed to any third country accidental war, blackmail attack, and that their total vulnerability is their security.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Is their security.

Dr. KISSINGER. This is my hangup, in addition to the fact that if one could get some defense for the strategic forces that are not mobile, it would certainly discourage that sort of blackmail.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. I also feel that these treaties do not really improve the American condition very much, the human condition very much, and I think that a large part of coming to these agreements and feeling comfortable with the agreements is wrapped up in the SDI and the abilities, as I understand it, of kinetic weapons or others to even now provide some defense or at least provide a good deal of deterrence.

Dr. KISSINGER. If I may say one thing about SDI that I feel rather strongly about. If we want to give up SDI as a nation, let's make that decision and get something for it. But let's not slide into it by pretending that we are preserving it while de facto giving it up just to get some other sort of agreement.

And I cannot believe that a moratorium on deployment, coupled with a limitation on testing will have any other consequence except ending SDI. And if we are willing to do that, then let's at least get the SS-18's for it or something else. But we should not play games with ourselves of giving the impression that we are doing one thing where in effect the practical consequences are something else.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Without extending this too far, my problem with giving up the SDI is my understanding of our inability to verify the fact that they are giving up the SDI.

Perhaps some of these tests, I understand, are just——

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, I would not give it up. I would negotiate the limits of SDI the same way I negotiate limits of offensive weapons, and bring the two in relation to each other.

It is not self-evident to me that you begin the process by getting rid of weapons aimed at weapons in order to preserve weapons aimed at people.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Boschwitz.

Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I had one line of questioning I did want to pursue, but you have prompted me to want to ask a couple of other questions by virtue of a couple of answers. I know it is late, and I apologize.

Dr. KISSINGER. No, really, I have time.

Senator KERRY. Well, I thank you. It has been interesting. I think you have opened a lot of significant questions.

Your last comment about blackmail and accident and SDI has always intrigued me, and I would like to just ask you about it. You referred to the threat of nuclear accident. An accident is going to be one of the superpower nations, one of the current nuclear nations accidentally firing a missile.

Rather than SDI, is it not far cheaper and more realistic technologically to go the PAL, the permissive action link route and deal with the question of destruction of the missile that way?

Dr. **Kissinger**. I am not so worried about the accident. It is the least——

Senator **Kerry**. Then let me come off the accident, because I think there is an easy solution.

Dr. **Kissinger**. That is the least reason.

Senator **Kerry**. OK. Blackmail. It seems to me that a country that is going to blackmail the United States is not going to choose the most expensive, nor will it be able to choose the most expensive means of delivery, which is an intercontinental ballistic missile, which requires launching pad, major nuclear fuel capacity and so forth, as well as development, testing, et cetera, all of which we would be tipped off to long in advance, and if necessary, could take preemptive action to. The reality of blackmail is a suitcase bomb or something surreptitiously delivered.

Now, that is not going to be cured by an SDI.

Dr. **Kissinger**. SDI does not cure all problems.

Senator **Kerry**. Well, not even all problems. I am just talking about this notion of blackmail. I mean, it really strikes me as being something of a red herring.

Dr. **Kissinger**. It seems to me, the fundamental point that I am making is that if we preserve the option of developing SDI, we can then have a rational debate in our country about what dangers we most need to protect ourselves, while if we forgo both the deployment and the testing of SDI, a priori, then we are making ourselves vulnerable to many unforeseen circumstances as well as developing a strategy that becomes increasingly absurd.

So, if the Secretary of Defense were to ask my view of how rapidly he should deploy SDI, there are all kinds of flexibilities in my view on that. If he were to ask me, however, whether we should negotiate it away in order to get a 50-percent reduction, since I do not see the great benefit of a 50-percent reduction, I have very grave doubts.

Senator **Kerry**. Well, let me ask you, then, when the ABM Treaty was negotiated, you among others talked about the inherent instability that is created when superpowers both possess a partial defense system.

What are the risks if the United States were to proceed now, as we are—that is precisely what phase I of SDI is, a partial defense—and you and others, I think President Nixon wrote about it, I think President Reagan even quoted him, talking about the sword and shield issue—are we not proceeding to create the very instability that you talked about?

Dr. **Kissinger**. Well, actually, the ABM agreement involved a partial defense.

Senator **Kerry**. I understand that.

Dr. **Kissinger**. The only problem was that because of our domestic debate, what we were defending did not make any sense. We were defending two missile sites in North Dakota.

Senator **Kerry**. In North Dakota, right.

Dr. KISSINGER. And we never built the second missile site, so we then negotiated that one away, but the Soviets were defending Moscow, which makes eminent sense, in the process of which, incidentally, they are protecting more missiles than we were protecting because of the envelope that is created and so many of their missiles are close to Moscow.

If I recall the ABM——

Senator KERRY. But the point of that was, and I apologize for interrupting you.

Dr. KISSINGER. No, please.

Senator KERRY. The point of that was that it was strictly agreed upon in a mutual fashion where——

Dr. KISSINGER. I would welcome that with respect to SDI also. I am not saying there should be an unrestrained race in SDI any more than I say it should be an offensive weapon, but I think we should get the capability and negotiate a level for it. Or negotiate a level for it and then get the capability. I have no problem with that.

Senator KERRY. I can see a scenario in which some limited land-based defense could be mutually deployed, simultaneously with adequate verification and so forth, by which you might actually strengthen deterrence if you were in fact dramatically reducing strategic weapons at the same time—down to very low levels.

Some people may be shocked to hear me say that, but I think you could do that. The problem is that the Soviet Union is not doing it. The problem is the Soviet Union does not want to do it. The problem is that we are proceeding unilaterally, as you have yourself said, I think, in a noncoherent fashion, which therefore it occurs to me can alter their perceptions of our capabilities, and ours of our own, which can tip nuclear deterrence and alter the balance.

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, the Soviet Union is doing it around Moscow within the permitted parameters.

Senator KERRY. Within the ABM Treaty.

Dr. KISSINGER. Within the ABM Treaty, but——

Senator KERRY. Certainly not the kinds of exotics that we are talking about.

Dr. KISSINGER. No, no, no, they do not have the capability yet for the kind of exotics that we——

Senator KERRY. Is that not dangerous? I mean, is that not the very partial defense that you talked about?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, but they have a partial defense, not against sophisticated U.S. attack, and to the best of my knowledge, they are doing a lot of development work and they have that illegal radar in Krasnoyarsk, so that in terms of existing ABM systems, they are undoubtedly ahead of us.

I do not see any huge unilateral advantage—I could conceive situations in which both sides have the right to develop ABM systems, and one side chooses not to deploy them, as after all we chose not to deploy an ABM system, and still not get a decisive advantage.

Senator KERRY. Well, we both agree on that. In fact, we can do that right now under the ABM Treaty.

Dr. **Kissinger**. Incidentally, I have not studied the stage 1 of the current SDI program, and I have not taken a position on that.

Senator **Kerry**. I happen to agree again with your statement that if we had single mobile weapons, and that was the agreed upon mutually deployed structure, it would be safer, and it would eliminate a first strike ability. But are there risks if we proceed to deploy mobiles, and they proceed to deploy mobiles without either side knowing precisely how many, and without a protocol for reductions so that you are merely adding to the current danger?

Dr. **Kissinger**. Well, if we were to make a START agreement that eliminated land-based MIRVed missiles and set a ceiling for it, I would welcome that. I think that would be preferable to an unrestrained race in single warhead missiles.

Senator **Kerry**. I think we are agreeing, then, that it is only under an agreement that you should deploy.

Dr. **Kissinger**. Well, I am not saying only under such an agreement because I do not want to be kept from doing the right things by the absence of an agreement, but it would certainly strengthen what one is trying to do unilaterally.

Absent such an agreement, I would first make most or many or some of the land-based missiles mobile, even if they remain MIRVed. The deMIRVing them becomes advantageous especially if it is part of an agreement. There is no huge reward for deMIRVing the missiles unless there is some agreement.

On mobility, we should do it unilaterally, because it gives us no offensive advantage and reduces their vulnerability.

Senator **Kerry**. Does it not raise more serious issues later in attempting to reach an agreement with respect to the issue of verification?

Dr. **Kissinger**. Anyway, from what I read in the newspapers, this is now already agreed.

Senator **Kerry**. Which?

Dr. **Kissinger**. That mobile missiles will be permitted under the START agreement.

Senator **Kerry**. I understand that may be under discussion.

Dr. **Kissinger**. I am reading the newspapers. I do not know whether I read it correctly.

Senator **Kerry**. Mr. Chairman, if I could just pursue a couple of other things.

As we approach this question of START and this treaty, would you agree that, looking at the whole issue of strategic stability, that we should seek as a matter of principle, if we were going to talk about principles that this committee and the Senate ought to try to adhere to, particularly in light of this treaty, would you agree that we should seek to disperse rather than concentrate our forces through the following three means?

No. 1, by emphasizing mobility, and I think you have said that, and the survivability of our land- and sea-based forces.

Two, by deemphasizing the MIRVed, and I think you just said that a moment ago.

Dr. **Kissinger**. Especially if it is done as part of an agreement. We are talking about an agreement now.

Senator **Kerry**. I understand. But what about unilaterally? Do you think we, not withstanding, should pursue those too?

And then the third one would be testing MIRVed ICBM's and MIRVed SLBM's with a view to maximizing the number of delivery vehicles that we would be permitted under the counting rules. Delivery vehicles versus number of warheads. Those three items.

Would those be sound principles to pursue as we move toward——

Dr. KISSINGER. Certainly for negotiations. As part of a unilateral policy, if it is not part of an agreement, I would certainly favor mobility.

I am not sure if I understood the implication of the last one. Do you mean we should put the maximum number of warheads or the minimum number of warheads?

Senator KERRY. The minimum number of warheads. The maximum delivery vehicles.

Dr. KISSINGER. Yes, I think both of these are desirable. And the single warhead as a unilateral step I would like to think about a little more.

But a priori, I think all three of those are certainly responsible decisions.

Senator KERRY. And as a matter of negotiated agreement——

Dr. KISSINGER. I would have no trouble with that. I would think all of these are good.

Senator KERRY. Now, as a matter of negotiated agreement, in terms of the survivability of strategic forces, do you think an agreement should include an incentive for both sides to reduce the number of warheads on both ICBM's and SLBM's?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, the question is, What are we trying to achieve?

Senator KERRY. We are trying to encourage nuclear stability, strategic stability.

Dr. KISSINGER. Strategic stability as defined, reducing the capability to launch a first strike. This will all contribute.

What we should, however, keep in mind is that the defense of the Atlantic alliance still depends on the American readiness to initiate nuclear war.

And we then have to answer the question, as the capacity to define a military outcome to that war becomes more and more obtuse, if not impossible, what is it that a President does when the Soviets, should the Soviets bring pressure on Europe, when he initiates nuclear war?

We have to answer that question as an alliance, and we have answered it neither as a nation nor as an alliance. In any administration. So this is not a comment on this administration nor on its predecessors, or when we were in office.

Senator KERRY. Finally, Mr. Secretary, and I thank you and the chairman for your patience, you asked the question, the question is whether an agreement leaves the relationship, between the superpower, the military balance, the allied relationship and so forth, are better as a consequence of a particular agreement?

I would reiterate that I think that unless we get a START agreement and prepare to configure our forces under START appropriately, and unless we have some resolution of the conventional force issue, there will be nothing significantly gained or even at all gained by this treaty.

But would you not say that as an interim step toward that agreement that we are better off by virtue of the intrusive inspection, asymmetrical reductions, and elimination or proof that we could eliminate one entire class of weapons?

Are not those three accomplishments, providing you get to a significant and rational agreement, important? And better? Are we not better for those three?

Dr. KISSINGER. This is the philosophical difference between me and my friends in the administration.

I certainly do not consider the argument you have made irresponsible or views that serious people cannot hold. I would think we have here a Soviet leader with a demonstrated willingness to look at things anew. In addition, animated by the necessity of making some changes.

And I would have preferred, if we had early on had a session in which we said, what are we trying to do here? Where are we trying to come to? And then work back from that. And I doubt that we would then have come to the same conclusion.

I do not believe that abolishing whole categories of nuclear weapons is desirable. We have this endless rhetoric of the administration that its purpose is to do away with nuclear weapons.

I do not believe this is possible, and I do not believe our leaders should create the impression that it is possible, let alone desirable. And therefore the argument that this abolishes two categories of weapons has never swayed me particularly.

Now, is it a first step toward better agreements, fuller agreements? It is an interesting question whether an agreement that in itself is of no huge consequence and pays a political price or a price in political relationships is a step toward something better.

Well, I would argue, why do we not go directly toward something better? But you know, it is easier said than done.

Senator KERRY. Mr. Secretary, we understand that beggars cannot be choosers, and we have been beggars on this issue for a long time.

Dr. KISSINGER. But I do not know why you have to be.

Senator KERRY. We would like to move further also faster, which is why I have said again and again, if we do not go further, I do not think this treaty is very meaningful either.

The significance is the potentiality of a first step, and I understand why you disagree with that, and also want to be on record as having said that. Because I think the day will come when we will measure this against where we have wound up.

Dr. KISSINGER. And of course, I mean, I have made it repeatedly clear that I am for ratification. So, we are not talking philosophically.

Senator KERRY. We are getting the best of both worlds, right?

Dr. KISSINGER. No. I am reluctant. It is my honest judgment that I may make few friends with my view.

Senator KERRY. I do not mean to make light of it. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much. It has been very interesting.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Kerry. Mr. Secretary, Dr. Kissinger, I thank you so much for being with us. There are a couple of questions that I have, and I am imposing on your patience even now.

Dr. KISSINGER. You are not putting me under any particular strain.

The CHAIRMAN. I was struck by a couple of your thoughts. I am not sure I agree with you.

But when you say what you do usually has merit, I can think of many things that I have done that I am not sure that they have merit, but they are fun.

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, you are a nicer person than I am.

The CHAIRMAN. Also, you said, and I agree with you, that peace is not the normal condition of human beings. I must say, I think you are right.

Human beings, unfortunately, are argumentative and combative of temperament. And the job of we leaders is to try to make sure that as few people get damaged in their exchanges of hostilities as possible. That is one of the reasons why men like myself seek to avoid nuclear weapons in their entirety, if possible.

I have a couple of questions. First, why have the Europeans really made the choice to accord conventional superiority to the Soviets? Because when you see their capacity, the capacity of production, the capacity of population, the amount that they are spending, you realize that they could make much better efforts and more efforts.

Why is it that they have chosen to accord this superiority to the Soviets when they are much closer to the area of the threat than we are, who are much further away?

Dr. KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman, that is a very good question, to which there is no answer other than that the European countries have deliberately decided to run these risks, because they are giving priority to domestic consumption, and to political survival of the governments that might have to make the unpopular decisions to increase spending, defense spending.

The CHAIRMAN. But do you not think that more of an effort should be made to get them to pull up their socks and carry a greater part of the load, since the threat is closer to them?

Dr. KISSINGER. I think that is inevitable now. I think that is one of the good results of this agreement. I think the Europeans are coming to that view too.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Do you think that a limited war is possible, that we could use the flexible response idea?

Dr. KISSINGER. No. Mr. Chairman, I would prefer no war. I do believe, however, that if through any combination of circumstances, madness, revolutions, whatever one wants to imagine, a war should occur, we all have an obligation to limit its scope.

That it is irresponsible to pretend or to argue that any war must automatically become a holocaust, because the level of destructiveness is more than any responsible leader has a right to impose on humanity.

I am not saying limited war is desirable. But it must be attempted if there is a war at all.

The CHAIRMAN. It must be attempted. But in your judgment, is it possible? I guess it is possible.

Dr. KISSINGER. I think, in fact, that as far as the superpowers are concerned, both sides will probably look for means to limit the war, because they have too much at stake.

What will happen when some of the Third World countries, with more fanatical leadership and a greater willingness to stake everything, develop nuclear weapons? That, I would think, is more of a problem. A much more complex issue.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you very much. I just want to add into the record here that early in the course of this hearing it was asserted that the majority of intelligence agencies believe that more SS-20's have been produced than were declared by the Soviets.

The administration has provided the following response, fully coordinated with all of the relevant executive branch agencies, including State Department, CIA, DIA, and INR.

The statement is incorrect. The majority of the national intelligence community does not support the view that the Soviets withheld a number of SS-20's. All data will be reviewed in the updated MOU, memorandum of understanding, and verified through on-site inspection.

The Director of Central Intelligence, speaking for the entire intelligence community, has said that the Soviet data in the MOU falls within the intelligence community estimates.

I just wanted to make that a matter of record. I thank you tremendously for your patience in being here for 4 hours. And we wish you well. This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:52 p.m., the hearing was adjourned to reconvene at 10:30, February 24, 1988.]

THE INF TREATY

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 1988

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.

The committee met at 10:30 a.m., in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Claiborne Pell (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Pell, Sarbanes, Cranston, Adams, Helms, and Kassebaum.

The Chairman. The Committee on Foreign Relations will come to order.

Today we have the privilege of hearing our majority leader, whom I accompanied on a very vigorous and intensive trip to Europe, where we went to the capital cities of Paris, London, Rome, Bonn, and Ankara, trying to comprehend, analyze, and understand their thoughts about the INF Treaty.

It is a great pleasure, indeed, to welcome Senator Byrd, who did a marvelous job on that trip.

Senator Helms.

Senator Helms. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

I am reluctant to take up the distinguished majority leader's time, but I am obliged to thank him for coming here this morning.

It is most gracious of you to share with us your observations about your recent trip to Europe, and I commend you for your desire to see that the Senate fully exercises its duty to provide advice and consent as to this treaty.

For the record, I would like to have it included that you, on a couple of occasions, at least, have emphasized how important it is for the Senate to be most deliberate in its consideration of this treaty, and I fully agree with you.

In December, you pointed out on the Senate floor how deliberate the Senate was in its consideration of SALT II, and I agreed with that. You noted how the Foreign Relations Committee had held 30 public hearings, 13 closed hearings, 16 days of markup sessions on SALT II.

I do not believe, and I certainly hope, Mr. Chairman, that we will not need that many days for markup of this treaty. But I am confident from the extensive hearing schedule that we have had already that our distinguished chairman will want to give this treaty the most deliberate consideration.

Also I want to commend the distinguished leader for recognizing the very serious responsibility with which each Senator is charged in dealing with this treaty.

In December, you said:

> Senate consideration should be, if anything, on the side of caution and thoroughness. This process will undoubtedly set the tone and the temper of arms control perhaps for a good many years to come.

Then Senator Byrd went on to say:

> I want to say that I do not share the view of those who imply that the Senate has no responsibility but to act as a rubber stamp, that it is just supposed to roll over and play dead, and place its full trust and confidence in our negotiators, this administration or any other administration, without taking the steps to satisfy itself as to such things.

Now, Mr. Leader, I could not agree with you more, and I will look forward to thorough consideration of this treaty when it gets to the floor.

Many of us also recall the way in which the majority leader encouraged a full debate of the Panama Canal Treaty in the late winter and early spring of 1978. That debate—and I always think of Jim Allen when I think of the debate on that treaty—that debate lasted some 2 months. But to the best of my recollection, I recall no instance, Mr. Chairman, in which the majority leader pressured anybody or attempted to hurry the Senate. I think that we are blessed with a majority leader who conducts himself in that fashion.

It was obvious to all that the floor debate was serious in nature and would have far-reaching consequences.

Now, I have agreed with you on everything up to now. But you and I differed as to the ratification of the Panama Canal Treaty. But at no time did I feel that either proponents or opponents were denied the opportunity to suggest modifications or to express their arguments and ideas to the Senate.

So I commend you, sir. I thank you for coming here.

That concludes my statement, for the time being, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much.

Senator Byrd, we are very glad to have you with us.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT C. BYRD, A U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA, AND MAJORITY LEADER OF THE U.S. SENATE

Senator **Byrd**. Mr. Chairman, Senator Helms, Senator Kassebaum, Senator Sarbanes, Senator Cranston, I am very grateful for this opportunity to appear before this committee.

I apologize for not being here at 10 o'clock. I am grateful for the remarks that have been made by both the chairman and the ranking member.

The chairman has referred to the delegation's trip during the February break to five NATO capitals. It was a remarkable trip, and it was a remarkable delegation: The chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, which committee has a predominant jurisdiction over this treaty; the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Nunn, whose committee is examining the treaty; and the chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Senator Boren, whose committee is examining the treaty, both of which latter committees have justifications for carefully studying this treaty in the interest of our country's security and in the security interest of our NATO allies. It also included Senator Warner, the ranking member of the Armed Services Committee.

It was a fine delegation. It had a high sense of purpose. We achieved our goals, our goals being to determine the attitude, the opinions, and elicit the wisdom of the heads of state, government leaders, defense ministers, foreign ministers, the opposition, the press, in those five countries which the delegation visited.

With respect to the INF Treaty, where do we go from here, after the INF Treaty is approved by the Senate, if it is approved, as I expect that it will be? We tried to determine how those same leaders perceive the new leadership of the Soviet Union and how we should conduct ourselves as a member of the alliance, and how best the alliance should proceed from here. Also, we wanted to leave with them a clear message, that message being the stability of this country, as a member of the alliance, the continued support of this country for the alliance, and the stability of our constitutional system and of the role that the Senate plays in the ratification of treaties.

The delegation worked hard, and I can only reflect upon it with the greatest of pride, and feel highly complemented by each Member and the participation by that Member in those meetings with more than 20 very high government officials in those countries.

I say all of this in response to the chairman's remarks.

As to the remarks of the distinguished ranking member, Mr. Helms, he has referred to the SALT II Treaty and the Panama Canal Treaties.

It was my judgment then, and still is, that the Senate's role in the making of treaties—and it has a role by its advice and consent—the Senate's role is one that is to be taken seriously. The Framers intended that the Senate fulfill a serious role, that it not be a rubber stamp to any President, be he Democrat or Republican, and that it conduct its study in a very thorough way.

This is implicit in the fact that the Framers felt it important that the Senate have this unique role in the making of treaties.

I have taken that responsibility seriously to heart as majority leader as; for example, when we worked our way through the Panama Canal Treaties in the long debate, to which the Senator referred. I could spend some time complimenting the members of the Foreign Relations Committee in that instance, and I could single out some members of this committee who are still sitting here today, who participated not only in the debate, but also who participated in the behind-the-scenes work that Senators did in bringing about the final, successful, conclusive act by the Senate in its approval of those treaties.

I will digress from what my intention was, not to name names, but I can remember a Sunday when Senator Frank Church and Senator Sarbanes—I remember those two Senators distinctly—met in my office. They were meeting with representatives of our State Department, meeting with the Panamanian Ambassador, meeting back and forth through that Sunday and on other days, working carefully, thoroughly, painstakingly, and dedicatedly. The results are there.

I have never regretted the vote I cast. I would vote for those treaties again if it were today.

In the case of the SALT II Treaty, I studied the treaty, read it thoroughly myself. I knew that it was to be an important, momentous, fateful decision. I was never enthusiastic about the treaty. But, after careful study, I concluded that, overall, it was in the best interests of the United States to ratify it.

I met with Chairman Brezhnev in the Crimea on July 4, 1979, in his summer retreat, he and I, one aide each, and one interpreter on each side of the table. I impressed upon him the necessity for the Soviet Union to lower its voice, reminding him of the Senate's role in the ratification of treaties and reminding him that the Senate was not a rubber stamp for any President, that the approval of the ratification required a supermajority of two-thirds, that the United States would not be intimidated by comments in Izvestia or Tass by any Soviet leader. President Brezhnev and Mr. Gromyko the next day agreed to accept that advice, to let the Senate work its will, and to stop threatening the Senate.

When the Soviets went into Afghanistan, I called President Carter and asked to come over to the White House. I said to the President:

> The Senate will not and cannot produce the two-thirds votes to approve the ratification of this treaty. It will be a futile effort and, in my judgment, it should not be called up * * *

the reason being that the Soviets had invaded Afghanistan.

And so, it was never called up.

The President acceded to that, agreed with it, and I acceded to his judgment that he should make the announcement and say that because of the invasion, the Senate would not go forward with debate on it. The matter stands exactly there today.

The treaty was never called up.

The Soviets have not gotten out of Afghanistan.

So, I thank the Senator.

I know of no heavier responsibility upon the Senate than that which now faces this committee. I feel the same way about the Senate's role in confirming the nominations by any President, Democrat or Republican. I don't feel it should be a rubber stamp to any President.

I will not go into that now. That is not a part of this committee's deliberations. I have expressed my viewpoint on that on the Senate floor on a number of occasions.

So, I thank this committee and I compliment it. I commend the committee for its early hearings. It has approached its work dutifully, responsibly, and with a high sense of purpose.

With that, I shall begin my prepared testimony.

Over the February recess period, I led a bipartisan Senate delegation to five NATO countries.

The Chairman. Without objection.

Senator Byrd. The last time that the Senate turned its attention to a major arms control treaty with the Soviet Union was 16 years ago, when it gave its advice and consent to the ratification of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

I would point out, Mr. Chairman, that 82 of the current 100 incumbent Senators were not in the Senate at the time that the ABM Treaty was approved for ratification.

I note in passing at this point, Mr. Chairman, that events since the approval of that accord have necessitated that the Senate handle the question of the authoritative interpretation of the text of the INF Treaty somewhat differently from past practice, a matter the importance of which was reinforced to the delegation during its NATO visit.

In addition to yourself, Mr. Chairman, as I have already explained, the makeup of the delegation was carefully calculated, based on the need for the chairmen of those committees, while two of them do not have the primary jurisdiction, certainly have not only justification in studying the treaty, but in my judgment it is a necessity that they conduct hearings and give their advice and findings to the Foreign Relations Committee.

That study by those committees will be very helpful to all of us in the Senate when we turn to floor debate on that treaty.

The leaders of the other countries appeared eager to learn the opinions and attitudes that we wished to convey about the Senate consideration of the INF Treaty, our perceptions of both the state of the alliance and the challenge we face with a new, dynamic style of Soviet leadership now in place in Moscow.

It was obvious to me that there was more than a passing interest on the part of European leaders as to our views about where the treaty and the alliance are headed, and a genuine desire to communicate their views to us. In all the capitals we visited, the level and the quality of the dialog were very informative and beneficial.

I have returned with a much deeper understanding of the climate in Europe and the challenges ahead for NATO.

For the record, the delegation first traveled to Munich, to participate in the annual defense conference known as the Wehrkunde Conference, where a sizable representation of officials from all NATO countries, as well as opinionmakers and outside experts were gathered. Both Senator Nunn and I delivered addresses to that gathering, and we had an opportunity at the outset of the trip to hear a variety of informed opinions as to the future security needs and challenges for the alliance.

Following that, we traveled to London, Bonn, Paris, Ankara, and Rome. In each capital, we meet with the head of state or of government: Prime Minister Thatcher; Chancellor Kohl; President Mitterand; President Evren and Prime Minister Ozal; and Prime Minister Goria.

Additionally, we met with the defense and foreign ministers at each stop, with opposition leaders and opinionmakers, as well as with both foreign and American press representatives. A full listing of those individuals, as well as transcripts of various roundtable discussions and meetings that we had with the press, will be provided to the Senate in the form of a written report.

The delegation will also be delivering our report and recommendations to the President tomorrow afternoon, with the aim of helping the President to prepare for his upcoming NATO summit meeting on March 2 in Brussels—a meeting of some importance to the alliance.

There were three broad purposes to the trip.

First, we sought to acquire a detailed and unvarnished view of NATO country leaders of the advantages and disadvantages of the INF Treaty, and to take those views into account in the context of our consideration of the treaty.

After all, more than anything else, this treaty is the central piece of American relations with our European allies at this time.

Second, we sought their views on where the alliance should be going from here, and, third, their perceptions of Soviet tactics and strategy for the foreseeable future. How do these leaders evaluate the Gorbachev regime's style and approach to the West? How should we collectively best adjust to that new style?

More specifically, we pursued several lines of inquiry.

What were their views on the effect on public opinion of the new Gorbachev "charm" offensive, in conjunction with the successful culmination of the INF Treaty?

Does this era of good feeling impact on the pace and type of future NATO weapons modernization planning?

Does the perception of a diminished threat from the East have an effect on NATO cohesion—and I emphasize the word "perception"?

Is there an undiminished consensus in Europe for a strong deterrent posture based on a successful strategy of flexible response with a robust nuclear component? Or is there developing a momentum for rushing into additional arms control agreements, particularly in the nuclear weapons area, as a result of the INF Treaty and the changed style of the Gorbachev diplomacy?

Do we need to reemphasize that arms control agreements are not ends in themselves but, first and foremost, a means to an end, the end being a greater security for the United States and its NATO allies?

In short, what is the state of the public mood, how is it being formed, and what educational strategy is needed on the part of Western leaders to retain a strong consensus for NATO programs, remembering that it was vigorous consensus-building by NATO leaders that resulted in the successful conclusion of the INF Treaty?

We were also interested in how European leaders evaluate the various proposals and programs for close bilateral military cooperation, particularly between France and Germany, but also between France and the United Kingdom, especially in light of a historic Soviet strategy of attempting to weaken NATO by playing on and promoting divisions among NATO partners.

Moreover, we sought their views on the most advantageous approach to NATO planning now, in terms of setting priorities, and the proper sequence and pacing of arms control initiatives and modernization actions.

Is there a need at this particular time for an overall evaluation and development of a common coordinated concept on these matters? How urgent is this question for the immediate future?

Both in my address to the Wehrkunde Conference and in our meetings in the individual capitals we sought to convey certain themes. Briefly, they were: First, the INF Treaty is a victory for the cohesion of NATO.

We conveyed our belief that the alliance is healthy, and indeed flush with perhaps its greatest victory since its founding—the turning back of Soviet tactics of intimidation embodied in its provocative and unnecessary deployment of intermediate-range missiles, the SS-20's, in the European theater.

Despite a major propaganda and disinformation program in Europe in the early 1980's and the Soviets' walking out of the Geneva negotiations, the alliance's dual-track policy was accepted by European constituencies after courageous stands were taken by European leaders.

Thus, the Soviets, faced with great NATO cohesion, were given no choice but to come back to the negotiating table to conclude an accord.

Such a winning strategy needs to be continued in the post-INF period, and the lesson that we can prevail in our strategies if we act in a coordinated fashion should direct our current planning.

In general, most of the European leaders with whom we met praised the consultative process with which the Reagan administration negotiators brought the alliance behind the INF Treaty.

That question, that specific question, was asked repeatedly by the delegation and more precisely by the ranking member, Mr. Warner.

Second is reassurance that the American commitment to NATO is undiminished.

We emphasized that our commitment to the alliance is unchanged. We have no plans for troop reductions, for instance, as we are aware that this could convey the wrong signal to the Soviets, and to the NATO allies.

This U.S. commitment remains in spite of budget pressures in the United States.

We reiterated our support for the continuation of NATO's deterrent posture of flexible response, including the modernization of nuclear and conventional systems.

Third is to suggest that the alliance ought to develop new initiatives on arms control, both to maintain the momentum of cohesion engendered by the success of the dual-track policy and to regain the psychological initiative vis-a-vis the Soviets, so that the future debates on these matters are framed on terms developed by NATO, not by Mr. Gorbachev and the Soviet bloc.

Fourth is to reaffirm the stability and constancy of the U.S. Senate in the American system.

As leaders of the Senate, we reaffirmed our unchanged commitment to the alliance and affirmed that, while administrations may come and go in Washington, and a confusion of noises can emanate from the United States during an election cycle, especially, the Senate is a permanent body which can be relied upon to keep America firmly anchored and coupled to Europe.

It was also our intent to clarify any question as to the Senate's commitment to conclude, as expeditiously as is possible, with due regard to the need for thorough investigation of its particulars, our consideration of the INF Treaty.

We indicated that, barring unforeseen developments, particularly in the verification area, we felt that Senate approval of the treaty was likely without the need for the kind of reservations which would require the administration to renegotiate the terms of the treaty with the Soviet Union.

It was immediately apparent that our themes of stability, steadfastness, the constancy of our commitment, and our understanding of European problems, are of considerable importance at this time. This is due to what, to put it bluntly, adds up to a pervasive sense of unease in Europe about American leadership, American constancy, and American reliability.

A series of events and developments, some of which have been ongoing and some of which occurred during our journey, highlights the components of the problem.

There was uncertainty during the trip over the possibility of delays in Senate consideration of the treaty because of a dispute between the Senate and the administration over how an authoritative interpretation of the treaty is to be arrived at.

The dispute, as the members of the committee are well aware, stems from the debate over the proper interpretation of the ABM Treaty provisions on the matter of new ABM technologies.

Just prior to the trip, and extending into the timeframe of the trip, Senator Nunn and I engaged in an exchange of letters with Secretary Shultz on this matter, and, while very considerable progress has been made in reaching a common understanding between the two branches on how such an authoritative interpretation is to be reached, I believe that the Senate will have to take additional formal action on the resolution of ratification to clarify any ambiguities that are now present.

After all, the process that this committee is engaged in and that the full Senate will shortly be engaged in, has to be grounded in the certainty that the interpretation the Senate arrives at, specifically of the obligations that the United States and the Soviet Union are undertaking to implement and abide by, is fully understood and will not be susceptible to change by any future administration after Senate approval is given, unless the further advice and consent of the Senate is given.

In particular, the other members of our alliance in NATO, who are very much dependent on the integrity of the American process in consummating the INF Treaty, as well as our treaty partner, in this case the Soviet Union, have to have some assurance that the obligations undertaken are not going to be repudiated by a future administration. Otherwise, the very value of negotiating treaties with the United States becomes debased and undermined.

In order to remove ambiguities and opportunities for future reinterpretation of the obligations herein undertaken, we have reached an agreement with the executive branch on access to negotiating records, and the Senate is now in possession of those records. They are being analyzed by the appropriately cleared staff members and are available for examination by all Senators.

A comparison between the testimony provided by administration officials and the contents of those records will be made so that an opportunity for a future administration to claim that the record reveals a different interpretation would be rendered nil.

I indicated earlier that we assured our European allies that it would not be necessary, barring unforeseen developments, to attach reservations to this treaty which would require renegotiation with the Soviet Union.

I do not think that the authoritativeness of the interpretation understood by the Senate in consenting to the resolution of ratification falls into that category. Such a reservation, which I am now inclined to believe is needed, would contain a statement: (*a*) That the Senate regards the testimony provided by executive branch witnesses as authoritative for purposes of interpreting the provisions of the accord; (*b*) that there is nothing in the negotiating record that contravenes that testimony; (*c*) that the Senate is relying on such testimony and representations and that it is therefore unnecessary to attach additional reservations to the resolution of ratification which outline the substance of that testimony; and (*d*) that an interpretation or meaning given to the treaty different from the one presented to the Senate prior to its vote on the resolution of ratification cannot be adopted without the further advice and consent of the Senate.

Naturally, Mr. Chairman, I will be pleased, if called upon, to work closely with you and the other chairmen and all interested Senators in constructing this understanding, since it will carry substantial weight and be an important precedent for future arms control treaties if they are submitted to the Senate.

Another matter which has tended to raise questions in the minds of Europeans about the steadfastness of America's course and commitments, and something mentioned frequently during our trip, was the Reykjavik superpower summit.

The impression conveyed from that summit was that the United States was uncertain about the value of nuclear deterrence in the European theater, raising all the old fears of a "decoupling" of America from Europe and fueling the arguments of those who believe that the proper goal is to make Europe a so-called nuclear free zone. The denuclearization of Europe is certainly on the top of the Soviet agenda to divide the West.

It is clear that we must continue to impress on Europe the unwavering commitment of the Senate to the strategy of flexible response, with the nuclear component which makes that strategy credible.

As Chancellor Kohl mentioned to us in Bonn and then again in his inspiring session with 50 Senators just last week, it has been the credibility of the nuclear deterrent which has been of central importance in breaking the cycle of wars on the European continent for the last 43 years.

The issue of the future location of the F-16 fighterwing based now at Torrejon Air Force Base in Spain has arisen. The delegation believes that that squadron's future should be determined by NATO, and notes that there are some among our allies who would make the necessary case to public opinion in their country of the need to provide a new home for the F-16's. The leaders in Italy were very supportive of such a new home, and I believe that events in this regard have moved rather quickly.

Suffice it to say that I believe it would send the absolutely wrong signal to provide any rationale to deactivate those squadrons. The newspapers in Europe, while we were there, carried some interpretations of a speech, or at least comments, made by a high U.S. official, as meaning that consideration was being given to deactivate the F-16's. We sought to allay that concern. And our own concerns were much allayed during the visit with high Italian Government officials.

Such a move would constitute a unilateral disarming of an important component of the defense of NATO's southern flank, and would be unwise.

Whether or not those comments that had been made had been misinterpreted, I am not in a position to say. They could very well have been. I did not have the opportunity to read the exact comments.

But we went out of our way to stress to our NATO allies the continuing importance of our presence in Europe, as embodied in the location there of the F-16's.

I would also note that problems continue with regard to our basing arrangements with Greece, Portugal, and Turkey, and whatever actions the Senate can take this year to ensure the continuity of those basing arrangements should be taken.

We had discussions of this type during the delegation's brief, but very productive, visit to Turkey, and I believe that there is a very healthy understanding between us and the Turkish Government on these matters.

It is important to note that there are always sensitivities on the part of any other partner, the basing country, and it is important for us to assess carefully those sensitivities in each of those countries before pointing the finger.

This matter of European sensitivities brings me to another point.

Threatening Europe with a diminished American commitment if Europe does not undertake certain specific actions is counterproductive.

A speech was delivered at Wehrkunde, which, rightly or wrongly, was widely reported in Europe to contain some kind of ultimatum. The headline on the front page of the International Herald Tribune story on that address on February 8 read, and I quote: U.S. warns of troop pullout if Bonn bars nuclear arms," and the lead paragraph read that West Germany had been warned that the United States might consider withdrawing troops from Europe if West German policies led to all nuclear weapons being removed from its territory.

Our discussions in Germany led us to conclude, without any question, that no responsible German official contemplates denuclearizing Germany. All German leaders—the Defense Minister, Mr. Woerner, the Chancellor, Mr. Kohl, the Foreign Minister, Mr. Gennscher—all reject the concept of the third zero, or removal of all short-range missiles from German territory.

The appearance—the appearance, I say—of the use of threats by the United States does the Germans a disservice.

It was the current German leadership which led the fight on deployment of INF missiles and made the difference in making the dual-track policy a success. They deserve the kind of common planning to which I will refer in more detail.

Last on my list of tremors in Europe is the report released just prior to our trip, entitled, "Discriminate Deterrence."

The essence of the report appears to be that other parts of the world are gaining in their importance and, consequently, the priority of the special American-European relationship ought to be reexamined.

Although this report of a blue-ribbon commission appointed by the Pentagon may not have received high billing in the United States, it very obviously played on European sensitivities about the American commitment. The delegation downplayed the importance of the document, but the level of attention that it has gotten in Europe is disturbing.

Mr. Chairman, despite the concerns that I have outlined here, the delegation found a great deal to be optimistic about in Europe. The alliance, in fact, is in good health, as I have indicated, and if it is reexamining those areas of concern and weakness, the atmosphere within which such self-examination is occurring has many positive aspects. The alliance has the opportunities to continue to be vigorous and prosperous. Those opportunities are substantial.

In general, we found a widespread consensus among the allies for continued cooperation and cohesion. There is evident unity, and indeed a desire for strong and more enlightened American leadership.

There was widespread agreement on:

One the need to develop allied priorities and new arms control initiatives to deal with the Soviet leadership;

Two, the importance of educating our respective publics about alliance policies and the requirement to formulate a sober, realistic assessment of our Western security interests independent of our evaluation of the "sincerity" of Soviet intentions.

As President Mitterand told the delegation, "The problem is not whether these men are sincere, but whether they are behaving as if they are sincere."

Personally, I say the problem is a matter precisely converse. The problem is not whether they are behaving as if they are sincere but, whether, indeed they are. There is no way for us to know beyond a shadow of doubt. And so we have to act on our needs, our security needs, and on the capabilities of our Soviet adversaries and the Warsaw Pact, not upon what we may perceive to be their intentions.

We must help make it to Gorbachev's advantage to be sincere.

Three, the general assessment of Mr. Gorbachev and his new style is that he presents new challenges to the West, but that the Soviet Union's objectives have not changed.

As Chancellor Kohl indicated, the Soviet campaign of disinformation in West Germany has not changed at all as a result of the coming to power of Mr. Gorbachev.

As an Italian official said, "They are just selling themselves better." So, there is not any great illusion among the leaders that we visited that the Soviet challenge is a thing of the past.

On the contrary, the desirability of close, unified NATO decisionmaking, as the key to success in dealing with the Soviet Union, is even more desirable in handling a stylistically renewed Soviet Union.

This sober-minded, cautious approach must be supplemented with a readiness to grasp any opportunities provided by the Soviet leadership to improve our relationship in ways clearly in Western interests and to construct initiatives to test their willingness to agree to arrangements which truly enhance our security and the security of the alliance and reduce the risk of conflict.

We do not know whether the Gorbachev reform program will be successful, and there is a healthy skepticism in Europe on that point.

Further, if he should succeed in revitalizing the Soviet economy, we do not know whether that would result in long-term Soviet foreign policies beneficial to the West.

The naval incident which occurred in the Black Sea during our trip illustrates the wisdom of sober realism. The intentional bumping of an American warship by a Soviet ship was a clear violation of the 1972 Incidents-at-Sea Agreement between the United States and the Soviets, an agreement designed to eliminate such hazardous bumping tactics.

We were fortunate in having with us on this delegation Senator Warner, who was Secretary of the Navy, I believe at the time of that agreement, and who certainly could speak authoritatively with respect to that treaty.

That agreement had been hailed as having a 14-year record of success in moderating the movements of the two superpowers' warships when operating in close proximity.

It should be instructive for us all that the Soviets are willing to violate one of the few operative agreements reducing the risk of conflict at the very time that the Senate is considering whether to approve an arms control accord.

I shall shortly conclude with some brief observations.

First, the INF Treaty should be ratified and without reservations requiring renegotiation with the Soviet Union.

Although there are differing opinions about the details of how the agreement was handled and about the specific impact on the military balance and future NATO planning for Europe, virtually everyone agreed that the treaty should be ratified.

Failure to ratify it would clearly cause a serious crisis in the alliance and would provide a fertile ground for Soviet mischiefmaking.

Second, an overall, coordinated NATO strategy on arms control initiatives and modernization questions should be formulated.

The priorities of the alliance should be developed with the objective of enhancing alliance stability and minimizing the potential for strains over, in particular, modernization questions that are premature. In dealing with priority setting, there must be an appreciation of the sensitivity of European public opinion on the matter of short-range nuclear weapons, and, most importantly, German public opinion on the issue of "singularity"; in other words, the proposition that Germany, as a result of some particular NATO nuclear modernization plan, is being asked to bear a disproportionate brunt of any future conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

While it is not necessary or appropriate for me to go into great detail on these issues this morning, I offer some suggestions as to how NATO should navigate this maze of modernization and arms control issues in the coming months.

The alliance agreed at its meeting at Montebello in 1983, to reduce the stockpile of nuclear weapons deployed in Europe by an additional 1,400 beyond the reduction of 1,000 agreed to in 1979. Along with these reductions, the military authorities of NATO were directed to recommend appropriate modernizations of the remaining weapons.

The objective of this was to maintain deterrence at the lowest level of weapons reasonably and appropriately possible.

The regular planning process of NATO has been implementing the decisions of Montebello and should continue to do so. We are approaching some key modernization decisions in the alliance, and these should be made in a timely fashion.

But I want to emphasize that there is no need to link modernization of short-range nuclear systems with the INF Treaty. The alliance has been embarked upon the process of reviewing its requirements in this area for some time, and there is no need to disturb or alter that process now. I believe, based on my conversations with General Rogers, General Galvin, and others prior to the trip, that it will be necessary to modernize certain systems not prohibited by the treaty, but those decisions are some months in the future, and should not be at the center of our discussions of the INF Treaty at this time.

Indeed, to discuss modernization in the context of the treaty could create the false impression—and I emphasize the word "false"—the false impression that modernization is somehow required to compensate—word that is used in Europe, "compensate"—for the elimination of the INF.

The West German Government has stated that, in its view, a comprehensive Western security concept needs to be developed to guide NATO in the post-INF environment of modernization and arms control. This position is not unreasonable, and I would urge our NATO allies and our own Government to take it seriously.

At the same time, I see no compelling need for an "agonizing reappraisal" of NATO strategy at this time.

The top priority for the present should be to formulate a comprehensive and detailed proposal on conventional arms reductions and control in Europe to present to the Soviets this year.

A consensus must be built around a sound conventional forces reduction proposal, which is a very formidable task. There are those in Europe who believe that the asymmetries between the Warsaw Pact and NATO are so large—5- or 6-to-1—that the chances of NATO coming out the loser are too great to even enter into negotiations.

Nevertheless, a major attempt should be made. Moreover, the chemical weapons talks must be pursued with renewed energy.

Clearly Europe would welcome thoughtful, vigorous, American leadership on these issues, and we should not disappoint them. No negotiations on further tactical nuclear weapons arms control should be entered into until and unless major progress has been made in negotiations dealing with the conventional and chemical weapons imbalances.

Regarding a START agreement, the consensus appears to be that the reaching of such an agreement is advantageous—that was the consensus that we found among the NATO leaders with whom we talked—particularly on the specific subceilings of weapons types and so long as verification procedures are adequate—with a very strong emphasis on the word "adequate."

Such verification techniques are different in kind from those employed in the INF agreement. Furthermore, we need to have assurances that the systems which will provide the verification will definitely be in place within specific necessary timeframes before the Senate seriously considers the taking up of a START agreement, and I would urge that the committee seek the advice of the Intelligence Committee, chaired by Senator Boren, the ranking member of which is Senator Cohen.

Finally, such an agreement must only be reached in close consultation with our allies. Thus, a sound agreement, with adequate—and, again, underlining the word "adequate"—ability to verify should be concluded when that treaty is ready. But no deadlines should be imposed which provide opportunities for negotiating advantages to the Soviets.

The deadline is not the important element in regard to a START Treaty. A deadline can be self-defeating to our own security interests and to the security interests of our allies. When we have a good treaty, that is the time.

A report that was required of the Secretary of Defense to be submitted to the Senate along with the INF Treaty, and which was designed to address the matter of the requirements of the alliance in the post-INF environment is now available, and that report is a result of an amendment which I offered and which the Senate accepted. It makes an important contribution on the question of the modernization of the nuclear deterrent in this environment.

I have this report, which I offer to the committee for possible inclusion into the hearing record of the INF Treaty. Mr. Chairman, I ask that it be included in the hearing record.

The **Chairman**. Without objection.

[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]

Senator **Byrd**. Regarding bilateral military cooperative arrangements among NATO allies, such as the French-German brigade proposal, these initiatives are desirable, and should be viewed as an ingredient in a healthy Western security system. So long as there is complete understanding in the alliance about the specific nature of the cooperative arrangements, and as long as they are made within the overall context of the security of the alliance, they should be encouraged.

It should go without saying that this specific initiative between the French and Germans was generally welcomed in Europe, given the historical barriers that such an arrangement has had to overcome.

I regard, Mr. Chairman, one of the highlights of our trip the 2 days that we spent in Paris conferring with French leaders and opinionmakers. It is evident that there is a healthy ferment in the French political system and that an important opportunity exists for the United States and the alliance to explore enhancements of the relationship with the French, despite their reluctance to rejoin the military planning organization of NATO. Their hospitality was very warm, and every opportunity for further dialog with the French should be explored.

They are very concerned—very concerned—about the uneasiness of the West Germans in a post-INF environment and the efforts of Soviet leaders to promote European denuclearization.

Now, I return to perhaps the most important, in my mind, of all the subjects discussed on our journey—public opinion in the West.

The delegation was impressed with the sensitivity of virtually all NATO leaders about the need to inform our respective constituencies in a comprehensive and persuasive fashion of the appropriateness of alliance priorities and strategies. Although the impact of the new style Soviet leadership of the Gorbachev era is in a formative period and varies from country to country, there is a consensus on the need for European and American leaders to educate actively and aggressively our respective publics to the fact that Soviet long-term objectives have not changed. There is no evidence, no real evidence, of it.

We must, as Chancellor Kohl told us in Bonn and stated again in his meeting with Senators last week in the Capitol, challenge Mr. Gorbachev to live up to his rhetoric. We can do this best and we can maintain the support of our publics by working in solidarity with our NATO allies, pursuing a sound and responsible policy of force modernization where necessary and arms reduction agreements where possible. In my judgment, each of us should take every appropriate opportunity, wherever it exists and presents itself, to speak on that theme, so that the focus of the American public can be centered upon realism, not upon what we would like to believe or upon wishful thinking in respect to the new style of Soviet leadership.

Mr. Chairman, I apologize for the length of my statement. I am ready to attempt to answer any questions that the committee may have.

[The prepared statement of Senator Byrd may be found in the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Leader. We will limit ourselves to the 10-minute rule.

Thank you for a very thoughtful and thorough report. As one who accompanied you on the trip, I can say that the reactions you report of the various leaders we met are accurate and well-capsuled.

What would you think, or how would you characterize the reaction of the Europeans with whom we spoke with regard to the importance of START, whether we ought to delay that or whether the INF is part of a continuum, the next stage being START?

Senator BYRD. Mr. Chairman, I briefly touched upon that in my statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator BYRD. Generally speaking, I found an enthusiasm. I say "I," but I think the delegation would support what I am about to say.

We found an enthusiasm among the NATO leaders toward developing a workable, effective START agreement. There was general approval of the concept of reducing nuclear weapons.

But there was also a clear realism that, as I have indicated in my statement, that we must look carefully at the sublimits and at the details with respect to verification, and that, while we need to proceed early, we need to go forward, we need to show initiative and momentum, the time for the treaty, the time for signing the treaty, the time for approving the ratification of the treaty is not to be dictated by the calendar—the month or the day—but when, and I quote a NATO leader's words, "when that treaty is ready."

I am in full accord with this approach. I believe that the delegation unanimously felt that that was the proper approach, and that is the way we should proceed; but that, in the meantime, as I have indicated also, we should press the alliance to a collective decision, to decide its strategy and present to the Soviets a challenging proposal with respect to the reduction of conventional and chemical weapons; that the alliance should take the leadership.

There was a concern that the Soviets, that Gorbachev, who has shown himself very proficient at coming at us with proposal after proposal, to the extent that we cannot even keep our briefing books up to date until we are hit with another proposal, and then another proposal, and then another proposal. There was concern that he might propose an asymmetrical reduction in conventional weapons—"I am willing to withdraw, I am willing to reduce on a 3-to-1 basis, 2-to-1, 3-to-1, 4-to-1"—that he might make such a proposal, realizing how good he is at PR, and that this would be a psychological stroke, and that our respective publics would be overwhelmed by it. The pressure to accept would be so great that it could not be resisted, whereas an asymmetrical reduction, which would be in our best interest, would have to be larger than that. Also the details of that reduction—where the forces would go, what forces would go, where and when—all of these would be difficult. We should proceed, while we are talking about START, we should proceed with the formation of a proposal of our own, meaning NATO, in these other areas.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Following up that thought, and also you touched on this in your remarks, in connection with linkage, do you think there should be any tying in or condition or category 1 or 2, even, though not 3, reservation, or mention of any other subject than arms control?

Should there be any reference to Afghanistan? Should there be any reference to getting preliminary agreement on conventional arms control, et cetera?

Senator BYRD. I do not believe that there should be any linkage to this treaty.

I think that there should be debate in the Senate. I am very interested in our highlighting the Soviet atrocities in Afghanistan. I think the least that we can do, those of us who have not suffered any losses of our families, any maiming of our children or grandchildren, who have not been driven from our homes, the least that we can do is to proclaim our shock at the continued actions of the Soviets in Afghanistan.

I shall seek to have a considerable debate on that issue when the treaty is before the Senate. I think we have a duty, but certainly not to link anything concerning Afghanistan with this treaty.

The treaty in itself, I am convinced, is in the interest of the United States and its allies.

I think under all the circumstances, it would be a serious mistake, and I have mentioned some of those circumstances in my prepared statement, it would be a serious mistake for the Senate to reject this treaty.

I have indicated that there is only one area in which I think the Senate would be justified, that being if it found flaws in the verification procedures, that it would be justified in going back and forcing further study and renegotiation of that treaty.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Thank you.

The question of the American troops over there as you know raises a good deal of questioning in our own country. There are 325,000 in uniform and a good many more families and dependents there. If that number were reduced a certain amount, particularly in light of the fact that the Europeans contribute less than we do as a percentage of their GNP, what would be your reaction?

Senator **BYRD**. Mr. Chairman, I think even any discussion of withdrawal of American troops from Europe at this time would produce serious tremors within the alliance, and the Soviets would take advantage of it. Any indication that the United States is contemplating pulling out from Europe, withdrawing its total support to the alliance, any indications would be seized upon by the Soviets to divide the alliance, to play upon the fears of the alliance, especially those front line countries, especially the Germans.

It would create confusion among our allies. I think it would be a serious mistake.

Quite the opposite: We must do everything that we can to reassure the alliance and the Soviets that there is no decoupling contemplated now or within the foreseeable future.

It would undermine the cohesion of the alliance. It would be destructive to the confidence of our allies. And it would be injurious to our own national security interests.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Thank you very much, indeed. My time is expired.

I recognize the ranking minority member, Senator Helms.

Senator **HELMS**. Mr. Leader, as always, you are very thorough, very clear, and very forthright.

I admire your work.

I will say, Mr. Chairman, that I follow with great interest and yearn for the day when we have compiled in a book the majority leader's discussions of the history of the Senate. It will be very scholarly.

Mr. Leader, I want to ask you a question that you might not feel comfortable in answering at the moment, and you have virtually answered it in any event. It is this. You don't really have a timetable, rigid or otherwise, for consideration of this treaty or how long it will take in the Senate?

Senator **BYRD**. I do have in my mind a tentative timetable. I have to have one, because I have to try to foresee the schedule of the Senate from the beginning of a session to the end of a session.

Senator **HELMS**. Of course you do. Yes.

Senator **BYRD**. I have to try to fit into my own thinking the budget, the appropriations bills, the INF Treaty, the conference report on the trade bill, the conference report on the catastrophic illness bill, and various other important measures that must be taken up, allowing for the two political conventions, allowing for the 3-weeks-in-and-1-week-out schedule, and allowing for the fact that the Senate ought to try to complete its work—and the House—in 3 weeks to a month at least before the elections and not have to come back.

Having said that, my plan is to bring to the floor—naturally a majority of Senators could prevent my doing that—my plan is to call up the INF Treaty within a reasonable, a very reasonably, short time after it is reported by this committee.

I have to do that, No. 1, because of the reasons I have stated. I would say this, that there is only one matter that I would put ahead of this treaty that I can foresee right now if the treaty were before the Senate, and that would be the budget resolution.

I say this only because I think it is important that the Congress send to the President separate appropriations bills, and not an omnibus appropriations bill, as it did last year and as it did the year before last.

So, as to the timetable, as to the length of time the Senate debates that treaty, that is a matter for the Senate, mostly for the Senate, to determine. I would not want to see a filibuster occurring. Were that to occur, I would see it my duty to try to bring that filibuster to a close.

Senator HELMS. Well, I do not contemplate a filibuster on it, but I find reassurance in what you have said this morning about adequate time for full discussion of any amendments or other modifications that might be proposed.

Now, Mr. Leader, is there in the works a Democratic or bipartisan leadership package of modifications to the treaty or the resolution to ratification?

Senator BYRD. Senator Helms, I know, I personally know of no Democratic or partisan——

Senator HELMS. Bipartisan.

Senator BYRD. Well, there may be a bipartisan one. But I know of no Democratic one. There may be one, perhaps. I don't know. I know of no Democratic effort as a party.

I know of no effort to make this a party issue, and I would oppose that. I have never in conferences, I don't believe that I have ever attempted to make foreign policy issues of this nature a party matter.

Senator HELMS. Right.

Would you like for those Senators who may have amendments or reservations to advise you in advance?

Senator BYRD. Well, Mr. Helms, I would appreciate it.

Senator HELMS. OK.

Senator BYRD. It is nothing that I would request. Senators don't have any responsibility to advise me of such.

Senator HELMS. I understand.

The CHAIRMAN. If I could interrupt for a moment, I think we in the committee would hope very much that we would have a chance to look them over, too.

Senator BYRD. I would appreciate that.

Senator HELMS. Well, as you know, rule 30 has been revised to eliminate article-by-article consideration by the Committee of the Whole.

Now, I don't know your views on that, Senator.

Senator BYRD. I support that.

Senator HELMS. But for the purpose of orderly debate, I wonder if you might consider for purposes of this treaty only propounding a unanimous consent request reinstating article-by-article consideration, but not reinstating deliberation in the Senate as a Committee of the Whole.

Senator BYRD. I would be happy to consider it, but I would like to have the opportunity to think about it and know what is involved.

Senator HELMS. That is fair enough. You have always been a gentlemen about it, as about everything. We can just have a gentlemen's agreement or something of that sort.

Senator BYRD. Senator Helms, my door is open to Democrats and Republicans alike——

Senator HELMS. It always has been.

Senator BYRD [continuing]. On this subject or any other subject. You are as welcome as any other individual in the Senate to come into my door at any time.

Senator HELMS. And I do it.

On page 11 of your prepared speech, and I followed it carefully as you were delivering it—and you delivered it well, by the way——

Senator BYRD. Not so well. I only had 3 hours of sleep beginning at 5:30 this morning, so I stumbled over some words.

Senator HELMS. No, you didn't.

Without getting too deeply involved in the broad-versus-narrow dispute on treaty interpretation, let me ask this question. Really, I ask it for the purpose of knowing how to proceed.

How, for example, under the authoritative approach that you have recommended should we treat the following cases involving presentations by the administration.

First, for example, how do we interpret a factual error in presentation? For instance, if a witness makes a statement, which is not corrected during his testimony, that a reading of the treaty language itself would reveal to be just plain wrong, would not the treaty govern and not the error of the witness?

I am trying to figure out exactly what the word "authoritatively" means.

Senator BYRD. Well, I will attempt to define that word as best I can.

As to a specific error, it seems to me that it is the committee's responsibility to very carefully study the testimony of witnesses. If there is something that appears to be an error, it ought to be seen at the time the committee is considering it, and the committee ought to probe and attempt to clarify any ambiguity in the statement of any witness.

I cannot comment on what should be done with respect to any particular error. It could be a minor error or it could be a major one. But it seems to me that the committee, if it is carefully circumspect and applies its energies to the matter, which this committee will, that kind of error should not happen, in my opinion.

Senator HELMS. So, the treaty would govern.

Senator BYRD. I am speaking in a very generic fashion——

Senator HELMS. You have to.

Senator BYRD [continuing]. As to your question.

As to what we mean by "authoritative"—is that the Senator's question?

Senator HELMS. Yes.

Senator BYRD. What do I mean by "authoritative"?

Senator HELMS. I am asking this in the context of what if witnesses or a witness made an error of fact. Also, how about contradictions between administration witnesses, which has occurred right here, and also the presentations by administration witnesses at this committee and at the Armed Services Committee and at the Intelligence Committee, there have been contradictions and changes and that sort of thing. That is the context in which I asked the question what does "authoritative" mean.

Senator BYRD. Well, as to apparent contradictions, it seems to me that the three committees in the Senate will have an ample opportunity to discuss those contradictions and to clarify them with the witnesses, with the administration. That should not appear to me to be an obstacle that cannot be overcome.

As to what is authoritative and why all this fuss about the official record and what is authoritative, I believe this. As I approach my decision and approval of ratification of this or any other treaty, I have to remember that a treaty is the law of the land; that most laws of the land are passed by both Houses of the Congress by simple majority votes; and that the President can veto them and that they can be overridden by supermajorities of both Houses.

I have to keep in mind that if this law of the land, this treaty or any other treaty, this law of the land does not pass both Houses; that the Constitution's Framers had some reason for giving this responsibility to one body, the Senate of the United States. In the case of bills that are enacted into law by both Houses, if there is a mistake that is made, the Congress can rectify that mistake quickly, through the passage of additional legislation, but if an error is made in our approval of the ratification of a treaty, that error cannot be so easily corrected.

It may be to the detriment of our Nation's security interest.

And so, in the context of "the law of the land," we have a very different animal here when we are talking about a treaty from that bill which becomes a law.

Now, if the Senate approves the ratification of a treaty, it ought to know what it is doing. It is no rubber stamp. It is the most serious, one of the most serious of all serious responsibilities on the Senate. The House does not have that responsibility.

And that law of the land, as I have said, can only be passed by a two-thirds majority.

If we make a mistake, we cannot apply the bandage to stop the hemorrhage quite so quickly as we can with a bill that is enacted into law.

I say that we ought to know what we are doing. Well, how do we know what we are doing?

We read the treaty. We read all four corners of the treaty. We expect the administration witnesses to level with us, whatever administration it is, to tell the truth. We have to depend upon those administration witnesses to a very considerable extent so that we might have a clear understanding of the contents of that treaty.

After all, they, on behalf of the President, wrote the treaty. They have a duty to this Senate, under any administration.

Senator Helms, when I was majority leader before, I had a President of my own party. To me, Presidents come and go. A lot of them are difficult to remember. But the names of Calhoun, Clay, and Webster will always remain.

To me, this Senate is the bedrock of the Republic in the troubled seas of democracy, and we have a responsibility to know, and if it is difficult to know, to find out what that treaty means.

Now, if an administration is not willing to tell us that what they are saying is authoritative—that is the official record: What we say to you, Senator, is I helped to write this treaty; I was in all of the discussions and this is what it means; this is what the Soviets understand that it means, and you can depend upon me, and I would be willing to take an oath that this is what it means; otherwise, I would not have advised the President to sign it.

This is what I mean by "authoritative testimony."

If any administration can come along later and change the interpretation of the treaty, then what we see happening is for a future administration to determine for itself what shall be the "law of the land."

The Senate has no opportunity if the administration later decides that it interprets the treaty differently. After all, it did not write that treaty. A future President did not sign that treaty. And yet, the Senate, which, in reaching its decision, based that decision on the testimony and on the record that was made before it in duly constituted hearings, the Senate has no opportunity then to give its advice and consent to the reinterpretation of that treaty.

That is why we have an obligation to insist that this administration stand behind its testimony. Does it believe in its own treaty? Does it believe in what it is saying? Is it being honest with us?

As I have said, whether it is Democratic or Republican, that is my attitude.

I happen to be one Senator who believes that the U.S. Senate was, to paraphrase another man saying it, "the stroke of genius of the Framers." I want to live up to my responsibility and I want the Senate to live up to its role.

The Senate sometimes has to stand up for its prerogatives and rights and duties to the American people.

I hope that answers what I mean by use of the word "authoritative."

Senator HELMS. We will revisit this subject a little bit later. Thank you so much for your answer.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I want to thank the leader for a very comprehensive, perceptive, and balanced report. I think it has, in fact, identified the various elements which need to be addressed both in the treaty and outside of the treaty, since the treaty works in the context of broader considerations.

I had just a couple of questions that I wanted to ask because I think the items have been very well covered, indeed, in the prepared statement.

First, in your discussions with the European leaders, would you say that their attitude now is one of hope and optimism about the future of NATO, or one of apprehension as to what may now come, or perhaps a blend of these?

Senator BYRD. I think it is a blend. There is hope and optimism, and yet there is concern and some confusion.

I think that we, the United States, have a major responsibility in helping to shape where we go from here. We must act at all times in full consultation with our allies. We must support the collective decisions of the allies, and at all times we should act and speak in ways that leave no question as to our dependability in the support of the alliance and in the protection of Europe, because Europe's security is our security.

Senator SARBANES. Was it your perception that some of the concern and confusion that exists stems from a view that there may not be a coherent overall deterrence doctrine that is part and parcel of the approach of the West? I think this particularly flows from some of the statements that were made at the time of the Reykjavik summit, which had the consequence of casting into doubt what is, in fact, NATO's deterrence doctrine.

For example, I see where you say the West Germans are pushing very hard and there needs to be a coordinated overall strategy on arms control. Of course, that implies that somehow we are not fitting these things into such an existing strategy. My sense of it is that a good deal of the anxiety is a result of some of the statements that were made at the Reykjavik summit.

Senator BYRD. Mr. Sarbanes, the Reykjavik summit produced an earthquake in Europe, and it shook me very badly.

I was amazed when I was called to the White House the next day, I believe it was, or a couple of days thereafter, and heard these glowing descriptions of how the President had discovered a new world. Reference was made to Columbus and his discovery of a new world. I was stunned by the posture that was being taken, that the United States had won a great victory at Reykjavik.

I thought to myself that these people think we are children. It was obvious that we had gone beyond the point that we should have gone. It was obvious to me that the President was unprepared for that summit, that his people had not adequately prepared him for it, that there had not been consultations, appropriate consultations, with our allies, and that we were severely hurt.

On this trip, I found that the reaction among NATO countries was as mine, and they have not recovered from their reaction. They have not recovered from the jitters, the tremors, the wave of perplexity, confusion, and wonderment that swept over them.

Then came the INF, and statements from time to time led the Europeans to believe that the United States was, indeed, contemplating decoupling. I spoke of the report, which I said should be played down, in which the focus was on turning the United States away from Europe and looking to the third countries—in other words, shifting our focus away from Europe to other theaters, third countries.

A combination of all of these things, led first by the Reykjavik summit, produced reactions from which they have not fully recovered.

And so, we like to think that this delegation did a service by reassuring our European allies and colleagues that, indeed, there is stability, as I have gone into quite at length already.

Senator **Sarbanes**. I think that is a very important point to make. I think we sometimes fail to appreciate that statements here about our strategy have a major impact in Europe.

I was very interested in your reference both to the ultimatum given to the West Germans, and also to the "Discriminate Deterrence" report, both of which have had a sharp impact on thinking. We sometimes contribute toward creating a situation that we don't want to see happen.

Let me just close with this observation, Mr. Leader.

I was very pleased to hear your reference to the fact that the SALT II Treaty was taken off the Senate calendar because of the Soviet aggression into Afghanistan.

Unfortunately, there have been some on our side who have suggested that the treaty would not have been approved in any event, and, of course, the Soviets have taken that position. The Soviets have sought to deny that it was Afghanistan that prevented that treaty from moving forward.

Now, whether it would have been approved or not, we don't know. That would have been the determination of the Senate after full consideration. But the treaty had been reported favorably by this committee to the floor of the Senate, and it was on the calendar of the Senate to be considered at the beginning of the 1980 session. I think it is very important for the world to understand, and for the Soviets to understand, that it was the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan that resulted in taking that treaty off the calendar for consideration.

I think your underscoring that fact here this morning was very helpful.

Senator **Byrd**. Senator Sarbanes, the fact that you have commented as you have I consider a compliment because I have tremendous confidence in you, in your ability, which is a kind of uncanny unique ability to go to the crux of things. I have said this many times in many places behind your back.

You can be sure that that treaty would have been called up in the Senate had it not been for the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union.

I did not take a trip to the Soviet Union for pleasure in 1979, and I did not come to my own decision to support that treaty easily or lightly. But when the Soviets went into Afghanistan, the President did not call me—I called him, and asked to come to see him.

I have related already what was said. But I will say it again.

I did not say, "Mr. President, do you think we ought to go forward with this treaty?" The President is still living. If I am misrepresenting what was said, he can refute it. I said, "Mr. President, we cannot produce a two-thirds vote to approve the ratification of the treaty." I said that, and in essence, I said, though I cannot remember the exact words, "The invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union has sealed the rejection of this treaty if we call it up."

I did not ask if I should go ahead because I had no intention. I have always said that I am the leader of the Senate, and I am the Senate's man, not any President's man.

Why do I say that here? Just so the record will show what took place in that room when the President and I had this discussion.

The President agreed, and we both felt that he, being the head of state in this country, the President of the United States, should, for policy reasons, announce that the treaty would not be called up. But the majority leader of the U.S. Senate, this majority leader, will always make that decision, as to whether a bill or treaty will be called up. The President won't make it. And, in making it, I do not presume to say that I will run over my colleagues. I always listen to my colleagues. But there is no question in my recollection and any who would say it otherwise are wrong.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. Thank you, Senator Sarbanes.

Senator Cranston.

Senator **Cranston**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We've spent many hours in this committee considering this treaty, with many witnesses, many discussions, many questions. I think this has been its finest hour—actually, 2 hours—that we have spent with you.

I think you have magnificently fulfilled your role as the leader of the Senate in providing leadership to us today regarding this treaty. I think yours has been the most constructive testimony we have received, the most instructive, the most substantive, and also the most focused in terms of zeroing in on the most significant matters that this committee and this Senate must consider as it comes to grips with the INF Treaty.

I am delighted with what you have done today.

Concerning your recommendations, I would just like briefly to discuss them.

Most importantly, you say on page 17, "The INF Treaty should be ratified and without reservations requiring renegotiation with the Soviet Union."

I certainly welcome that. I think most members of this committee welcome that, and I believe that is what the Senate will do and should do. Your leadership can obviously help to bring that about.

Second, in regard to linkage generally, you stated in regard to Afghanistan that, while the Senate should debate the horrors that have stemmed from Soviet brutality and its invasion of Afghanistan, we should not link Afghanistan in a formal sense in considering this treaty.

I gather that generally you are opposed to linkage on other issues, like human rights, modernization of short-range weapons, conventional force balance, and other issues that may be brought up, such as compliance record in the past.

You have set forth a very clear delineation of what you think we must do in regard to one matter, and that is the reinterpretation of treaties, and living up and protecting the role of the Senate and its constitutional responsibilities in that realm. So, I have one question out of all that.

Is the issue of interpretation of treaties the only understanding or reservation you feel should be attached to this treaty?

Senator **Byrd**. Mr. Cranston, it is, unless, as I have said, some potentially fatal flaw can be found in the verification procedure.

I have read them. Of course this committee and the other committees will go into them more deeply. You probably have already. And through your questioning of the witnesses, you and they can best probe to find any potential flaw.

A reading of the procedures, it seems to me, is clear, and I see no need for any such reservation or condition.

Barring that unforeseen development, I would resist any linkage with any other subject matter in this particular treaty.

I think that the treaty is in our best interest. It is a unique treaty in that the Soviets are asymmetrically reducing their weapons. It is a complete elimination of this particular type of weapon. It should be easily verified that if any such weapon is found anywhere, then there is good reason to believe that the Soviets have violated the treaty.

So, it hopefully may open the gates for other good arms control treaties, which are not, as I say, to be considered as ends within themselves.

Let me say one final thing.

I feel so strongly about the unwarranted invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union and the atrocities, the barbarities that have been visited upon old people, children, and the freedom-loving people of Afghanistan. So atrocious have these been.

If I should ever think of linking anything to a treaty, it ought to be something about Afghanistan. The freedom fighters there have nothing but courage and a steel will, and indomitable love of freedom with which to repel the aggressiveness of these primitive-acting, barbaric invaders. This is something that should excite the admiration of the American people especially.

When we deal. in a treaty with a country that shoots down a Korean plane and rewards the person who gave the order, a country that will countenance, even countenance, the dropping of toys for innocent children to pick up, this is something that is so loathsome that it should repel the conscience of any freedom loving people or any people anywhere, because all people love children.

And so, that is the adversary with which we are dealing in this treaty.

Having said that, the treaty is not the place with which to deal with those issues.

I do believe that we must be very careful that we don't support any effort at this time to disarm the freedom fighters in Afghanistan on the basis of promises or in any way that would reward or appear to reward the Soviets for getting out of Afghanistan. They should not be rewarded for getting out. They simply ought to get out.

I hope that what I have said, Mr. Cranston, will underline not only the fervor with which I deplore this despicable invasion, but also the feeling with which I support no linkage in this treaty with even Afghanistan.

Senator **Cranston**. I am sure that this Senator and every other Senator shares your sense of abomination over the behavior of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and in other matters.

There will be some strong debate, and I know that you will lead that particular phase of the debate as well as other phases when this matter is before the Senate. I am glad that you do feel that linkage would not be wise.

Afghanistan wrecked one treaty and set us back for a long time. Since the Soviets, for whatever reasons, including the strength and valor of the freedom fighters, are now deciding to try to get out of Afghanistan, this is not the time to let that matter wreck another treaty.

I have two more points.

I welcome your commitment to early Senate consideration with dispatch of this treaty once this committee has done its work and made its report to the Senate. That is very important in terms of moving this process along.

Finally, on page 23, you say, "We must challenge Mr. Gorbachev to live up to his rhetoric."

All of us, of course, agree with that. If it turns out that his rhetoric reflects reality, I would like to express the point of view that there may actually be a change in Soviet long-term objectives. We do not know that, but we may find that that is the case as we challenge his willingness to live up to his rhetoric.

He has said that all nations should seek security in ways that do not undermine the security of other nations. And if they lived up to that, that would be a change, it seems to me, in their long-range objectives.

He has said that they are willing to explore conventional, asymmetrical readjustments of the balance of conventional forces in Central Europe. If they live up to that when we test them, that would seem to be an abandonment of their policy of using overwhelming force as a threat to achieve their goals in Europe, even though they don't actually resort to the use of that force.

Finally, Gorbachev has said that, as they want to get out of Afghanistan, they would also like to explore ways of reducing the tensions in Third World areas, specifically Central America. And, again, we have to test all that. But if it turns out that the Soviet Union, under his new leadership, with new thinking, is prepared to live up to those three matters, in addition to others that he has expressed, that could mean that there is some change in their long-range world objectives, and that could mean that we could have a significantly more secure world and a significantly better relationship with them.

All of that remains to be tested and proven. What the outcome will be, none of us knows.

Again, in sum, on this treaty, I think your leadership on it today and the leadership we know we will have when it comes to the Senate floor is truly magnificent, and for that I thank you.

Senator **Byrd**. Mr. Cranston, as long as I live, I will be skeptical of Soviet leaders.

As I indicated, we must be ready to seize every opportunity and try to help Mr. Gorbachev to be sincere. But I will never—never—I cannot envision myself being ever convinced to the extent that you have indicated.

I have to remember that Khrushchev said, and I paraphrase, "Do not think that we have forgotten Marx or Lenin. They will not be forgotten until a shrimp learns to sing."

Lenin said, "We shall destroy everything, and upon its ruins we will build our castle."

I think the Soviet leader is doing what he thinks he has to do. He sees the need for a new economic order. He may be successful, he may not be. But always he will act to serve the interests not only of his country but of his party, the Communist Party.

He is no soft touch.

Senator Cranston, you did not become a U.S. Senator by being unrealistic. It was a tough way, a tough way, to the top.

Gorbachev did not get where he is by being a nice guy. He is tough.

Senator Sarbanes, Senator Pell, I saw that in him before President Reagan ever met him. He is tough as flint. He is smart, he is articulate, he is formidable. He is arrogant, he is overbearing.

I say this understanding that at least the last two adjectives have been applied to me, perhaps appropriately in the minds and eyes of some. But this man is tough.

My two colleagues were with me when we met him. We were his guests, and naturally, he controlled the discussion. When he came to our country, he was a guest in our country, and he controlled the discussion.

There is nobody who can debate that head of state because nobody else is on his level, except the President of the United States. I cannot debate him when I am his guest. I cannot debate him when he is ours. He knows that.

I am disturbed when, because he simply opens the door of his car and walks out and shakes the hand of those who are onlookers, the American people virtually swoon.

So, I say "Yes," let's try to help him to be sincere, but let caution be the watchword always, unless the Russian people, the Soviet people, somehow change the underlying system. Then I may view the leadership differently.

Your compliments, may I say, Mr. Cranston, are words that I will cherish.

I like to have a few pats on the back once in a while, though I can understand how I don't deserve them many times. It does not bother me.

But I do love to hear the kind of words that you say, and you said them with the utmost sincerity. I appreciate that, and I hope that I can live up to them as I continue to work with our colleagues on this treaty and the other matters that affect the interest of our country.

Senator CRANSTON. Let me say one thing if I may, Mr. Chairman, just very, very briefly.

I know that you will fulfill my confidence and that of others in your leadership in this matter and in others.

I, too, have met Gorbachev, and I totally share the way you size him up. He is strong, he is smart. I totally share your skepticism without any reservation. I share that skepticism.

Perhaps the only difference is that I have a little bit more hope. Maybe I am more of an optimist and maybe you are more of a pessimist on this matter.

But, to paraphrase what President Reagan said, "We can have hope but we must verify, and we cannot do anything that would endanger our security." We have to do whatever is necessary.

I do believe, as you believe, that we may find greater security in arms control, and that is why this treaty is so important.

Again, thank you very much.

Senator **Byrd**. I thank you.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman and I thank all members of the committee.

The **Chairman**. Thank you.

Senator Adams, do you have any questions?

Senator **Adams**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Leader, very much for visiting the committee this morning. I want to share the things that have been said by our colleagues that we appreciate and look forward to your leadership on the ratification of this treaty.

I particularly appreciate your comments indicating that you do not believe there should be reservations that would require negotiation.

I am in support of this treaty. I am concerned, and I wanted to state it to you because I have shared now a number of fights with you on the floor of the U.S. Senate, and it has been a pleasure to do that and to support you, and I intend to do that in the future.

I am concerned that a small group will attempt to place process over substance on this treaty, and that it will not come up quickly enough and that it will be delayed through procedural conditions, reservations, amendments being offered, that would keep us from ratifying it before the summer is over.

I am hopeful that you will work with us and help us to avoid the ability to have this treaty stopped for grounds that do not deal with the substance of it, because I agree with you. I think this is a net benefit to ourselves and our allies, and our allies have said this.

And so, I would hope that it could come up very early and that we would not have a number of conditions, certainly on our side, or be diverted from what I am afraid will be the necessity that all of us join with you to prevent delay of its consideration.

I wanted to share that with you because I have sat in these hearings now for days and weeks and I see a lot of nonsubstantive things coming. And you are so very good at handling these matters.

I am hopeful that, as you are meeting with us and with the bipartisan coalition that will be necessary to pass this, that we avoid amendments, conditions, and reservations which could delay consideration of the final passage of this treaty because I think it is essential that we do it by this summer.

You and I have both had experience with this. I have had some in the executive branch as well as on Capitol Hill, and I know the dangers.

That is all that I have to say, Mr. Leader.

We very much appreciate your being here, and I hope that you will consider this as the plans are being developed for the ratification of the treaty.

Senator **Byrd**. Mr. Chairman, I can assure the Senator and the committee on one point: When he states his desire that there be no delay in consideration of the treaty, there won't be any delay in the consideration of the treaty.

The motion which I will make to proceed to executive session to consider the treaty is not debatable. I will make that motion.

The debate will occur once the treaty is on the floor, before the Senate, so as for delay in taking up the treaty—as I believe I use your words—there won't be any. That will be placed into the schedule at the appropriate moment, without delay, considering the circumstances that confront the Senate at the time with respect to other matters.

Naturally, if the budget resolution were before the Senate, I would not set that aside for the treaty. There won't be undue delay in calling up the treaty.

Senator ADAMS. I thank the majority leader, and I am hopeful that we will be able to resist and not have many conditions or that we will be able to promptly dispose of these, because I do have a concern for the procedural delay that could be caused as the treaty is being considered, and I, therefore, very much appreciated your statement indicating that you did not believe we should have linkage or conditions for renegotiation because, if we can promptly move to dispose of these, I think there is a two-thirds majority in support of the treaty, and we will do everything we can to assist you in seeing that that two-thirds majority gets a chance to vote on this by the summer.

Senator BYRD. Such delay as the distinguished Senator has referred to, procedural delay——

Senator ADAMS. By amendments, reservations, and so on.

Senator BYRD [continuing]. By amendment, reservation, et cetera.

Senator ADAMS. I hate to see us get into too much of this on our side who want to have the treaty.

Senator BYRD. I share that.

Senator ADAMS. By "our side," I mean all Senators who favor the ratification of this treaty. I hope we don't do too much of this because I am fearful that there will be a considerable amount by those who may not want the ratification of this. It will be, as the leader knows, his task, as it always is, to lead us through this.

Senator BYRD. I share the Senator's concern.

Senator ADAMS. I thank the leader very much.

Senator BYRD. I fully support his hope that the treaty can be adequately, thoroughly debated, but not unduly delayed, and certainly not rejected by direct attack or indirect attack.

Senator ADAMS. I thank the leader.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Leader. Your statement and your replies to our questions have been very helpful and build a very solid record.

Your support of this treaty means a great deal, and I think your emphasis, that we should have a bipartisan approach to it, as bipartisan as possible, with the leaders getting together and all of us working together, is an excellent one, and I trust it will be followed up.

Do you have any final remarks?

Senator BYRD. I would only say, Mr. Chairman, that I profoundly thank the committee and all of the members who have been here today for the courtesies, the very gracious courtesies, that have been extended to me.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, indeed.

The Foreign Relations Committee is recessed.

[Whereupon, at 12:51 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 5 p.m., March 3, 1988.]

THE INF TREATY

THURSDAY, MARCH 3, 1988

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.

The committee met at 5 p.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Claiborne Pell (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Pell and Sarbanes.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.

We will be very glad to receive testimony from Senator Grassley in connection with the INF treaty.

Senator Grassley, if you would like, please proceed as you wish.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, A U.S. SENATOR FROM IOWA

Senator Grassley. This is my full statement which I would like to put into the record.

The Chairman. It will be inserted into the record as if read.

Senator Grassley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Sarbanes and other members of the committee for this opportunity to testify, and I appreciate very much your willingness to listen to the point of view on other aspects of the INF Treaty as opposed to just the issue of the treaty itself.

Human rights and fundamental freedoms represent the foundation of this country. Political and religious oppression brought settlers to America, and since our early history we have protected religious and political freedoms. Today our commitment to fundamental human rights extends beyond our borders, and we recognize that there are various components to a mutually beneficial relationship between the United States and other nations with which we have cooperative relations.

It is this point that I want to stress today, Mr. Chairman. The INF Treaty represents an important achievement, but we must not allow the approval of this treaty—and I expect that it will be ratified—to alter our fundamental view of and therefore our relationship with the Soviet Union. As a totalitarian regime, the U.S.S.R. does not share our view of the overriding importance of human rights in a society.

Let me highlight a few examples. First, the Soviet Union persists in violations of its commitments under the Helsinki accords by denying freedom of movement and permission to emigrate. While we have seen numerous well known refuseniks leave the Soviet Union, there are some 400,000 Soviet Jews desirous of leaving. Although the numbers are not as high, the same treatment is afforded ethnic Germans and Armenians.

In addition, the Soviet Union refuses permission for old and ailing Soviet Jews like Benjamin Charny and the denial of emigration rights on the basis of madeup excuses like state secrets further point out the arbitrariness of the system.

Second, the Soviet Union consistently denies religious freedom. The Soviet Union officially bans the Ukrainian Catholic Church, and in the last 2 years, more than 150 churches have been destroyed, this, Mr. Chairman, during a period of glasnost.

Third, the Soviet Union abuses medical and psychiatric treatment for political purposes. With at least 18 special hospitals, dissidents are regularly admitted for their anti-Soviet activity.

These human rights violations occur in spite of the fact that the Soviet Union has signed the Helsinki accords and other important human rights documents. They show that the Soviets have a lot of progress to make. Thank God the United States is in a unique position to work on improvement.

First, we have the Jackson-Vanik amendment. We have as a matter of law and policy linked trade and commerce to human rights. Because emigration levels have been inadequate, the Soviet Union has not been granted a waiver of Jackson-Vanik restrictions. But Jackson-Vanik can and does reward real progress.

While we are pleased that the rate of emigration in 1987 was significantly higher than in 1986, the 1987 number is only 15 percent of the total number who left in 1979, the peak year of Jewish emigration. We must remind the Soviets of the Jackson-Vanik amendment and encourage them to continue to improve their emigration record.

Toward this end, I, along with my colleagues Senator DeConcini and Senator Moynihan, will be circulating a letter for transmittal to the President and Secretary Shultz reminding them of our Jackson-Vanik obligation. I hope that our other colleagues will join in this effort.

Second, the ongoing Helsinki process recognizes that trade, disarmament and human rights are interconnected matters. All three areas are of great importance to us, and we must have meaningful progress on human rights to ensure achievement in other areas.

To reaffirm our commitment to the Helsinki process, I am introducing along with Senator DeConcini and Senator Lautenberg an amendment to the resolution of ratification. The amendment is simply a declaration of our commitment to human rights and understanding about their importance in the development of cooperative relations with the Soviet Union. The amendment is not intended to impede or otherwise restrict ratification of the INF Treaty. This amendment will send an important message to the President and to Secretary Gorbachev about the high priority of human rights.

We are the best hope for the Soviet Jews and other national minorities of the Soviet Union. We must remind the Soviet Union at every opportunity that peace and freedom are intimately connected. We must insist that emigration barriers be lifted, that religious freedom be observed, and that national minorities have the chance to enjoy their heritage. The basis on which the United States of America was founded demands no less.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Senator Grassley may be found in the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Grassley.

Thank you for your courtesy in letting us know of your intention to introduce I presume a category 1 amendment or declaration to the treaty.

My own thought is that the treaty should be left as unencumbered, as pristine as possible. I do not disagree with a word you have said here, but I am not sure that the treaty should be the vehicle for carrying this message to the Soviets.

But this we can talk about at the time when you bring your resolution up.

Senator GRASSLEY. Correction, Mr. Chairman. The amendment would be category 2, so that our President would then carry that message to Gorbachev as a result of the enactment by the Senate.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right, category 2 means the Soviets have to be notified, and also involves a declaration by our own Government.

Senator GRASSLEY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. I want to thank Senator Grassley for his testimony. In fact, we have worked together on many of the issues which he has covered here in his statement today.

I must say I was a bit puzzled by your statement because although I have differed with the President on a range of issues, it is my own impression that he, and perhaps even more so, the Secretary of State, have kept the human rights issue high on our agenda with the Soviet Union. In other words, it is my perception that President Reagan and Secretary Shultz have pressed the issue, that they have not sought to set it aside, and in fact, have kept it in the forefront, although obviously the Soviets would like to set it aside if they could.

But you seem to suggest that we need to send the President, and I take it, the Secretary, a message about the importance of the human rights. I guess my perception was that they appear to understand its importance.

Do you differ with that?

Senator GRASSLEY. I suppose, Senator Sarbanes, it is a case of my saying what have you done for me lately or, you know, you have done a lot, but you are not doing enough.

Admittedly, I would agree with you that our President has, and our Secretary has kept it high on the agenda. I guess what I feel is that it is brought up not just as a matter of courtesy, it is brought up because of firm conviction, but it is brought up in light of—let me say it this way. It is brought up and on the agenda, and always high on any level of negotiating between our country and the Soviet Union, but brought up in a sense of not being pressed hard enough each time, in other words, brought up to a point where the Soviet leaders, all of the last four or five we have had, have had to acknowledge that we brought it up, dissent from it, and then immediately drop it.

I sensed that when Gorbachev was here, that yes, it was discussed, we were promised it was going to be discussed, it was discussed, but we listened to the usual Gorbachev rhetoric, and that was the end of it, and I am not sure that that is enough. At least that is not enough from my point of view.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Well, I am in this somewhat unique position of defending the President and the Secretary of State, but I must say to you my impression is that the Secretary is genuinely committed to this issue, and that he has pressed it. I know on his latest visit to the Soviet Union he met with Sakharov and others to pursue the issue. Apparently it was the first item on his agenda, and he spent an extended amount of time on it.

I mean, clearly, the Soviets would like to get human rights off the agenda, and we do not intend to let that happen, but I do think that the Secretary and the President have tried to keep it there.

Senator **Grassley**. Could I also say, Senator Sarbanes, that the issue is as much, in my speaking here as well as any activity during the discussion of the INF treaty, to reaffirm, if there is any doubt in Gorbachev's mind where the Congress as a whole stands as well.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Well, that is a separate point. I understand that.

Let me ask just one other question.

There appears to have been some progress over the past year in the emigration levels, although they are clearly still inadequate, and they continue to be premised on the wrong concepts, and they have risen from an extraordinarily low base, and they compare very poorly with the numbers from 1979, for instance. But even recognizing all of that, to what do you attribute what little bit of progress has taken place?

Senator **Grassley**. It is very difficult for me to answer that question because, quite frankly, even with a period of 15, 17 years where there have been ups and down in levels of emigration, it is really difficult to have an explanation of why the numbers go up or down.

You know, during the period when they were sometimes the highest were some times when the relationship between the United States and the U.S.S.R. were not necessarily the friendliest.

So, I do not know whether we can give a reason.

I am going to suggest to you, though, that my feeling is—and I hope 10 years from now it turns out to be correct, is that Gorbachev represents a new generation of leaders, who have a real desire to change the environment. I want to believe that the changes we see and read about are for real, and that he is going to have the political power to make it stick over his own party, over his bureaucracy, and over the military.

But I do not absolutely know that yet. But I hope that this is one more bit of evidence of a breath of fresh air coming in. But you know, I cannot be sure of that today.

If I were sure of that, I would not be here speaking.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Well, thank you very much. I appreciate your testimony.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Thank you very much.

I guess what you are afraid of or concerned with, as has been shown in Russian history in the past, under the tsars or any time, that for every reformation, a counterreformation could follow.

Senator **GRASSLEY**. Yes.

The **CHAIRMAN**. We want to make sure that this reformation sticks, and I think we all agree on that.

Thank you very much for being with us.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:14 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene 3:30 p.m., March 14, 1988.]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NANCY M. NEUMAN

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am Nancy M. Neuman, President of the League of Women Voters of the United States. I am pleased to be here to voice the support of more than 250,000 members and supporters of the League of Women Voters, and of concerned citizens across the country, for ratification of the INF Treaty.

President Reagan has said that with the treaty, "we took a step ... that may be the most important taken since World War II to slow down the arms buildup." We believe the Senate must now take the next step and overwhelmingly approve the INF Treaty.

We are now at an important crossroads. The new Soviet willingness to negotiate seriously on arms reductions, as shown by the INF Treaty, presents us with an historic opportunity to move toward a more stable and lasting peace.

The INF Treaty represents an historic opportunity -- an opportunity to reduce the threat of nuclear war by cutting the number of nuclear weapons and by eliminating an entire class of weapons from U.S. and Soviet arsenals.

The INF Treaty represents an historic opportunity -- an opportunity to adopt precedent setting on-site verification provisions that will increase confidence and set the stage for mutual cooperation on future arms control treaties.

The INF Treaty represents an historic opportunity -- an opportunity to lessen nuclear tensions in Europe and to increase U.S. national security by reducing the risks of escalation to nuclear war.

If these opportunities are taken, we will all -- not only Americans and

Soviets, but also people around the world who are dependent on good relations between the superpowers for their own survival -- we will all live in a safer, more secure world.

But if the Senate fails to approve this agreement, or if the Senate insists on "killer" amendments to the treaty, we face a bleak future. If we turn our backs on this agreement, we face the mounting distrust of our allies. If we turn our backs on this agreement, we face an arms race that will increasingly weaken our national economy, if it doesn't lead to nuclear disaster. If we turn our backs on this agreement, we will have lost a chance to build a stable and lasting peace.

Opponents of arms control argue that modifications in the treaty are needed. We reject this approach. We urge rejection of all "killer" amendments to the treaty.

The choice is clear -- between a safer, more secure future and the risks of an escalating nuclear arms race based on fear and distrust between the superpowers.

As you know, the League of Women Voters of the United States is a nonpartisan citizens organization with members in more than 1,200 state and local Leagues in all fifty states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. Throughout our sixty-eight year history, the League has been at the forefront of the political debates that have shaped our nation at the state, local and federal levels. We are a political organization that studies issues and takes a stand on issues. We never support or oppose candidates for public office. But the League does not hesitate to let public officials know what we believe is in the public interest. We come before you today to express our very strong support for speedy adoption of the INF Treaty.

The League's interest in international relations goes back many decades. But within recent years, League members have become increasingly concerned that something has gone fundamentally wrong in the way the superpowers view national security policy.

Seemingly locked in an escalating spiral, the United States and the Soviet Union have built more and more offensive nuclear arms. Qualitative changes have been made in nuclear weapons that increase the threat of accidental nuclear war and reduce the nuclear threshold. And, perhaps most dangerous, there have been attempts to reopen an arms race in strategic defenses.

Deeply concerned about a view of national security that is limited to military policy -- missiles, tanks and high levels of military spending -- Leagues across the country have undertaken to educate themselves and their communities about national security policy.

Since 1982, Leagues have researched the issues, held numerous public seminars and forums, and debated military and arms control policies and defense spending priorities.

As a result of these study processes, League members reached consensus on the basic shape of national security policy. They affirmed that national security has many dimensions and cannot be limited to military policy alone. They affirmed that a strong economy and the government's ability to meet social and environmental needs are key elements of our national security. And they affirmed that arms control measures are essential to reduce the risk of nuclear war and increase global stability.

League members also agreed on factors that should be used in evaluating arms control agreements. Among these factors are:

Equity -- Each nation's security and interests should be adequately protected. Equity does not require equality in numbers of weapons but may be achieved through a relative balance in total capabilities.

Verifiability -- Each party should be able to ensure that other parties comply with the terms of the agreement, whether using national technical means or on-site inspection. The League believes it is extremely important to ensure compliance, recognizing that absolute certainty is unattainable.

Continuity -- Negotiations should build on past agreements and should be directed toward future negotiations whenever feasible.

Tested against these factors, the INF Treaty is clearly a good agreement. Tested against a broad definition of national security -- one that includes the strength of our economy and our ability to meet social needs -- the INF Treaty clearly sets our nation on the right course.

This treaty lays the foundation for new agreements reducing strategic nuclear arsenals and conventional weapons. Our trading partners have long recognized that military spending can reduce national strength. Japan and the NATO allies spend much less than we do on military forces. If the United States and the Soviet Union can build on the critical elements of the INF agreement, we may be closer to the day when the productive capacities of our two nations can be unleashed from the arms race and directed toward meeting human needs and improving the quality of our lives.

The INF Treaty is the first nuclear arms control agreement that actually eliminates an entire class of weapons rather than placing limits on future deployment.

By eliminating an entire class of weapons, the superpowers are taking the first small step toward reducing the threat of nuclear war by cutting the number of nuclear weapons. Under the treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union agree to eliminate all intermediate-range nuclear weapons based in Europe and Asia, including a total of more than two thousand land-based launchers. These missiles include short-range weapons fired at targets of 330-600 miles and longer-range weapons fired up to 3,400 miles away from their targets.

It is important to note that these reductions in missile forces are not equal -- but they are equitable. The Soviet Union will eliminate twice as many missiles as the United States. The Soviet missiles carry four times as many warheads as the U.S. missiles.

United States' verification and compliance concerns are fully addressed by the INF Treaty. The treaty contains precedent setting on-site verification and weapons destruction provisions -- provisions that increase confidence and set the stage for mutual cooperation.

In addition, in the interest of ensuring Soviet compliance, the treaty is "front-loaded" to eliminate short-range INF weapons within 18 months of treaty execution. All short-range INF weapons subject to this provision are Soviet weapons, thus providing an opportunity for the United States to assess Soviet compliance before any U.S weapons are dismantled.

The INF Treaty provides for each country to inspect facilities on the other's territory, or that of its allies, to verify treaty compliance.

This "on-site verification" is the most intrusive method of treaty verification to date; past agreements have relied on satellites and other external devices for verification.

In addition to these verification procedures, the treaty provides for:

-- Designation of weapons deployment areas and notification of any weapons movement between designated areas;

-- Comprehensive and up-dated base-line data exchanges;

-- Explicit rules for destruction of weapons;

-- Long-term on-site inspection at designated facilities; and

-- Scheduled inspections and short-notice challenge inspections at other designated facilities.

In sum, these verification provisions ensure that U.S. interests will be protected.

The INF Treaty lessens nuclear tension in Europe and strengthens U.S. national security by reducing the risk of escalation to nuclear war. INF weapons on both sides have contributed to nuclear tensions and instability in Europe. Their removal will alleviate those tensions, both between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces and between the United States and the Soviet Union. At the same time, deterrence will be maintained in Europe. The Soviets will destroy many more weapons than we, and over 4,000 U.S. and NATO nuclear weapons will remain after the treaty is in force. In addition, U.S. credibility with our allies will be bolstered.

One of the most dangerous trends has been to blur the lines between conventional and nuclear conflict, making it easier and more likely for escalation to full-scale nuclear war. INF weapons have been one of the links in the chain leading to full-scale war. By eliminating them, both sides have taken a limited step in enhancing their own security, while not undermining the security of their allies.

The INF Treaty is important in its own right. But the strategic significance of the treaty is limited -- only about three percent of the total nuclear forces held by both countries will be dismantled. The treaty is most important because it sets a number of important precedents -- because it lays foundations for further agreements and understandings.

By reducing the number of nuclear weapons and eliminating a class of weapons, the INF Treaty sets the stage for reductions in long-range nuclear arsenals.

As I have mentioned, the verification provisions of the treaty break new ground. Intrusive, on-site verification; explicit rules for the destruction of weapons; comprehensive and up-dated base-line data exchanges; short-notice, challenge inspections; all these are important in building a base for verification of later treaties.

The treaty is also precedent setting politically. This Administration does not have a reputation for being soft on the Soviets. That the President of the United States, that this President of the United States has negotiated a tough, realistic arms control agreement with the Soviets indicates arms control can and must be a crucial element in national security policy. This President has realized that destroying weapons can lead to greater security, when carefully conditioned and rigorously verified. This fact in itself holds promise for continuity in exploring, negotiating and ratifying new agreements for reducing nuclear and conventional weapons.

Finally, the INF Treaty represents a positive step in U.S. Soviet relations. As incompatible as U.S. and Soviet political and economic ideologies may be, it is as much in the interest of the Soviet Union as the United States to reduce the threat of nuclear war. We must recognize this overriding, mutual interest and continue to move forward whenever and wherever possible. The INF Treaty demonstrates that real progress can be made in pursuit of this common interest. We should not condition this progress on resolution of other issues of U.S. Soviet disagreement. With respect to nuclear arms control, we must seek realistic, tough-minded agreements whenever progress in creating a safer, more stable world can be made. The INF Treaty is just such an agreement.

While we understand that the Senate must carefully review the treaty before giving its approval, we are opposed to amendments or other conditions that would require renegotiation of the treaty or that would significantly delay its implementation. While such conditions may be offered in good faith, the effect of their adoption would be to scuttle the treaty and substantially reduce the chances of attaining even more significant arms control agreements in the future. If individual Senators believe that the INF Treaty is not a good agreement, they should vote against it. However, if you agree that it is a good agreement, we urge you to attach whatever clarifications or understandings that may be necessary or advisable in a form that does not endanger ratification of the treaty.

Proposed amendments to strengthen treaty verification are particularly mischievous. As I have discussed, the verification provisions of the INF Treaty are broader and more complete than ever before. They ensure compliance more thoroughly than ever before. To suggest that additional verification provisions are necessary is simply wrong. An amendment in this area would put in jeopardy the very thing it claims to advance -- strict and effective U.S. verification of Soviet compliance.

An amendment regarding conventional forces in Europe also makes little sense. The military balance in Europe is maintained under the treaty. Even after compliance with the new treaty has been completed, over 4,000 U.S. and NATO nuclear weapons will remain in Europe to maintain the deterrent. The treaty has been endorsed by the NATO chiefs in Europe. In addition, the INF Treaty establishes the principle of asymmetrical reductions, which will be important in seeking mutual reductions of conventional forces in Europe. By providing for greater reductions in Soviet forces than U.S. forces, the INF Treaty recognizes that equity in arms control agreements may be achieved when one side makes larger reductions than the other.

Proposed amendments to link the INF Treaty to other well-intentioned goals, from human rights compliance to Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, have also been suggested. No matter how desirable the end, the effect of these amendments would be to derail the INF Treaty. Consequently, neither goal would be served.

While the League of Women Voter supports ratification of the INF Treaty without reservation, we do have some related concerns.

The first is our concern that the treaty might be allowed to become a smokescreen for abandoning other existing U.S.-Soviet agreements on strategic weapons. Continued U.S. and Soviet observance of the constraints initially set by the SALT II agreement is essential. Without observance of these limits, the INF agreement can be easily circumvented by replacing the destroyed weapons with new strategic weapons. In addition, the INF Treaty should not distract us from vigilance against a new arms race in strategic defenses.

Our second concern is one that we share with many members of the Senate. It relates to the Senate's constitutional role in the treaty-making process. In the dispute over interpretation of the

Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the President has asserted the right to reinterpret a treaty without regard to the Senate's understanding of the treaty at the time of ratification. Frankly, as a matter of constitutional principle, we believe this view makes no sense. In our system of constitutional government, the mutual understanding of treaty provisions by the Executive and the Senate at the time of Senate action must govern treaty interpretation.

We agree with those who believe that action on the INF Treaty must not be allowed to undermine the Senate's constitutional role in the treaty-making process. However, we believe this problem can be resolved without delaying or sidetracking the INF Treaty. We respectfully submit that no amendment or other condition is needed in this area. The Senate can only approve what it understands it is approving. And what it understands to be approved is approved. If later an administration seeks to reinterpret a treaty, the Congress may, indeed must, use the power of the purse, as it has in the case of the ABM Treaty, to assert its proper role and prevent the implementation of an incorrect interpretation.

In the next few days and weeks, you will have the opportunity to vote on the INF Treaty. The League of Women Voters urges that each Senator vote for the treaty and against "killer" amendments that would delay implementation or require renegotiation with the Soviet Union. The INF Treaty represents a cautious but important step toward U.S.-Soviet cooperation to reduce the threat of nuclear war. It is a step our nation must take to secure a safer world for ourselves, our children and our grandchildren.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. BETTY G. LALL

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. I am pleased to present to you views and recommendations of the Council on Economic Priorities, a public-interest research organization, on the Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Elimination of their Intermediate- and Shorter-range Missiles. The Council supports the ratification of the Treaty for the following reasons:

1. The Treaty constitutes a major breakthrough on verification. It introduces for the first time major on-site inspection provisions as part of the verification process in the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, and Czechoslovakia, as well as in the United States and five of its allies in Western Europe.

In past treaties the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to rely only on their national technical means to assure adherence to the agreement. In the INF Treaty US personnel may visit as many as 84 specific places in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany to check for treaty compliance. Similarly, Soviet inspectors can visit 24 sites in the United States and its territories, another 12 places in West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, where weapons have been installed. The attached chart gives details on all the places subject to on-site inspection in these countries.

Inspectors will check first to determine that data supplied, for example, by the Soviets on items to be eliminated are accurate.

Once a facility or base has been closed, US teams may observe that all Treaty-prohibited activities have ceased. Thirdly, US teams will witness the destruction of the weapons. One hundred missiles may be launched for purposes of elimination. Others will be crushed, burned, flattened, or broken-up through explosive demolition.

A fourth type of inspection will consist of visits on short notice to assure that bases and facilities used for weapons have been cleared of all such military items and activities.

Fifth, continuous monitoring of one specific production facility on each side may occur for 13 years to provide confidence that secret, prohibited production cannot take place. The implementation of these and other Treaty provisions further provide the potential for reducing the distrust of Soviet intentions toward the United States and its NATO allies.

2. The implementation of the Treaty will require a high degree of cooperation between the US and the Soviet Union. Inspectors from the two countries will be meeting and travelling together as teams throughout the three year period of implementing the main Treaty provisions and thereafter for up to 13 years. They will also observe the destruction of each missile, launcher, storage facility and many other items associated with the weapons to be eliminated. Then, over a period of 13 years inspectors may check a maximum of 185 places on Soviet, GDR, and Czechoslovakian territory to determine compliance with the Treaty. This will impose on both sides, particularly on the hitherto secrecy-addicted Soviets, a high degree of cooperation, understanding, and good will to achieve success in the many tasks involved in carrying out the Treaty's provisions.

The newly created Speical Verification Commission provides additional impetus and scope for continuous cooperation as opposed to the verification commission established for the ABM Treaty, which met only infrequently.

The verification arrangements under the Treaty mark an important breakthrough in as much as they envisage intrusive on-site inspections. This procedure will not only be effective in and of itself, but can help develop mutual confidence between the US and USSR. This will in turn help to lay the foundation for the yet more intrusive arrangements which will be needed if agreement is reached to reduce strategic nuclear weapons.

3. While the number of nuclear weapons involved is a small percentage of the total US and Soviet stockpiles, the elimination of the ability to deliver over 3000 nuclear warheads by the Soviets on the people of Western Europe and other countries in Asia not only constitutes a significant step toward reducing the threat of nuclear war, but perhaps of equal significance, the elimination of these categories of nuclear weapons from Western and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, will help to reduce tensions in our relations with the Soviet Union.

4. The successful completion of the ratification of the INF Treaty would provide a strong impetus for the completion of the START negotiations. These would reduce by 50 percent the large stockpile of strategic nuclear weapons which particularly threaten the destruction of the people of the US and USSR. Some of the INF verification measures can be applied to the elimination of strategic weapons. For example, on-site monitoring or conversion of plants producing strategic weapons should be considered.

5. It is especially noteworthy that the Treaty has the unqualified support of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. In

previous arms control negotiations key military leaders have often conditioned their support for an arms control treaty by requiring offsetting commitments by the President for increased spending for other weapons. In the case of this Treaty our understanding is that no such conditions have been imposed.

The Council on Economic Priorities also believes the following points are relevant to the debate and should be considered. These are based on our analysis of the Treaty, which we are sending to members of the Committee.

1. With respect to responsibilities for monitoring the INF agreement, we note the possibility from testimony of the Secretary of Defense, that the Department of Defense may undertake the monitoring function by setting up a defense inspection agency. Such a function, however, is by statute lodged in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and therefore, ACDA should be associated with the verification of the Treaty. We believe and urge, therefore, that ACDA should share the monitoring function with the Department of Defense, and as necessary, with other agencies.

2. We note that changes in the Protocols of the Treaty can be executed by the Parties simply agreeing to them, presumably through the Special Verification Commission. They would not be considered as amendments to the Treaty and thus would not be submitted to the Senate for its consent. We suggest, however, that any changes be discussed with and brought to the attention of the appropriate committees of the Congress. It is important for bipartisanship in the arms control area to work toward a high degree of cooperation on these treaty implementation matters between the Senate and the Executive branch. We deplore all

efforts to change basic provisions of any treaty unilaterally, by either the Executive branch or the Senate. We, therefore, urge strict compliance with the Constitutions's provisions in this regard.

3. Over time the INF Treaty will save money for the taxpayer. US bases will be closed; troops managing these bases may be able to return home. The weapons to be destroyed obviously will no longer have be maintained. We believe the savings from removing maintenance costs alone over an expected 15-year operational life cycle for these weapons should save between $5-10 billion. The lower figure is a 1981 estimate; inflation may double it.

The net savings from the INF Treaty must take into account the cost of monitoring the Treaty. The Secretary of Defense estimated a cost of $180-200 million in the 1988 budget for a monitoring agency, including the cost of missile destruction. It is not clear, however, what might be total costs of verification over the period of the active elimination of weapons.

4. The warheads of the missiles to be destroyed will not be eliminated. Under the terms of the INF agreement the fissionable material and the "physics package" will be subject to reprocessing and reuse. In any new treaty, such as the START agreement now being negotiated, the US and USSR should eliminate the nuclear warheads involved. Secretary of Defense Carlucci testified that "Verifying the destruction of the physics package, fissionable material, would be an absolute nightmare." The Executive branch must begin to devise effective ways to dispose of the radioactive waste, render it nonlethal, and develop alternative safe and beneficial uses for the material.

If the fissionable material in the Pershing and cruise missile nuclear warheads is to be saved, as planned, then the US Government should reduce by a corresponding amount, budgetary figures to procure fissionable material for weapons during the current and coming years. There surely is no need to produce additional fissionable material at this time. The budget should reflect this. We must use this Treaty as an opportunity to begin to rid ourselves of nuclear warheads and the fissionable material in them.

5. It is important to note that the Treaty does not in its verification provisions allow inspectors to roam anywhere they wish. Rather, the verification is strictly controlled. The Treaty partners must first assure themselves that the weapons are placed in specific areas and only those areas. Following this, inspectors can only go to areas specified in the Treaty's Protocol and Memorandum of Understanding, and then only within limited time periods. Should a Party later believe weapons are stored in any way outside the permitted areas this will be an issue for the Verification Commission to take up.

6. Finally, the Soviets have named several places where elimination of their weapons will take place. The United States has not, however, specified its elimination facilities. This appears a significant omission which ought to be clarified, if possible, before the Treaty ratification process is complete. Are the weapons, for example, to be returned to the US or destroyed at their bases in Europe?

In closing, the Council on Economic Priorities commends the US and Soviet governments for completing a significant step, both in confidence building and toward reducing the threat of nuclear war. It urges the Senate to give its consent to ratification and encourage the two Parties to complete other negotiations toward these crucial ends.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HENRY KISSINGER

Mr. Chairman,

I would like to take this opportunity to sketch briefly the main tasks facing the Atlantic Alliance.

Any discussion of the state of NATO must begin with the recognition that it represents one of the great success stories of the post-war period. For more than forty years Europe has known no wars--the longest period of peace in Europe since the creation of the modern state system. While it is never possible to prove conclusively why something has not happened, the Western democracies have every reason to take pride in their collective achievement.

Success breeds two contradictory dangers however: on the one hand complacency and on the other a temptation to tinker that takes the achievement for granted and seeks to combine it with basically irreconcilable objectives.

The Atlantic Alliance faces both dangers: complacency in the reluctance to come to grips with the major political and technological changes that have occurred; tinkering in the restless quest for negotiating formulae often heavily influenced by domestic considerations that will in the long run undermine the cohesiveness of the Western democracies.

Part of the cause for this state of affairs lies in the failure to resolve contradictions that have beset the alliance since its early days. These contradictions were tolerable so long as the democracies possessed a vast military superiority. But the growth of nuclear stockpiles on both sides and the resulting nuclear balance requires that they be dealt with if the achievements of the postwar generations are not to be jeopardized.

NATO Strategy

The present NATO deployment of five American divisions and supporting air and naval forces evolved in the 1950s, when NATO's doctrine was massive retaliation. The strategy then was to react to aggression with an immediate and overwhelming nuclear blow against Soviet territory. From the perspective of massive retaliation this deployment had a political, not a military rationale. On the one hand NATO did not wish to tempt Soviet conventional aggression by doing anything to suggest that a Western response would be limited to non-nuclear means. On the other hand the European members of NATO sought for political reassurance: they wanted to make sure America was organically committed to nuclear retaliation even in the face of conventional aggression. Both European and American conventional forces were conceived as a trip wire for an American nuclear riposte. From the birth of NATO a full conventional defense has been part neither of its strategy nor of its efforts. A substantial non-nuclear establishment was created nevertheless to give credibility to the nuclear threat.

This situation became precarious when the growth of Soviet strategic forces altered the credibility of the nuclear threat. Yet NATO deployment has been essentially unaffected by the change. NATO has improved its conventional defenses but not as fast as the Soviets have improved corresponding capabilities; hence the gap in conventional forces remains and is perhaps greater than ever. As the current NATO commander made clear recently, even counting the five American divisions that have remained in Europe, the alliance is still unprepared to withstand a major Soviet ground attack for more than a few weeks. Ambivalence continues 35 years after NATO's creation. Our allies remain unwilling to develop forces strong enough to provide an alternative to nuclear weapons; the United States would surely not reintroduce the draft. Yet much of public opinion and many leaders shy away from even thinking about the practicalities of nuclear deterrence. Indeed they constantly affirm the unthinkability of nuclear war while basing their security policy on its deterrent effect.

The need to build up NATO's conventional capability has been passionately affirmed for a long time; for an equal period the goal has proved elusive. This is partly because our European allies have less confidence in conventional defense than some American systems analysts. History teaches them that deterrence with conventional weapons is a chancy enterprise. For hundreds of years Europeans have seen wars break out between armies that were thought to be evenly matched. (Even at the outset of World War II the French army was considered to be--and in fact was--superior in numbers and equipment to the German army.) In conventional war, leadership, concentration of force, and tactics, play a role which make systems analysis calculations a hazardous guide. It can be no accident that all wars in the postwar period have broken out where there were no American forces and no nuclear weapons.

NATO has never solved its perennial problem: the proper mix between conventional and nuclear forces and the appropriate strategy for the use of nuclear weapons albeit as a last resort. The doctrine of flexible response was to resolve these issues. But NATO is still some distance from a conventional capability that could sustain itself for even the thirty days envisaged in some scenarios. And the elaboration of a doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons runs into two obstacles: Some anti-nuclear groups insist that nuclear war must necessarily be all-out extermination of civilians lest governments be tempted into nuclear adventures. Some of our allies start at the opposite end of the political spectrum but reach the same conclusion: that anything less than the threat of all-out war would weaken deterrence.

However, statesmanship and morality both demand that so long as nuclear weapons exist governments seek ways to limit their use and to terminate any war before it turns into a world holocaust. In a world of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, it is reckless to teach that any nuclear incident must automatically escalate into a cataclysm. If the worst happens--for whatever reason--governments have an obligation to humanity and to history to limit the consequences. Only nihilists or abstract ideologues can shirk that duty.

The situation is made more complex because in nearly every NATO country the consensus on defense and foreign policy has broken down. As a result, national security policy is too often overwhelmed by domestic politics. The result has been an unworthy debate in which for example the recent American proposals on modernization are presented by critics as a means of shifting the risks of nuclear devastation to Europe.

Competitive avoidance of nuclear risk cannot possibly be the basis of NATO strategy. It is essential to develop a strategy that distributes risks equitably but effectiveness must be the ultimate outcome. This is why the issue of modernization should become the occasion for a careful and bipartisan reappraisal of NATO strategy and arms control policy. Otherwise the Alliance will be left with a precarious combination of the formal NATO doctrine of flexible response which, however, now has to be applied under conditions of nuclear stalemate, growing nuclear pacifism, a subtle Soviet strategy to separate the US and Europe -- especially in the nuclear field -- and continued inadequacies in conventional forces.

INF and NATO Modernization

Divisive trends have been magnified by the INF agreement. This is not the occasion to analyze the merits of what will soon be an accomplished fact. If the Senate were to refuse ratification, domestic pressures in all European countries would force the withdrawal of these missiles in any event. The current choice is between unilateral withdrawal or the quid pro quo envisaged in the agreement.

To understand the impact of this state of affairs some discussion of the background of INF is important. The formal justification for INF as a counterbalance to the Soviet SS-20's was always a mistake and led directly to the so-called zero option. The INF weapons were never aimed at the SS-20's. Their ultimate justification was to prevent the nuclear blackmail of Europe by linking the strategic defense of Europe with that of the United States. With intermediate range American weapons in Europe the Soviets could not threaten Europe selectively; any nuclear attack and any successful conventional attack would trigger an American counterblow from European installations since the Soviets would have to calculate that the United States would use its missiles before they were overrun. Hence the Soviets would have to attack the missiles if they used even conventional weapons in Europe; that in turn would trigger a counterblow on Soviet territory. Were the war confined to Europe this would inflict an unacceptable level of damage on the Soviet Union. But the Soviets could escape this challenge only by initiating general nuclear war against US territory--a decision out of proportion to any likely objective. Hence the defense of Europe and the US were "coupled."

INF in short was a reassurance for defense-minded Europeans that America would use its nuclear capability on behalf of Europe's survival. But the defense-oriented leaders in Europe faced bitter opposition. In the end the INF missiles were introduced only after riots and demonstrations that shook the domestic tranquility of many countries for months. It is impossible to understand the psychological impact of the INF agreement without considering what the current leaders went through when the missiles were installed.

The NATO challenge can thus be summed up as follows:

-- The INF agreement and the pressures it generates against the remaining nuclear systems places the predominant burden of nuclear defense on weapons based in the United States or at sea.

-- In the process, many Europeans are convinced a gap is being created that in time will enable the Soviet Union to threaten Europe while sparing the United States. In technical terms, the defenses of the two sides of the Atlantic may be "decoupled."

-- This fear is all the greater because the Soviet conventional superiority has not been reduced. The threat that generated NATO in the first place remains intact.

-- The modernization of NATO's short-range nuclear weapons must be seen in this context. The Atlanticists in the Federal Republic have been traumatized by the removal of intermediate range weapons. They fear another change in American position while the critics of US policy feel confirmed in their view. Both now tend to unite against a scheme that can be represented as making Germany a nuclear battlefield. Sentiment is therefore being generated for the removal of these missiles--the third zero option. And modernization of short-range weapons is likely to face the same domestic opposition as the intermediate range weapons a decade ago.

On the other hand, the denuclearization of the Federal Republic--the nearly inevitable consequence of the third zero option--would create profound splits in the Alliance. A nuclear free zone logically implies the adoption of a "no first use" concept, because otherwise the zone would still be under nuclear threat from weapons outside. And once the alliance has proclaimed that it would not use nuclear weapons first, it is committed to accepting defeat with conventional weapons rather than escalating to nuclear war. Once the principle of defeat is accepted the neutralization of Central Europe, the goal of Soviet policy for 40 years, will be nearly complete. The nuclear armed members of NATO would be asked to assume risks on behalf of the Federal Republic which that country is not prepared to run for itself--an impossible state of affairs.

The Future of the Atlantic Alliance

A single statement can do no more than outline directions. A complete policy must emerge out of a detailed debate within the United States as well as within the Alliance. But restoration of the unity of the Atlantic Alliance must be a prime objective of American foreign policy; without it a continuation of current East-West negotiations will lead to the unravelling of all that has been achieved by forty years of bipartisan foreign policy.

a. A Coherent NATO Strategy

The ambiguities that have beset NATO for forty years--some of which have been outlined above--must be overcome. On the part of the United States it requires an end to the rhetoric that America's goal in East-West negotiation is the total elimination of all nuclear weapons. Such a goal is neither possible nor desirable and Western leaders do their publics a disservice if they shrink from avowing this truth. Tens of thousands of nuclear weapons have been produced by the superpowers; hundreds by medium-sized countries; dozens by recent entrants into the nuclear club. No scheme of disarmament could account for all these weapons. Nations would insist on residual forces to protect themselves against cheating, or against the fact that the factories that produced the weapons would remain, or, should by some improbable chance these too be destroyed, against the knowledge in the minds of men from which these factories and weapons sprang in the first place. Mankind cannot unlearn the secret of the atom. For the immediate future--even assuming forseeable reductions--that level will remain quite high; the real issue before us will be the nature of deterrence, and its components.

At the same time our European allies have an obligation to face strategic and technological realities. Too many of them create the impression that deterrence can be separated from defense and that it depends entirely on the vastness of the threat. But deterrence in fact is the product of the threat and credibility. If credibility is zero even the most devasting threat will amount to nothing. Europe has a right to insist that the United States use all the means necessary to stop Soviet aggression. It can have no interest in a strategy that has the end of all civilized life as its inevitable corollary. The elaboration of other options is in the interest of both sides of the Atlantic.

It is therefore urgent to end the demoralizing debate over which side of the Atlantic is seeking to escape what risks and responsibilities. The goal must be an effective defense at tolerable cost. The deterrent threat cannot be separated from what the Alliance is prepared to implement without opening a psychological gap which sooner or later will tempt aggressive conduct.

b. . Arms Control Policy

The idea of arms control is novel, if not revolutionary. Developed in its present form in the 1950's arms control strove explicitly for stability by reducing the incentive for surprise attack not through arms but through agreement. The historically extraordinary notion emerged that a country's vulnerability was a strategic asset; with the civil populations of both sides at risk--so the argument ran--neither side would dare to launch its weapons. Arms control theory contributed--in the West--to an aversion to defensive weapons; it also caused every offensive system to be subjected to extended scrutiny lest it somehow "destabilize" the military equation. Never before in history had military policy been judged by such criteria; the Soviets for their part have shown no such inhibitions in their unilateral weapons decisions.

This is not the place for an analysis of arms control theory which included many valuable and indispensable insights. However, arms control, to be effective, requires an unusually delicate understanding of the elements of strategy. Nations had often suffered catastrophe in the past even when they fancied themselves superior; negotiating equality with an adversary calls for an unprecedentedly sophisticated analysis. The measurement of equality has been maddeningly complicated by the novelty of the weapons, by the asymmetry in the design of the weapons systems of the two sides, in their geostrategic positions and in the unpredictability of technological developments. Thus even were the Soviets ready for a serious effort, negotiations would be difficult because the weapons of the two sides are designed by different criteria and serve different strategic ends.

Since its early days, arms control theory has developed a life of its own. It used to be argued that arms negotiations should be an essential complement to broader strategic and foreign policies. Today the tail comes close to wagging the dog. Care must be taken lest esoteric arms control schemes become an end in themselves thereby eliminating any relationship to defense strategy.

The issue of NATO modernization illustrates the point. Before the INF agreement modernizing the Lance weapons stationed in the Federal Republic was considered an internal NATO matter not subject to international discussion. The INF agreement has turned it into an East-West issue. Modernization is opposed by the Soviets with the argument that it violates the non-circumvention clause of the INF agreement. And it is opposed by significant segments of German political opinion because it allegedly singles out the Federal Republic for nuclear risk. The so-called "compromises"--linking modernization to some new arms control measure--nevertheless accept the principle of denuclearization of the Federal Republic; the controversy concerns the price.

All this repeats the INF experience. None of the schemes account for the fact that the Soviet Union as a nation state will retain the capacity for nuclear threats while NATO as an alliance in need of 16 sovereign decisions gradually loses that capacity as nuclear weapons are being delegitimized while the conventional inferiority remains. Even assuming full compliance with foreseeable agreements the Soviet Union will always retain categories of weapons on that part of its national territory outside the agreement from which it can launch a threat to Europe. But the removal of categories of weapons in NATO denuclearizes nations--not parts of a national territory. Hence it throws an increasing burden of decision on the United States and elaborates different perspectives between the US and Europe and between the nuclear and non-nuclear countries within Europe.

This is all the more worrisome because NATO depends on nuclear weapons more than the Soviet Union. Finally, large reductions in START work against the discriminating use of nuclear weapons and hence underline the declining credibility of the threat of general nuclear war at a time when the INF negotiations force ever greater reliance on a nuclear strategy founded on weapons based in the United States or at sea. In short, arms control policy and alliance strategy must be brought into harmony lest they paralyze each other. Or else arms control becomes a device by which the Soviet Union gains a veto over Western defense policy without meaningful reciprocity.

c. A Larger Role for Europe.

In the early days of NATO the United States had first an atomic monopoly and later a huge nuclear superiority coupled with economic predominance. It was inevitable in these circumstances that the Alliance structure came to be dominated by America. But since then Europe has recovered economically and restored some of its military strength. Britain and France have developed nuclear forces of their own. In the process, existing arrangements have become unbalanced. When one country dominates the alliance on all major issues--when that country chooses weapons and decides deployments, conducts the arms-control negotiations, sets the tone for East-West diplomacy and creates the framework for relations with the Third World--little incentive remains for a serious European effort to redefine the requirements of security or to coordinate foreign policies. Such joint efforts entail sacrifices and carry political costs. Leaders are not likely to make the sacrifice or incur the cost unless they feel responsible for the results.

An imbalance such as the one now existing cannot be corrected by "consultation," however meticulous. In the long run, consultation works only when those being consulted have a capacity for independent action. Then each side takes the other seriously; then each side knows that the other's consent has to be won. Otherwise consultation becomes "briefing." Agreement reflects not conviction but acquiescence for want of an alternative.

Moreover, military dependence on another nation has a cumulative impact. When dependence no longer results from wartime destruction but from a policy choice, made under conditions of relative prosperity, it can breed guilt, self-hatred and a compulsion to display independence of the senior partner wherever doing so is safe, especially with regard to some Third World issues, the Middle East and certain aspects of East-West relations.

For all these reasons the United States has a positive interest in encouraging the evolution of a more autonomous European voice in security matters. During the entire postwar period it has been an axiom of American policy that for all the temporary irritation it might cause us, a strong, United Europe was an essential component of the Atlantic partnership. We have applied that principle, insofar as it depended on American actions, in all areas except security. With respect to defense, the US has been indifferent at best--at least since the failure of the European Defense Community in 1954--to any sort of Europeanization. Many seem to fear that a militarily unified Europe might give less emphasis to transatlantic relations and thus weaken the common security.

The opposite is almost certainly the case. In the economic field, integration was bound to lead to transatlantic competition, even to some discrimination. What defines a Common Market, after all, is that its external barriers are higher than its internal ones. In the field of defense, by contrast, increased European responsibility and unity would almost certainly promote closer cooperation with the US. A Europe analyzing its security needs in a responsible manner would be bound to find association with the US essential. Unity in defense matters would also enable the Federal Republic to escape the fear of isolation and enable the Atlanticists to resist nationalist tendencies.

Greater unity in defense would also help to overcome the logistical nightmare caused by the attempt of every European nation to stretch already inadequate defense efforts across the whole panoply of weapons. For example, there are at least five kinds of battle tanks within NATO, different types of artillery and different standards for calculating the rate of consuming ammunition. In a major conflict, it would be a herculean task to keep this hodgepodge of forces supplied.

Thus the paradox: the vitality of the Atlantic Alliance requires Europe to develop greater identity and coherence in the field of defense. I am not talking about traditional "burden sharing", paying more for the existing effort. I have in mind something more structural--a more rational balance of responsibilities. The present allocation of responsibilities fails to bring the allies to reflect naturally about either security or political objectives. Everyone has been afraid to take the initiative in changing the present arrangement, lest doing so unravel the whole enterprise or antagonize the United States. There is no foreseeable East-West conflict in which Europe will not be better off with American support. This is why, if the British and French can agree on coordinating their nuclear forces, the United States should encourage it as an important first step toward a greater European role in the joint nuclear defense. Above all the United States should make clear that European union on defense matters will be viewed as strengthening not weakening Atlantic ties.

East-West Relations.

Too many in the West seek to escape their dilemmas by taking refuge in the personality of Gorbachev. Without entering into the debate as to the long range purposes of the Soviet leader, the democracies cannot make themselves dependent on a single personality, especially as every Soviet leader except Lenin has been disavowed by his successor.

Gorbachev's personality is no doubt striking. But is it wise to treat his person as the deus ex machina to solve all the West's dilemmas--a communist leader who will bring peace and tranquility without any real effort on the part of the free countries? Do these attitudes do justice to the actual choices facing the Soviet leadership? It is easy to forget that Gorbachev has emerged at the top of what must be the toughest competition in the world--one in which losers are rarely heard from again. He has never wavered from basic communist doctrine. And how could he, never having held any position other than as a member of the communist hierarchy?

Reality no doubt imposes at least a respite on Soviet foreign adventurism, perhaps even an end to it no matter who governs in Moscow. But Gorbachev, as any prudent leader, is unlikely to court unnecessary domestic problems. He will not volunteer changes in political and strategic arrangements that powerful factions within his bureaucracy would find unpalatable. Obviously, he will push those programs most advantageous to his own country.

More fundamental issues must be addressed. What exactly is it that the West wants the Soviet Union to stop doing? What is the American and Western notion of cooperative conduct? In the contemporary situation is glasnost or human rights progress enough, or are other changes necessary? Can four centuries of Russian expansionism be due to personalities, or do they reflect more permanent geopolitical and strategic elements? The absence of criteria causes domestic disputes to fester. The reluctance to endow peaceful coexistence with political content produces an overemphasis on numerical nostrums and threatens to open up a gap between strategy and arms-control policy in which each checkmates the other.

I do not know how Gorbachev would react if presented with a comprehensive program that would reduce nuclear and conventional weapons simultaneously. Or how he would respond to a serious attempt to discuss the US-Soviet role in the world a decade or so ahead of us. I am convinced that he has the intelligence and imagination to make a significant and constructive response. And if he refused, we would at least understand the nature of the challenge better than we do now.

Conflicts Outside the NATO Area.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was a response to the fear of Soviet aggression against Europe. At that time, 40 years ago, the United States had a huge nuclear superiority and was dominant economically, while Europe was only beginning its recovery from the war. Conflicts outside Europe were produced by the process of decolonization; the Soviet role in them was relatively minor. The United States, reluctant to be involved in colonial wars, insisted that the obligations of the Atlantic Treaty did not extend outside of Europe.

Since then, conditions have changed dramatically. Europe has recovered its economic dynamism and is moving, although fitfully, toward political unity. The fear of Soviet invasion has diminished. American nuclear superiority has been replaced by rough parity with the Soviet Union, and European allies increasingly question the credibility of the nuclear deterrent.

But on the issue of relationships towards third area conflicts the early problem remains almost unchanged, although the two sides of the Atlantic have exchanged their roles. Now it is Europe that insists that the treaty's obligations do not extend to the developing world. And it is Europe that feels free to dissociate itself from US actions where indigenous upheavals and Soviet efforts to outflank the alliance produce contemporary crises.

That process of dissociation has been accelerating for at least 15 years. During the 1973 Israel-Arab War, Britain and West Germany refused to grant the US permission to use American bases for reconnaissance--or blocked American arms shipments to the Middle East from their territories. Allied governments almost unanimously opposed American policy toward Iran during the hostage crisis, on Central America and Grenada. To be sure, cooperation in the Persian Gulf has been much better. But as Europe develops its own autonomy explicit arrangements for third area conflicts and tolerable dissociation become more important. The Alliance will be weakened if interests considered vital by one partner are consistently neglected by the other.

Conclusion

This is a vast agenda. And it cannot possibly be accomplished except in a bipartisan setting. The national security interest of the United States does not change every four or eight years. That possibility makes us a factor of instability. Weapons decisions, arms control strategy and serious diplomacy have a lead time longer than the term of office of a single Presidency. There will always be disagreements over tactics; but the fundamental issues must be settled. It should be the highest priority of a new Administration and of both sides of the Congress.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHARLES E. GRASSLEY

THANK YOU MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE. I APPEAR BEFORE YOU TODAY TO SPEAK ABOUT THE VERY FOUNDATION ON WHICH THIS COUNTRY WAS BUILT -- HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS.

THE EARLY SETTLERS ON THESE AMERICAN SHORES CAME TO ESCAPE RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL OPPRESSION. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WAS THEN FOUNDED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND EXPRESSION. OUR GREAT NATION, THROUGHOUT OUR 200 YEAR HISTORY, HAS VIGOROUSLY PROTECTED THESE FREEDOMS WITHIN OUR OWN BOUNDARIES.

BUT WE DO MORE THAN THAT. IT IS OUR POLICY TO WORK FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGHOUT THE NATIONS OF THE WORLD. WE MUST CONTINUE THIS TASK WITH COMPLETE DEDICATION AND COMMITMENT, USING EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO SEEK INCREASED FREEDOMS FOR PEOPLE, WHEREVER THEY LIVE.

AND WE EXPECT THE COUNTRIES WITH WHICH WE HAVE COOPERATIVE RELATIONS TO SHARE OUR COMMITMENT TO THE PROTECTION AND ENHANCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. IT IS THIS POINT --THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE VARIOUS COMPONENTS TO A TRUSTING, MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE U.S. AND OTHER NATIONS -- THAT MUST BE STRESSED HERE TODAY.

PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS REACHED AN IMPORTANT AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION -- ONE THAT FOCUSES EXCLUSIVELY ON NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION AND VERIFICATION. THIS IS, NO DOUBT, AN IMPORTANT ACHIEVEMENT, AND ONE WHICH THIS COMMITTEE AND THE

WHOLE SENATE WILL ALSO REVIEW AND CONSIDER SO AS TO ENSURE THAT OUR MILITARY AND SECURITY INTERESTS ARE PROTECTED.

BUT WE MUST NOT ALLOW THE APPROVAL OF THIS TREATY (AND I EXPECT THAT IT WILL BE RATIFIED) TO ALTER OUR FUNDAMENTAL VIEW OF, AND THEREFORE OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH, THE SOVIET UNION.

THE U.S.S.R. IS A TOTALITARIAN REGIME BASED UPON OPPRESSION AND PERSECUTION. SOVIET LEADERS DO NOT, NOW, NOR HAVE THEY AT ANYTIME IN HISTORY, SHARED OUR VIEW OF THE OVERRIDING IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN A SOCIETY.

WE SAW, IN 1987, AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF SOVIET JEWS AND ETHNIC GERMANS GRANTED PERMISSIONS TO EMIGRATE. WHILE THIS HAS GIVEN US SOME CAUSE FOR OPTIMISM, THERE ARE OTHER DEVELOPMENTS WHICH REMIND US OF THE TRUE CHARACTER OF THE SOVIET UNION. LET ME SHARE A FEW EXAMPLES WITH YOU.

FIRST. THE SOVIET UNION PERSISTS IN ITS VIOLATIONS OF ITS COMMITMENTS UNDER THE HELSKINKI ACCORDS BY DENYING FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND PERMISSION TO EMIGRATE. WE HAVE SEEN NUMEROUS WELL KNOWN REFUSENIKS LEAVE THE SOVIET UNION THIS YEAR, BUT A NUMBER OF LONG TERM REFUSENIKS ARE STILL DENIED PERMISSION TO LEAVE. THERE ARE OLD REFUSENIKS IN VERY POOR HEALTH -- LIKE BENJAMIN CHARNY AND VLADIMIR TUFELD WHO CANNOT LEAVE. ALSO, THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES CONTINUE TO ABUSE THE STATE SECRET REASON FOR DENYING PERMISSION. SOVIET REFUSENIKS IGOR AND INNA USPENSKY ARE EXAMPLES OF THE ARBITRARINESS OF THE SYSTEM. THEY, ALONG WITH THEIR 18 YEAR OLD SON, HAVE BEEN REFUSED FOR MORE THAN 8 YEARS. UP UNTIL RECENTLY, THEIR REFUSAL WAS BASED UPON INNA'S BROTHER ALLEGED POSSESSION OF STATE SECRETS. IN JANUARY OF THIS YEAR, HER BROTHER, ALEXANDER IOFFE, AND HIS FAMILY LEFT FOR ISRAEL. NOW THE USPENSKYS' HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT THEY ARE DENIED BECAUSE STATE SECRETS OF IGOR USPENSKY'S AGED MOTHER. SHE HAS BEEN RETIRED FROM THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE

FOR MORE THAN 10 YEARS AND NEVER WORKED WITH CLASSIFIED INFORMATION DURING HER TENURE THERE. THE IRRATIONALITY OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM IS QUITE APPARENT.

SECOND. THE SOVIET UNION'S CONSISTENT DENIAL OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FURTHER INDICATES ITS LACK OF PROGRESS ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS FRONT. THIS YEAR REPRESENTS THE MILLENNIUM FOR CHRISTIANITY IN RUSSIA, BYLORUSSIA AND THE UKRAINE. THE SOVIET UNION, OFFICIALLY AN ATHIEST STATE, BANS THE UKRANIAN CATHOLIC AND ORTHODOX CHURCHES. MORE THAN 150 CHURCHES HAVE BEEN DESTROYED IN THE UKRAINE IN THE LAST TWO YEARS, THE SAME PERIOD DURING WHICH WE HAVE BEEN TREATED TO "GLASNOST." SOVIET CHILDREN ARE ROUTINELY WARNED NOT TO GO TO CHURCH WITH THEIR GRANDMOTHERS, PEOPLE THE GOVERNMENT CALL, "FOOLISH OLD WOMEN." FURTHERMORE, THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES ENGAGE IN A POLICY OF HARASSMENT AND EVEN IMPRISONMENT FOR THOSE WHO SEEK TO PRACTICE THEIR FAITH.

THIRD. THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUES AN OFFICIAL POLICY OF MEDICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC ABUSE FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES, IN SPITE OF ITS HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS. THE SOVIET UNION HAS AT LEAST 18 SPECIAL PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITALS, TO WHICH DISSIDENTS ARE ADMITTED FOR THEIR "ANTI-SOVIET" ATTITUDES AND ACTIVITIES. SOVIET DOCTORS USE DRUGS AND MEDICAL PROCEDURES IN THE SAME WAY THAT NAZI DOCTORS, LIKE JOSEF MENGELE, USED THEIR PRISONERS FOR EXPERIMENTS. ALL OF THIS OCCURS WITH REGULARITY IN A COUNTRY THAT IS A SIGNATORY TO IMPORTANT HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTS, LIKE THE HELSINKI ACCORDS.

THESE EXAMPLES DEMONSTRATE THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS A GREAT DEAL OF PROGRESS TO MAKE IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS ARENA. THE UNITED STATES IS IN A UNIQUE POSITION TO WORK ON IMPROVEMENTS IN THESE AREAS.

FIRST, WE HAVE THE JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT. THIS LAW RECOGNIZES THAT THE OPPORTUNITY TO LEAVE A COUNTRY TO SEEK

RELIGIOUS OR POLITICAL FREEDOM IS THE BASIS FOR HUMAN INTEGRITY AND LIFE ITSELF. JACKSON-VANIK PROHIBITS THE GRANTING OF A TRADE BENEFIT TO THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH RESTRICT EMIGRATION. WE HAVE, AS A MATTER OF LAW AND POLICY, LINKED TRADE AND COMMERCE TO HUMAN RIGHTS. THE SOVIET UNION HAS NOT, TO DATE, BEEN GRANTED A WAIVER OF JACKSON-VANIK RESTRICTION. THEIR PERFORMANCE ON EMIGRATION HAS NOT WARRANTED THE AWARDING OF THIS TRADE BENEFIT.

LET ME SHARE WITH YOU SOME DATA ON SOVIET EMIGRATION. LAST YEAR, IN 1987, 8,155 SOVIET JEWS RECEIVED PERMISSION TO LEAVE THE SOVIET UNION. THIS REPRESENTS A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE OVER THE 914 SOVIET JEWS ALLOWED TO LEAVE IN 1986. BUT THE 1987 FIGURE IS ONLY 15% OF THE TOTAL NUMBER WHO LEFT IN 1979, THE PEAK YEAR FOR JEWISH EMIGRATION. CLEARLY, THE SOVIET UNION HAS A LONG WAY TO GO IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE ITS COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS GUARANTEES. WE MUST REMIND THE SOVIETS OF THE JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT AND ENCOURAGE THEM TO CONTINUE TO IMPROVE THEIR EMIGRATION RECORD. WE HAVE A LEGAL MECHANISM ALREADY IN PLACE TO REWARD REAL AND SUSTAINED PROGRESS ON EMIGRATION. I HOPE THAT MY COLLEAGUES WILL JOIN WITH ME, SENATORS DECONCINI AND MOYNIHAN TO REMIND PRESIDENT REAGAN AND SECRETARY SHULTZ OF OUR OBLIGATIONS UNDER JACKSON-VANIK.

SECOND, WE ARE INVOLVED IN THE ONGOING HELSINKI PROCESS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THE HELSINKI PROCESS RECOGNIZES THAT TRADE, DISARMAMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS ARE INTERCONNECTED MATTERS, WHEN IT COMES TO HOW NATIONS COOPERATE WITH ONE ANOTHER. BEFORE THE SOVIET UNION CAN EXPECT PROGRESS ON THE TRADE AND DISARMAMENT ISSUES, WE MUST INSIST ON TANGIBLE PROGRESS ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES SET FORTH IN THE HELSINKI ACCORDS AND THE VARIOUS FOLLOW-UP DOCUMENTS. AS A SIGNATORY TO THESE AGREEMENTS, THE SOVIET UNION MUST HONOR AND IMPLEMENT THE HUMAN

RIGHTS GUARANTEES, AND WE MUST CONTINUE TO BRING PRESSURE ON THE SOVIET UNION TO IMPROVE ITS HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD.

TOWARD THAT END, I AM INTRODUCING, ALONG WITH SENATORS DECONCINI AND LAUTENBERG AN AMENDMENT TO THE RESOLUTION OF RATIFICATION ON THIS SUBJECT. THE AMENDMENT IS SIMPLY A DECLARATION OF OUR COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS AND UNDERSTANDING ABOUT THEIR IMPORTANCE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF COOPERATIVE RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THE AMENDMENT IS NOT INTENDED TO IMPEDE OR OTHERWISE RESTRICT RATIFICATION OF THE INF TREATY. I AM HOPEFUL THAT OUR COLLEAGUES WILL JOIN IN THE AMENDMENT AND SEND AN IMPORTANT MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN, AND ULTIMATELY SECRETARY GORBACHEV, ABOUT THE PRIORITY WE PLACE ON HUMAN RIGHTS.

TO THE SOVIET JEWS AND OTHER NATIONAL MINORITIES OF THE SOVIET UNION, OUR AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IS THE BEST HOPE FOR IMPROVEMENT IN THEIR LIVES. WE HAVE THE ABILITY TO EXTRACT CONCESSIONS FROM THE SOVIET UNION AS IT SEEKS MODERNIZATION AND INTEGRATION INTO THE WESTERN WORLD. AND WE MUST CONTINUE TO USE THIS LEVERAGE.

PEACE AND FREEDOM ARE INTIMATELY CONNECTED. WE CANNOT ACHIEVE A GENUINE AND RELIABLE PEACE WITH THE SOVIET UNION UNTIL THOSE WHO WANT TO LEAVE ARE ALLOWED TO GO, UNTIL EVERY CHRISTIAN, MOSLEM AND JEW IS GIVEN THE RIGHT TO PRACTICE HIS RELIGION, AND UNTIL EVERY NATIONAL MINORITY IS GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO STUDY AND ENJOY ITS CULTURE AND HERITAGE. THE PRINCIPLES AND IDEALS ON WHICH THIS COUNTRY WAS FOUNDED DEMAND NO LESS.

THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RABBI DAVID SAPERSTEIN

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to address this committee this morning on behalf of a large segment of the organized American Jewish community. In addition to my own organizations, the Union of American Hebrew Congregations (comprised of 800 congregations and 1.3 million Jews throughout the United States) and the Central Conference of American Rabbis (representing over 1500 Reform Rabbis in the United States), I also represent today the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council (NJCRAC). NJCRAC is the coordinating umbrella organization of 13 national Jewish organizations and 114 local Jewish Community Councils representing Jewish communities throughout the United States (see appendix).

NJCRAC constituent national agencies include the Anti-Defamation League, American Jewish Committee, American Jewish Congress, B'nai B'rith International, Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America, United Synagogue of America, Women's League for Conservative Judaism, Jewish War Veteran's of America, Hadassah, Women's American ORT, National Council of Jewish Women and the Jewish Labor Committee as well as the UAHC.

I welcome this opportunity to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee today because I believe the Jewish experience is of particular relevance to your deliberations. Precisely because of the enormity of the nuclear danger, there are those who would close their eyes to it, deny that humankind is capable of so infinite a folly as that which these wretched weapons make possible. Alas, while other people see merely as vague possibility the evil unleashed by technology misused; for us this is already tragic memory. No people knows better than we how close to the surface the demons are buried, how casually they may be disintered and come to consume us all.

Samuel Pizar, a Holocaust survivor, while addressing the Israeli Knesset made this very point wher he said:

> "To us, the holocaust was not only an indelible memory of horror; it is a permanent warning... in the shadow of permanently flaming gas chambers where Eichmann's reality eclipsed Dante's vision of Hell, we have witnessed a pilot project for the destruction of humanity, the death rattle of the entire species on the eve of the atomic age, of thermonuclear proliferation--the final solution.
>
> We know that man is capable of the worst as he is capable of the best, of madness as ~~of~~ genius. We know that the unthinkable is indeed possible...Here with the authority of the numbers engraved on our arms, we cry out the commandment of 6 million innocent souls...: Never again.
>
> From where, if not from us will come the warning that a new combination of technology and brutality can transform the planet into a crematorium?"

His words reach to the heart of concern over the nuclear arms race. If good people who are alarmed about an increasingly destabilized nuclear arms race do not act to prevent it, these bombs may one day be used, changing for eternity life as we know it. We must, therefore, begin by recognizing that the unbelievable can happen. Let us not recreate the mistakes of the past when the world would not believe Auschwitz existed until the smoke ceased to rise from its chimneys.

Mr. Chairman, it has long been obvious that we must reclaim mastery over our weapons, that it is we, the citizens of this planet, who must set the strategies on which our fate depends, rather than allowing our technology to dictate those strategies. And the INF treaty is a first step in precisely that direction. It will not end the terror, nor is it even a significant enough step to set in motion an irreversible momentum. But it does offer us all a clear and present hope that we will not forever permit ourselves to be passive witnesses to endless escalation. It offers us all, for the first time, the hope that we can regain control over our destiny, that we can grab hold of the nuclear arms race and turn it in a more constructive direction.

Let us acknowledge that the INF treaty is not only an important step in the right direction, but has established several historic breakthroughs. First, this treaty permits a range of on-site inspection for both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. This is something that many members of Congress have for years argued that the Soviets would never agree to -- but we have it today. Second, we have an unprecedented agreement not merely to put a cap on future building but actually to reduce arms, literally to dismantle hundreds of nuclear weapons -- in the process eliminating an entire class of nuclear weapons. Third, this treaty represents the Soviets willingness to engage in asymetrical reductions based on the equivalent effect of the reductions not on an arbitrary reduction of equivalent numbers of weapons from asymetrical arsenals. This development enhances prospects for new agreements which could provide greater stability in the nuclear arms race.

The fact that INF does not yet put an end to that race, the fact that we remain a very long way from the time of the plowshares and the pruning hooks, is hardly a relevant criticism. In the Talmud we are taught, "It is incumbent upon thee to complete the task; neither art thou free to desist from it." So also here.

INF must be part of a process. And we hope that the Administration will push ahead vigorously in pursuing its START talks so that the benefit of this treaty will not be off-set by deployment of more strategic weapons aimed at the same targets as the intermediate missiles.

Mr. Chairman, the Jewish community wholeheartedly supports the INF treaty in its current form. We oppose any amendment or reservation that would require renegotiation of the treaty because we believe that while no treaty is perfect, this one enhances American security and can lead to more sustained efforts to reverse the nuclear arms race. We urge this committee and the Senate to pass a resolution of ratification as expeditiously as possible because we believe that men and women around the world look to us to endorse the new road on which we have embarked, and to endorse it with enthusiasm, not with a grudging and half-hearted reluctance. We believe that if INF is to be not only a step away from the brink, but a step towards a more comprehensive agreement, its ratification must give evidence of America's commitment to continue the climb from the abyss to the mountain top.

No one supposes that will be an easy climb. We are prisoners of doctrines past and of fears present, and there are rational foundations for both our doctrines and our fears. But are we not like that prisoner, locked in solitary confinement for 30 years, who one day thought to try the door to his cell only to discover that it had been unlocked all along? With INF we have the opportunity to begin, one step at a time, to replace the doctrines and the fears that have confined us so long, to become commanders of our fate.

Ever since President Kennedy asserted that peace is, in the last analysis, basically a matter of human rights, we have understood that there is an intimate connection between the two. As we address this INF Treaty, what, then, of human rights? Indeed, the American Jewish community shares with this committee a compelling interest in the status of human rights in the Soviet Union, and particularly in Soviet fulfillment of the promise, recorded in Article XIII of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and implied in the Helsinki Accords, that all people have the right to leave any country, including their own. How is it that we, despite our profound disappointment in the human rights record of the Soviet Union, nonetheless so enthusiastically endorse INF?

In our view, indeed, the two issues -- arms control and human rights -- each of such towering importance that to link them formally would be to commit a grave error. When one adrresses such crucial concerns of basic moral principal and fundamental interests, improvement in one area should not be made contingent on the other. Treaties which protect human rights ought not be made contingent on improvements in nuclear arms control. Nor should strengthening our strategic interests through reversing the nuclear arms race be contingent on human rights improvements.

The linkage between arms control and human rights is one primarily of meta-legal intuition, whereby the very atmosphere of negotiation and the very foundation of trust in one arena is profoundly colored by behavior in the other. The long-term potential for agreements in either area will be stymied by violations of the accords in the others. Such linkage does not, however, require formal articulation; it is inherent and the Soviet Union knows that quite well.

This linkage should be contrasted to making those aspects of US-USSR relations in which we have a lesser interest dependent on improvements in human rights or other issues of basic principle -- hence the continued determination of the US to maintain Jackson-Vanik and make improvements on trade dependent on emigration performance.

For these reasons, we urge the committee to incorporate strong language on behalf of human rights including the right to emigrate into its resolution of ratification in the form of a Type 2 understanding requiring notification of the Soviet Union without requiring Soviet concurrence. For the reasons described above, we would oppose any Type 3 amendment or reservation on these issues which would require renegotiation of the treaty with the Soviet Union.

There are those who argue that if the Soviet Union so blatantly violates human rights accords, why should they be trusted to maintain arms control agreements. There is some truth to this. Our concern for that record does not represent an intrusion into the domestic policies of the Soviet Union. We must never forget that the formal commitments of the Soviet Union with regard to human rights are aspects of solemn international commitments to which the Soviets have pledged themselves. And it is plain that those commitments have not been fulfilled. Over and over again, the U.S. government has made it clear to the Soviet Union that our ability and our readiness to take its commitments regarding arms control and reduction seriously cannot be separated from its record on human rights accords -- a record which is, of course, deeply disappointing.

Yet we recognize that there are systemic differences between human rights and arms control agreements which allow us to move ahead on arms control even while addressing vigorously the problems in the human rights arena.

First, the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken through such agreements, and surely under INF, is not left up to the good will or mutual trust of the signatories; it is comprehensively monitored through elaborate systems of verification, including the important new precedent of on-site inspections.

Verification is plainly the key, for the Soviets cannot view casually the implications of their violation of this treaty. They must know that such violations would be spotted quickly and would not only and rightly bring down upon them the condemnation of world opinion, but would also bring to an abrupt halt all negotiations on further arms reduction. This would, indeed, re-ignite the arms race, with all its costs and with all its terrifying possibilities.

Second, violations of arms control agreements can be deterred by the threat of abrogation of the treaty and of concomitant steps by the US to off-set the impact of such violations. A violation of a human rights treaty cannot be deterred by a US "in-kind" response which would off-set the Soviets' violation. Thus, while Soviet human rights violations breed distrust of Soviet intentions and integrity which may impede a positive long-term realignment of our relationship, it need not delay progress in those areas of arms control where verification and reciprocal remedies are available to us.

That is as it should be. Perhaps, some day, we will be able to look back on INF as the first in a series of confidence-building and trust-enhancing measures. For now, it is enough to know that the language of the treaty itself offers all the protection against its violation that is required.

Most importantly, we believe that there is a positive relationship between improvements in arms control and in human rights. No one can be certain of what motivates the actions of Soviet leadership. We can only note the trends of the past and draw inferences from them. As a number of experts on the Soviet Union have noted, the plight of dissidents in general, and the Soviet Jewry in particular, tends to improve during periods of detente and cooperation. When relations between the two countries are most strained, human rights restrictions increase and emigration is restricted. When our countries cooperate, restrictions have been eased and emigration increases. The Soviet leadership seems to have recognized that the benefits from improved relations with the United States will never be fully realized in an atmosphere of criticism, sparked by increasing human rights violations.

Although the period of "glasnot," which has been coextensive with warming U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations, has resulted in modest improvements in human rights and rates of emigration, we note with alarm a disturbing pattern of more restrictive emigration since the December 1987 Reagan-Gorbachev summit. Consistent U.S. pressure on the emigration and other human rights issues is needed the ensure that the message is clearly given that further improvements in overall relations between our countries is dependent on improvement in their human rights record.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we believe the INF treaty can be the first important step down a path to a world not threatened by nuclear holocaust. It seems clear to us that we dare not simply resign ourselves to the sterility of a never-ending escalation and destabilization in nuclear capability without pursuing, as vigorously as we can, creative and responsible alternatives. And it must be said that no one in the United States or in the Soviet Union knows what possibilities might be opened to our planet were the same resources which have been invested in the escalation of the arms race were refocused on resolving world problems. We hope that this treaty will move us in that direction.

Let us always remember that when we enter into arms reduction agreements with the Soviet Union, we are not conferring a benefit on that nation. We are, instead, acting out of our own compelling self-interest -- and, we believe, in the interests of all humankind. The hopes of humanity are vested in this treaty and in your deliberations.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REV. ROGER MAHONY

My name is Roger Mahony. I am the archbishop of Los Angeles and the chairman of the Committee on International Policy of the U.S. Catholic Conference (USCC). I speak on behalf of the U.S. Catholic Conference, the public policy agency of the Roman Catholic bishops of the United States. The conference is made up of 298 bishops, serving some 52 million Catholics.

On behalf of the USCC, I begin by expressing our sincere gratitude for the invitation to present our views on the moral considerations that we believe should guide your evaluation of the INF Treaty and post-INF arms control policy.

With this testimony, we urge you to ratify the INF Treaty, without crippling amendment and without undue delay. We do so as teachers and pastors not technicians or political leaders. We do so with deep respect for the technical complexity of the treaty in all its political and strategic dimensions. But as teachers and pastors, we also recognize that no question of foreign affairs surpasses the nuclear arms race in terms of moral content and importance.

In our 1983 pastoral letter, The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response, we examined in considerable detail the moral and religious aspects of the nuclear arms race. It is the responsibility we feel for continued assessment of the meaning, morality and direction of nuclear policy which brings us to testify today.

In my testimony, I, will first outline briefly the moral and religious themes which shape our views. Next, I will argue that the INF Treaty is significant in itself and significant as part of a larger political and strategic process. Finally, I will suggest that ratification of this treaty should be just the first of ever more determined steps toward nuclear and conventional arms reductions.

I. The Moral and Religious Perspective of the Testimony

The bishops' 1983 pastoral letter reflects a long and constant tradition on war and peace within the Catholic community and examines difficult issues of the nuclear arms race in light of it. I would like to highlight the key aspects of the pastoral letter's moral analysis which provide the framework for my discussion of the INF agreement.

A. The Relationship of Disarmament to Peace

In our view, the INF Treaty should be seen in the context of a broad, distinctly positive vision of peace. It goes without saying that peace is the moral imperative; but toward what kind of peace should we strive? As the Second Vatican Council defined it: "Peace is not merely the absence of war. Nor can it be reduced solely to the maintenance of a balance of power between enemies. Nor is it brought about by dictatorship. Instead, it is rightly and appropriately called 'an enterprise of justice'(Is. 32:17)" (Pastoral Constitution #78).

Pope John Paul II has elaborated on this theme by describing three conditions for peace: "Disarmament, justice for safeguarding the rights of individuals and of peoples, and development" (Address to the Diplomatic Corps, Jan. 9, 1988).

It is the first of these three conditions -- disarmament -- which concerns us here today. It should be noted that our concern for disarmament as one condition for peace grows out of a quite realistic Catholic teaching on international relations. This realism recognizes a nation's right to legitimate defense within the strict moral limits of the criteria of the just war doctrine.

But in a nuclear age, the moral limits on war have taken on a qualitatively new character. It is the qualitatively new character of war in the nuclear age that has led this fundamentally realistic Catholic teaching to arrive at two moral judgments. First, the arms race is to be unreservedly condemned as a theft from the poor and as a dangerous way to maintain a "peace of a sort" (Pastoral Constitution #81). Second, the political process of mutual, verifiable arms control and disarmament is essential to place human and moral constraints on technology and the arms competition. In Catholic teaching, arms control agreements are indispensable means to control and reverse the arms race.

Our strong emphasis on the necessity and efficacy of reversing the arms race by means of agreements such as the INF Treaty derives its logical force in large part from our extreme skepticism that nuclear use could be morally acceptable and from our strictly conditioned moral acceptance of nuclear deterrence.

B. Nuclear Use and Nuclear Deterrence

Because of their character, their location, and the strategy they support, the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe has given greater immediacy to the question of the moral limits on the use of nuclear weapons. In The Challenge of Peace, we made distinct judgments on nuclear use. While we have not condemned every conceivable use of nuclear weapons a priori, it is "our view that the first imperative is to prevent any use of nuclear weapons and our hope that leaders will resist the notion that nuclear conflict can be limited, contained, or won in any traditional sense" (The Challenge of Peace #161).

Perhaps the more difficult moral judgment involves the strategy of deterrence, of which the INF weapons are only a small part. A consideration of the concrete elements of this strategy led us in 1983 to "a strictly conditioned moral acceptance of nuclear deterrence" (The Challenge of Peace #186). In our judgment, deterrence was acceptable under two key conditions. First, deterrence policy must be a transitional imperative, providing time and space during which steps should be taken to halt the arms race, reverse its course and move toward not only arms control but nuclear disarmament. Secondly, as a transitional imperative, the components of the deterrent must be limited to those which are sufficient to deter; the quest for nuclear superiority or nuclear war-fighting capability must be eschewed.

These two restraints disallow any blanket endorsement of all weapons systems, strategic doctrines, or policy initiatives advanced in the name of stregthening deterrence. Nuclear deterrence should be used as a step on the way toward progressive disarmament. We do not consider it adequate as a long-term basis for peace.

II. The INF Treaty

Because we believe the arms race must be reversed through mutual, verifiable arms control agreements, we urge you to ratify the INF Treaty as a modest but important step toward this kind of progressive disarmament. We recommend ratification because, in our judgment, this treaty is a significant achievement in itself, and is significant as one part of a larger political and strategic process.

A. Significant in Itself

As many have already noted, the treaty's real significance lies in the fact that it does not merely limit but actually reduces nuclear armaments. The global elimination of all U.S. and Soviet ground-launched INF missiles creates, as Pope John Paul II said, "a new situation" (Address to the Diplomatic Corps, January 9, 1988). It underscores the fact that the spiraling nuclear arms race can be reversed if only we are willing to recognize mutual security interests and pursue negotiated solutions with some of the same skill and vigor with which we pursue the arms race itself.

While the actual numbers of missiles eliminated are relatively modest -- they carry only about 4% of already excessive and redundant nuclear warheads -- the very fact of their elimination gives us hope that we are on the road to reducing nuclear weapons to a level sufficient to deter, and ultimately, to eliminating them completely.

A second reason the treaty is significant in its own right is that its asymmetrical reductions should improve the balance of theater nuclear weapons in Europe, and in doing so, reduce the possibility of an early or first use of nuclear weapons. Since they were deployed in the late 1950s, Western Europeans have considered the Soviet SS-4 and SS-5 intermediate-range missiles the most immediate nuclear threat to Europe. The successor to these missiles, the even more threatening SS-20, provided part of NATO's rationale for its 1979 decision to deploy ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) and Pershing IIs. The Soviet's SS-12/22s and SS-23s which will be destroyed have no U.S. counterpart. The asymmetrical reductions which will result in the elimination of all of these weapons systems should improve the nuclear balance in Europe until further reductions can be negotiated.

Moreover, the possibility of early or first use of nuclear weapons in Europe is diminished by the removal of these weapons. Some of the weapons to be eliminated are deployed in areas likely to be overrun in the early stages of war, thus increasing the likelihood of rapid and uncontrollable decisions on their use. More importantly, the Pershing IIs and cruise missiles were deployed to strengthen NATO's "flexible response" strategy, which contemplates the first use of nuclear weapons in response to a Warsaw Pact conventional attack.

While we recognize that this strategy is intended to deter any war in Europe, we judged, in The Challenge of Peace, that the first use of nuclear weapons would be morally unacceptable because of the likelihood that such use could not be controlled, and hence, would result in unacceptable collateral loss of life. The elimination of the INF missiles should reduce but will certainly not eliminate the threat and perceived necessity of the first use of nuclear weapons in Europe. Therefore, we repeat our plea in our 1983 peace pastoral that NATO move rapidly toward the adoption of a "no first use" policy. This should be done in tandem with negotiating significantly reduced and more balanced conventional forces in Europe, improving confidence-building measures along the lines of the Helsinki process, and developing an alternative conventional defense posture.

In addition to diminishing the possibility of early or first use, this agreement eliminates two missiles -- the SS-20 and the Pershing II -- which many experts consider destabilizing because of their vulnerability and "prompt hard-target kill" capability that threatens to make the other side's retaliatory forces vulnerable.

Finally, this treaty is significant because it offers unprecedented verification requirements. This complex and intrusive process should allay any serious doubts about the ability to monitor compliance, it should serve as an important precedent for the even more intrusive verification provisions that will be required for agreement on strategic and chemical weapons, and it should contribute to the slow process of creating the climate of trust which is a condition of progressive disarmament through negotiation.

B. Significant as Part of Larger Process

The importance of the real, asymmetrical cuts, the diminished threat of nuclear use, and the verification provisions should not be underestimated, but it is clear from these hearings that the real significance of -- and controversy over -- the treaty involves its part in a larger political and strategic context. The treaty is the product of and a factor in a larger process of nurturing a more positive relationship with the Soviet Union. Certainly, arms control and disarmament are not the whole of peace, nor are they the whole of U.S.-Soviet relations. Regional conflicts and human rights issues are just two of the many sets of problems which demand resolution as a prerequisite to the more stable, peaceful relationship with the Soviet Union that should be our goal. The USCC will continue to focus its attention on these essential conditions of peace.

While the INF Treaty is only a part, it can be a significant part in a more stable and peaceful superpower relationship if it becomes part of a larger process of disarmament. As Pope John Paul II explained, this process of disarmament is not "an end in itself....(but) is one of the elements in the research process for a firmer type of security aimed in the end at establishing mutual relations based on faithful dialogue, on closer cooperation and on greater trust" (Address to the Diplomatic Corps, January 9, 1988).

Finally, we applaud this treaty and urge its prompt ratification precisely because it has reinvigorated the arms control process after more than a decade of growing doubt over its future. The failure to ratify SALT II, the Threshold Test

Ban Treaty, the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, or any other major arms control treaty since 1972; direct attacks on the very idea of negotiated arms control; and the rapid modernization of all aspects of the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals have undermined and delayed the necessary movement on arms control. Our "conditional acceptance" of deterrence in moral terms is intrinsically tied to the concept of arms control. That linkage has been inadequately fostered in recent years and needs to be reconstructed. We sincerely hope that, as Pope John Paul II said, the INF Treaty is "a point of departure rather than a point of arrival" in the arms control process (Address to the Diplomatic Corps, January 9, 1988).

III. Post-INF Arms Control Policy

What kind of progress on arms control do we envision? How can the INF Treaty be a "point of departure" for the arms control process? We urge that the treaty be the beginning of a process that will lead to rapid progress on a strategic arms agreement and on agreements that could help defuse and diminish the NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation.

In his 1979 testimony before this same committee, Cardinal Krol, testifying on behalf of the Bishops' Conference, supported the SALT II Treaty. But in giving this support he expressed fears that SALT II would be used as an excuse to increase military expenditures and modernize strategic forces on both sides, rather than as the basis for a follow-on treaty that would make deep cuts in the strategic arsenals of both sides.

Regrettably, our fears of 1979 have been realized. SALT II was not ratified and it did not usher in an era of deep cuts. Instead, the United States embarked on an unprecedented peacetime military buildup which included major additions to and modernization of all legs of the nuclear triad. The Soviet Union, for its part, has shown no less restraint. We cannot and should not proceed along such a dangerous path again. The INF

Treaty must not become the excuse for the introduction of new, modernized nuclear weapons in Europe, nor should its significance be allowed to pale in the face of an unabated strategic arms race. Rather, we sincerely hope that it becomes the model for much deeper cuts in nuclear weapons, especially strategic arsenals. The asymmetrical reductions and strict verification provisions of the INF Treaty should serve as important precedents for the much more complicated START talks, in which considerable progress has already been made. Movement toward strategic arms reductions should coincide with a more vigorous pursuit of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

The INF Treaty and a possible START agreement have brought renewed attention to the East-West confrontation in Europe. In The Challenge of Peace we said that the moral imperative to control and ultimately end the nuclear arms race was not intended to make the world safe for conventional war. In the judgment of many experts, the removal of the Pershing II and cruise missiles will not increase the threat of conventional war in Europe. Nevertheless, their removal and the possibility of significant strategic reductions highlight the need for more vigorous pursuit of agreements to stabilize conventional forces at much reduced levels.

Conventional arms and troops reductions would require corresponding action on tactical nuclear and chemical weapons as well. The tactical nuclear weapons that remain in Europe continue to multiply dangers of early use disproportionate to their deterrent value. For the same reason, rather than continue to produce new binary chemical weapons for placement on the front lines in Europe, the United States should seek more aggressively to resolve the remaining issues of verification in the Geneva talks on a world-wide ban on chemical weapons.

IV. Conclusion

To summarize, our position is as follows:

1. Our first imperative is to prevent any use of nuclear weapons, and to reject policies and force structures based on the notion that nuclear war can be limited, contained, or won.

2. Nuclear deterrence is not acceptable as a long-term basis for peace; our goal should be a sufficient deterrent, not nuclear superiority, a deterrent that is not an end in itself but a step toward a progressive disarmament.

3. Our policy should be aimed at achieving this progressive disarmament primarily through negotiated deep cuts in and the eventual elimination of the world's nuclear arsenals.

4. The INF Treaty is a modest but important first step toward achieving these deep cuts and, as such, should be ratified, without crippling amendment or undue delay, by the Senate. It offers real, asymmetrical reductions in potentially destabilizing weapons, and thereby diminishes the possibility of their early or first use; it reinvigorates the arms control process at a critical juncture and contributes to a more positive U.S.-Soviet relationship.

5. But the INF Treaty must be a point of departure to mutual, verifiable arms control measures that make deep cuts in strategic weapons, ban all testing of nuclear weapons, outlaw chemical weapons, and reduce conventional forces to a new balance at the lowest levels possible.

It is our deep conviction in offering these proposals that, as we said in our 1983 pastoral, "Progress toward a world freed of dependence on nuclear deterrence must be carefully carried out. But it must not be delayed" (The Challenge of Peace #189). As Pope John Paul II said recently of the INF agreement: "If the Washington agreement constitutes a beginning and a benefit to the international community, may it also represent for it a point of no return! A return to the arms race would no doubt be fatal for everyone. The nations which live in different political or social systems now realize even more that they must learn to live together, to finds grounds for cooperation and to deepen their peaceful ~~relations" (Address~~ to the Diplomatic Corps, January 9, 1988).

We pray that the INF Treaty is a point of no return for the arms race, and it is in this spirit that we offer this testimony before you today.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ARIE R. BROUWER

My name is Arie Brouwer. I am General Secretary of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. and an ordained minister of the Reformed Church in America. I wish to express my gratitude to you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify before you on this important treaty.

The National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. is the principal ecumenical organization in the United States through which 32 Protestant, Orthodox and Anglican church bodies (see attached list) with a combined membership of 44 million Christians make a common witness to their faith and work together to serve the churches and the world. While I do not purport to speak for all members of the communions constituent to the National Council, I do speak for our policy-making body, the Governing Board, whose 260 members are selected by those communions in numbers proportionate to their size.

The National Council of Churches has a long history of concern for defense and disarmament issues. Our major policy statement on disarmament, "Defense and Disarmament: New Requirements for Security," (attached) was adopted in 1968 and reaffirmed in 1977. In it we called for "a major and sustained effort, in conjunction with other nations, for substantial and rapid progress toward arms control and general disarmament through international agreement." We welcome and support this Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty as a significant new step in this direction, the first in this decade which has seen the largest growth ever in the world's arsenals. At its September 1987 meeting the Executive Committee of the NCC Governing Board welcomed the agreement which led to the INF Treaty as "the first time an agreement is within reach which would not only limit but eliminate some of the most destabilizing weapons...[and] signal the opening of a new age of trust and confidence-building which will lead to the further reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear arms."

In recent years churches in the National Council of Churches, as well as the larger religious community, have experienced significant growth in work for peace among their members. Several communions have organized new program emphases on peace. Bible studies, children's curricula, worship services, workshops and seminars on peace have proliferated around the country. Several communions have written public statements or pastoral letters on peace, in addition to the well-known pastoral letter of the U.S. Roman Catholic Bishops. Academic courses in peace studies have grown rapidly in church-related colleges and universities. The ecumenical "Peace with Justice Week", initiated by the NCC, has become an annual feature of church life. In 1987, its fifth year, it involved an estimated million people in every state of the union. We believe that all of these things have helped to create the public climate in this country which supports this treaty. In March the heads of most of our member churches will issue a joint pastoral letter specifically in support of ratification of the INF Treaty to be read in local church services around the country.

In addition to this, the National Council of Churches has led the way in developing exchange and dialogue with people and churches in the Soviet Union. These exchanges began in 1956 when the NCC paid its first official visit to churches in the Soviet Union. In 1979 leaders of the National Council of Churches met with Soviet church leaders to seek areas of agreement on peace issues. Since then, thousands of church people have traveled to the Soviet Union, while Soviet church delegations have frequently come here. In 1988 we know of approximately 8,000 people who will journey to the Soviet Union to help celebrate the 1,000th anniversary of the coming of Christianity to the Russian people. We believe that these experiences and relationships are helping to change the way Americans and Soviets perceive each other, and are making a contribution toward reducing the tensions between our two nations. We are particularly grateful for President Reagan's statement of interest in and support of such exchanges. We support this INF Treaty as an instrument for reducing U.S.-Soviet enmity.

We would like to emphasize several strengths of the INF Treaty. It does reduce U.S. and Soviet nuclear stockpiles. It increases security in Europe, and hence also for us, by removing some of the most destabilizing nuclear weapons. It demonstrates a new will to negotiate verifiable agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union. It has particular significance in establishing momentum for what we hope will become a long process of arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union.

We look to you, Mr. Chairman, to this committee, and to the United States Senate for sustained leadership in helping to develop a national security policy which is based on a realistic vision of common security. We can no longer doubt that the nuclear arms race has made the security of all nations indivisible. There is growing recognition among our churches that nuclear deterrence cannot provide an adequate basis for common security and that the drive for space defenses is both illusory and dangerous to our security.

We therefore hope that INF Treaty ratification will open the way to successful negotiations on the following measures:

-- a mutual halt in the further production and deployment of strategic offensive and defensive missiles system;

-- deep cuts in existing strategic nuclear arsenals;

-- reductions in both battlefield nuclear weapons and conventional forces;

-- a ban on space weapons;

-- a comprehensive test-ban treaty, not only to curb the qualitative arms race but also to provide the single most important action to strengthen the Non-Proliferaiton Treaty.

Moreover, we hope that this renewal of diplomatic momentum will soon lead to a ban on chemical weapons.

We believe that both the U.S. and the Soviet Union must comply rigorously with all existing treaties between them. In particular, we strongly support precise adherence with the traditional interpretation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. We believe that failure to do so will jeopardize this INF Treaty and all future negotiations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

The INF Treaty, as it stands, does have some serious limitations. As you well know, it affects only a small fraction of U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces. The provision of the treaty by which nuclear warheads are simply removed and not dismantled or destroyed is troublesome to us, and we hope that future negotiations will address this issue more satisfactorily. Nevertheless, we support this treaty for what it does accomplish and believe that it should be ratified without amendments which would require it to be renegotiated.

The achievement of this treaty is important to many people in this nation and the Soviet Union for another reason. The National Council of Churches, with other organizations in this country and abroad, is deeply committed to human rights and religious liberties throughout the world, including the Soviet Union. The last twenty years show clearly that in times of reduced tension between our two countries there is the best chance of improvement in human rights in the Soviet Union. Ratification of this treaty will contribute to building the political climate within which improvements in human rights and religious liberties in the Soviet Union, and elsewhere, can take place.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, it should be noted that bilateral U.S.-Soviet agreements take place within the whole family of nations, all of whom have a tremendous stake in their outcome. In that regard, I would like to say a word about the United Nations. The National Council of Churches' 1968 policy statement, to which I made reference previously, calls for "the strengthening of the United Nations as a peace-keeping and peace-making agency." We regret that the United States has opposed so many disarmament initiatives in the United Nations. We urge this committee and the United States Senate to support the United Nations Third Special Session on Disarmament in May-June 1988, to pledge and insure maximum financial support for the United Nations, to review the United States voting record on arms control issues at the United Nations, and to urge the administration, as a reflection of its leadership on the INF Treaty, to change its policy regarding the United Nations as an appropriate forum for disarmament discussions.

Again, Mr. Chairman, we applaud this treaty and President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev for achieving it. We urge its ratification without amendments which would require renegotiation. We see it as a first step toward developing real security for us and the world's peoples.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you.

MEMBER COMMUNIONS
of the
National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A.

African Methodist Episcopal Church

African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church

American Baptist Churches in the U.S.A.

The Antiochian Orthodox Christian Archdiocese of North America

Armenian Church in America

Christian Church (Disciples of Christ)

Christian Methodist Episcopal Church

Church of the Brethren

Coptic Orthodox Church in North America

The Episcopal Church

Evangelical Lutheran Church in America

Friends United Meeting

General Convention, The Swedenborgian Church

Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America
Hungarian Reformed Church in America
International Council of Community Churches
Korean Presbyterian Church in America
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National Baptist Convention of America
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Progressive National Baptist Convention, Inc.
Reformed Church in America
Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church
Syrian Orthodox Church of Antioch
Ukrainian Orthodox Church in America
United Church of Christ
The United Methodist Church

Resolution on the Agreement in Principle between the USA and the USSR on the Elimination of Intermediate Nuclear Forces

Adopted by the Executive Committee of the Governing Board,
National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A.
September 18, 1987

The Executive Committee of the Governing Board warmly welcomes the agreement in principle between the Foreign Minister of the USSR and the Secretary of State of the USA on the elimination of their short and medium range nuclear forces announced today. The churches joined in the National Council of Churches of Christ in the USA have warned of the dangers of the nuclear arms race since the atomic bomb was first developed. We have worked and prayed for a reversal of this race to global destruction. We thank God that now for the first time an agreement is within reach which would not only limit but eliminate some of the most destabilizing nuclear weapons. We continue to pray that this agreement in principle will signal the opening of a new age of trust and confidence-building which will lead to the further reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear arms.

"TO PRESERVE AND NOT TO DESTROY"
National Council of the Churches of Christ
in the U.S.A.

DEFENSE AND DISARMAMENT:
NEW REQUIREMENTS FOR SECURITY

A Policy Statement

adopted by the General Board
September 12, 1968
(Updated November, 1977)

INTRODUCTION

It is the purpose of this statement to address the issues of national defense and security in Christian perspective in an effort to provide a new concept of, and a new context for, national security. We believe that a new international community is coming into being in the midst of the system of nation-states, which for so long have been preoccupied with their own security. This new system of increasingly global interdependence is one in which security must be seen more and more in its international dimension — bound up with technology, finance, trade, and cross-cultural encounter — and less in strictly military terms. The world view that provides the context for present United States defense policies seems to be an inadequate reflection of this reality. An increase in military power is not necessarily an increase in security or any other value.

The National Council of Churches, in setting forth its views concerning the imperatives of a just peace and the requirements of a responsible use of power, has stated that "to secure such a peace, new presuppositions of thought and attitude, and new policies of action are required."* Nowhere is this more valid than in the area of national defense. In the quest for a just peace and a responsible use of United States power, Christians must therefore examine seriously the questions raised by the United States emphasis on military power in the pursuit of security.

THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

The Christian concern with the uses of United States power is based on the Christian belief that:

- God is Lord of creation, and men and women are to tend and develop this creation for the common good.
- God is sovereign over creation, both limiting national sovereignty and giving a degree of legitimacy to the nation-state as a major instrument today for shaping the conditions of human community.
- God is active in creation through the reconciling act in Christ whereby we are called to be agents of reconciliation.

Within this theological framework, Christians are not united in their convictions concerning military power. Especially in our present situation of a severe and threatening arms race, however, we are agreed that these theological convictions place qualifications on the use of military power;

- Responsibility for the created order is a responsibility to preserve and develop it, not to abuse and destroy it.
- God's sovereignty places limits on the moral autonomy of any aspect of the political order.
- God's reconciling act in Christ denies the ultimacy of the parochial political community and affirms that the "enemy" is the person for whom Christ died.

The function of politics, and the legitimate concern for security must, according to Christian faith, be controlled by God's creative, ordering, and reconciling work. The Christian vocational concern in this area is to provide better conditions for an effective work of love

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*Policy Statement, "Imperatives of Peace and Responsibilities of Power," adopted by the General Board, February 21, 1968.

– conditions under which the mission of reconciliation can be carried on in relatively better circumstances.

SECURITY AND THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

In seeking the conditions for reconciliation, there must be a clear perception of the international situation to which people are to respond. In the search for national security, the United States has accumulated massive military power. There is real evidence, however, that the security sought by this massive accumulation of power has not been fully achieved.

In *theological* terms, the adequacy of present defense policies must be questioned in view of the following dangers:

(1) They threaten to destroy the created order for which people are responsible.

(2) The requirements of present policies seem to have become self-validating in actual practice, subordinating other values to military necessity.

(3) The possibility of advanced escalation in an actual nuclear war implies the destruction of the adversary's population and social order, denying thereby the inclusiveness of the human community.

In *political* terms, the adequacy of present defense policies must be questioned in the light of the following criticisms by many knowledgeable observers:

(1) The national security of the United States has declined as the nuclear arms race has increased.

(2) The arms race has resulted in an enormous outlay of money and resources for military purposes that jeopardizes other national programs.

(3) The power and influence that inevitably accompany the control of such a large portion of our national resources mean that defense considerations now influence virtually all other national decisions.

(4) There are dehumanizing elements in the nuclear strategies.

(5) An overly ideological approach to the world's ills on both sides influences the perception of events and causes distorted interpretations of the facts to fit preconceived ideology.

A NEW CONTEXT FOR SECURITY

The demands of the Christian faith, and the most salient features of the international situation to which Christians must respond, lead us to ask for a new approach to national defense and security issues on the part of the citizens and the Government of the United States. Such an approach encompasses at least three requirements:

1. A first requirement is a new understanding of security. National security is integrally related not only to direct threats from other nations but in our time even more profoundly to the needs of the developing world, and must be supplied by international processes and institutions rather than by vast defense establishments.
2. A second requirement is a new approach to the use of national resources. The building of our own nation and the use of our resources to help others build their nations are the two primary tasks, requiring a major shift in national priorities.
3. A third requirement is a new emphasis on human rights and values. Defense should never become an end in itself, but should always serve the purpose of providing the stability required to enable life on earth to become human. This means, among other things, that defense policy must not be removed from effec-

tive political processes. Citizens must have an increased voice in defense policy and demand that resources be used to meet real human needs.

It is necessary, in reappraising the meaning of security, to acknowledge the ultimate futility of the attempt to maintain nuclear superiority. There is no advantage to be gained by it when each side is admittedly capable of inflicting overwhelming damage on the other, even after being attacked first. In addition, the present international situation includes positive political forces that encourage a movement toward a decline in the importance of nuclear weapons, and that provide opportunities to strengthen the bonds of international community. The Christian political vocation must seek to utilize these positive elements as it seeks to restore defense to its proper limits and to subordinate it to the demands of justice and the work of reconciliation among peoples and nations.

PROPOSALS FOR ACTION

As next steps toward a national reorientation on defense and security issues, we urge United States efforts and initiatives to seek the following:

1. *In arms control and arms limitation:*
   (a) a mutual halt in the further production and deployment of strategic offensive and defensive missile systems;
   (b) widespread support for the non-proliferation treaty;
   (c) a mutual cessation of production of fissionable material for military purposes;
   (d) a comprehensive test-ban treaty, taking into full account available national means of detection and inspection;
   (e) continued study and planning in problems related to conversion from defense to non-defense production; and
   (f) the strengthening of international revulsion against the production and use of chemical weapons and the development of effective control and verification measures to reinforce international restraints.

The significance of these first steps, some of which are already United States policy objectives, will be primarily in the extent to which they reflect a new determination to proceed to more far-reaching steps in the control and reduction of armaments.

2. *In defense spending and use of resources:*
   (a) significant reductions in defense spending and the channeling of the funds into development projects at home and abroad; and
   (b) a radical curtailing and strict controlling of the supply of arms to other countries.
3. *In peace-keeping, peacemaking, and disarmament:*
   (a) the strengthening of the United Nations as a peace-keeping and peace-making agency, including the training by member nations of special forces to be available for United Nations peace-keeping operations; and
   (b) a major and sustained effort, in conjunction with other nations, for substantial and rapid progress toward arms control and general disarmament through international agreement.

Present policies call into question our stewardship of our resources, our national priorities, and our wisdom in the management of power. A serious examination of the assumptions behind these policies could greatly improve the chances of that Great Power accommodation which is so necessary for a just peace and a stable international order. But the necessary changes require first that we stop thinking in obsolete terms. There must be a new context for looking at defense matters, requiring on the part of church members and all citizens a change of concepts, disposition, will, and determination. Such a reorientation may bring the United States to use its power in the years ahead to secure the development of nations and peoples, including its own, and to establish the international structures necessary for world order, justice, and peace.

FOR: 88 AGAINST: 0 ABSTENTIONS: 2

RESOLUTION ON PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS RESULTING FROM NUCLEAR FUEL REPROCESSING TECHNOLOGY

Adopted by the Governing Board
October 8, 1976

Whereas the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. has long held that "all resources of the earth . . . are gifts of God, and every form of ownership and use of such property should be kept under such scrutiny that it may not distort the purpose of God's creation";[1] and

Whereas the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. has recognized "that problems and hazards are created by all types of man-made radiation and that there is a need for continual international study and supervision by appropriate agencies;[2] and

Whereas the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. has called upon the United States "to join with other nations in a major and sustained effort for substantial and rapid progress toward arms control and general disarmament";[3] and

Whereas the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. has urged "the United States efforts and initiatives to seek . . . widespread support for the non-proliferation treaty; a mutual cessation of production of fissionable material for military purposes; . . . a radical curtailing and strict controlling of the supply of arms to other countries";[4] and

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1. "Christian Principles and Assumptions for Economic Life," September 15, 1954.
2. "Some Hope and Concerns of the Church in the Nuclear-Space Age," December 5, 1957.
3. "Imperatives of Peace and Responsibilities of Power," February 21, 1968.
4. "Defense and Disarmament: New Requirements for Security," September 12, 1968.

Whereas The United States and the USSR, despite the disarmament stipulations in Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, have failed to reduce their strategic weapons stockpiles, thereby enhancing the prestige of national nuclear armories and encouraging the continuation of a double standard between nuclear and non-nuclear nations; and

Whereas The National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. has reaffirmed "its concern about the proliferation of nuclear weapons"[5] and has urged "the reinforcement of safeguards to prevent the diversion of plutonium from peaceful use to the creation of nuclear weapons";[6] and

Whereas The National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. has urged the government of the United States to declare "a moratorium on the commercial processing and use of plutonium as an energy source, and on the building of a demonstration plutonium breeder reactor, pending further study";[7] and

Whereas The National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. has directed the Division of Church and Society to initiate a study of energy use giving "particular attention to nuclear production for energy and weapons . . .";[8] and

Whereas The output of national and multinational nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities may be used for either military or civilian purposes, increasing the possibility of war initiated by either national states or terrorist groups; and

Whereas The availability of nuclear reprocessing facilities weakens the effectiveness of safeguards, while increasing the proliferation of nuclear weapons;

Therefore The Governing Board of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A.:

(1) Urges the United States Government to:

(a) Set an example, and encourage all signatories to carry out the commitments agreed upon in the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, especially Article VI; encourage the International Atomic Energy Agency to develop a more stringent safeguard program; and also to encourage the development of incentives which would lead countries to choose non-nuclear alternatives;

(b) Implement Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by reducing the U.S. stockpile of strategic nuclear weapons, if possible in cooperation with the USSR, but if necessary, independently, both to create a world climate for non-proliferation and to reduce the understandable anxieties of non-nuclear nations;

(c) Support a moratorium on national and multinational commercial processing and use of plutonium pending development of adequate health and safety conditions and an enforceable international nuclear safeguards program;

(d) Use more aggressively its good offices and powers of moral, political and economic suasion to prevent the export of fuel reprocessing and enrichment technologies by other countries, pending establishment of such conditions and safeguards;

(e) Take an aggressive lead in appropriate international circles to develop comprehensive controls over the storage of spent nuclear fuel;

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[5] Resolution on "The Plutonium Economy," March 4, 1976.

[6] *Ibid.* [7] *Ibid.* [8] *Ibid.*,

(f) Stimulate an open debate on the implications of an international economy based on the use of plutonium as a fuel;

(g) Take an aggressive lead in research and development of alternative and appropriate technologies such as conservation and solar energy; and

(2) Urges its member denominations to call upon each Christian to inform him/herself enough to cast a reasoned vote, communicate with conviction to his/her representatives and to organize advocacy groups in assisting the administrative and legislative branches of the United States Government to carry out the actions called for above.

RESOLUTION ON THE COMPLETE CESSATION OF ALL EXPLOSIVE NUCLEAR TESTING

Adopted by the Governing Board
May 4, 1977

Whereas the quest for a just peace and a responsible use of U.S. power requires that the issue of the nuclear threat be raised; and

Whereas the concern with the use of U.S. power is based on the Christian belief that God is Lord of Creation and man and woman have a responsibility to preserve and develop the created order, not to abuse and destroy it; and

Whereas the nuclear arms race is accelerating both in the multiplication of weapons systems and in the spread of weapons capabilities to additional countries; and

Whereas the National Council of Churches in 1968 called for a "comprehensive test ban treaty, taking into account available national means of detection and inspection";[1] and

Whereas President Carter has declared he "would like to proceed quickly and aggressively with a comprehensive test ban treaty" and he is in "favor of eliminating the testing of all nuclear devices instantly and completely";[2]

Therefore the National Council of Churches commends President Carter for this new disarmament initiative, urges him to pursue a treaty for complete cessation of all explosive nuclear testing by all nations with unrelenting vigor and courage, and urges its program units and member churches to take immediate action to encourage mobilization of public opinion and encourage citizen action toward the accomplishment of these goals.

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1. "Defense and Disarmament: New Requirements for Security," policy statement adopted by the General Board, September 12, 1968.
2. *Congressional Record*, January 24, 1977.

RESOLUTION ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Adopted by the Governing Board
November 10, 1977

Whereas the world is spending an estimated $350 billion annually on an unresolved arms race; and

Whereas nuclear weapons pose an increasing threat of utter devastation if ever used, and the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the nations now known to have them is almost a certainty unless there is a reversal in the nuclear weapons competition; and

Whereas President Carter, in his Inaugural Address on January 20, 1977, expressed the conviction that "the ultimate goal of this nation should be the reduction of nuclear weapons in all nations of the world to zero"; and

Whereas the General Assembly of the United Nations has called a Special Session on Disarmament to be convened May 23-June 28, 1978;

Therefore the Governing Board of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A.:

(1) Reiterates its conviction that general and comprehensive disarmament is the goal toward which the United States should strive, as unanimously endorsed in 1961 by the United Nations General Assembly;

(2) Supports a halt in further production of nuclear weapons and a roll-back of existing nuclear weapons, toward the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons from the arsenals of all nations which have them or could produce them, and urges the U.S. Government to work toward these ends;

(3) Urges the United States Government to continue to work for major strategic arms reduction through negotiation, and for a halt in the authorization and funding of the neutron bomb, and of weapons systems such as the cruise missile, the Trident submarine, the MX mobile missile, and the Mark 12A warhead, all of which are designed to deliver nuclear weapons;

(4) Calls upon the United States Government to renounce military doctrines and petitions the World Council of Churches to use its good offices to call on all governments to do the same;

(5) Again urges the United States Government to continue to work for a multilateral agreement to halt all nuclear tests (as called for in an earlier National Council of Churches Governing Board Resolution on May 4, 1977) and in the meantime calls for suspension of underground tests by the United States, coupled with an invitation to the Soviet Union and other nuclear nations to follow this initiative;

(6) Supports an immediate cut-off of the production by the United States Government of fissionable material for nuclear weapons, with encouragement to other nations to do the same, and further supports, as President Carter proposed on April 7, 1977, an end to nuclear exports with bomb-making potential;

(7) Commends President Carter for signing, on May 26, 1977, Protocol I of the Tlalelolco Treaty (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America), which, when ratified, will prohibit the U.S. from placing nuclear weapons in its territories in the Latin America treaty zone, and urges President Carter to submit Protocol I to the U.S. Senate for ratification and further urges early ratification of the treaty by the Senate;

(8) Calls upon the United States to support the establishment under U.N. auspices of a world disarmament authority to supervise and administer agreements for arms reductions; and

(9) Requests the member communions to give leadership to educational efforts designed to increase awareness among church people of the dangers of the continued arms race.

(Based on "Defense and Disarmament: New Requirements for Security," adopted by the General Board, September 12, 1968.)

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN T. JOYCE

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your invitation to appear before the Committee. I am very pleased and grateful to have this opportunity.

I am Jack Joyce, President of the International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen. I am also a Vice President of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, the AFL-CIO. As such, I am a member of the Federation's Executive Council and chairman of the AFL-CIO Committee on Defense. It is in this capacity, on behalf of the AFL-CIO, that I come before the Committee this morning to provide testimony on the INF Treaty.

I have just arrived from Miami, where the AFL-CIO Executive Council met last week. It was my privilege to submit to the Council the AFL-CIO Committee on Defense report on the INF Treaty. I also submitted for the Council's consideration a resolution on the Treaty. On February 16, the Council approved this resolution. It is now the policy of the Federation. If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like to summarize AFL-CIO policy for the Committee.

The AFL-CIO considers the INF Treaty to be a good treaty which merits the consent of the Senate. It serves the security interests of the United States and its NATO allies. The AFL-CIO urges the Senate to ratify this treaty.

As you are aware, Mr. Chairman, the AFL-CIO has long been a proponent of a strong national defense. Five years ago, the AFL-CIO expressed the opinion that the best kind of arms control treaty is one that does not set limits or ceilings on weapons, up to which point the United States or the Soviet Union can arm themselves. The AFL-CIO maintains that the best kind of arms control treaty is one that causes actual cutbacks and reductions in the levels of arms in the world's arsenals.

According to this view, Mr. Chairman, the INF Treaty is the best kind of arms control agreement. It does not set a ceiling;

rather, it establishes a floor, and establishes it at absolute zero. It eliminates an entire class of nuclear weapons.

Although the Treaty deals with only three percent of the nuclear arsenals on the American and Soviet sides, it establishes two precedent-setting principles that could very well open the way toward real progress in both strategic and conventional arms control.

The first is that of asymmetrical or disproportionate reductions. The treaty requires these to achieve equivalent numbers of weapons on each side -- the number in the case of intermediate-range nuclear forces being zero. These reductions will not adversely affect NATO's deterrence capability.

The second is that of intrusive verification, i.e., on-site inspection. The INF Treaty marks the first time the Soviets have agreed to these principles, which the AFL-CIO has called for in the past.

In urging Senate approval of the INF Treaty, the AFL-CIO is under no illusion that this agreement will remove the impetus to the arms race or achieve dramatic reductions in military spending. The AFL-CIO remains steadfast in its conviction that the costs of a strong national defense should be borne equitably by all sectors of our society, and that the burden should not fall disproportionately on the backs of the working men and women of this country.

The AFL-CIO recognizes that, though it is a good arms control treaty, the INF agreement cannot stand on its own. It is imperative that progress be made on talks bearing on the levels of strategic nuclear forces and on talks governing the conventional levels of forces facing each other in Europe. It is within a framework of two other arms control agreements -- one on strategic weapons and one on conventional forces -- that the INF treaty will best serve American national security interests.

Fortunately, the INF Treaty provides two tools-- asymmetrical reductions and intrusive verification -- that will be useful in the work of building agreements on strategic and conventional forces. The AFL-CIO cannot conceive of any successful arms control agreements in the future that do not embody and strengthen these two new fundamental principles of arms control.

The AFL-CIO is especially concerned about the status of conventional forces in Europe. There is now an urgent need to reach agreement on achieving balanced conventional force reductions, so that NATO will not be compelled to build up its conventional forces.

Of particular concern to the Federation is the United States' ability to mobilize and sustain its armed forces in times of war. The problems affecting our capacity as a nation to project our military power under war-time circumstances are acute. They will only become more pressing in the days ahead as our conventional forces become more important to deterring a Warsaw Pact attack on NATO and in preserving the security and peace of Europe.

The AFL-CIO urges ratification of the INF Treaty, with the Senate's understanding that it is a first step toward a goal--but only a step. Its ultimate value will be determined by whether comparable progress can be made in the reduction of conventional and strategic forces.

That, in sum, is the position of the AFL-CIO on the INF Treaty. I would like to submit to the Chairman and to the Committee copies of the full report of the AFL-CIO Committee on Defense on the INF Treaty. This report contains the full text of the resolution.

I would be most pleased to answer any questions the Chair or the Committee may have.

PREPARED STATEMENTS OF THE AFL-CIO COMMITTEE ON DEFENSE ON THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) TREATY

INTRODUCTION

The AFL-CIO Committee on Defense, after completing its 1987 study of the Strategic Defense Initiative, was asked by President Kirkland to undertake a study of the INF Treaty and related issues, and to report to the AFL-CIO Executive Council in February. Chaired by John T. Joyce, President of the International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen, the Committee met with experts on this topic during the month of January 1988. A list of those who appeared before the Committee to discuss the INF Treaty is included in this report, and a list of the Committee members is appended.

The Committee's report to the Executive Council follows.

THE COMMITTEE REPORT

History of the INF Question

The history of the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe has its origins in the early post-war period and the development of the strategy of massive retaliation. The tenets of this strategy were simple: any Soviet attack on the NATO alliance would invite a devastating, full-scale nuclear counter-attack on Soviet soil. Such a strategy was the product, in the early days of defense planning, of the crude nature of ballistic missile technology, the imbalance between Warsaw Pact and NATO conventional forces, and of the heightened political tensions associated with the Cold War. It was also cheaper to deploy nuclear weapons than to finance a military build-up to eliminate the Warsaw Pact conventional force advantage.

The shortcomings of this approach became all too apparent in the 1960s, when missile accuracy and throw-weight improved sufficiently to make the wholesale destruction of cities a morally repugnant response to conventional attack. The NATO alliance developed a replacement for massive retaliation that came to be known as "flexible response." Instead of triggering a general nuclear counter-attack, a Warsaw Pact assault on West Europe would now trigger a chain of responses, each more serious than the one that preceded it, and each designed to escalate the conflict at the appropriate moment to an appropriate level. If the lowest level of flexible response failed to halt the advance, the theory went, then a second, more threatening, response would be launched, and so on. This series of responses could escalate all the way through to general nuclear warfare. The difference between flexible response and massive retaliation lay in the fact that the former provided a spectrum of defense steps that could be employed selectively, while the latter relied on an almost automatic radical escalation.

But in time the credibility of flexible response was undermined by a combination of factors affecting the Alliance's ability to deliver nuclear warheads onto Soviet territory. First, the Alliance possessed only two such delivery systems: the aging and ineffective British Vulcan bomber, which was being phased out of service, and its newer American replacement, the F-111. Second, the Warsaw Pact forces had by that time developed formidable air defense systems. It was becoming clear that the F-111 could only with difficulty penetrate those defenses and strike targets deep in Soviet territory.

It was decided to close this gap by adding new delivery systems to the Alliance's weapons inventory: the ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM), and the Pershing missiles.

Meanwhile, in late 1977, the USSR introduced the first SS-20s to the European theater. These were modern, mobile ballistic missiles, each carrying three independently-targetable nuclear warheads that were capable of striking any target in Western Europe from bases in the USSR. The deployment of the SS-20 gave new impetus to the deployment of GLCMs and Pershings.

Deployment of these weapons by the Alliance and by the Warsaw Pact proceeded apace for over ten years. However, the USSR was able to arm itself with far more SS-20s and other INF systems, such as the SS-4 and the SS-5, than NATO could match in the same period, owing both to the nature of Soviet society, and in the absence of treaties controlling the manufacture and deployment of INF weapons. The Alliance's pace of deployment was also slackened by massive protests and political problems in some Western European democracies during the initial deployments of American GLCMs and Pershings.

By the time the INF Treaty was signed, last December 8, the Soviet Union possessed 1752 INF missiles, deployed and non-deployed, while the United States had only 859, deployed and non-deployed -- a missile ratio of 2:1 favoring the USSR. The numbers of nuclear warheads on these weapons gave the Soviets an even greater advantage of nearly 4:1 over the United States.

Even as deployments of these weapons were proceeding, the United States and the Soviet Union were talking about doing away with them.

In November 1981, President Reagan proposed the so-called "zero-option," which applied to the "longer-range intermediate-range nuclear forces" (LRINF). These are weapons with ranges of between 600 and 3,400 miles. The United States offered to cancel deployment of the GLCMs and Pershings in Europe if the Soviets would agree, in turn, to dismantle their SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles. Two years later, in November 1983, the Soviet Union walked out of the INF talks. In March 1985, the Soviets returned to the negotiating table.

A Soviet counterproposal in October 1985 for freezing the deployment of American and Soviet INF weapons, which had proceeded in the absence of an agreement, brought a positive response from the United States with an additional proposal to negotiate the numbers of "shorter-range intermediate-range nuclear forces" (SRINF). These weapons have a range between 300 and 600 miles. Such weapons are the American Pershing I-A and the Soviet SS-12 and SS-23.

This American proposal became the second zero in the "double zero option" when, in June 1987, the United States proposed the elimination of all SRINF weapons on both sides. The next month, the USSR indicated its willingness to accept the "double zero option." In September 1987, the USSR and the USA agreed to conclude a treaty on INF. Remaining differences between the two sides were negotiated in the next three months, culminating in the signing of the INF Treaty in Washington, D.C., on December 8, 1987.

The INF Treaty

As the American and Soviet governments have told the world, the INF is a significant arms control pact because, in the words of the White House, both countries:

> will eliminate -- for the first time in history -- an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons: intermediate-range nuclear force missiles. This is the first agreement in history to actually reduce, not simply limit, the buildup of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, almost four deployed Soviet warheads will be eliminated for every one the U.S. eliminates.... Such reductions will establish a foundation of mutual restraint and responsibility that will help us build a safer world. [Emphasis in the original.]

To be sure, the elimination of all INF weapons is significant. But the Committee believes greater significance rests in the establishment of two principles, both of which will be instrumental to the success of future, and arguably even more important, arms control treaties: 1) the principle of asymmetrical reductions, and 2) the principle of intrusive verification. Acceptance of these principles offers hope for progress on strategic and conventional arms agreements.

These principles are introduced in the first of the four documents that constitute the Treaty.

The first document comprises the treaty articles and binds the United States and the Soviet Union to the elimination of all LRINF missiles and launchers within three years of the Treaty's taking effect, and to the elimination of all SRINF missiles and launchers within 18 months of the Treaty's taking effect. Thereafter, these weapons are banned. The weapons' support structures and support equipment are dealt with similarly. (The Treaty does not require the parties to destroy the nuclear warheads on these missiles, nor does it mandate the destruction of the warheads' guidance systems.)

As mentioned earlier, the Soviets possess a 2:1 advantage in missiles and an almost 4:1 advantage in warheads. Thus, in order to reach the level zero, the Soviets must eliminate twice as many missiles and four times as many warheads as the United States. This is the first instance of disproportionate cuts in nuclear arms agreements.

(It should be noted that INF warheads make up only 3% of the nuclear arsenal of the Soviet Union and the United States. The Treaty effects a very small class of weapons.)

Further, as soon as the treaty takes effect, neither party may produce or flight-test, and, in the case of SRINF missiles, launch, any INF weapon. Certain numbers of LRINF missiles may be launched if such launching is designed to dispose of the missile.

Once these weapons and related systems have been eliminated three years down the road, all facilities for the deployment, storage, repair, and production of INF missiles are banned.

The United States and the Soviet Union also agree to submit to a regime of verification by representatives of the other side and to abide by an effective verification system explicitly for the terms of the Treaty. Though the Committee is given to understand that there are no fool-proof verification systems, and that the procedures associated with the INF Treaty verification can be circumvented, the establishment of even an imperfect on-site inspection system is a breakthrough in nuclear arms control agreements.

The second document of the Treaty is the "Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Data." Based on information exchanged between the two sides on November 1, 1987, the MOU describes each individual LRINF and SRINF system covered by the agreement, its numbers and characteristics, as well as the map co-ordinates of each missile deployment area and each missile operating base. Related facilities are defined in extraordinary detail.

The third document of the INF Treaty is the inspection protocol, which describes the verification system associated with the Treaty. It lays out the conduct of and procedures for on-site inspections. These include short-notice inspections and what is known as "continuous portal monitoring," a system of resident inspectors, consisting of representatives from the other country, who continually verify adherence to the terms of the Treaty at a missile factory in each country. In the United States, the site where Soviet inspectors will monitor U.S. compliance is the Hercules Plant Number 1, which produces Pershings, in Magna, Utah. In the Soviet Union, American verifiers will be situated at the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, where the SS-20 is built, in the Udmurt Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic.

In addition, this protocol provides for elimination and "close-out" inspections, and requires each side to facilitate the other side's collection of verification intelligence through national technical means.

The final document is the elimination protocol, which essentially describes the permissible manner and methods for the disposal of the missiles, launchers, and support equipment associated with the INF pact.

The INF Treaty has unlimited duration. Either party may withdraw from the agreement when it considers its interests are no longer served by compliance. A six-month notice of intention to withdraw is required. The parties may also amend the treaty.

Previous AFL-CIO Policy

The INF Treaty is consistent with previous AFL-CIO policy on intermediate-range nuclear forces, verification, and arms control.

The first interim report of the Defense Committee, published in February 1983, made note of the INF negotiations then going on between the United States and the Soviet Union and welcomed the direction they were taking. To quote that report:

> As for the negotiations now underway on intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Europe, the Committee believes that the Administration's call for the "zero option" -- the elimination of all such weapons -- is a goal that merits support.

That further negotiations led to the elimination of not only LRINF but also SRINF -- that is, to the "double zero option" -- is a logical and welcome extension of the AFL-CIO's policy.

The 1985 AFL-CIO Convention also laid down a policy on arms control and verification which finds satisfaction in the INF Treaty. The Convention endorsed "the objective of a balanced *reduction* of nuclear arms within a system of verification guaranteeing collective security." [Emphasis added.] The Treaty has, for the first time, actually reduced the numbers of weapons to a balanced level. But the INF Treaty goes further by making that level zero and by requiring asymmetrical reductions to achieve that level.

Finally, the INF agreement reflects the view set forth in the AFL-CIO Executive Council's statement on the Strategic Defense Initiative (August 19, 1987), that "negotiated arms limitation agreements are essential to the maintenance of world peace." This treaty is a step in the right direction, but, in the Committee's view, only a step.

The Hearings on the INF Treaty

To assist in its consideration of the question of intermediate-range nuclear forces and of the treaty governing their elimination, the Committee held four hearings during two days in January 1988, interviewing five prominent experts. The views they presented to the Committee included those of the Administration, an opponent of the Treaty, a foreign policy advisor to the Senate Armed Service Committee, and representatives of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy.

The experts who appeared included an official responsible for negotiating the INF Treaty, another responsible for U.S. national security policy formulation, and two former NATO commanders.

In order of appearance, the Committee met with:

Ambassador Max M. Kampelman, Head, United States Delegation to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

General Bernard W. Rogers (USA, Ret.), former Supreme Allied Commander of Europe

Gregory Craig, National Security Advisor, Office of Senator Edward M. Kennedy

Dr. Fred Ikle, Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy, and Co-Chairman, the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy

General Andrew J. Goodpaster (USA, Ret.), Chairman, the Atlantic Council of the United States, and Member, the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, and former Supreme Allied Commander of Europe

The Committee is grateful for their valuable contributions to its work and understanding of the complex political, military, and strategic implications of the INF Treaty. The Committee also drew on numerous articles and analyses that appeared in the media during the course of the negotiations and signing of the INF pact.

Throughout these hearings, the Committee sought, first, to determine whether the INF Treaty merits AFL-CIO support and serves the interests of American national security; and, second, to identify related issues of American and allied defense policy that now require the full attention of the political and military authorities of the democracies. That is, what will happen to the defense equation, assuming the INF Treaty is ratified and the INF weapons are eliminated?

(The basis of this assumption lay in the Committee's view that, once the Soviet Union and the United States agreed to the elimination of the INF weapons, there was little reason to believe that the NATO countries where these weapons have been located, often against vocal domestic opposition, would insist that they remain.)

As the Committee states in its "Conclusions," the treaty is clearly in the national interest of the United States.

At the same time, we recognize that the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear forces from Europe and Asia has led to certain serious implications for the security of the NATO countries and other American allies, implications that must be addressed as the superpowers proceed with negotiations on conventional and strategic arms limitations.

Perhaps the most important contribution the INF Treaty makes to American national security lies in the new standards it sets in the arms control process. Each speaker interviewed by the Committee, regardless of his opinion of the treaty, identified the two principles cited earlier as significant departures from previous arms control agreements and holds the view that they will be instrumental in the START and conventional force talks. That is.

* any future arms control agreement will have to rely on asymmetrical reductions in order to restore conventional and strategic balances between the two superpowers; and

* intrusive verification procedures will also be necessary to improve the chances of success of future arms control agreements. The United States has learned through hard experience, both with the Soviets and, before them, with Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, that an arms control agreement that cannot be verified is no arms control agreement at all.

Senate approval of the INF Treaty would preserve these two principles as important precedents for other negotiations. Rejection of the Treaty will give the Soviets the opportunity to recant these principles, which would be a major setback for future pacts.

A second contribution of the treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces to the national interests of the United States is that, in some important ways, it strengthens the military security of the Alliance.

Soviet superiority in the INF class of weapons is well-established; indeed, it was virtually acknowledged by Mr. Gorbachev when he publicly acceded to the need for "disproportionate" reductions. The Treaty would abolish that Soviet edge, and thus maintain NATO's strategy of flexible response, by preserving NATO's capability of delivering nuclear charges to Soviet territory, employing either allied American air power or with the independent nuclear forces of France and Great Britain. The elimination of Soviet INF weapons complicates the Warsaw Pact's ability to strike at NATO ports and airfields, which are important targets because of their wartime role as staging points for incoming American men and materiel.

The elimination of the Soviet INF further enhances Western military security by denying the Warsaw Pact strategic offensive options which they have possessed for three decades, thus further complicating Soviet attack planning -- contributing to increased international stability.

The INF Treaty also serves U.S. national interests by doing away with an entire class of nuclear weapons without undermining the credibility of NATO's nuclear deterrent. The elimination of these missiles, though they constitute roughly 3% of the nuclear arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States, contributes to a more balanced nuclear equation and to increased strategic stability between the superpowers. The elimination of these missiles also lessens the possibility of a conventional confrontation escalating into a full-fledged nuclear war.

The Committee recognizes that the INF Treaty does not cure all the woes of the Western alliance, nor is it an ideal arms control agreement. The Committee heard impressive testimony reflecting serious doubts about the effects the elimination of these forces could have on the strategy of deterrence. But taking this testimony into account and weighing it against the positive effects of the Treaty, the Committee has concluded that the Alliance will continue to have the capacity to deter a Warsaw Pact attack through the use of remaining tactical nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and conventional forces, all backed by the American strategic nuclear guarantee.

Finally, the political success of the entire INF story -- from the initial deployments to the signing of the Treaty -- represents a significant gain for the United States and the NATO alliance. The unity displayed by the allies during the long period leading to the conclusion of this agreement has strengthened the alliance politically and demonstrated to the Soviets the depth of NATO resolve. As trade unionists, we are well aware of the truth of the maxim, "In unity is strength."

The Committee's Concerns: What Lies Ahead?

While the INF Treaty merits the support of the AFL-CIO and the approval of the U.S. Senate, its effects cannot be viewed in isolation from the other elements of the Alliance's military security -- i.e., the strategic and conventional force balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, both of which are the subjects of negotiations now underway. Indeed, the ultimate security value of the INF agreement may well be determined by the outcome of those negotiations. That is, if the INF agreement leads to further progress in the reduction of nuclear arms, the need to redress the conventional force imbalance in Europe becomes more urgent. Unless agreement can be reached on conventional force reductions, achieved through disproportionate cuts, NATO will be forced to build up to Soviet levels, at considerable cost.

After INF: The Nuclear Balance

Before the signing of the INF Treaty, the American nuclear forces consisted of three elements -- short-range, or battlefield, nuclear weapons; intermediate-range nuclear weapons, such as the Pershings, GLCMs, and those delivered by aircraft; and long-range weapons, such as intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The INF Treaty has done away with the most potent and, from the Soviet point of view, most threatening weapons of the second type, leaving aircraft-borne bombs as the main weapon of this class.

Since the deterrence of war should continue to be the main objective of American defense policy, the Committee was compelled to consider the impact of the INF Treaty on the Alliance's deterrent capability. We conclude that, while the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe will not significantly undermine the strategy of deterrence, it will leave some gaps in the implementation of the "flexible response" doctrine.

There are limitations on the deterrent capabilities of both long- and short-range nuclear weapons in the European theater. Short-range, or battlefield, nuclear weapons, cannot strike Soviet territory and therefore pose no threat to the Soviet Union. Their effects would be confined to Europe itself, a prospect that understandably frightens many Europeans. Long-range, or strategic, nuclear weapons are poor theater weapons because Soviet missile trackers cannot distinguish one fired in a theater role from one fired in an attack on the Soviet Union. This makes long-range weapons dangerous to rely on as theater weapons.

With the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear forces, the F-111 remains the only useful step on the flexible response ladder between the use of short-range and strategic nuclear weapons. And unlike the Pershings, the F-111 in not invulnerable to defensive countermeasures; nor are they as fast or as accurate. The Committee doubts the wisdom of relying on such aircraft as its primary theater nuclear deterrent.

The resulting gap in our theater deterrence capability becomes more critical in light of the opinion expressed by virtually all of the experts who appeared before the Committee to the effect that NATO's conventional forces could probably not survive a Warsaw Pact attack for more than ten days. We also learned that the NATO Commander is required to request permission to use nuclear weapons -- that is, to start the escalatory chain of flexible responses -- no later than 14 days after a Warsaw Pact invasion begins.

The Committee is concerned about the elimination of any intermediary steps between the initiation of conventional warfare and the resort to strategic nuclear exchanges. Various proposals have been made to redress this problem by restructuring our nuclear forces. In the months ahead, the Committee will review these proposals as it turns its attention to the negotiations on strategic arms reductions.

An area of concern for the Committee is the conventional balance between the NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. There is a substantial disparity between the Warsaw Pact and NATO in terms of numbers. The situation has not changed appreciably from 1983, when the Committee stated that "Soviet superiority in conventional forces is incontestable." Yet, one cannot measure these forces simply by referring to the ratios of tanks-to-tanks, aircraft-to-aircraft, and men-to-men. Technological superiority is an important factor which is not measured in "bean counts" of men and materiel.

Nevertheless, conventional forces remain of concern to the Committee for several reasons.

As of now, the West enjoys a comfortable technological lead in many conventional weapons, but there is no guarantee that this will always be the case.

Recent Soviet successes in space technology compare brilliantly with the numerous failures and disappointments of the American space program. They also indicate that the Soviet Union can overtake the United States in certain types of technology which once were generally recognized as areas of American dominance. Were the Soviets ever to surpass the NATO allies in terms of conventional defense technology, NATO's numerical inferiority could become a serious security problem. It is imperative, therefore, that the West maintain its lead in the race to develop new technology.

While it may be true that the West's technological superiority makes the East's numerical superiority of less military importance, the massive numbers of Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops wield political strength, whose purpose it is to intimidate Western Europe and to separate it from the United States.

The political advantage the Soviets possess should not be underestimated. The Soviets are masters of exploiting political situations to their advantage. If given the opportunity, Mr. Gorbachev is no less likely to make full use of the political value of his country's military machine than his predecessors were.

The preferred answer to Warsaw Pact conventional superiority is not a build-up of Western forces, which may well be politically and economically impossible, but a build-down of forces on both sides to equivalent levels. This can be achieved only through asymmetrical reductions, as both sides have agreed.

Mindful of the fact that the NATO Commander is required to request permission to use nuclear weapons within two weeks of battle, the Committee is deeply concerned that NATO's inability to mobilize quickly and sustain a conventional defense could result in an early nuclear exchange.

Even if recent trends towards overcoming these insufficiencies continue, the lack of adequate American sea- and airlift capability could paralyze any mobilization effort.

The United States and its allies spend hundreds of billions of dollars annually on defense equipment and personnel, but virtually nothing on the air- and sealift needed to transport this equipment and personnel. Part of the solution lies in the revitalization of the maritime industry and the merchant marine, and in the creation of supersonic forms of military air transport.

Conclusions

In summary, the AFL-CIO Committee on Defense recommends that the AFL-CIO support Senate approval of the INF Treaty. We believe it is a good treaty, although not perfect, and that it serves the national security interests of the United States.

Those interests are not guaranteed by the Treaty alone; it must be supplemented by agreements leading to balanced and verifiable reductions in conventional and strategic forces. Such reductions will also require the United States and its allies to develop appropriate new defense policies and to restructure their remaining forces accordingly.

The Committee attaches considerable significance to the inclusion in the INF Treaty of the principles of asymmetrical reductions and intrusive verification. These principles can open the door to real progress toward future strategic and conventional arms control agreements.

The Committee respects the views of those who have expressed reservations about the INF Treaty and its impact on the defense of Europe, which is most directly affected by the weapons eliminated. We believe that many of their concerns can and must be addressed in future arms negotiations and adjustments in Allied defense planning. We do not, however, concur with the view that the Treaty represents a serious setback for the doctrine of deterrence.

Meanwhile, the Committee recommends that the AFL-CIO reaffirm its strong support for the American commitment to NATO and the defense of Europe. At stake is the protection not merely of geographical territories but of democratic values and institutions, including the free trade union movement itself.

The recently concluded treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear forces serves the security interests of the United States and its NATO allies and merits the consent of the Senate.

In several important respects, the Treaty conforms with arms control proposals advanced by the AFL-CIO over the past five years. Chief among these is that, unlike past agreements that set ceilings on increases in the number of weapons allowed each side, this treaty reduces the numbers of nuclear weapons and does so by eliminating an entire class of them.

The AFL-CIO concurs with the findings of its Committee on Defense that these reductions will not adversely affect NATO's deterrence capability.

Although the Treaty deals with only three percent of the nuclear arsenals on both sides, it establishes two precedent-setting principles that may open the way toward real progress in both strategic and conventional arms control.

The first is that asymmetrical or disproportionate reductions are required to achieve equivalent numbers of weapons on each side -- the number in the case of intermediate-range nuclear forces being zero.

The second is that compliance with the Treaty requires intrusive verification, i.e., on-site inspection. The INF Treaty marks the first time the Soviets have agreed to these principles, which the AFL-CIO has called for in the past.

The AFL-CIO believes that the INF Treaty would never have been achieved were it not for the political unity and determination demonstrated by the NATO alliance, despite a massive Soviet propaganda campaign aimed at driving a wedge between the United States and Europe. Had the Alliance not proceeded with the deployment of cruise and Pershing missiles, in the face of Soviet deployments of the SS-20s, there would have been little inducement for the Soviets to return to the bargaining table.

In urging Senate approval of the INF Treaty, the AFL-CIO is under no illusion that this agreement, in isolation, will remove the impetus to the arms race or achieve dramatic reductions in military spending.

The elimination of INF weapons necessarily focuses attention on the conventional force imbalance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, an imbalance Gorbachev has implicitly acknowledged by publicly agreeing to the principle of "disproportionate" cuts in conventional forces. There is now an urgent need to reach agreement on achieving balanced conventional force reductions, so that NATO will not be compelled to build up its conventional forces.

The AFL-CIO notes the view of many defense experts that, in a post-INF era, the maintenance of a credible deterrence against a Warsaw Pact attack on Western Europe will require a restructuring of U.S. strategic nuclear forces. As the strategic arms limitations talks proceed, the Executive Council calls upon the Defense Committee to study what, if any, such restructuring might be required within the framework of the AFL-CIO's repeated calls for radical, balanced, and verifiable reductions in strategic nuclear warheads.

The goal of the AFL-CIO continues to be the maintenance of a credible deterrence to war at ever lower levels of nuclear armaments. It is not necessary to believe that the erosion of that deterrence would provoke an immediate Soviet invasion of Europe to appreciate that it would significantly enhance the Soviets' political leverage and powers of intimidation in the region, to the detriment of American security.

The INF Treaty is a step toward our goal -- but only a step. Its ultimate value will be determined by whether comparable progress can be made in the reduction of conventional and strategic forces.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REV. WILLIAM SLOANE COFFIN

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for the opportunity to testify this morning before the Senate Foreign Relations Commitee on behalf of the approximately 175,000 members of SANE/FREEZE and its over 1,000 local affiliated groups. Those members and local groups also represent, in turn, the millions of citizens who constitute "the American peace movement."

It is rare that a spokesperson for the peace movement has such an opportunity - though I trust in the coming years we will have many more treaties and many more opportunities to testify - to give voice to the millions of Americans who, I think it is important to recall, made the INF Treaty possible. It is currently fashionable to speak of glasnost - a term roughly translated as "openness." But glasnost comes from the old Russian root "glas" or "voice" and literally means "voiceness" or giving voice. And so I propose some American glasnost.

I would like to report briefly on why our organization agreed at its National Congress in November to make ratification of the INF Treaty our first priority in 1988. Then I would also like to underscore the role of American citizens in helping to bring this Treaty about, discuss what lessons we should draw from that experience, and finally, look at where we in the peace movement believe this nation should head after the INF Treaty is ratified.

Whose Treaty Is It Anyway?

In recent months we have read, first before the Summit in December, that Howard Baker considered the INF Treaty "the President's Treaty." Then on January 25, Secretary of State George Shultz testified before this committee and said, "The INF experience offers important lessons on how to proceed as we confront other challenges to our security." As part of his lesson, the Secretary also said, "We succeeded because we stayed the course... This took considerable political courage. In

Europe, the so-called peace movement took to the streets to try to block US deployments. In the United States, the 'freeze movement,' in effect, wanted to reward the Soviets for deploying first, by letting them keep their advantage and removing any incentive to negotiate reductions."

As someone who spent a number of years in the CIA opposing Josef Stalin during the height of the Cold War, I think we should be wary of any Soviet-style rewriting of history. And one of the worst possible outcomes of the INF Treaty process, I believe, would be to encourage any impression for future historians or the public that the world's first reduction in nuclear weapons was simply handed to us by Ronald Reagan as if it were an act of God. Or perhaps I should say - since it is unclear in the current electoral season whether being connected to God or to secular humanism is the greater sin - that we must remember that in a democratic society, it is the will of the people that ultimately steers the ship of state. That is why these hearings in the Senate, like those deliberations on nominations to the Supreme Court, are so important and so welcome. The constitutional role of the Senate to advise and consent should remind us all that ultimately it is the American people who have the final say.

How then did it come to be that this august body is today considering a Treaty to eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons through an INF agreement with the Soviet Union that is mutual, verifiable, and a first step in reversing the arms race?

If these phrases seem familiar, it is, of course, because to a large degree they echo the important elements of the initial Nuclear Freeze proposal that ignited a prairie fire of concern over nuclear weapons in this decade. It was the heat from that prairie fire, it is clear, that melted Mr. Reagan's Cold War rhetoric, warmed his anti-Soviet heart, and finally, attracted him to cozy fireside chats with Marxist-Leninist Mikhail Gorbachev in Iceland's Hofdi House and in the White House.

By 1978, when I formed a national disarmament program at the Riverside Church in New York, it was already clear, as it was to my colleagues at SANE and other peace groups, that new nuclear weapons technologies - advances in inertial guidance systems, warhead miniaturization, and the like - were making a counter-force or first-strike strategy an option for both US and Soviet planners. It was also clear that nuclear deterrence and mutual assured destruction or MAD - symbolized by ICBM's in invulnerable silos and second-strike SLBM's in untrackable submarines - were rapidly being undercut. Plans for the highly accurate MX and Trident D-5 missiles, for cruise missiles of all kinds, as well as discussions of weapons for use in so-called "limited nuclear wars" such as the neutron bomb and improved theater nuclear weapons in Europe revealed what was formalized in President Carter's PD 59: that the US was preparing to fight a nuclear war.

With massive protests against the neutron bomb in Europe, followed by the first UN Special Session on Disarmament in 1978 in New York and a demonstration there of 20,000 Americans calling for nuclear disarmament, the modern nuclear disarmament movement was born again. Or perhaps I should say - found new purpose and direction. At the same time, considerable opposition to the SALT process and then to the SALT II Treaty, which in our view merely ratified a qualitative rather than a quantitative nuclear arms race, gave rise to attempts on the part of the peace movement to find a new strategy. We set out to actively stop and reverse the arms race, not merely control it.

These efforts culminated in a paper by Randall Forsberg called "A Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race," which, by 1981, became the basis for the Nuclear Freeze Campaign. The aim of the Nuclear Freeze, we should now recall, was to reach the broadest possible spectrum of Americans with a pragmatic and simple program. That simple, but profound idea was to halt the testing, production and deployment of new nuclear weapons on a mutual and verifiable basis.

The very same Administration that now touts its careful verification procedures for intermediate-sized missiles, both deployed and undeployed, that explains how portals at nuclear weapons facilities in both the United States and the Soviet Union will be monitored, in 1981 ridiculed the Nuclear Freeze and called it a KGB plot. Either Mr. Reagan has now become, as Howard Phillips put it so colorfully, a "useful idiot for the Kremlin," or the Nuclear Freeze movement - which provided expert testimony showing that verification was possible, from William Colby and the late Pete Scoville of the CIA among many others -- was prophetic indeed.

Again, if Mr. Reagan is to be reborn as a disarmer during the current INF Treaty debate, he must first recall and reject his earlier pro-nuclear stances. It was the Reagan Administration, after all, that opposed arms control of any sort.

It was Ronald Reagan who roughly quadrupled spending on bizarre civil defense plans and allowed T.K. Jones to pronounce citizens safe from nuclear war with "a shovel" and some dirt. Only citizen outrage and ridicule, and then Congressional action, curtailed this madness.

It was Ronald Reagan who persisted with a campaign to get MX missiles with first-strike warheads. He argued that US ICBM's were in a "window of vulnerability" and placed the MX in fixed silos. Again, only a massive grassroots campaign to Stop the MX Missile and, finally, Congressional action, put a cap on the MX at 50 missiles. Again, it was Mr. Reagan who doubled spending for strategic nuclear weapons, bringing back the B-1 Bomber that had been killed during the Carter years, and adding about 5,000 new nuclear warheads to the US arsenal. It was Mr. Reagan who resisted the finding of a nuclear winter discovered by Carl Sagan and others. Again, only after massive public outcry and mounting scientific evidence did the Administration permit the Defense Department to proceed with its own studies of nuclear winter.

Mr. Reagan is also the first US president not to seek a Comprehensive Test Ban, despite an 18-month Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing and clear American public opinion in favor of such a move. Mr. Reagan wanted increased plutonium production in the US, ignoring hazards at nuclear weapons production sites, again until public outcry was irresistible. Again, it was Mr. Reagan who pushed for a nuclear pumped X-ray laser as part of his Star Wars plan, even while claiming the program was non-nuclear. Again, he ignored massive public and scientific protests that the X-ray laser idea was, frankly, crazy.

While the Reagan Administration was doing all this, it was the peace movement that actually first suggested the double zero option in Europe. Rev. Bruce Kent of CND (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) in Great Britain, urged the removal of Soviet SS-20's as well as the elimination of plans for NATO's GLCM's and Pershing II missiles. Like the original Freeze proposal itself, which called for reductions in both Soviet and American weapons, the European and US protests of the early 1980's urged the removal of both cruise and Pershing in the West and SS-20's in the East. Our program then and now was the same -- the elimination of all nuclear weapons in Europe, both East and West. In fact, the double zero and the idea of a nuclear free Europe were central to the massive protests in Europe in 1981-1983, when, at regular intervals, 250,000 to 400,000 people would demonstrate in London, Amsterdam, Bonn, Madrid, and elsewhere. The Reagan Administration and too many of its followers in the media regularly characterized the European movement as tools of the Soviet Union attempting to undermine NATO unity. In fact, the movement carefully maintained dialogue with the Soviet Union and often criticized it while calling for mutual restraint in the arms race.

We should remember, too, that the Administration consistently argued that the Soviet Union was impervious to world opinion, that public demonstrations only put pressure on the West and that nothing could ever change inside the Soviet Union. These bromides used to forestall disarmament opinion were just plain wrong.

The Reagan Administration also argued that only a full-scale military build-up would be sufficient to scare the Soviet Union into bargaining. But thanks to American public opinion, to organizing on the part of the peace movement, and finally, to action on the part of the Congress, the MX Missile was capped at 50. The SALT II and ABM treaties were reaffirmed, ASAT's restricted, calls for a Comprehensive Test Ban heard, funds for Star Wars substantially cut, and military spending curtailed.

In short, it is precisely when the United States has shown signs of relenting from an ever-escalating arms race, when a Democratic-controlled Congress has begun to constrain the Executive, and when public opinion has shifted decisively in favor of peace, that the Soviet Union has come forth with dramatic concessions.

You should recall, too, that Mr. Reagan entered START talks only after the massive public demonstrations that I've described, including one of nearly a million people in New York City - one which he refused to recognize - and that his Star Wars program was designed after the nuclear freeze won referenda in 44 state and local elections in 1982. SDI was in fact designed to a large degree with political objectives in mind. The goal? To seize the moral high ground from the peace movement, as Greg Fossedal, then of the Heritage Foundation, put it in a memo. His view was echoed by Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, who wrote to Secretary Weinberger on March 31, 1982, "In light of the current country-wide press for 'nuclear freeze,' I want to bring to your attention the value of the High Frontier concept as an effective counter." After the 1984 elections in which Mr. Mondale was buried, but in which arms control representatives made gains in the House, the Administration then liked to pretend that the peace movement had simply disappeared. But it just isn't true.

In November 1985 SANE and the Nuclear Freeze Campaign, along with other groups, collected nearly 1.2 million signatures on petitions for a Nuclear Test Ban and delivered them to Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev at the Summit in Geneva. Mr. Reagan refused to see us. By October 1986, SANE/FREEZE again went to the Summit in Reykjavik, Iceland, and delivered 200 state, county, and municipal resolutions in favor of a Test Ban to Central Committee Secretary Anatoly Dobrynin. Again the Reagan Administration refused to see us. Yet, these resolutions were the result of a grassroots effort similar to the Freeze, all across the country. In fact, when the late Mayor Harold Washington was reelected in 1986 in the city of Chicago, 76% of Chicago's voters also came out and supported a Nuclear Test Ban. These measures were then followed by several hundred thousand additional petitions delivered to the White House at Christmas of 1986. Finally, at the recent Summit here in Washington, hundreds of thousands of letters from children in the United States and around the world were presented at the Soviet Embassy in Washington. The White House, sadly and predictably, refused to allow even a group of children armed with long-stem roses to come in and talk.

Now, after Nuclear Freeze referenda and resolutions, initiatives and ballots, test ban campaigns, and victories for peace-oriented candidates in the 1986 elections, Mr. Reagan is ready to make peace. And he wants to claim credit for it. Well, I'm a believer in redemption and I'm ready to welcome Mr. Reagan as a peacemaker and to support the INF Treaty which he has negotiated. But, I am not ready to call it Mr. Reagan's Treaty, nor am I going to allow Secretary of State George Shultz or anyone else to rewrite the history of how and why these measures for peace came to be in a democratic society.

These lessons about the role of American citizens and the organized peace movement are crucial, I believe, as we look to the future. I must ask the distinguished members of this panel to consider whether ideas and proposals being put forth by the peace movement today may not be the INF Treaties of tomorrow? Surely the current treaty would have come much sooner and more simply had all of us challenged this Administration sooner and more strongly on its whimsical ideas of fighting and winning a nuclear war, its refusal to seriously negotiate with the Soviet Union on strategic reduction, and its attempts to discredit, disparage, and vilify American citizens organized for peace. The INF Treaty, I believe, is not the result of our massive military buildup, now being slowed and reversed by fiscal realities and citizen pressure. Nor is it the result of steely resolve or a willingness to hang tough. It is instead the result of the work and the dedication of millions of American citizens over these past seven years who have made peace an acceptable idea, even to Ronald Reagan.

SANE/FREEZE Supports INF Treaty

Why then does SANE/FREEZE support the INF Treaty negotiated by President Reagan and what do we propose come after it? First to turn to the Treaty itself. We welcome the INF agreement but we recognize that it does nothing to halt testing, to stop Star Wars, or to restrain those corporations and contractors who profit from the deluge of weapons that pour from America's arsenals.

Nevertheless, I believe that ratification of the INF Treaty is important for two main reasons: First, to scuttle even so small a step for peace with restricting amendments or outright rejection would plunge the majority of peace-loving Americans into despair or cynicism, of which we have plenty in this day of the 30-second TV spot. Rejection would further jeopardize the reforms and constructive proposals coming from General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union. That would leave us not only with a spiraling arms race, but with a more determined enemy and with little hope that the arms race could ever be ended. If Ronald

Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev can not safely remove less than 4% of the world's nuclear weapons, who then can?

Second: I believe the INF Treaty deserves ratification simply on its merits. The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty signed by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev on December 8, 1987, is a significant step toward reversing the nuclear arms race. For the first time, the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to eliminate a whole category of nuclear delivery systems -- ground-based missiles with ranges between 300 and 3,400 miles.

Under the Treaty, the two countries will destroy 2,695 missiles and remove 2,096 nuclear warheads. The Soviets will remove four warheads for every one removed by the United States.

While these numbers are small, the weapons to be destroyed are those that were among the primary concerns of the disarmament movement. They also meet the original Freeze idea of mutuality. The West has fully achieved its primary objective in the INF negotiations -- the complete elimination of the triple warhead Soviet SS-20 missile aimed at Europe. The Soviets, on the other hand, have obtained the withdrawal of the US Pershing II missiles, which were capable of decapitating first strikes on Soviet command and control facilities within only a few minutes.

At SANE/FREEZE we are especially pleased with the incorporation of another Freeze idea, the verification arrangements established by the INF Treaty. Both countries have agreed to open up missile production plants, bases, and support facilities to a wide range of on-site inspections to verify compliance with the Treaty. This represents a reversal of the long-standing Soviet opposition to inspections, and sets an important precedent for verification of more far-reaching future nuclear reductions.

Our colleagues at the Union of Concerned Scientists in their excellent report The INF Treaty and the Future of Western Security also assure us that the unprecedented verification provisions of the INF Treaty will allow for the monitoring of mutual compliance with very high confidence. To supplement highly accurate verification by satellite imagery and other "national technical means," the Treaty establishes totally new procedures for on-site inspections of missile production plants, operating bases, and support facilities. Some 84 locations are designated for inspection on the Soviet side, including seven in Eastern Europe; for the US, there are 34 locations, including 12 in Western Europe.

Each side will carry out several different types of inspections, including, among others, continuous perimeter monitoring over a 13-year period of one production plant in each country, to be carried out by teams in residence near the site. The US plant is the Hercules Aerospace Company's facility in Magna, Utah, which manufactured motors for the Pershing II. The Soviet plant is the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, an SS-20 production facility.

We heartily approve of these measures, not only on technical grounds, but on moral and psychological ones as well. The dehumanizing rhetoric of "evil empire" will clearly have to give way to seeing Soviets working at American nuclear sites as symbolic of what Robert Jay Lifton has called "our shared fate" in the nuclear age. Similarly, who could have imagined the cooperation symbolized by an additional verification measure that requires the Soviets to facilitate surveillance of the long-range SS-25 mobile missile, not covered by the Treaty. For up to three years, the USSR will be required, at US request, to open the roofs covering SS-25 missile launchers and to keep them open for a 12-hour period. This will allow US satellites to confirm that no banned SS-20's are being concealed at SS-25 sites.

Thus, the Treaty's provisions for mutual inspection and verification, so reminiscent of the call for a Nuclear Freeze, clearly establish the groundwork for further reductions in nuclear weapons while maintaining the security of both superpowers. Both sides can claim significant achievements from the INF Treaty, the United States and NATO in achieving its original goal of removing Soviet SS-20's from Europe, and the Soviet Union in turn by removing a potentially first strike missile, the Pershing II.

Thus, SANE/FREEZE supports the INF Treaty and applauds the American people and President Reagan who have made it possible. I urge the distinguished members of the Senate, then, to ratify the INF Treaty unanimously and call upon Senator Jesse Helms in particular to join in this historic peace effort. If the Reverend William Sloane Coffin can unabashedly support Ronald Reagan on this issue so vital to our nation's security, surely Sen. Helms can bring himself to stand with the president. To do otherwise flies in the face of American public opinion, in the face of common sense, and flouts America's security interests. It seems to me that after all the testimony you have heard in favor of the Treaty from the Administration itself, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from distinguished military experts, and from so many others on how the INF Treaty will advance America's interests, it is, dare I say, for a patriot like Sen. Helms, practically un-American to reject this historic effort.

INF: A First Step, Not A Side Step

If then the INF Treaty by itself is a small but vital step for the US and for the Soviet Union, we must make sure that it is indeed a first step and not a side step. If the INF Treaty is not quickly followed by deep cuts in strategic nuclear weapons, by reductions and reconfiguration of conventional forces in Europe, and ultimately by nuclear disarmament based upon the principle of common security for all nations, we will have missed perhaps our last best hope to create a world in which our grandchildren may actually wish to live.

So we must go further and talk finally of nuclear disarmament. The INF Treaty will not end the continued erosion of nuclear deterrence by highly accurate, ever more destructive and first-strike oriented nuclear weapons. Without an end to that deadly first-strike competition that currently goes under the guise of modernization and enhanced deterrence, the INF Treaty will not reduce the potential hazard of a nuclear winter, that planetary devastation following even limited nuclear exchanges calculated by Doctor Carl Sagan and others -- calculations so long resisted by the Reagan Administration. Nor will the INF Treaty eliminate the threat of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war, significantly affect the nearly one trillion dollars worldwide spent annually on weapons (mainly by the US and Soviet Union) that could be better spent on building our own societies and for the development of the rest of the world where, according to Ruth Leger Sivard, over half the children do not even have water that is safe to drink.

I mentioned that a Nuclear Freeze, when first proposed, was considered naive, unrealistic, utopian, even dangerous. Similarly, adequate verification was considered difficult, even impossible, or it was assumed that the Russians would resist it. That was until American citizens, through the Natural Resources Defense Council, negotiated on their own to place seismic monitoring equipment at Soviet nuclear test sites. And calls for 50% cuts in nuclear weapons by George Kennan, for which he won the Einstein Peace Award, were ignored or ridiculed until world opinion helped Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev go George Kennan one better in Reykjavik.

Now as some cuts seem likely, we hear constant entreaties and calls from experts like Henry Kissinger -- who seems to favor only those peace initiatives which he has personally sponsored -- that we must resist "arms control fever." We must avoid the denuclearization of Europe, we must build up our conventional forces, and we must maintain deterrence by modernizing our nuclear forces while proceeding with Star Wars. Although it may seem presumptuous of me to challenge someone who has won the Nobel Peace Prize, I do want to emphasize that on this issue, Dr. Kissinger and others - like Richard Perle and Kenneth Adelman, who seem to wish to perpetuate the dark side of the Reagan soul before its conversion to peace -- are simply wrong. Their thinking has steadfastly ignored Albert Einstein's prophetic plea for change.

Put simply and clearly, I think the outmoded World War II style thinking that Albert Einstein had in mind, with its offensive capabilities, first and second strikes, and talk of prevailing is, in the nuclear age, absurd. It reminds me of that famous gentleman who every day, ritually, at high noon, tore up hundreds and hundreds of tiny scraps of paper and then scattered them to the winds in front of his house to keep it from being trampled to the ground by rampaging elephants. When asked by a neighbor how he knew if his paper-tearing ritual was effective, he glanced about himself excitedly, almost feverishly, and replied, "Well, you don't see any elephants around here, do you?"

What may make calls for nuclear disarmament seem utopian and the war planners occasionally seem sane is, I think, the tremendous distance we have yet to go to get from the world we live in to the world that we want to live in. But if we lose the vision of a world without nuclear weapons, a world where diplomacy is preferred over destruction, we shall surely perish. But how do we get there?

Nuclear disarmament is a reasonable and prudent course, it seems to me, as it seems to millions of American and Soviet citizens and to most nations in the world who have called a third UN Special Session on Disarmament and Development for this June.

If we accept disarmament as a goal, the steps to getting there are relatively obvious, and they follow from an historical and realistic analysis of our world, not worst-case game theory. For example, is the Soviet Union really likely to attack Western

Europe with or without nuclear weapons? The current balance of conventional forces in central Europe alone, taken alongside any sensible analysis of Soviet economic and political interests, would quickly reveal the absurdity of a Soviet-launched World War III ground war. According to an analysis of figures from the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, Military Balance 1987-1988, by our friends at the Union of Concerned Scientists, there are 33 Warsaw Pact divisions and 30 1/3 NATO divisions readily available for combat (within 4-5 days of mobilization) along the central European front. Counting Soviet forces east of the Ural mountains, or their reserves, or divisions that are not combat ready, serves no purpose. Even if Mikhail Gorbachev were prepared to launch a surprise blitzkrieg attack on Paris with D-Day the evening before a May Summit, the two sides would be evenly matched in ground forces. Further, the US and NATO have the advantage in air power, nuclear weapons, and surely in unity, cohesion, and morale over Warsaw Pact forces. On the much heralded matter of tanks, the Warsaw Pact, the presumed attacker, has an advantage of only 18,000 to 12,700 NATO tanks.

For those of us who served in WW II or who are familiar with classic military strategy, attacking a well-armed, politically coherent foe with only equal forces would indeed be suicidal. In fact, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs, and practically every serious military thinker I know of considers a conventional Soviet attack the remotest of possibilities. But how can we be sure if the Soviets maintain an offensively structured, blitzkrieg-oriented military posture that they label defensive? That we feel threatened by Soviet forces no matter what Mr. Gorbachev proclaims his intentions to be does indeed get to the root of the problem.

Both our nuclear and our conventional war strategies maintain an offensive posture and then label it "defensive." Our nuclear first-strike capability, for example, assumes a potential bolt from the blue Soviet nuclear attack or a long drawn-out series of constantly escalating nuclear exchanges in which one side emerges a winner. Those are the rather preposterous foundations for our constant struggle to improve our nuclear weapons. If there is any lesson to be drawn from the past seven years and from the public concern that led us to an INF Treaty, it is that this is the stuff of madness. We must stop seeing every Soviet move as offensive and threatening while seeing our own steps as purely defensive. Further, we must begin to see the Soviet Union and its citizens for what they are: our fellow human beings.

At SANE/FREEZE, we aim to cut through the Gordian knot of offensive posturing, of enhancing deterrence, and of constantly looking only at the mote in the Soviet eye. At our November 1987 founding SANE/FREEZE National Congress in Cleveland, Ohio, over 1,000 citizens representing congressional districts from all across this nation voted not only to ratify INF, but also to stop nuclear testing, the engine of the arms race. In fact, on March 12, thousands of citizens, myself among them, will once again protest at the Nevada Nuclear Test Site - a tradition started in the 1950's by gentle Quakers - because we believe there is no such thing as a good nuclear weapon or a good nuclear test.

Our National Congress also decided to oppose the Trident D-5 missile because of its first-strike capabilities. We also oppose the Trident II D-5 program for additional reasons. It cost $3.5 billion in 1988 alone, and is projected to cost $25 billion between now and the year 2000 - making it the single most expensive weapon system in the entire military budget. Each D-5 missile also carries the destructive force of 1.4 million tons of TNT - 100 times the explosive force of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. And each Trident submarine will carry 24 of these missiles. That's enough fire power to destroy every major city in the Northern hemisphere. These are the kinds of calculations that American citizens are tired of.

And it is the potential first-strike usage of the Trident, along with its power, that puts it in a different category than previous submarine weapons systems. If it is never to be used, why then is the guidance system on the Trident II missile so sophisticated that it can make its warheads strike within 400 feet of a projected target? Such accuracy for so powerful a nuclear weapon is only necessary if its purpose is to destroy targets hardened to withstand nuclear blasts - missile silos. And targeting missile silos, not soft military targets or population centers, indicates that we plan, under certain circumstances, to hit Soviet silos while their missiles are still there. In short, a first strike.

Our National Congress went further and continues to oppose the Strategic Defense Initiative, or Star Wars, because any defensive system ultimately deployed alongside existing weapons like the MX or ones like the Trident D-5 can only add to an offensive scenario. And finally, our good citizens of the SANE/FREEZE Congress voted to continue to improve our relations with the Soviet Union and to explore new policies and initiatives such as the alternative defense policies outlined by Randall Forsberg of the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies -- the mother of the Nuclear Freeze.

We must work toward a realignment of US and Soviet forces in Europe and elsewhere that emphasizes actual military defense rather than offense, especially during that period in the coming years when we work to reduce both nuclear and conventional forces. In brief, it means that we must move away in NATO from things like FOFA, or follow-on forces attack -- an offensive strategy based on advanced aircraft attacks -- even as we expect the Soviets to move away from tank-led blitzkriegs. As an overall strategy, alternative defense has four main goals:

- Non-provocative conventional defense.
- Non-intervention.
- Denuclearization.
- Non-military approaches to security.

Such a framework of alternative defense policy, we at SANE/FREEZE believe, can help to bridge the gap between the current security needs of nations like the United States and the Soviet Union while working toward an arrangement of forces that reduces tensions, reduces the risk of war, and hence of nuclear holocaust. These interim measures, however, clearly point in the direction of nuclear disarmament and, ultimately, international cooperation.

Before the INF Treaty, such calls may have seemed hopelessly naive or utopian, but Mr. Chairman, I conclude as I began. When the Nuclear Freeze was first proposed seriously in 1981, it was derided as a Soviet plot, as naive, as utopian, as unworkable. Now we sit here, in large part thanks to millions of Americans concerned with peace, about to ratify an historic treaty that embodies much of the original Nuclear Freeze concept. The INF Treaty points the way, realistically, I believe, toward a disarmed world -- a world truly safe for our children and for all future generations.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS K. LONGSTRETH

Mr. Chairman and members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on behalf of the Federation of American Scientists*, I am pleased to be offered this opportunity to present a statement on the pending INF Treaty. I have been designated by the Federation to express our views on two issues related to the INF Treaty which we believe have received insufficient attention during these hearings: the problem of further modernization of theater nuclear forces in circumvention of the agreement and the technical feasibility of warhead dismantlement.

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* The Federation of American Scientists (FAS), founded in 1945 as the Federation of Atomic Scientists, is the oldest organization in the world devoted to ending the nuclear arms race. Democratically organized, FAS is currently composed of 5,000 natural and social scientists and engineers interested in problems of science and society. Our board of sponsors includes approximately 50 per cent of all American Nobel Prize winners.

I would first like to stress that the Federation of American Scientists strongly supports the immediate ratification of the INF Treaty. This committee has received testimony for several weeks now from a wide range of distinguished witnesses who have listed the treaty's merits in detail, and we would concur with the assessment of those witnesses.

As has repeatedly been noted, the INF Treaty will eliminate hundreds of Soviet missiles carrying thousands of nuclear warheads aimed at U.S. forces and our allies in Europe. It contains the most sweeping verification measures in the history of U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations. We would also note that the elimination of the Pershing II missile - which because of its high accuracy and short flight time presented a serious threat to Soviet command and control - will enhance crisis stability.

We believe that the objections that have been raised against the treaty thus far have been spurious. Some of these objections, for example the accusation that the Soviets have intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) deployed in Cuba, are absurd and dangerous.

However, two issues have arisen during the course of the hearings that the Federation believes have not been adequately addressed, and I would like to examine them more closely. They are: first, the modernization of NATO nuclear forces after withdrawal of INF missiles and; second, the technical feasibility of warhead dismantlement within an arms control treaty. Both of these issues are of real importance and relevance to future arms negotiations and agreements.

CIRCUMVENTING THE INF TREATY WITH NEW NUCLEAR WEAPONS

There has been considerable discussion during these hearings about the modernization of other tactical and theater nuclear weapons and delivery systems after the INF Treaty. Reagan Administration officials and military leaders have appeared before this committee and asserted that NATO must now undertake a massive, across-the-board build-up of new nuclear weapons in Europe in order to "compensate" for the removal of Pershing II and GLCMs under INF.

All sorts of reasons have been put forward for this new requirement: the need to follow through on the 1983 Montebello decision; the impending obsolescence of existing systems; and the alleged dramatic build-up in Soviet tactical nuclear systems are but a few that have been mentioned.

In order to implement this new build-up, the Reagan Administration is now discussing with our NATO allies within the High-Level Group (HLG) and other planning forums a number of programs. Modernization efforts now being undertaken or contemplated include:

* lifting the 925 ceiling on production of 155mm and 8 inch nuclear artillery shells (including possible renewed production of enhanced radiation [ER] weapons);

* developing a new longer-range, land-based nuclear missile to replace the Lance missile now deployed in several NATO countries;

* developing a new nuclear air-to-surface missile for deployment on U.S. and other NATO nuclear attack aircraft;

* the continued production and deployment of new air-delivered nuclear gravity bombs (B-61, etc.);

* the allocation of navy sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) to SACEUR;

* and the continued production and deployment of new anti-submarine warfare (ASW) nuclear bombs.

The United States and its NATO allies stand at a crossroads. The completion of the INF Treaty has allowed to us to look seriously at a gradual movement away from reliance on the threat of nuclear holocaust to deter war in Europe and toward a safer more stable Europe. Alternatively, we can continue down the path marked "business as usual," initiate yet another round in the nuclear arms race, and pretend that the INF Treaty never happened.

But the political climate within which this new round of the arms race would begin has changed dramatically as a result of the INF Treaty. This Administration is kidding itself by pretending that it will have an easy time of it continuing to spout rhetoric to American and European publics about "eliminating an entire class of nuclear weapons" if, instead, it tries to circumvent the INF Treaty by deploying an entirely new generation of nuclear weapons outside of the treaty's narrow constraints. The days are over when such nuclear programs could be carried through quietly. They now must pass the scrutiny of a newly sensitized and aroused public.

Each of the proposed modernization programs has shortcomings both politically and militarily.

Lifting the ceiling on nuclear artillery -

Currently, according to unclassified figures, the U.S. has about 1,500 nuclear artillery shells in Europe, down slightly during the past seven years and expected to decrease below 1,000 by the early 1990s. The principal reason for this decline is an ongoing Congressional restriction, first imposed in the 1985 Defense Authorization Act, that the combined production of new 155mm and 8 inch nuclear artillery shells could not exceed 925, for all theaters.

The decision by Congress to impose a ceiling on new short-range nuclear artillery was sound in 1985 and remains sound today. When pressed, most military commanders agree that nuclear artillery encourages preemptive attack because of its peacetime vulnerability and is useless militarily.

From a political standpoint, if any one decision could send the wrong signal to the German people, removing the 925 ceiling would be it. Whereas one can at least plausibly argue that air-delivered weapons might explode on Soviet territory, no such argument with respect to nuclear artillery holds water -- it is intended and has sufficient range for use in only one place, Germany. These are the weapons, so thoroughly integrated into NATO's strategy, training and force structure, that the West German government and people really have in mind when they speak of "singularity."

Lifting the production ceiling, particularly if it involves renewed production of ER weapons, will send absolutely the wrong message to the Germans and the rest of Europe and probably bring about the kind of crisis that threatened NATO solidarity in the early 1980s over the INF deployments.

Follow-on to LANCE -

The Pentagon is also moving forward on a replacement for the existing Lance surface-to-surface missile, called "follow-on-to-Lance" or FOTL. The replacement would have increased range (250 kilometers versus a nominal range of about 115 kilometers for the existing system) and accuracy.

FOTL is being justified because Lance is "obsolete," doesn't have sufficient range to hit important Warsaw Pact targets, and is deployed in insufficient numbers to counter the large number of Soviet SS-21, Scud and FROG-7 missiles deployed in the Western USSR and Eastern Europe.

Military commanders testifying about the small number of Lance missiles in Europe have played games with the numbers. While the total number of Lance launchers in Europe is relatively small (about 88 launchers with U.S. and five other allied forces), the total number of nuclear warheads and missiles deployed which could actually be fired from these launchers is much higher - about 700, according to unclassified figures.

In looking to a follow-on to Lance, the Army has examined a number of candidate missiles. The leading contender at this point is a nuclear version of the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) now under development. ATACMS was intended originally to be a highly accurate semi-ballistic missile, armed with a high explosive warhead, that would improve NATO's conventional force posture by being able to strike high value Warsaw Pact targets well behind enemy lines. The Army would like to have nuclear and conventional versions of ATACMS/FOTL to be virtually interchangeable and capable of being fired from the same MLRS launchers.

Such a deployment has a number of undesirable implications.

First, it reverses the trend that ATACMS was supposed to initiate: moving NATO away from reliance on the early use of nuclear weapons and towards a more robust conventional defense posture. Deploying ATACMS in both nuclear and conventional modes does little to raise the nuclear threshold in Europe, which was the expressed purpose of ATACMS.

Secondly, it would complicate the prospects for any future arms agreement that sought to limit shorter-range missiles - for the same reason that verification of SLCMs is proving to be such a difficult issue in the START negotiations. It is also true, however, that this verification problem probably would not be any more severe than for Lance, which is also dual-capable and deployed in both nuclear and conventional versions.

Thirdly, as is already apparent, FOTL would face severe political opposition in West Germany. Not surprisingly, West Germans are extremely sensitive to the prospect - with the ink not yet dry on the INF Treaty - of deploying a new, ground-based nuclear missile that, unlike Pershing II and GLCM, could only land on their own soil or their immediate neighbors.

Over the past several years, the Congress has quite wisely prevented the Defense Department from spending funds to develop ATACMS as a new nuclear missile. This restriction should remain in place.

Air-Delivered Munitions

In addition to the above examples, there are a number of new air-delivered nuclear weapons in development or being deployed. The tactical air-to-surface missile (TASM), B-61 bombs, new F-15E, Tornado and F-16 attack aircraft are all being deployed to build up NATO's already formidable ability to drop thousands of nuclear weapons on Warsaw Pact targets in Europe from the air.

To the extent that these systems have the range to strike targets inside the USSR, they will undoubtedly complicate the START negotiations or, at the very least, make it more difficult to move beyond START towards any further strategic arms reductions. The Soviet Union can certainly be expected to question vigorously why an FB-111 bomber carrying SRAMs based in the United States should be included as a strategic system but an F-111 carrying TASMs based in the United Kingdom should not be considered a strategic threat.

AN ARMS CONTROL ALTERNATIVE

Far better alternatives exist from a political, military and economic standpoint to the massive modernization of theater nuclear forces that the Pentagon would like to implement.

For example, instead of proceeding with the Lance follow-on, NATO should propose that each side eliminate all ground-launched missiles with ranges below 500 kilometers and their launchers. Such a simple and dramatic proposal, coming on the heels of the INF Treaty, has a number of selling points.

First, it would eliminate one of the chief disparities left over after INF: between Warsaw Pact and NATO ballistic missiles below 500 kilometers. Soviet SS-21, SCUD and FROG-7 missiles armed with nuclear, chemical or conventional warheads constitute the principal current and future threat against critical, time-urgent targets such as nuclear storage sites and other weapons depots, air bases, command and control facilities, transhipment points, etc.

Banning these systems would also eliminate the need for a large and costly anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) system which some have advocated to protect critical targets from short-range ballistic missiles.

Finally, such a proposal would help NATO regain the arms control initiative in the post-INF era. Without some similarly innovative proposal, the alliance will most likely suffer additional public relations defeats at the hands of Gorbachev and his advisers.

DISMANTLING NUCLEAR WARHEADS

During the course of this committee's hearings on the INF

Treaty, Administration spokesmen have repeatedly put forward the view that the actual dismantling and destruction of nuclear warheads is neither practical nor verifiable. The Federation disagrees.*

In fact, researchers affiliated with FAS have spent a great deal of time examining practical approaches to the problem of warhead dismantlement and have concluded that an arms control agreement which included the actual dismantling of warheads is, indeed, feasible.

The Administration propagated several misconceptions about warhead dismantling. First, Secretary of Defense Carlucci alleged that verification procedures would expose the secrets of U.S. warhead designs to Soviet inspectors.

In fact, the inspectors would only have to verify that a batch of nuclear warheads had entered a U.S. dismantlement facility and that, after all the warheads had been dismantled and their components destroyed beyond recognition, no intact nuclear-weapons remained inside.

It was also alleged that the only way to dispose of weapons-grade plutonium would be to mix it with nuclear reactor fuel, an activity that would invite terrorist attempts to steal the fuel.

In fact, if the weapons plutonium were mixed with some of the fission products from which it was originally separated, it could be made as inaccessible as the plutonium which is routinely discharged in the spent-fuel of U.S. nuclear-power reactors. Furthermore, if the highly-enriched uranium in U.S. nuclear weapons were diluted to the low-enriched grade used in civilian power reactors, tens of billions of dollars could be recovered.

Finally, it was alleged that the Soviet Union would have an advantage in such a regime because it could easily replace any nuclear material destroyed, due its superior production capacity.

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*On February 16, 1988, FAS held a press conference on the warhead dismantlement issue. Participating were Dr. Frank von Hippel, FAS Chairman and a professor at Princeton University and Dr. Theodore Taylor, a former nuclear weapons designer and currently a technical consultant to FAS.

In fact, in 1982 the Soviet Union expressed its willingness to enter into an agreement to end the production of new fissile materials for nuclear weapons and also accepted on-site inspection to verify such an agreement. The Reagan Administration has successfully ignored this important development, which would make it unnecessary to continue to operate the dangerously run-down U.S. plutonium production complex.

In sum, verifiable agreements that included the actual dismantling and destruction of nuclear warheads and weapons-grade materials are feasible and should be on the arms control agenda in the coming years. Otherwise, nuclear arms agreements may continue to primarily reshape rather than reduce the nuclear arsenals.

THE NEED FOR START

The final point which I would like to make has already been forcefully explained by other witnesses but deserves reiteration. The INF Treaty will become irrelevant shortly after it enters into force if it is not quickly followed by an agreement to reduce strategic nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union has an overabundance of strategic missiles, most of which could be re-programmed (if they are not already) to strike European targets without adversely affecting Soviet strategic targeting requirements. A START Treaty that requires large reductions would force Soviet planners to choose between strategic and theater targets and would reduce the threat to both the United States and Europe, in any case.

Unfortunately, two years ago the Reagan Administration abandoned the SALT II Treaty - which provided the only constraint on Soviet strategic nuclear forces. If the INF Treaty is not to be rendered meaningless, we must work harder to reach a START agreement soon that achieves substantial reductions in strategic nuclear weapons. The Senate should continue to press the Administration to reach a START Treaty before it leaves office and, hopefully, in time for the Moscow Summit.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and other members of the Foreign Relations Committee, for providing FAS the opportunity to submit our views on the INF Treaty.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SEYMOUR D. REICH

Inscribed on the Isaiah Wall opposite the United Nations in New York is the historic saying of the Jewish Prophet: "They shall beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks. Nation shall not lift up sword against nation; neither shall they learn war anymore." (Isaiah,II, 4)

The vision of peace is central to the tradition of Judaism and reflects B'nai B'rith's highest aspiration. That is the reason for my presence here today; to provide witness for a significant and meaningful initiative and one that reduces world tensions and enhances the prospects of peace. The planned removal of the intermediate nuclear missiles from Europe, with appropriate verification, constitutes a stepping stone to the vision of Isaiah. I strongly endorse it and urge the Senate to give its consent to the treaty without attaching the kind of amendment that would necessitate renegotiation.

We look to further steps that would fulfill the prophetic vision in the area of intercontinental missiles as well as the field of conventional arms stability, which is today closely linked to the Helsinki accord. At the same time, we must emphasize the axiomatic principle outlined by the late UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold: "We know that the question of peace and the question of human rights are closely related. Without recognition of human rights, one shall never have peace." President John F. Kennedy, in his famous American University speech of June 10, 1963, asked the critical

Imposed barriers to the exercise of the right to leave, a clear abridgement of the international code of conduct result in lower levels of emigration then had been the case in the past. The 1987 emigration total for Soviet Jews was 8,155, which constitutes a mere third of the average annual rate of the 1970's (24,000) and but a sixth of the highest level reach in 1979 (51,000).

Needless to say, the pattern of gross violation of international human rights law and standards cannot but effect the atmosphere of negotiations over further arms control issues. Trust is essential to the negotiating process and non-fulfillment of binding legal obligations under international law stimulates distrust and doubt.

Moreover, the very negotiating process concerning conventional arms stability, within the framework of the Helsinki process requires that positive balancing steps be taken under the rubric of Basket 3 of the Helsinki Accord, and ineluctably this means progress in complying with international human rights standards notably on the right to leave.

The Helsinki Accord, it must be stressed, is carefully structured on a balance between security, trade and human rights, the 3 Baskets -- and the 10 "Principles" which are at its core. Should concentration be placed on largely security issues without accompanying progress in the human rights area then the delicate balance of the accord will be undermined. If the accord is to remain viable, positive movement in establishing a mandate for conventional arms stability talks must be proceded or accompanied by positive movements in advancing the human rights purposes of the agreement.

question of our day: "Is not peace, in the last analysis, basically a matter of human rights?"

The question is especially relevant now when the Soviet government transgresses and violates law and international standards of conduct concerning the vital and core right to leave a country. It is inscribed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights -- Article 13 (b) -- and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights -- Article 12 -- and it is at the very heart of the Helsinki Final Act. As the Soviet Government is a Contracting Party to the Covenant and is a signatory of the Helsinki Accord it is legally bound and obligated to fulfill the mandate on "the right of everyone to leave any country including his own."

Soviet Jews seeking to reunite with kin aboard are confronted by serious and, in many instances, insuperable obstacles preventing them from emigrating. Soviet regulations governing exit visas, in effect since January 1, 1987, restrict applicants for exit visas to those having a first degree relative aboard. This severe limitation stands in sharp contradiction to international law.

The same emigration regulations provide for refusals on grounds that applicants know "state secrets." This clause, when arbitrarily and capriciously applied -- which is most often the case -- leads to mischievous violations of international law and standards. The authoritative UN study of "the right to leave a country" by Jose Ingles, jurist and statesman of the Philippines, allows security limitation on the vital right only the very narrow circumstance of a "clear and present danger."

It will be a serious mistake to demand immediate and premature consummation of the mandate for conventional arms stability talks. Basket 3 and Principle 7 human rights requirements must not be jeopardized. The balance of the Helsinki process must not be distorted or subverted. Too much is at stake including a cornerstone of the Helsinki process -- the right to leave.

We would hope that the Senate, in providing its advice and consent to the valuable and constructive intermediate missile treaty, will include a statement in the form of an understanding which incorporates the principle that human rights is essential to the preservation of peace and detente. Further progress in the negotiating process for arms control should take account of the human rights factor especially when it falls within the purview of the Helsinki Final Act. If the prophetic vision of Isaiah is ultimately to be fulfilled, human rights must inevitably be linked to peace.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JEROME GROSSMAN

The President has forwarded to the Senate, for its advice and consent, the Treaty on the elimination of U.S. and Soviet Intermediate-range and Shorter-range Missiles (INF). Council for a Livable World, one of the nation's oldest and largest organizations specializing in nuclear arms control, endorses the INF Treaty with enthusiasm. It is a remarkable achievement which should be approved by the Senate without amendment.

All humanity is grateful that the superpowers are finally beginning to meet their responsibility to reduce their nuclear arsenals, a responsibility spelled out in a number of treaties, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in which, twenty years ago, the United States and the Soviet Union declared their "intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament."

Although the INF Treaty is militarily modest, reducing nuclear arsenals by only four percent, it is politically potent because it expresses the worldwide public opinion that the nuclear arms race is a clear and pressing danger to the human race. The treaty is politically potent because it opens the way to a series of superpower agreements which could end the nuclear arms race:

- A fifty percent reduction in strategic nuclear weapons is most desirable. So excessive is the nuclear overkill that American and Soviet arsenals can be drastically reduced without risking security. Political, military and psychological wisdom strongly points toward the reduction. The time appears propitious on both sides. The reduction would dispose of unneeded weapons and be militarily stabilizing. It would be a major step in reversing the arms race because it would transform our relationship with the Soviets.
- An end to all nuclear testing can and should be negotiated. The technology exists for effective verification. A comprehensive test ban would forestall the development of new generations of nuclear weapons and help stabilize the superpower relationship. It would help control proliferation and the potential danger of nuclear terrorism.
- Production of all weapons-grade fissionable material should stop.

Senator Helms has raised an important issue by calling for the destruction of nuclear warheads and particularly the nuclear fissionable material. Although we do not believe his suggestion is appropriate for this treaty, we call upon Senator Helms to join us in urging all nuclear powers to end production of all weapons-grade fissionable material. We have more than we can use now and there is no point in producing more when we propose to reduce, not increase the number of nuclear weapons.

— All battlefield nuclear weapons should be eliminated. The INF Treaty does not eliminate nuclear weapons with a range up to 500 kilometers. This "third zero" is necessary to prevent battlefield officers from turning a conventional conflict into nuclear war. On this issue we agree with our German allies who dread local use of such weapons. Furthermore, it makes no sense to deploy a new generation of Lance missiles and nuclear artillery shells when we should be moving in the opposite direction.

— Nuclear arsenals should be reduced to minimum deterrent levels. At the Washington Summit, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev said, "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." If this is so, we should not prepare for it. Both sides should reduce to a minimum deterrent to minimize the dangers of war by accident, unauthorized use or miscalculation. A minimum deterrent would reduce the capability of either side to launch a crippling first strike.

The precedent-setting verification and compliance provisions of the INF Treaty, which clearly protect the national interest, will make these future landmark agreements possible regardless of who is in the White House. It is appropriate at this time to give credit where it's due for this breakthrough. President Reagan made the original creative suggestion for the zero-zero solution in 1981. General Secretary Gorbachev made concession after concession to satisfy our perception of our security needs. But the unsung heroes are in the worldwide peace movement, which brought world attention to the awful dangers of nuclear war. In the United States alone there are 8,000 peace groups in 50 states, a mighty rise from 1,000 in 1980. These peace groups stimulated grassroots pressure on the House of Representatives and the

Senate, pressure which helped to bring about a remarkable series of congressional actions on nuclear arms control. Arms control is no longer the monopoly of the executive branch. Many senators from both parties played important roles in the political and educational process and we salute them.

In celebrating the INF accord, we should remember that there have been other hopeful beginnings in previous administrations which did not develop beyond single agreements. Nearly every Administration since World War II has tried to make a fresh start in nuclear arms control. Each new president has wanted to put his stamp on the process. In the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan administration[illegible] lurched from detente to paroxysms of anti-Soviet rhetoric and self-defeating policies. We must break out of this cycle.

An important new factor is the superpowers' economic condition. Military strength must be balanced against the needs of the economy that sustains it. The economies of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. have declined dramatically in relation to their competitors and even in absolute terms. Military spending excesses must stop. Preparations for war have cost the United States $2 trillion since 1981—$21,000 for each American household. Preparations for nuclear war have cost $427 billion; for conventional war in Europe, $736 billion; for conventional war in Asia and the Persian Gulf, $588 billion. The money seems to disappear down an enormous sinkhole with little evidence of increased military security. An insolvent economy will dissolve national strength. If America continues the arms race with the Soviet Union, Japan will win. Today public opinion tends to define national strength as ultimately based on economic potency, and the superpowers are both broke if not in debt.

We urge all senators not to use the INF Treaty as a vehicle to address other arms control issues, U.S.-Soviet differences or military budget considerations. Amendments—no matter how well-intentioned—are likely to disrupt the ratification process. Ratification itself, a complex and difficult process, ought to be our prime consideration. Arms control opponents are working hard to obstruct the INF Treaty and to derail any hope of completing a START treaty in 1988. If the treaty is not ratified, or if it is weakened by amendments, prospects for future arms control will be bleak.

We view INF as a first step toward far-reaching reductions in nuclear arms and agreements to prevent a new arms race in space and to reduce conventional weapons in Europe. We hope you also support these goals and will find appropriate legislative vehicles to further them, but we urge you not to do so through amendments or reservations to the INF Treaty. We urge you to help build a bipartisan majority to resist amendments and to support further agreements made possible by the Reagan-Gorbachev initiative.

Once INF is ratified, the Reagan Administration may be able to conclude a START agreement with the Soviet Union, perhaps by the time the spring summit is held in Moscow. We urge the Foreign Relations Committee and the entire Senate to consider a START Treaty this year. Even though there are only a few months left in the Congressional session, even though this is the last year of the Reagan Administration and the November elections are fast approaching, the processes of government should continue and the Senate should give the most prompt consideration to a START Treaty.

By far the most significant aspect of the INF Treaty is the revival of hope, hope that our species is not condemned to self-destruct. We have a moral and ethical responsibility to ourselves and to our planet to preserve life. We refuse to accept the inevitability of nuclear war. We are morally outraged that our species, carrying its divine spark of consciousness is threatened by its own perverse actions. But a species capable of producing William Shakespeare, Leonardo da Vinci, Albert Einstein and Larry Bird must find a way to save itself. What humanity hath wrought, humanity can undo and the INF Treaty may be the first step in the undoing.

NATIONWIDE COALITION OF ORGANIZATIONS ENDORSES NUCLEAR ARMS TREATY

A nationwide coalition of 111 major organizations today strongly endorsed the Reagan Administration's agreement with the Soviet Union to eliminate short and intermediate range land-based nuclear missiles.

The coalition, which includes many of the nation's major religious, labor, environmental, citizen and arms control organizations representing millions of Americans, applauded the INF Treaty for advancing the mutual security interests of both superpowers.

The joint statement reflects broad grassroots support for a major nuclear arms agreement -- more recent treaties, including the 1979 SALT II agreement, lacked such widespread backing.

The coalition members, many of whom opposed previous Reagan Administration nuclear weapons plans, intend to work with key Senate leaders and the Administration to mobilize public and congressional support for the treaty.

Major individual signers include United Steelworkers of America President Lynn Williams, League of Women Voters President Nancy Neuman, Sierra Club Chairman Michael McCloskey, Committee for National Security Founder Paul Warnke, YWCA President Glendora Putnam, National Council of Jewish Women President Lenore Feldman, and Common Cause President Fred Wertheimer.

The coalition urged the Reagan Administration to utilize the INF Treaty "as a step toward agreement on strategic nuclear weapons and space weaponry."

The statement and list of signers follows:

> We strongly endorse the Reagan Administration's agreement with the Soviet Union to eliminate land-based nuclear missiles with a range of 300 to 3,500 miles. The resulting treaty, which will eliminate all intermediate range nuclear missiles, advances the mutual security interests of the United States and the Soviet Union.
>
> We applaud the precedent that this agreement will create -- a treaty signed by the Reagan Administration, certified by that Administration as mutually advantageous and adequately verifiable, and approved by a Democratic-led Senate. Such a treaty will enhance the prospects for future and more significant agreements that would substantially reduce the huge stockpiles of strategic nuclear weapons. We intend to mobilize public and congressional support for the treaty.
>
> Even as we endorse the INF agreement, we will work to ensure that this treaty not be used as a smokescreen for abandoning existing U.S.-Soviet agreements on strategic weapons, particularly the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, for moving towards deployment of a Star Wars system or for slackening the endeavor to complete successfully the negotiations on the central strategic nuclear arms systems that gravely threaten the world.
>
> Without limits on strategic offensive and defensive weapons, an INF agreement can be easily circumvented by replacing the destroyed weapons with new strategic weapons. We urge therefore that the administration utilize the INF Treaty as a step toward agreement on strategic nuclear weapons and space weaponry.

ACORN (Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now)	Mildred Brown, President
Alliance of Atomic Veterans	Anthony Guarisco, Director
American Association of University Women	Sarah Harder, President
American Baptist Churches, U.S.A., Office of Governmental Relations	Robert W. Tiller, Director
American Friends Service Committee	Asia Bennett, Executive Secretary
American Library Association	Margaret Chisholm, President
American Medical Student Association	P. Preston Reynolds, M.D., Ph.D., President

American Public Health Association	Bailuf Walker, Jr., Ph.D., M.PH., President
Americans for Democratic Action	Marc Pearl, Executive Director
Architects/Designers/Planners for Social Responsibility	Tician Papachristou, President
Catholic Peace Fellowship	Bill Ofenloch, Coordinator
Center for New Creation	Joan Urbanczyk
Center of Concern	Peter Henriot, Executive Director
Church of the Brethren, Washington Office	Leland Wilson, Director
Church Women United, Washington Office	Sally Timmel, Director
Citizens Against Nuclear War	Karen Mulhauser, Director
Clergy and Laity Concerned	Sister Barbara Lupo
Coalition for a New Foreign Policy	David Reed, Executive Director
Commission on Social Action of Reform Judaism	Norma Levitt
Committee for Children	J. Scott Douglas, Director
Committee for National Security	Anne Cahn, Director James Leonard, Board of Directors Paul Warnke, Board of Directors
Common Cause	Fred Wertheimer, President
Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility	
Congress of Italian-American Organizations	Mary Sansone, Executive Director
Council for a Livable World	Jerome Grossman, President John Isaacs, Washington Director George Rathjens, Chairman
Defense Budget Project	Gordon Adams, Director
Delta Sigma Theta Sorority	Dr. Marcella Peterson, Executive Director
Dumbarton Peace Ministry	Jessma Blockwick
Environmental Policy Institute	Robert Alvarez, Director, Nuclear Weapons & Testing Production Project
Episcopal Peace Fellowship	Patricia Scharf, Executive Secretary
Federation of American Scientists	Jeremy Stone, Director
Federation of Reconstructionist Congregations and Havurot	Rabbi Mordechai Liebling, Director
Freeze Voter	William (Chip) Reynolds, National Director
Friends Committee on National Legislation	Edward Snyder, Executive Director
Friends of the Earth	Cynthia E. Wilson, Executive Director
General Board of Church and Society, United Methodist Church	Donna Morton Stout, Associate General Secretary
Graphic Communications International	James J Norton, President
Gray Panthers	Karen Talbot, Executive Director
High Technology Professionals for Peace	Alex Brown, Director
IMPACT	Gretchen Eick, National Director
Institute for Policy Studies	Richard Barnet, Senior Fellow
Institute for Space & Security Studies	Dr, Robert Bowman, President
International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers	William Winpisinger, President
Jesuit Social Ministries	Joe Hacala (S.J.), Director
The Jewish Peace Fellowship	Rabbi Philip Bentley, President Naomi Goodman
Lawyers Alliance for Nuclear Arms Control	Anthony P. Sager, Executive Director
Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy	Alex Miller, Executive Director
League of Women Voters of the United States	Nancy Neuman, President
Mennonite Central Committee, Peace Section, Washington Office	Delton Franz, Director
Methodists United for Peace with Justice	Adrien Helm, Co-Chair
Missouri Rural Crisis Center	Roger L. Allison, Executive Director
Mothers Embracing Nuclear Disarmament	Maureen King, Executive Director Linda Smith, President
National Association of Social Workers	Mark Battle, Executive Director

National Audobon Society	Patricia Baldi, Director, Population Program Fran Webber, Director, International Issues
National Conference of Black Lawyers	Wade Henderson
National Congress for Community Economic Development	Robert Zdenek, President
National Council of Jewish Women	Lenore Feldman, National President
National Council of Senior Citizens	
National Education Association, Peace & Justice Caucus	Rhonda Hanson, Chairperson
National Farmers Organization	DeVon Woodland, President
National Institute for Women of Color	Sharon Parker, President
National Rural Housing Coalition	Bob Reposa, Director
NETWORK: A Catholic Social Justice Lobby	Nancy Sylvester, Coordinator
New Jewish Agenda	Rabbi Marc Gruber, National Co-Chair
Nuclear Information Research Service	Michael Mariotte, Executive Director
Nuclear Times Magazine	Richard Healey, Executive Director
Organization of Pan-Asian American Women	June Inuzuka, President
Pastoral Care Network for Social Responsiblity	John R. Thomas, Chair
Pax Christi, U.S.A.	Mary Lou Kownacki, O.S.B., National Corrdinator
Peacelinks	Betty Bumpers, President
Performers and Artists - Anti-Nuclear Action Committee	Barbara Kopot
Physicians for Social Responsibility	Maureen Thornton, Executive Director
Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), Washington Office	George Chauncey, Director
Presbyterian Peace Fellowship	Bill Yolton
Professionals' Coalition for Nuclear Arms Control	David Cohen, President Richard Mark, Executive Director
Project Vote	Sanford Newman, Executive Director
Psychologists for Social Responsibility	M. Brewster Smith, President
Public Citizen	Joan Claybrook, President
Rabbinical Assembly Social Justice Committee	Alan Silverstein, Chairperson
Reconstructionist Rabbinical College	Author Green, President
Reformed Church in America	
Religious Action Center of the Union of Americans Hebrew Congregations and Central Conference of American Rabbis	Rabbi David Saperstein, Director
Ripon Society	
Riverside Church Disarmament Program	
Rural Coalition	Lawrence Parachini, Executive Director
SANE/FREEZE	David Cortright, Co-Director Carolyn Cottom, Co-Director
Security Options	Jane Wales, Executive Director
The Shalom Center	Ira Silverman, Honorary President Arthur Waskow, Director Jacqueline Levine, Board Member Viki List, Chair of the Board Morton Siegel, Board Member
Sierra Club	Michael McCloskey, Chairman
Sisters of Notre Dame de Namur, Mission Education Center	
Sisters of St. Joseph of Carondelet, Incarnation House	
Sojourners	Jim Rice
Union of Concerned Scientists	Howard Ris, Executive Director

Unitarian Universalist Association of Churches in North America	Robert Alpern, Director, Washington Office Dr. William Schulz, President
United Auto Workers	Dick Warden, Legislative Director
United Campuses to Prevent Nuclear War	April Moore, Executive Director
United Church of Christ, Washington Office for Church in Society	Jay Lintner, Director
United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America	John H. Hovis, Jr., President
United Food & Commerical Workers International Union, AFL-CIO-CLC	William H. Wynn, International President
United Steelworkers of America	Lynn Williams, President
U.S. Student Association	Circe Pajunen, President
Women for a Meaningful Summit	Anne Zill, President
Women for Racial and Economic Equality (WREE)	Cheryl Burrows, President Vinie Burrows, International Secretary
Women Strike for Peace	Edith Villastrigo, National Legislative Coordinator
Women's Action for Nuclear Disarmament	Calien Lewis, Executive Director
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom	Isabel Guy, Legislative Director Jane Midgley, Executive Director
Women's League for Conservative Judaism	Evelyn Auerbach, President Bernice Balter, Executive Director
Women's Peace Initiative	Jancis Long, Director
World Federalist Association	Walter Hoffman, Executive Director
World Peacemakers	Bill Price, Director
Young Women's Christian Association of the U.S.A., National Board	Glendora Putnam, National President

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. ANNE H. CAHN

Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in support of ratification of the INF Treaty. I am the Director of the Committee for National Security (CNS).

The Committee is a nonprofit public education group that strives to build an informed constituency for sound national security policies. Our Committee is made up of 130 prominent citizens, including former senior government officials, scientists and business leaders. We feel specially qualified to offer our views, in part because the Committee counts as members many former arms negotiators who can expertly assess the INF Treaty's provisions.

Equally important, our programs outside of Washington bring us into frequent contact with hundreds of civic leaders around the country. Many have expressed their approval of this Treaty. We feel our testimony also reflects their sentiments.

I take special pleasure in testifying today because our organization evolved from Americans for SALT, which was formed in 1980 to keep the arms control process alive. Eight years later the Reagan Administration has offered the Senate a treaty banning present and future deployment of ground-based missiles in Europe and the Soviet Union with ranges of 500 to 5500 kilometers. It is not the comprehensive accord reducing strategic weapons that we envisioned as SALT III. But, as a prelude to such an accord, whether you call it START or SALT, the INF Treaty is a positive building block in the arms control process we have long advocated.

Standing on its own, the INF treaty appears to be a very good deal. The Soviets will dismantle over 3,000 deployed and non-deployed weapons of intermediate and shorter range that have been in the Soviet arsenal for the last 30 years. The United States removes about 860 deployed and non-deployed intermediate range weapons, of a type that NATO has had in place since 1983.

In essence, what do we get? The elimination of a long-standing Soviet monopoly in intermediate-range weapons that pose a unique threat to Europe. And what do we give up? A few hundred warheads aimed at targets redundantly covered by our 12,000 strategic warheads.

Military and Political Advantages

Despite its virtues, the INF Treaty is not devoid of critics. They see the accord as insignificant (only a "sideshow") or even dangerous (making Europe safe for conventional war). But to assess the Treaty realistically, we have to distinguish what it accomplishes, militarily and politically, from what it was not intended to accomplish.

Under the Treaty terms, Europe will be better off militarily than it was in 1977, when the Soviets first deployed the accurate, triple-warhead SS-20. Prior to that time, the USSR had targeted Europe with its single-warhead SS-4s and 5s.

By the end of the 1970s, the SS-20 force came to be perceived as posing an increased threat to Europe. Some Europeans, notably West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, were concerned that the SALT negotiations were aimed at constraining weapons that could hit the United States leaving unconstrained the SS-20s that could hit Western Europe.

The INF Treaty was designed to address the Schmidt school of thought. The psychological wedge that the SS-20 drove between us and our allies will be gone, while 325,000 American soldiers and 4,300 American nuclear weapons will remain in Europe. The effect, therefore, should be to strengthen U.S.-European ties rather than to "decouple" U.S. and European defense.

In this regard, we should emphatically reject the notion that the Treaty will leave Europe "safe for conventional war," as some claim. While the conventional force balance in Europe is a matter of concern, the problem should not be exaggerated. Department of Defense simulations reportedly show NATO doing very well in hypothetical scenarios against the Warsaw Pact.

Nonetheless, we should aggressively pursue East-West negotiations on conventional force reductions as soon as NATO reaches an agreed position. In the meantime, we should press ahead with force improvements, including more spending on fast sealift, reserve forces, readiness and sustainability. CNS has persistently suggested that defense priorities should be shifted toward ground and tactical air forces for Europe.

But however one might assess the state of the military balance in Europe, Senators should recognize that an effort to use the INF Treaty as leverage in negotiations on conventional forces in Europe will only undermine the chances of achieving a conventional arms accord. In the INF Treaty, the USSR agreed to eliminate about four nuclear warheads for every U.S. warhead removed. It is hard to imagine how the United States could wring additional concessions on conventional arms out of the Soviets by threatening to hold up final implementation of a Treaty that is so one-sidedly to the advantage of NATO.

With all this being said, the military importance of the INF agreement should not be overestimated. The Treaty eliminates 2,000 nuclear warheads, but the United States and the Soviet Union together deploy about 25,000 warheads on long-range strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. These weapons can be retargeted to cover any of the sites previously identified as targets for the intermediate-range forces that are being eliminated. And the military advantages, such as they are, will be wiped out by the Soviet buildup that could take place if SDI is deployed or START not completed.

Primary Value is Political

Thus, the Treaty's primary value is political. By agreeing to the dual track decision in 1979 and following through on both its tracks -- deployments and negotiations -- NATO passed its severest test in many years. The United States proved its leadership by addressing alliance and Japanese concerns. And a useful basis has been laid for a healthier US-Soviet relationship.

The significance of these gains should not be underestimated. Ratification would indeed be a political plus. But failure to ratify would be more than a political minus. It would hold up START, disastrously undermine relations with our allies, sour the US-Soviet dialogue on other issues, and throw us into an arms-control dark age. Senators contemplating Category 3 amendments -- those that require renegotiation with the Soviet Union -- should understand that a revision would cost the US more than it would gain.

Biden Resolution on Legal Meaning of INF Treaty

Given the importance of proceeding expeditiously toward

Treaty ratification, we are also generally skeptical about the value of Category 1 and Category 2 conditions. Unless a provision is obviously essential to clarify the meaning of the INF Treaty, we would prefer that it be dropped. Other occasions will arise to debate conventional arms reduction measures, the adequacy of allied contributions to the common defense, the need to achieve NATO's force planning goals, US policy in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), Soviet policy in Afghanistan, Cuba, Angola and Nicaragua, or the proper direction of the Strategic Defense Initiative research program. Debate over the INF Treaty is not the proper forum for resolving all of the critical matters at issue in US national security policy.

Consideration is being given to an effort to clarify the constitutional role of the Senate in interpreting the meaning of treaties. Senator Joseph Biden has discussed the possibility of appending to the resolution of ratification a provision that would require Senate approval of any future reinterpretation of the INF accord. CNS does sympathize with the Senator's concern. We flatly reject the Reagan Administration's attempt to reinterpret the ABM Treaty. We would reject a future Administration's attempt to do the same with this treaty.

In this regard, Secretary of State George Shultz' February 9th letter to Senators Sam Nunn and Robert Byrd was an orderly retreat from an untenable position. His letter affirmed that the testimony of Executive Branch witnesses would be authoritative and and that the Administration would not depart from the meaning of the INF Treaty as presented to the Senate. More than that, he could not do. No written pledge from this Administration can prevent a future one from also mistakenly asserting that the President has the power to invent novel interpretations of treaties. We should expect future Presidents to show more respect for the Senate's constitutional role in treaty-making.

It is strongly our view, however, that this matter should not require appending a formal condition to the INF Treaty. On the contrary, the legally correct view is that the meaning of treaties as officially explained to the Senate by the executive in ratification hearings is legally binding on current and future Administrations. It should not be necessary, and it could be destructive, to hold up the INF Treaty in order to assert that point in a formal amendment to the Senate's resolution of ratification.

INF as Precedent for START

Beyond its political and military value, the INF Treaty sets useful precedents for the arms control process. Before laying these out, it is important to put the Treaty in the context of what it is, and what it is not. It is an optimum solution to a narrow security threat. It does not deal with a single Soviet missile that can hit the American heartland.

With that in mind, we can point to four precedents that the INF treaty establishes for future treaties, including START. First, the exclusion of French and British systems from the negotiations removes a nagging issue that has dogged U.S.-Soviet negotiations since SALT I. The United States and the Soviet Union can proceed more easily in strategic arms talks now that a precedent has been established for treating weapons possessed by allies separately.

Second, from the start of INF discussions, the Administration properly insisted that the Soviets could not be permitted to reduce weapons in Europe by shifting deployments to another theater. Thus, the Treaty does not benefit the British at the expense of the Japanese. We should keep future agreements equally free of regional loopholes.

Third, the INF Treaty establishes an important precedent for a verification regime that includes on-site inspections. This is not completely new, of course. During the Carter Administration, the Soviets had agreed in principle to such inspections for a Comprehensive Test Ban, but negotiations on that Treaty were suspended by the Reagan Administration. Also the Stockholm Agreement, which entered into force in 1987, includes provisions for on-site observation of troop maneuvers by inspectors from East and West. The INF Treaty establishes a far more extensive on-site inspection regime than was ever before contemplated, however.

Last but not least is the INF Treaty's disarmament precedent -- the elimination of an entire class of weapons. This is frankly the most novel and far-reaching aspect of the accord. It probably cannot be duplicated with any of the systems under consideration at this stage in START, but it should not be dropped from the memory bank when future Administrations shape their arms control strategies.

Where INF is not a Precedent for START

We are more skeptical, however, about the value of some other precedents that the Administration often cites. First is the "lesson" that persistence -- "hanging tough" -- produced a favorable INF accord. Admininstration officials would have us believe that all we have to do is say "no" to get the Soviets to to say "yes."

In fact, the United States also needs the courage to say "yes." In START, unfortunately, we see little such willingness to compromise. The American negotiating position is that the Soviet Union should accept deep cuts in its strategic offensive forces while the United States has a free hand to proceed with testing and even early deployment of a space-based strategic defense. While the Soviets might temporarily go along with an ambiguous compromise on strategic defense, we would err to presume that the Soviets will accept a permanent arrangement that they regard as inconsistent with their most basic security concerns.

Second, we would warn against the temptation to point to the on-site inspection procedures of the INF Treaty as a precedent for a more extensive anytime, anywhere regime for START verification. While on-site inspection has political appeal, and can serve certain specific uses, it is not a panacea for our justifiable nervousness about potential Soviet cheating.

Even with the elaborate layers of baseline, portal, close-out, elimination, and short-notice inspections included in the INF Treaty, the verification regime is not foolproof, as Secretary of State Shultz has acknowledged. As General Welch, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, testified, "There are obviously areas of some uncertainty. We cannot guarantee that small numbers of missiles will not be concealed."

Nevertheless, the Administration has concluded that the Treaty is "effectively verifiable," according to JCS testimony. Let us pause for a moment and review what that phrase means. In the revised arms-control lexicon of the Reagan Administration, "effective" verification is that which would "enable the United States to know with confidence whether the terms of agreements are being honored....In practice, this means...to render a reasonable judgment on whether other parties are complying with the terms of an agreement and to render this judgment in a timely manner..." [Arms Control Impact Statement, April 1986].

But according its own testimony, the Administration fails to meet this standard. The shortcoming is explained by General Welch. As he told your Committee on February 4, "...for the Soviets to maintain a militarily useful force of covert missiles, they would need an elaborate hidden infrastructure to hide the missiles, periodically test them, and provide an effective means of employing them in a crisis. They would run a high risk of detection over time.

"Apart from these technical considerations, the military utility of such a cheater force would be low compared to the risk." In short, says General Welch, if the Soviets were to attempt to cheat, the United States could catch them before such cheating would pose a significant military threat.

This is a perfectly acceptable stardard for verification, in the view of the Committee for National Security, but it does not constitute the "effective" verification regime demanded by hard-liners in the Reagan Administration. Welch's standard is precisely the one established by previous Administrations for adequate verification. As defined in Senate hearings, "adequate" verfication require that "any Soviet cheating which would pose a significant military risk or affect the strategic balance would be detected by our intelligence in time for the United States to respond effectively."

What gave previous Administrations confidence that the United States could detect militarily significant cheating on other arms control accords in a timely fashion, and what principally gives this Administration the same degree of confidence, is our National Technical Means (NTM) of verification -- reconnaissance satellites and electronic eavesdropping. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Crowe testified, "National Technical Means (NTM) will be the principal method of regularly monitoring Soviet compliance with the [INF] Treaty." This method would be "buttressed" by on-site inspection and the "total web of all intelligence sources."

Let us briefly review how NTM will indeed be our first line of detection against Soviet cheating in the INF accord. Satellites will monitor the flight-test ban on missile systems, our most critical safeguard against any Soviet temptation to squirrel away weapons in caves. This is owing, as Admiral Crowe explains, to the operational unacceptability of using systems that have not been frequently tested.

Additionally, the tip-off to suspicious activity that could lead to a short-notice, challenge inspection authorized under the Treaty will come largely through National Technical Means.

We emphasize the verification issue because it can make or break an arms control treaty. We hope the standard established by this Administration for what constitutes adequate -- not "effective" -- verification will apply to future agreements. As we and now apparently the Reagan Administration see that standard, it is the timely detection of militarily significant divergences from the agreed provisions of a treaty. We expect no less from a START Treaty. Whether we can expect more will depend on the development of breakthroughs in verification methods and technologies.

Breaking the Deadlock: A CNS Arms Control Proposal

Up to now we have discussed the political, military and arms control implications of the INF Treaty. As noted above, however, the considerable accomplishments of that accord will be futile in the absence of limits or reductions in strategic offensive weaponry. Therefore, our testimony would be incomplete without an eye to next steps in arms control.

The United States and the Soviet Union now stand at an important crossroad. One path leads to an uncertain future, complicated by US and Soviet domestic politics, where arms control could collapse. The other leads to deep, stabilizing cuts in both sides' bloated nuclear arsenals.

A year ago, CNS offered a proposal to break the deadlock. It is even more relevant today.

The key to an agreement lies in constraining the President's Strategic Defense Initiative in return for reductions in strategic offensive forces. One approach would be to promise continued adherence to the ABM Treaty for at least a certain period of time. The major problem is to define adherence to the Treaty, however, and not merely to settle on an appropriate number of years for guaranteed non-withdrawal.

The Reagan Administration's October 1985 reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty is inconsistent with the letter and the intent of the Treaty. The United States must return to the correct, "traditional" interpretation of that treaty.

The United States and the Soviet Union must work out specific agreements on the application of Treaty terms to SDI-related technologies. Current unilateral US interpretations stretch the Treaty's terms to the breaking point and will erode the Treaty to the point of collapse.

A reasonable U.S.-Soviet agreement on the application of the ABM Treaty to SDI-related technologies is possible. The ABM Treaty prohibits testing and development of space-based components of an ABM system at the point where it can be verified that an ABM capability has been demonstrated. The United States and the Soviet Union should be able to agree on verifiable criteria that clearly distinguish between permitted testing on non-ABM capable devices in space and prohibited testing of ABM-capable devices.

This clarification would allow the United States to go ahead with virtually all of the experimentation needed to assess the potential of critical SDI technologies, while assuring the Soviets that the United States was not achieving the ability to deploy space-based defenses without a further lengthy period of weapons development. This will preserve a basic goal of the ABM Treaty: to ensure a considerable "lead-time" between the moment when it became apparent that one nation had decided to build a territorial missile defense and the point at which it could achieve one.

In exchange for such reasonable restrictions on SDI development and testing, the US is well-positioned to achieve its longstanding goal for arms control: deep reductions in strategic offensive weapons.

The framework for these reductions is already in place. The two sides should be able to settle the details of a treaty which improves stability and reduces fears of attack. In so doing, the Administration should beware of loopholes that would enable some weapons, such as SLCMs, to creep far out beyond the 6,000-warhead limit. Likewise, counting rules should not permit bombers to be so heavily discounted that the actual number of gravity bombs or short-range missiles permitted makes a mockery of the 50 percent cut.

With these provisos in mind, the present opportunity to reach agreement is great. It will not last long. The realities of American and Soviet domestic politics will inevitably work to reduce the chances for an agreement. Unless progress is made, arms control advocates in the Soviet Union may be weakened, and the prospects for completing and ratifying a new treaty under the Reagan Administration decline daily. The time for serious bargaining is now.

Conclusion

The jury is still out on the Reagan Administration's arms control record. The Administration will either be remembered as the first to negotiate deep, meaningful cuts in strategic weapons, or as the worst squanderer of historic opportunity. To date, we can note with more than polite applause that the conclusion of the INF Treaty brings the President back to a long-standing, bipartisan tradition: the primacy of arms control in US-Soviet relations. Like his predecessors, President Reagan has realized that the nuclear peril so transcends other issues that, despite our political differences, it must remain at the top of the superpower agenda.

It should not be the only issue on the agenda, however. The new leadership in the Soviet Union presents us with a perplexing new openness that we have not fully appreciated or acknowledged. Americans have become so accustomed to cold war sentiment that it is hard to conceive of a mature, pragmatic U.S.-Soviet relationship that encompasses a broad agenda of political, economic, and other issues.

But that is just what the new Soviet leadership offers us. To take account of how remarkable this leadership is, consider General Secretary Gorbachev's statement to his 1986 party congress: "We can never be secure while the United States feels itself insecure." An objective assessment of the other side's sense of security has long been the missing element in our national security planning. It was certainly missing when the Reagan administration unilaterally decided to exceed the SALT II limits, pursue a space-based defense against strategic weapons, and continue nuclear testing in the face of a Soviet moratorium.

It is time for a good measure of "new thinking" on our side as well. Let us open this window of opportunity as far as it will go.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EDWARD TELLER

Chairman Pell and distinguished Senators, I thank you for the opportunity to testify here today. The treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) raises a number of important questions. It proposes to eliminate delivery facilities for approximately 3,000 Soviet nuclear explosives and fewer than a thousand U.S. nuclear explosives. While the number of Soviet nuclear explosives involved in the treaty is still not clearly determined, the elimination of thousands of nuclear weapons aimed at densely populated areas of Europe is certainly to be welcomed.

That the Soviets should eliminate three times as many weapons as the United States seems to be entirely appropriate. Between 1960 and 1980 the explosive power of the U.S. stockpile decreased by two-thirds, while during the same period, the power of the Soviet stockpile increased beyond the explosive power the United States ever held.

Today the Soviet stockpile of nuclear weapons is estimated to be three times as powerful as the U.S. stockpile. The INF treaty, when ratified and observed, would decrease the Soviet stockpile by not much more than 10 percent. That reduction is not a truly extraordinary phenomenon. Nevertheless, it is the first time a treaty has provided for a true reduction in nuclear attack weapons, and it is particularly significant because the direct menace to Europe, the cradle of Western civilization, is diminished.

No treaty of the importance and complexity of the INF treaty can fail to raise worries and doubts, many of which are certainly justified. There also can be little question that the INF treaty should be and indeed will be ratified by the Senate. At the same time the process of ratification can include amendments, and the objections raised will influence future treaties. A recent example suggests that the discussion may have an influence on the interpretation of the treaty. Therefore, the ratification procedure of the INF treaty remains most important and must be approached with care.

There are three disturbing aspects of the INF treaty. The first is the possibility of producing misunderstanding, suspicion, and fear within the NATO community. Another concern most often mentioned is the issue of treaty verifications. The third and to my mind most serious problem that the treaty points up is our lack of a bipartisan policy for preventing war. Both parties are, of course, for deterrence, but there is a lack of agreement about what means are required to achieve this goal. Lacking a bipartisan foreign policy, mere ratification of the INF treaty will be of little help.

Whenever a treaty calls for withdrawal of weapons from Europe, it is unavoidable that our NATO allies will be concerned that the effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear umbrella will be diminished. No matter what arrangements we make, worries on the European side are understandable and unavoidable. We can only try to involve our NATO allies as early and as deeply as ever possible both in the negotiations and in all aspects of the common defense policy designed to ensure the survival of the free world.

While studying the treaty from the point of view of a scientist who knows little about legalities, I was struck by Article 14: "The parties shall comply with this treaty and shall not undertake any obligations or undertakings which would conflict with its provisions." At first glance, such an article seemed redundant; at second glance, offensive. After some thought, I became concerned about its effect on our NATO allies. The Senate could make a great contribution by insisting that the INF treaty, and in particular Article 14, must not be interpreted as interfering with the solid foundation of our earlier treaties and that the NATO alliance remains at the center of our policy for deterring any major conflict.

In connection with verification, any treaty between an open and a closed society is of necessity an unequal treaty. Any treaty violation in a free society is subject to revelation by individual citizens, by a free press, and by the intelligence sources of the other party to the treaty. Two of those safeguards are missing in the Soviet Union. The reliability of the third is questionable, as the widely different estimates of the number of SS-20 missiles provided by the CIA and the DIA demonstrate. Therefore, treaty enforcement in East and West will differ for the foreseeable future.

An exchange between Congressman Jack Kemp and the State Department may serve as an illustration of the peculiar nature of treaty verification. Our negotiators accepted a pictorial representation of the SS-20, the chief object of the present treaty, as a valid representation of the Soviet weapon. Kemp questioned the adequacy of the picture. It turned out that the representation did not properly differentiate between the SS-20, the intermediate-range missile forbidden by the treaty, and the SS-25, a long-range missile with possible applications against the United States and not forbidden by treaty. Under the treaty, inspection teams located outside the factory are supposed to differentiate between SS-20s and SS-25s. Yet the data needed by those teams was not provided until one of the critics of the agreement questioned its adequacy. I do not intend to criticize the technique of our negotiating team; I am not an expert in that field. But the example illustrates how far we are from anything that could amount to a really valid program of verification.

The foundation for a practical program of arms reduction has not been laid as yet. In order to proceed, it may well be found desirable to abstain from ratification until the Soviet Union lives up to its past treaty obligations. Or it may be helpful to make withdrawal from the treaty automatic if a violation occurs. Or the Senate may declare that steady progress toward true and valid verification is required for our prolonged adherence to the INF treaty. I am not arguing for an amendment that would nullify the treaty, but for a procedure that will in the long run make a badly needed significant contribution to the verification of adherence to treaties.

Actually, the verification provisions in the INF treaty represent a considerable improvement over those in earlier treaties. I have one real regret about the course of the negotiations on verification. The vital question in treaty verification is permission to conduct practically unlimited inspection. Encouraging such openness in the Soviet Union not only strengthens the treaty but has innumerable beneficial long-term consequences.

In negotiating the INF treaty, the United States failed to pursue the inspection issue fully out of fear of disclosures about our own sensitive installations. I am deeply convinced that such protection is much less important to us than knowledge about the highly secret installations in the Soviet Union. We can hardly keep any secrets from the Soviets, but the opposite statement is not true. I hope that in future negotiations we shall place maximum emphasis on openness.

The most vital question I must address in this testimony concerns our national approach to the problem of deterring a third world war. We are engaged today in an arms reduction procedure linked to openness and, at least in some measure, to cooperation with the Soviet Union. Yet a deep division in U.S. politics, a lack of cooperation among ourselves, produces an unreliability in our nation's foreign policy. A bipartisan spirit should indeed be cultivated in regard to the reduction of massive aggressive armaments and in regard to the facts, effects, and prospects of technological changes in military affairs.

Deterrence has been and remains the necessary cornerstone of our national military policy, but the unhealed division, drawn largely along party lines, about the necessary means to deter war has become a major stumbling block to our security. The disagreement is over whether the greatest emphasis should be placed on disarmament treaties, or whether the physical means to maintain strength, which given our era are based on rapidly changing technologies, should be emphasized.

President Reagan has successfully and in a balanced manner pursued both avenues. The treaty under consideration today is the first in the history of negotiations to provide for an actual reduction in weapons and provides a real advance in verification procedures. During his term of office, the most pressing problems of our conventional military forces have been addressed, and even more important, research in strategic defense, an area of military affairs that has been ignored in a unilateral manner for three decades, has been initiated.

This committee is probably aware of the remarkable strides the Soviet Union has made in defense research and deployment. There may not have been sufficient discussion of the consequences of that progress on the retaliation deterrence of the United States. One aspect of the Strategic Defense Initiative has received particularly little attention. That is the active cooperation on defense research within the free world, involving Britain, West Germany, Italy, Israel, and Japan as well as the United States. Both Soviet and allied developments indicate that significant and rapid technical progress in defensive measures is occurring.

A dual approach of treaties and defense should be taken most seriously. No one can maintain that treaties alone will make peace 100 percent certain. Nobody claims that defensive measures will stop 100 percent of incoming rockets were there to be a massive attack. Yet the combination of treaties together with the development and deployment of defensive measures could reduce the danger of a catastrophic conflict almost to the vanishing point. If the removal of a whole rank of deterrent weapons could be tied to the deployment of effective defense, the concerns of our NATO allies would be much reduced.

Considerations of strategic defense cannot be accomplished without a full, realistic examination of the question of how much defense will cost. Estimates vary by as much as a factor of 100, with low values in the tens of billions, and high values in the trillions of dollars. Neither the low estimates of the proponents nor the high estimates of the critics are based on realistic evaluation. Both arguments are short on experience. Only if a pilot operation is executed, can we begin to have a realistic feeling of the shape of things to come.

Once we have a realistic picture of what defense can accomplish, cooperation between the democracies can play an increasingly important role in stabilizing peace and raising mutual confidence. At the end of the road, there is the prospect of sharing defensive measures for the benefit of everyone, as proposed in the original announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative.

Having been born in a country where all attempts toward a democratic order have been frustrated, having spent more than half a century in the country where democracy in all matters is most fully practiced, and having worked half my life on difficult controversial issues, I am filled with admiration for the practical successes of the United States.

In the international arena the United States achieved a completely unprecedented success through the Marshall Plan and the other measures that helped Germany and Japan to assume constructive roles in the world. That success was due to the initiative of an exceptionally great Democratic president, Harry S. Truman. That policy was made possible by the cooperation of the Republicans of that period. So great a success depends upon a bilateral foreign policy, on a clearly agreed upon, unified purpose. Such a purpose was present in the decades during which unified development was planned for the North Atlantic world. Today, we need Senators of the stature and vision of Arthur H. Vandenberg, who had the courage to dismiss party concerns and outdated ideas, and work for a future world in which peace could be more secure.

President Reagan has made his contribution to a bipartisan foreign policy aimed at deterring a major conflict. There are obvious signs that leaders of the Democratic party are considering a response whereby arms control and strategic defense could be made into a dual support for a stable future. Ratification of the INF treaty will not suffice. Ratification must go hand in hand with a sensible, consistent bipartisan policy that acknowledges evolving technologies in strategic defense in the Soviet Union and supports and encourages the efforts of the United States and its allies in the same promising field.

I offer the Senate Foreign Relations Committee one opinion from the area of my expertise. My experience in regard to arms limitation treaties is that those treaties dealing with weapons of attack make good sense. Those treaties about weapons of defense, which the United States neglected for many decades, make no sense. We know far too little to introduce limitations or even to negotiate wisely.

I recommend that the Senate consider the INF treaty on a bipartisan basis together with strategic defense. Let the race to deploy obsolescent means of mass destruction be ended. At the same time, let us make great efforts toward international cooperation in the field of defensive instruments, which can deter aggression and increase the chances of stability. Our team in Geneva conducted negotiations with those objectives in mind. I hope that the results of those negotiations will be fully supported by the ratification procedure of the INF treaty.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BURTON YALE PINES

I appreciate the opportunity to comment on the proposed U.S.-Soviet INF Treaty. As negotiated and signed, the treaty is seriously flawed. A great number of witnesses before this committee already have explained INF's military flaws. I intend to focus on its political flaws: how it aids the Soviet Union and how it threatens our ties with our NATO allies.

The first of these political problems is the strong possibility that ratification of this treaty could breed the euphoria which ignites a new spirit of detente. I fear that this could blind us to the dangers that still lurk in the world.

Despite Gorbachev's soothing rhetoric, there has been no evidence so far that Moscow has changed any of its foreign policy or strategic aims. Tactics differ strikingly, but the goals remain the same -- to drive a wedge between the U.S. and NATO's European members; to denuclearize Europe; to neutralize Germany; and, as a result, to dissolve NATO. A French official earlier this year wrote: "Never have the Soviets advertised so openly the objectives the West has always attributed to them: denuclearization of Europe, delinkage of Europe and the United States, and the creation of a new all European security system."

We must remember that the spirit of INF and of Glasnost is not the Kremlin's first peace offensive. Not its first New Look. Not its first United Front. Not its first Thaw. Not its first Spirit of Rapallo. Not its first Spirit of Geneva. Not its first Spirit of Camp David.

The second political problem with INF is that removing intermediate-range nuclear weapons from West European soil would remove one of the most important concrete links coupling the security of the U.S. with that of Western Europe. Without those missiles in Western Europe, it is said by many West Europeans that America's pledge to defend its NATO allies would be less credible. "Decoupling," of course, is the primordial fear of many West Europeans.

The Pershings and Cruises, as we know, were not deployed to specifically couple U.S. security tighter to Western Europe's. Deployment was to offset the Soviet SS-20s. Yet the unintended beneficial result of deployment was to link more tightly together both sides of the Atlantic. Moscow understands this; NATO commanders understand this; Washington apparently does not. In this sense, Moscow's deployment of its SS-20 was an enormous blunder because it brought American INF bases to Europe. It is a blunder, however, from which the Soviets could recover because of the treaty.

Is this so bad? After all, the INF agreement simply restores the European nuclear balance to the status quo ante -- the situation of 1979. And we were pretty satisfied with the 1979 balance of theater nuclear forces.

It is bad for two reasons. First, even though it was somewhat inadvertent, the result of sending intermediate-range U.S. missiles to Europe has given NATO commanders added flexibility, thus strengthening the Alliance militarily; withdrawing the missiles weakens the Alliance.

Second, history cannot be erased. We cannot pretend that we can return to 1979 as if intervening events never occurred. Although removing INF from Europe leaves the U.S. coupled as tightly to Western Europe as it was in 1979, it is not as tight as it is right now, with the Pershings and Cruises in place. Psychologically, therefore, it is a serious mistake to pull the missiles out. The West Europeans will be justified in feeling that the U.S. is pulling away from them a bit.

Making matters worse, is the West German calculation of a European battlefield without the American INFs. In such a battlefield it is Germany on which the remaining European-based nuclear weapons will explode. And it is mainly Germany in which a possible conventional East-West war will be fought. It is no wonder that, in the wake of the INF negotiations, the West Germans have begun sounding more accommodating towards the Soviet Union. It is no wonder that neutralism is beginning to sound like a good idea to increasing numbers of West Germans.

This, I believe, is the reality of the present situation.

How do we deal with it?

Let me offer a few observations.

1) If INF cannot be renegotiated and if ratification by the Senate is inevitable, then we must assure that the ratification process carefully scrutinizes the emerging U.S.-Soviet relationship. These hearings, other Senate hearings and those in the House must define the limits and dangers of this relationship. By these hearings, we must make certain that we know to what we are agreeing, why we are agreeing to it and what we

expect from ourselves and the Soviets. We must not permit ourselves to repeat the mistake of the hurried ratification which characterized SALT I which, in its wake, left serious ambiguities. And these hearings must educate the U.S. public about the fundamental issues raised by INF and INF's effect on the American commitment to NATO's defense.

Just as the public learned from two congressional hearings in the past year an enormous amount about Robert Bork and about Administration policy towards the Contras, so the public can learn about the nature of the U.S. commitment to NATO and the threats which NATO faces. The main point of these hearings thus should educate the American public, to signal Moscow and to reassure NATO that America understands the dangers inherent in the new superpower dynamic and that the U.S. will not abandon NATO.

2) We should recognize that despite the flaws with INF and the haste in concluding the agreement, the U.S. deserves credit for bringing Gorbachev to the negotiating table. Deployment of the Pershing IIs and the Cruise Missiles probably took Moscow by surprise. Soviet ability to block the neutron bomb in the mid-1970s surely gave the Kremlin confidence that it could veto major Western weapons decisions. Moscow must have been surprised too by Reagan's success at winning support for the modernization of the U.S. arsenal -- building the B-1 bomber, the MX missile, the 600-ship navy. The lesson in this is clear. We can deal with Moscow only from strength.

3) The U.S. must work on finding ways to strengthen U.S.-NATO ties to prevent the appearance of decoupling. To compensate for the eventual withdrawal of INF systems from Western Europe, we should begin taking, as NATO Commander John Galvin urges, "buttressing measures," such as the modernization of the 3,250 nuclear artillery shells, gravity bombs and other tactical weapons that will remain in NATO's arsenal. Other compensatory measures include assigning U.S.-based bombers armed with air-launched cruise missiles to NATO, deploying nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles in NATO waters and assigning additional ballistic missile submarines to NATO.

And, of course, we and especially the West Europeans, really have to do more to strengthen our conventional forces. We can, for example, fulfill NATO's proclaimed force goals, improve NATO air defenses, provide more operational reserve forces and enhance anti-tank, command and control and strategic lift capabilities.

To coordinate our effort in the wake of the INF agreement, the U.S. should call for a NATO summit. Atop the agenda should be the discussion of how the Alliance can offset the loss of INF through improvements in conventional forces and through nuclear arms permitted by the accord.

To signal further its commitment to NATO, Congress should abandon any attempts to restrict allied participation in our Strategic Defense Initiative. Congress, for example, should reject proposals to restrict the foreign -- this means mainly West European -- role in the SDI program entirely to projects which cannot be fulfilled by U.S. firms. Rather, a broad allied role in SDI should be encouraged.

4) We must devise a political strategy to accompany INF. We must ensure that the Soviet Union is viewed in perspective. This means that we must describe to our countrymen how the USSR remains a military threat to the U.S., the West and Third World countries. We must explain that Gorbachev is not the first Soviet leader to sing seductively of freedom and peaceful coexistence.

We must expose Soviet disinformation efforts vigorously to demonstrate to Americans and West Europeans that the Soviets, despite their sweeter rhetoric, remain on the ideological offensive. We must expose the fact that Moscow spreads stories that AIDs was created by U.S. Army laboratories. Or that the U.S. routinely kidnaps Latin American children to use their organs for transplants. Or that U.S. intelligence agents killed young Samantha Smith because she was working for peace. Or that the CIA was behind the assassination of Indira Gandhi and so forth.

We must expose more vigorously than we have in the past Soviet violations of their treaty promises. If we continue to be reluctant to do so, we cannot expect Americans or West Europeans to be realistic in their assessment of Soviet promises.

We must insist on strict linkage between Soviet strategic agreements and improved Soviet behavior in selected areas -- such as improved human rights inside the Soviet

Union or reduced Soviet support of terrorists or an end to Moscow's troublemaking in the Third World.

We must speak often and publicly about the enormous problems involved in conventional force reduction. Policymakers, the press and the public must understand the situation sufficiently not to be fooled, for instance, by a Soviet offer to withdraw Soviet troops from Eastern Europe in exchange for an American pullout from Western Europe.

We must devise litmus tests by which Moscow can prove that there genuinely is a Soviet New Reality. We can echo, for instance, Ronald Reagan's call for Gorbachev to tear down the Berlin Wall or that there be a public repudiation of the Brezhnev Doctrine or that a definite timetable be announced for Soviet troop withdrawals from Afghanistan.

To sum up, the events of the past year or so that culminated in the INF treaty pose a new challenge to NATO. It is a major challenge. To assure that the Alliance will survive intact, a number of military measures are needed. As important, a political strategy and deft tactics are required to insure that INF does not launch us on another detente joy ride and to insure that INF does not weaken NATO.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF R. ADM. ROBERT H. SPIRO, JR.

Thank you Mr. Chairman, and thank you members of the Committee for giving me an opportunity to testify on the pending INF Treaty. I am appearing before you as a representative of the bi-partisan American Security Council, and as the former Under Secretary of the Army during the Carter Administration. Admiral Thomas Moorer (USN, Ret.), the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a Vice President of the American Security Council wanted to appear before you, but unfortunately he is in Europe today and he asked me to represent a group of over 1,000 retired Admirals and Generals that he assembled.

The Treaty before you is one that my retired flag officer colleagues and I have given a great deal of consideration. Ever since I was on active duty in World War II, I have firmly believed in a bi-partisan defense and foreign policy. I have often stated my concurrence with the late Senator Henry (Scoop) Jackson's belief that "in matters of national security, the best politics is no politics." I sincerely wanted to support this treaty, but after careful consideration I must tell you that I believe it is not in our national security interests.

The major item I want to present to you are two combined petitions. The first is signed by 2,074 retired flag officers opposing any arms control agreement that would lock the United States into strategic or military inferiority, and the second petition is signed by over 1000 senior retired flag officers, and it urges opposition to the INF Treaty.

The group of 1,000 senior retired military officers are a diverse group of educated and experienced officers who share very strong reservations about the INF Treaty in its present form.

As retired officers, they are free to speak their minds honestly and openly. With an average level of military service of 32 years, and having reached the highest levels within the services, they represent more than 32,000 years of thoughtful military experience.

They are men and women of peace. They have survived America's wars during the past three generations. Most have been in battle. They have experienced the horrors of war and want no further part of war and injury and death for themselves, their children and grandchildren, their country.

I am one of this group, a Reservist who volunteered for service as an enlisted man on December 27, 1941. I served 19 months -- without a night ashore -- aboard a destroyer in the Pacific Theater during 1943-1945, concluding that service in a devastating Kamikaze crash on my ship in April 1945. I then served another 32 1/2 years in the Naval Reserve before retiring.

But with my fellow flag and general officers I know that the only road to peace is through strength. Irresolution, weakness, unpreparedness, and lack of will inevitably lead to war.

We, the 1,000 officers of the Coalition of Peace Through Strength believe that the proposed INF Treaty, as negotiated and presented to the Senate, is very seriously flawed and is dangerous to the security of the U.S.

President Reagan on March 12, 1987 gave this unambiguous assurance to the Congress, that Soviet "compliance with past arms control agreements is an essential prerequisite for future arms control agreements. . . strict compliance with all provisions of arms control agreements is fundamental, and this Administration will not accept anything less."

A CIA sponsored study conducted by Dr. Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., describes Soviet arms control policy:

> . . . the only arms the Soviet Union seeks to control are U.S. arms. Arms control to the Soviets is a strategic military and intelligence operation that is in opposition to Western concepts of arms control in nearly all respects. Cheating is deliberate in Soviet arms control policy and is planned even before agreements are signed.

Admiral Moorer, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, asserts that:

> Prior to the 1972 SALT I Treaty, the Soviets violated 24 of 25 summit agreements. Since then, the General Advisory Committee of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has found material cheating on 9 current treaties and 4 international agreements.

General Bernard Rogers, who served for most of this decade as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, believes that U.S. intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Western Europe are an essential link between NATO's conventional forces and its strategic nuclear ones. Once the only European based missiles which can reach the USSR are removed, he fears, the Soviet Union can increasingly blackmail Western Europe into doing its will, leaving the U.S. isolated and impotent.

The French Defense Minister, Andre Giraud, reportedly said last fall that the French see the INF Treaty as a "nuclear Munich."

Admiral Moorer further asserts that the Soviets have outspent the U.S. on both strategic offensive and defensive weapons by over $500 billion from SALT I to 1985, and are now way ahead in missile defense.

While Soviet words are currently soft and reassuring, Soviet intransigence in Nicaragua, Cuba, Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan continues unabated. And while a few individuals have been permitted to emigrate, the Soviet Union continues flagrantly to violate human rights despite the Helsinki Pact, which its representatives solemnly signed more than a decade ago.

The two chief merits of the INF Treaty, claimed by proponents, are asymmetrical reductions and on-site verification. Regrettably, both these pillars of the Treaty can, we believe, be circumvented by the Soviet Union with relative ease. We believe the Treaty in its present form is unverifiable and unenforceable. We are also concerned about the Treaty's data discrepancies.

We believe that the arms control process has dramatically increased the threat to U.S. security. We are deeply concerned about the lack of a U.S. grand strategy of national security. This treaty, and others that my be negotiated in May and beyond, must weigh carefully the totality of U.S. national security; arms control treaties are vital to national security, but they are only a part of the total consideration which the Congress, the President, and the American people must take into account.

Thus, on behalf of the Coalition for Peace Through Strength, I present to this Committee, and to the U.S. Senate, our Petition, approved by more than 1,000 retired flag and general officers, urging:

1) the adoption of a national strategy of peace through strength;

2) termination of the ABM Treaty, to build SDI;

3) rejection of the INF and START Treaties.

We request your careful consideration of our views. Thank you.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARTIN COLMAN

[I must begin by stating that while there are many views about the details of the INF within our organization, nonetheless the thrust of these remarks reflects a long standing policy of the American Foundation for Resistance International. These policies have also been unanimously resolved by both the Bern and Vienna conferences which where primarily sponsored by our Foundation and included the major independent human rights groups from each of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries]

I have come before you today to express several concerns about the INF Treaty. However let me preface my remarks by stating that I am not calling for the Senate to reject the Treaty, instead, I intend to address an aspect of the Treaty that has been heretofore largely ignored, and through which the intent of this Treaty can be greatly strengthened. Additionally nothing which I am about to suggest would require a "killer" amendment nor would it require renegotiation with the Soviets. Instead I will be advocating greater compliance and increased stability through reinforced agreements.

While an increasing number of questions are being raised as to the compliance and verifiability of the INF Treaty many are suggesting that the real significance of this Treaty is not its military but its political value, that it includes great symbolism. If that is in fact the case then the following recommendation is all the more imperative.

There exists a compliance agreement in which, both we and the Soviets have agreed to certain obligations that are is essential for all relations and agreements. We have also agreed not to undertake agreements which would undermine existing accords and further to implement agreed provisions.

I refer of course to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Helsinki 1975 (Final Act). It was the Helsinki Accords in which, we and the Soviets solemnly took upon ourselves very clear and explicit obligations which govern our entire relationship in the areas of human rights, science, culture, commerce, and most significantly peace and disarmament. The great misperception about the Accords is that this is just a Human rights agreement not so. This is an umbrella agreement which established a framework under which the 35 states that includes the Warsaw Pact and NATO) determined a whole category of principles which controls all our mutual dealings. We agreed, for example that peace and respect for human rights are not two separate issues but multifacets of a single interdependent issue. It was agreed not only by us but by the Soviets, that nations who had the restraint of their people through respect for freedom to protest, speak, write, assemble and petition their government (among other rights), where less likely to be aggressive. We have in fact agreed that the best verification procedure is, an open society. Try to name, for example, the last time that two major democracies declared war on each other. I have attached for the convenience of this committee quotations from the accords which clearly establish this case. THIS IS NOT LINKAGE, they are multidimensions of a single, issue which profoundly and regularly, impact each other.

EXCERPTS FROM THE HELSINKI ACCORDS

The participating States in/Reaffirming their objective to promoting better relations among themselves and ensuring conditions in which their people can live in true and lasting peace free from any threat to or attempt against their security;

Recognizing the close link between peace and security in Europe and in the world as a whole and conscious of the need for each of them to make its contribution to the strengthening of world peace and security and to the promotion of fundamental rights, economic and social progress and well-being for all peoples;

The participating States will refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in their international relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations and with the present Declaration. No consideration may be invoked to serve to warrant resort to the threat or use of force in contravention of this principle.

Accordingly, the participating States will refrain from any acts constituting a threat of force or direct or indirect use of force against another participating State. Likewise they will refrain from any manifestation of force for the purpose of inducing another participating State to renounce the full

> *exercise of its sovereign rights. Likewise they will also refrain in their mutual relations from any act of reprisal by force.*
>
> *No such threat or use of force will be employed as a means of settling disputes, or questions likely to give rise to disputes, between them.*
>
> *The participating States recognize the universal significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for which is an essential factor for the peace, justice and well-being necessary to ensure the development of friendly relations and co-operation among themselves as among all States.*
>
> *They will constantly respect these rights and freedoms in their mutual relations and will endeavour jointly and separately, including in co-operation with the United Nations, to promote universal and effective respect for them.*
>
> *They confirm the right of the individual to know and act upon his rights and duties in this field.*
>
> *In the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the participating States will act in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They will also fulfil their as set forth in the international declarations and agreements in this field, including inter alia the International Covenants on Human Rights, by which they may be bound.*
>
> *Reaffirming that they will respect and give effect to refraining from the threat or use of force and convinced of the necessity to make it an effective norm of international life,*
>
> *The participating States recognize the interest of all of them in efforts aimed at lessening military confrontation and promoting disarmament which are designed to complement political detente in Europe and to strengthen their security. They are convinced of the necessity to take effective measures in these fields which by their scope and by their nature constitute steps towards the ultimate achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and which should result in strengthening peace and security throughout the world.*
>
> *Having considered the views expressed on various subjects related to the strengthening of security in Europe through joint efforts aimed at promoting detente and disarmament, the participating States, when engaged such efforts, will, in this context, proceed, in particular, from the following essential considerations:*
>
> *--The complementary nature of the political and military aspects of security;*
>
> *--The interrelation between the security of each participating State and security in Europe as a whole and the relationship which exists, in the broader context of world security, between security in Europe and security in the Mediterranean area; (Helsinki Final Act)*

Accordingly it should be noted that successor and subsidiary agreements such as the INF were envisioned by the Accords.

It was in Helsinki, that the U.S. and the Soviets for the first time signed an agreement which included, all the NATO and Warsaw Pact states, that specifically: prohibited the use of force and occupation of territory; mandated the peaceful settlement of disputes; PLEDGED THEMSELVES TO PEACE AND DISARMAMENT; and established a regime of confidence building measures such as troop movement notifications (which the Soviets violate) and an exchange of observers (which are harassed and even sometimes shot as in the case of Maj. Nicholson).

EXCERPTS FROM THE HELSINKI ACCORDS

Document on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament

The participating States,

Desirous of eliminating the causes of tension that may exist among them and thus of contributing to the strengthening of peace and security in the world;

Determined to strengthen confidence among them and thus to contribute to increasing stability and security in Europe;

Determined further to refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in their international relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations and with the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States as adopted in the Final Act;

Recognizing the need to contribute to reducing the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities which could give rise to apprehension, particularly in a situation where the participating States lack clear and timely information about the nature of such activities;

Taking into account considerations relevant to efforts aimed at lessening tension and promoting disarmament;

Recognizing that the exchange of observers by invitation at military manoeuvres will help to promote contracts and mutual understanding;

Having studies the question of prior notification of major military movements in the context of confidence-building;

Recognizing that there are other ways in which individual States can contribute further to their common objectives;

Convinced of the political importance of prior notification of major military manoeuvre for the promotion of mutual understanding and the strengthening of confidence, stability and security;

Accepting the responsibility of each of them to promote these objectives and to implement this measure, in accordance with the accepted criteria and modalities, as essentials for the realization of these-objectives; (Helsinki, Final Act)

There is an important aspect of this Treaty which is so far dangerously ignored. **This is the first time since the Helsinki Accords where signed that we have a new agreement which affects the primary issues covered by Helsinki.**

We are, in fact, negotiating for something already bought and paid for. To enact the INF now, in the face of massive Soviet violations of C.S.C.E is, to undermine the Helsinki process, decimate this underlying agreement, demoralize the human rights movements of the East block, distance ourselves from our allies, and demonstrate that there is a reward, not a penalty for violating an agreement with us, and the reward is, more agreements, and most importantly a vote to ratify this treaty while ignoring C.S.C.E. is, a vote against Helsinki. I must point out here that this would place us in clear violation of the Accords which we are obligated to enforce in all of our dealings, even unilaterally.

EXCERPTS FROM THE HELSINKI ACCORDS

The participating States) Declare their determination to respect and put into practice, each of them in its relations with all other participating States, irrespective of their political, economic or social systems as well as of their size, geographical location or level of economic development, the following principles, which all are of primary significance, guiding their mutual relations:

All the principles set forth above ar of primary significance and, accordingly, they will be equally and unreservedly applied, each of them being interpreted taking into account the others.

The participating States express their determination fully to respect and apply these principles, as set forth in the present Declaration, in all aspects, to their mutual relations and co-operation in order to ensure to each participating State the benefits resulting from the respect and application of these principles by all.

X Fulfillment in Good Faith of Obligations Under International Law

"The participating States will fulfill in good faith their obligations under international law, both those obligations arising from the generally recognized principles and rules of international law and those obligations arising from treaties or other agreements, in conformity with international with international law, to which they are parties.

In exercising their sovereign rights, including the right to determine their laws and regulations, they will conform with their legal obligations under international law; they will furthermore pay due regard to and implement the provisions in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation."

Matters Related to Giving Effect to Certain of the Above Principles

The participating States,

--To take effective measures which by their scope and by their nature constitute steps towards the ultimate achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Having considered the views expressed on various subjects related to the strengthening of security in Europe through joint efforts aimed at promoting detente and disarmament, the participating States, when engaged in such efforts, will, in this context, proceed, in particular, from the following essential considerations:

--The complementary nature of the political and military aspects of security;

--The interrelation between the security of each participating State and security in Europe as a whole and the relationship which exists, in the broader context of world security, between security in Europe and security in the Mediterranean area;

The participating States,

Intending to implement the provisions of the Final Act of the Conference in order to give full effect to its results and thus to further the process of improving security and developing co-operation in Europe,

1. Declare their resolve, in the period following the Conference to pay due regard to and implement the provisions of the Final Act of the Conference:

(a) unilaterally, in all cases which lend themselves to such action;

(b) bilaterally, by negotiations with other participating States;

(c) multilaterally, by meetings of experts of the participating States." (Helsinki Final Act)

To separate these issues now, and ratify the INF in the face of these massive violations is, to choose between Helsinki and INF. Further, I am not suggesting that we renegotiate anything with the Soviets. All that we need in this matter was negotiated in C.S.C.E. Therefore, what I recommend to this Committee requires nothing that the Soviets have not already agreed to, and would enhance the prospects for security and peace, treaty compliance and overall better relations. My recommendation therefore is for the Senate to set the implementation date of this Treaty, once it is ratified, to coincide with the President's public certification that the Soviets are in full compliance with all the terms of C.S.C.E.(This only requires a statement by the President, which could take the form of a Senate declaration attached to the Treaty, mandating the President to act and requiring no new negotiations with the Soviets or to change the Treaty).

EXAMPLE:

Recommendation One

WHEREAS, The basis and framework for the INF Treaty is a part of the overall umbrella established in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe;

"The Senate shall set the implementation date of the INF Treaty to coincide with the President's certification to the Senate that the Soviets are in full compliance with all the provisions of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Treaty Authority Language

Relevant Articles from the Treaty to Eliminate Intermediate and Shorter Range Missiles

Article XVII

"This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification."

Article XVI

"Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures set forth in Article XVII governing the entry into force of this Treaty."

Let me make very clear that I do not support and in fact would adamantly oppose any resolutions or expressions that seek to satisfy the concerns over Helsinki but that have no binding affect on policy. We have seen in the past how such expressions, encourage dissidents to risk their lives for our values in the false belief that we will back them up.

Is there really a credible argument that we should not insist on compliance with related agreements, prior to accepting the other parties signature once more.

The importance of supporting what can be achieved by compliance with C.S.C.E. is demonstrated by, the verification controversies already underway with the INF.

We are told that rejecting this Treaty would upset our European friends, whose arms we twisted to support it to begin with and it would of course put a chill in East/West relations. Abandoning Helsinki by ignoring them in this process will cause much more lasting harm to the alliance and to Soviet perceptions of U.S. policy. We can hardly expect others to depend on our word or respect our values when we readily abandon them ourselves.

Full C.S.C.E. compliance, and having the ability to verify and in concert with "Confidence Building" measures, as the Accords refer to it could eliminate the numerous problems with the Treaty. As this committee is already aware our foreign policy establishment has gone to extreme effort to certify and reaffirm nearly anything the Soviets tell us. I refer of course to the controversy over the Memorandum of Understanding and the number of counted and countable missiles, their locations and the numbers that may or may not have already been destroyed. To paraphrase what former Assistant Secretary Richard Perle has said there are many easy ways in which the Soviets could hide missiles and violate the Treaty without us ever knowing.

If our NATO allies now seek to cut their own deals to cover themselves with the Soviets, the blame will rest in Washington and nowhere else. To encourage the neutralist tendencies in Europe could be a mistake of incalculable proportions.

This Treaty is being sold to the American people as an instrument through which an entire class of weapons are being eliminated world wide. The question is, does it really do that, and if it does not, will the American people support the Treaty when we discover that we have been deceived. I am concerned that this may eliminate public support for legitimate arms control. Among these issues are the SS-24's and SS-25's, which are completely left out of the Treaty, simply because the Soviets have told us that they are longer range missiles. This does not mean that they are not nuclear missiles for Europe. This only means that they can be fired from a greater variety of locations from deep within Soviet territory, making them even harder to verify. We know that they can be, and may already have been, retargeted for Western Europe. Therefore, it may be that we are participating in an American missile elimination process, while supporting a Soviet missile modernization program. If amendments are to be considered for the Treaty, then including the SS-24's and 25's it is important for confidence in the process and if the Soviets are in fact being honest they should have no objection. After all, ALCM, SLCM, and GLCM are eliminated for the same reason, although unwisely in that case, since this provision may encourage Soviet violations while limiting our conventional deterrence. However if amendments are not possible, this all the more reaffirms the necessity of full compliance with existing agreements so that an atmosphere of understanding and cooperation that does not currently exist can be established.

I have enumerated below two more recommendations having to do with the vital issue of conventional forces in Europe and they as well do not amend the Treaty, they would be declarations affecting our administration's behavior.

Recommendation Two

WHEREAS, The success of the INF Treaty depends on Soviet compliance and most importantly the U.S. government's absolute insistence on compliance it is therefore essential that all security agreements between our nations be maintained in full compliance;

"The Senate shall set the implementation date of the INF Treaty to coincide with the President's certification to the Senate that the Soviet Union is currently in full compliance with all agreements of a security nature to which the U.S. and Soviet Union are signatories."

Recommendation Three

WHEREAS, the long standing policy of the U.S. and NATO is that peace in Europe Continues to depend on deterrence, AND

WHEREAS, the Senate does not wish for the prospects for peace to be diminished by the INF Treaty and instead seeks to insure that accompanying action enhance peace and the success the treaty's intent;

"The Senate shall set the implementation date of the INF Treaty to coincide with the final Appropriation of additional funds to increase U.S. conventional forces in NATO sufficiently to equal the level of deterrence that existed with the Pershing II's in place (prior to the INF Treaty) (i.e. "mutual balance of conventional forces"). Accordingly, the President is requested to send to Congress the details of this funding request expeditiously so as not to delay the implementation of the treaty."

My final recommendation to this Committee is to create an incentive for the Soviets to comply. I believe that it is axiomatic that since so much of the Treaty depends on interpretation and trust that any violation would constitute a violation of the entire underlying meaning of the Treaty. Therefore, the Treaty should automatically terminate upon any violation.(Once again this would be in the form of legislation obligating the President to serve termination notice in accordance with the Treaty. No amendment required.)

Whereas, complete compliance is essential to the success of the Treaty and no violation can be tolerated;

"The Senate shall include in its accompanying legislation or as a legislative directive attached as a declaration to the Treaty a provision requiring that the President in no uncertain terms, invoke Article XV, paragraph two, of the Treaty upon the discovery by the administration of any violation of the Treaty's terms."

I request that while there has not been sufficient time to read all of my remarks in open session that my printed statement be entered into the record as having been read.

Thank you.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OF THE AFL-CIO

The recently concluded treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear forces serves the security interests of the United States and its NATO allies and merits the consent of the Senate.

In several important respects, the Treaty conforms with arms control proposals advanced by the AFL-CIO over the past five years. Chief among these is that, unlike past agreements that set ceilings on increases in the number of weapons allowed each side, this treaty reduces the number of nuclear weapons and does so by eliminating an entire class of them.

The AFL-CIO concurs with the findings of its Committee on Defense that these reductions will not adversely affect NATO's deterrence capability.

Although the Treaty deals with only three percent of the nuclear arsenals on both sides, it establishes two precedent-setting principles that may open the way toward real progress in both strategic and conventional arms control.

The first is that asymmetrical or disproportionate reductions are required to achieve equivalent numbers of weapons on each side--the number in the case of intermediate-range nuclear forces being zero.

The second is that compliance with the Treaty requires intrusive verification, i.e., on-site inspection. The INF Treaty marks the first time the Soviets have agreed to these principles, which the AFL-CIO has called for in the past.

The AFL-CIO believes that the INF Treaty would never have been achieved were it not for the political unity and determination demonstrated by the NATO alliance, despite a massive Soviet propaganda campaign aimed at driving a wedge between the United States and Europe. Had the Alliance not proceeded with the deployment of cruise and Pershing missiles, in the face of Soviet deployments of the SS-20s, there would have been little inducement for the Soviets to return to the bargaining table.

In urging Senate approval of the INF Treaty, the AFL-CIO is under no illusion that this agreement, in isolation, will remove the impetus to the arms race or achieve dramatic reductions in military spending.

The elimination of INF weapons necessarily focuses attention on the conventional force imbalance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, an imbalance Gorbachev has implicitly acknowledged by publicly agreeing to the principle of "disproportionate" cuts in conventional forces. There is now an urgent need to reach agreement on achieving balanced conventional force reductions, so that NATO will be not be compelled to build up its conventional forces.

The AFL-CIO notes the view of many defense experts that, in a post-INF era, the maintenance of a credible deterrence against a Warsaw Pact attack on Western Europe will require a restructuring of U.S. strategic nuclear forces. As the strategic arms limitations talks proceed, the Executive Council calls upon the Defense Committee to study what, if any, such restructuring might be required within the framework of the AFL-CIO's repeated calls for radical, balanced and verifiable reductions in strategic nuclear warheads.

The goal of the AFL-CIO continues to be the maintenance of a credible deterrence to war at ever lower levels of nuclear armaments. It is not necessary to believe that the erosion of that deterrence would provoke an immediate Soviet invasion of Europe to appreciate that it would significantly enhance the Soviets' political leverage and powers of intimidation in the region, to the detriment of American security.

The INF Treaty is a step toward our goal--but only a step. Its ultimate value will be determined by whether comparable progress can be made in the reduction of conventional and strategic forces.

SUPPORT OF NATO STRATEGY IN THE 1990'S

OVERVIEW

Purpose

The following report concerns U.S. and allied planning for the future security posture of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

It responds to the Congressional request (spelled out in the Appendix) that the Secretary of Defense discuss how Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) missile reductions fit with NATO objectives and how they relate to the Alliance's flexible response strategy. In so doing, the report reflects consultation with NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It includes seven supporting sections matched to specific questions from the Congress. This Overview discusses these important matters involving flexible response, defense requirements, arms control and developing programs. All involve issues which are integral to the support of NATO and America's overall strategy -- aimed at bolstering deterrence, strengthening our alliances, and decreasing Soviet military advantages.

The INF Agreement

The INF Treaty provides for the U.S. and the Soviet Union to eliminate all their ground-launched missile systems with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, worldwide.

This is a major achievement for NATO and its policy. It not only represents the culmination of years of negotiation with the Soviet Union, but also years of steadfast NATO resolve in maintaining and advancing our shared security interests. At the same time, it should not stimulate a false sense of security nor become an excuse to reduce defense efforts. For decades we have included arms control as one of several measures available to improve our security posture. We have never pursued it as an end in itself.

In 1979, NATO met the rapid expansion in the dangerous nuclear missile threat to Europe with a "dual-track" decision to deploy U.S. PERSHING IIs and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM), and at the same time work to negotiate the reduction of Soviet INF missiles. In the 1980's, the U.S. and NATO also began comprehensive modernization efforts directed toward restoration of badly needed nuclear and conventional capabilities. Together, these initiatives will strengthen our Alliance and will enhance our security, if we are steadfast in pursuing them.

The INF Treaty contributes to NATO security in several ways. First, it will reduce the military threat to Western Europe and Asia. Under its provisions the Soviet Union will eliminate forces capable of delivering over 1600 nuclear warheads. Many of the systems have conventional and chemical warfare capabilities which, of course, will also be eliminated. For this reason, such reductions complement efforts by NATO and other allies to deal with the existing and very serious Soviet advantages in non-nuclear forces.

The removal of a complete class of missile systems will reduce the Soviet Union's ability to strike critical targets throughout Western Europe without recourse to its strategic weapons. In addition to relieving pressures on our own nuclear forces, and related command and control facilities, this should improve NATO's ability to reinforce its conventional forces during wartime by reducing the Soviet threat to air bases, ports, depots, and other facilities essential to that reinforcement effort.

Accompanying this reduction in the Soviet threat is the requirement that our side eliminate forces capable of delivering about 400 nuclear warheads. This will remove a part of our ability to strike targets in Eastern Europe and the Western USSR. Nevertheless, both East and West still will retain robust nuclear and conventional forces and capabilities, including ground-based nuclear systems as well as those carried by aircraft, ships and submarines. Significant risks to us, our allies, and friends in Europe as well as in Asia will remain.

We still have the pressing need to revitalize and strengthen our military capabilities for the 1990s, as was the case prior to the INF Agreement.

The Treaty, in addition to eliminating a category of weapons in which the Soviet Union has enjoyed a significant preponderance, will not impede NATO's ability to maintain and modernize a credible mix of nuclear and conventional forces. The United States will remain prepared to respond to aggression with its full range of forces, including its strategic nuclear arsenal, if necessary. Moreover, British and French independent nuclear forces will not be affected by the Treaty.

A second major way in which the INF Treaty promises to buttress NATO security is by enhancing the credibility of NATO as a whole and showing that our nations have the political will to make -- and stand by -- the tough decisions necessary to ensure our security, and to preserve our shared values.

The INF Treaty also promotes security by validating sound arms control principles. It affirms the principle of asymmetrical reductions to achieve equal U.S. and Soviet levels, which is now an important precedent for future negotiations in both the strategic nuclear and conventional fields. Moreover, the eliminations are global; they do not simply transfer the Soviet threat from one region of the world to another. And, the agreement does not rely on stated intentions, but rather on a very stringent verification regime.

The Treaty contributes to NATO's objectives. It promises to advance both NATO's military security and its political cohesion.

NATO Objectives

In May 1987, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff completed a review of the military significance of arms reductions. They concluded that our security interest would be served by a verifiable agreement to eliminate U.S. and Soviet INF missiles worldwide. That assessment has not changed. However, because of long-standing asymmetries, the INF Treaty must be an integral part of coordinated force planning which is designed to support our strategy. We must ensure the effectiveness and strength of NATO's nuclear and nonnuclear forces as NATO carries out INF reductions. This is a fundamental objective.

The INF Treaty preserves intact NATO's strategy of flexible response as a credible framework for deterring aggression and intimidation. To be effective, flexible response has always required that NATO possess deterrent capabilities that encompass a spectrum of possible responses to aggression. As a part of this overall deterrence posture, NATO maintains a spectrum of nuclear options which could be used to defeat an attack if needed, and to increase the Soviet risks in continuing the aggression.

It remains U.S. and NATO policy to deploy the minimum number of theater nuclear weapons in Europe required to do this job. Though its ground-launched nuclear missiles will be reduced in number, NATO will continue to maintain the forces needed to implement its strategy of flexible response and forward defense. This remains our consistent goal.

NATO Military Posture

Our military strengths and weaknesses are well-understood by NATO and there is consensus about needed improvements in defense capabilities. The U.S. and NATO also look to arms control where agreements will clearly support our efforts to improve security.

In recent times, Congress and this Administration have emphasized armaments cooperation as another means for speeding progress in NATO improvement efforts and for encouraging more acceptance of shared responsibilities.

Our allies, in fact, do more for NATO defense than is commonly recognized, but they can and should do even better. If we are to lower the risks associated with existing and projected conventional imbalances, our European and Canadian allies must find ways to help sustain and go beyond what has been achieved in the past few years. However, our allies are also independent nations, with individual priorities. In the coming months and years, we will all need to do more than perhaps ever before to limit possibilities for weakening our common purpose.

The U.S. commitment to the Alliance mission is clear. We will retain over 300,000 troops and about 4,000 theater nuclear warheads in Europe in support of U.S. and allied forces. An allocation of U.S. Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) warheads remains assigned to SACEUR. U.S. and allied strategic nuclear capabilities should also improve significantly in the 1990s.

Shortcomings in NATO's military posture would have been much more severe had it not been for the greater U.S. investment in defense over the past seven years. However, basic asymmetries still exist because of the Warsaw Pact's geographic advantage in its ability to reinforce land and air forces from the USSR, and the major quantitative advantages it maintains in essentially every category of offensive forces.

Ultimately, the strength of our military posture will depend on whether NATO nations will sustain the political will to take steps necessary to ensure their security. The Kremlin will certainly seek to engender an air of euphoria about East-West relations in order to undermine the resolve of NATO citizens to make difficult choices in spending for defense. The Soviets have already been quick to portray NATO modernization measures as circumvention of the INF Treaty and counterproductive to future arms agreements, while at the same time continuing to improve their own offensive capabilities.

To strengthen our security posture and to maintain the effectiveness of the Alliance as it enters its fifth decade, NATO political and military leaders will have to work harder at not letting our citizens forget the basic lessons we have learned about Soviet respect for strength and how they are prepared to exploit weakness.

NATO Plans

The nuclear and conventional modernization and improvement programs which NATO has underway are founded on consistent Alliance policy direction and extensive military planning.

With respect to nuclear forces, these requirements stem most directly from NATO's 1983 decision taken by Defense Ministers at Montebello to modernize NATO's theater nuclear force posture. The program calls for a range of measures to ensure that NATO's nuclear weapons are responsive, survivable, and effective, and on this basis the European nuclear stockpile was also reduced by over 1,400 warheads. NATO must continue with the modernization of its remaining nuclear forces. The NATO modernization programs which have high priority include: development of a dual-capable (nuclear-conventional) longer range follow-on to the LANCE surface-to-surface missile system; development of a tactical stand-off air-to-surface missile (TASM); modernization of nuclear artillery projectiles, dual-capable aircraft, and nuclear bombs; and continued improvement in nuclear security and survivability. None of these programs are constrained by the INF Treaty because the agreement in no way limits systems with ranges below 500 kilometers or dual-capable aircraft.

The NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) is reviewing how the theater nuclear force posture might be further adjusted in light of the security situation following implementation of an INF Agreement.

We will be consulting with our allies in the NPG and will address such adjustments in the U.S. program and budget process. In this way we will narrow the options and focus on approaches which reinforce stability and NATO's force improvement programs.

With respect to conventional forces, the need for substantial improvements was well established long before the Soviets returned to the INF negotiating table. NATO's current Conventional Defense Improvement (CDI) program is designed to remedy or ameliorate the most critical deficiencies in our Alliance's conventional force posture, including areas relating to reinforcement, Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA) mission, and the counter-air mission in all its dimensions. Moreover, given the massive Soviet chemical arsenal, modernization of U.S. retaliatory chemical weapons also is crucial to our ability to deter at any level of conflict. In addition to pressing ahead with these and other ongoing programs, we will explore certain adjustments to our conventional force structure as well as new initiatives for strengthening flexible response. For example, we will vigorously pursue the potential of longer range air- and sea-launched cruise missiles for a wide range of missions.

Certainly we can envision conventional forces arms control agreements that could complement -- although by no means substitute for -- our maintenance of an effective military posture. In that regard, the prospective NATO-Warsaw Pact negotiations designated "Conventional Stability Talks" (CST), are still a priority for NATO.

While Soviet and Warsaw Pact intransigence have stalemated the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna, NATO has called for the new CST negotiations to deal with the threat arising from Warsaw Pact advantages in Europe. The new talks would encompass a broader geographic zone than MBFR, from the Atlantic to the Urals. We expect East and West can agree that the goal of these negotiations should be to strengthen security in Europe by establishing a more stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels. Our interest must be in eliminating the Pact's capability for surprise attack and large-scale offensive action.

Although we have already negotiated certain confidence building measures, such as notification and observation of large military exercises, major reductions in Pact offensive capabilities are the only arms control cuts which could improve the basic security situation. NATO's conventional force posture can ill-afford sizeable reductions in its standing forces if it is to defend Alliance territory against a Warsaw Pact surprise attack. Any Warsaw Pact reductions should be large and highly asymmetrical. Small reductions, or less asymmetrical ones, would simply make the conventional force balance worse, and more unstable.

The INF Treaty provides no basis for significant changes in U.S. or Canadian force levels in Europe. These forces are the most tangible, most credible guarantee of the fundamental North American commitment to the defense of Europe. Holding our troop levels more or less constant is essential to providing an incentive for the Soviets to negotiate meaningful reductions and to maintaining and, if possible, improving the current conventional balance.

The INF Treaty heightens awareness of that balance; of persisting NATO deficiencies; of the trends in Soviet force posture; of Soviet lines of communication and reinforcement advantages; and of the importance of stepping up the momentum behind NATO's force improvement efforts.

Some force adjustments may need to be made and are being considered as a result of the INF Treaty. However, the realities of the basic security situation in Europe exist with or without the INF Treaty. The predominant impact of the INF Treaty, in this regard, is not to exacerbate NATO's problems but rather to highlight the risks of neglecting them.

Strengthening Flexible Response

NATO's military posture will continue to deter. This is so because it is sufficiently robust to confront a potential aggressor with major uncertainties about the consequences of using or threatening the use of nuclear or conventional forces in an attack against NATO. But this favorable judgment is conditional. It depends upon NATO's ability to act decisively to sustain both nuclear and conventional modernization.

The NATO strategy of Flexible Response is itself a reflection of the inherent strength of the Alliance, and of the profound commitment of its members to the common defense of their citizens and of fundamental shared values. We must build on this foundation and revitalize a sense of shared priorities and responsibilities -unambiguously directed toward the absolute requirement for strengthening Flexible Response. This is our mission.

There are many ways to approach this task. We should welcome proposals which are clearly consistent with our mission. However, we cannot afford a debate about that mission. From the perspective of an accountable NATO Defense Minister, the preferred approach is a direct one. The outlines of such a program, relevant to our security in the 1990s, are quite clear. Its goal is well established. The following is a framework for a NATO Defense Program directed toward strengthening Flexible Response in all of its dimensions:

1. In strengthening Flexible Response we must confront two challenges.

- First, NATO's most difficult challenge will continue to be providing adequate resources for defense.

- Second, NATO's enduring challenge is exploiting the West's technological edge. We must continue to use quality in offsetting the Warsaw Pact's greater numbers. In meeting this challenge we need greater cooperation among NATO nations in all aspects of our defense programs -- from research to production to increased interoperability.

2. Strategic forces must remain the backbone of NATO's deterrent. Therefore, continued modernization of systems comprising this element of the NATO Triad is essential to strengthening Flexible Response.

- We are hopeful that such modernization will at some point be complemented by the limits of a strategic arms treaty, ideally achieving the 50 percent mutual reductions we have been seeking. However, we must not make our plans dependent upon such an outcome.

Under President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, we also are researching the feasibility of defenses against all types of missiles -- defenses which could strengthen our deterrence of attack against our allies, as well as against us.

3. NATO dual-capable forces and forward defense capability must be strengthened. This requires modernization of tactics, systems, and forces which can provide the best assurance for blocking Warsaw Pact attacks on NATO's front lines; for slowing and halting reinforcing forces; for knocking out critical targets in the enemy's rear areas; and for confronting the Soviets with grave risks if they mass troops for concentrated attack.

- Achievement of a modern Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA) capability complemented by vital offensive and defensive counter-air forces, as well as command and control, and active and passive measures for dealing with the combined air-and-missile threat must remain priority objectives. We must also thoroughly explore technology to deliver systems with modern capacity to strike deeper targets. Conventional Stability Talks (CST) may provide options for reinforcing such a strengthened posture, but in the course of such negotiations our dual-capable systems and critical conventional armaments must be appropriately protected. As in the case of START, we must not make our plans dependent on arms control.

4. NATO initiatives for strengthening our defenses must build upon what has been established in planning improvements and in modernizing our forces over the last few years. We must not slide backward. Our Canadian and European allies must take on a greater share of the responsibility we all have for protecting the gains that have been made and building upon them.

5. We must emphasize a better sense of shared priorities in every aspect of the NATO Defense Program. In so doing, we must ensure that there is sufficient balance in the total program to prevent any decisive weakness from developing for NATO or for the U.S. as a result of emphasis placed on any special interest or single priority. This requires much more long-range strategic and budget planning. The following functional management areas must be a major part of such planning. We will thoroughly coordinate priorities among them, and protect such priorities in defense budgets.

- a. We must first maintain high-level consultations using the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) for the development of long-range nuclear policy, strategy, and forces recommendations. The aim must be to most effectively maintain the credibility, survivability, security, and safety of NATO's nuclear and dual-capable forces by implementing our modernization programs while also planning for NATO's future security.

- b. Second, we must focus (1) on those elements of NATO's Conventional Defense Improvement (CDI) Program which have the best long-term prospects for narrowing the gap in the balance; (2) on those which can most effectively be advanced by NATO arms cooperation that results in fielded, highly leveraged systems; and (3) on those which are appropriate for our Canadian and European partners to carry a greater share of responsibility. In this respect, the U.S. approach should not be limited to NATO alone, but must embrace other allies around the world. In setting specific priorities we will seek to avoid inefficient duplicative efforts among nations, as well as military services. Opportunities will be sought for our allies to take the lead in fielding systems for certain missions.

- c. Third, in guiding our defense preparations, NATO leaders must be creative and open-minded in identifying and refining all possible low-cost measures which can enhance security. We must develop means for ensuring that plans and tactics achieve the most deterrence for our investment. For example, we should find ways for making better use of terrain for barrier planning, and for planning greater flexibility in defensive operations.

- d. Fourth, we also must further develop what we call "Competitive Strategies", which seek to guide our acquisition process so as to align enduring Western strengths against persistent Soviet weaknesses. Initial analysis indicates that investment in areas such as countering air-and-ground penetration and command and control operations could contribute to raising Soviet uncertainties about the Warsaw Pact's ability to successfully conduct offensive operations.

Ultimately, the future of NATO and our democratic institutions is determined by the judgments of our citizens about how best to allocate resources for their security.

This emphasizes how important it is for our political and military leaders to provide our citizens with a straightforward framework which clearly shows how their resources are applied to missions and a strategy which can be directly related to deterrence and their security. The NATO Defense Program outlined above provides a basis for strengthening Flexible Response and for gaining the support of our publics in pursuing prudent choices for the common defense.

There is no safe and easy way to avoid the burdens of assuring our security through adequate military strength. Arms control can help -- as the INF Treaty shows -- but only if increased security can be demonstrated to be the goal.

NATO Defense Ministers support the need to move ahead with force improvements consistent with the Montebello nuclear modernization framework and with the NATO Conventional Defense Improvement (CDI) initiative. We will move swiftly to work out the specifics in consultation with them. We will also offer the NATO Defense Program we have outlined to help tie together other elements of our planning and management to focus a revitalized sense of mission for NATO.

We will need Congressional support to advance the NATO Defense Program in the years ahead. Even though defense is likely to be confronted with increasingly constrained budgets, we must ensure -- and will so encourage the NATO Defense Ministers -- that the prioritized elements of an integrated program along these lines are given special attention as they compete with other priorities.

We have already established our NATO Defense Program priorities in the Department of Defense and are proceeding in their refinement. We must now consult with our allies to ensure that we are joined in a newly relevant sense of direction strengthening our security posture. Above all, we need the firm backing of our citizens, here in America and in Europe.

We need to coordinate our effort and more than ever before to deal with the two basic challenges which confront the NATO Defense Program -- getting the most from (1) our resources and, (2) from our technology. Modern cooperative armaments management is a major factor in dealing with these challenges.

Cooperative Armaments Management

Because both the U.S. and our Allies have significant technological capabilities in areas important to the NATO Defense Program, we see increased cooperation in exploiting our collective industrial strengths to develop and field the weapons and other military assets we will need well into the future. We are taking two important steps in that direction. One involves cooperative research and development efforts, including new and continuing activities supported by the NATO Cooperative Research and Development Program, as well as new work to be carried out under the Balanced Technology Initiative (BTI). The second step involves the planned establishment of a NATO Conventional Armaments Planning System (CAPS).

The NATO Cooperative Research and Development Program was established in 1986 to support joint weapons and material development work on an equitable cost-sharing basis by the U.S. and one or more NATO Allies. Important cooperative activities involving precision guided munitions, standoff weapons, sea mines, high performance aircraft; radar systems for reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition applications; target identification, and NATO frigate for the 1990s have been started. Additional efforts related to air-to-air warfare, missile mobility and tactical missile systems, advanced sensors communications systems, battlefield intelligence, surface ship defense, and other areas important to the defense of Europe are currently being developed. To date, $445 million has been appropriated for this program.

The Balanced Technology Initiative is another new defense program that is addressing many problems of considerable importance to our NATO Allies. This program was explicitly established to support the development of technologies important to conventional defense. The program was described in detail in a report to Congress submitted in May, 1987. The estimated cost of the planned work described in the report was more than $1.5 billion over a five-year period. As the BTI program continues, we intend to develop cooperative technology development efforts - as opposed to the systems development activities of the NATO Cooperative Research and Development Program - with our NATO Allies.

The NATO Conventional Armaments Planning Systems (CAPS) is intended to increase cooperation in exploiting our collective industrial strengths and provide a framework for developing armaments plans consistent with NATO long-term planning guidelines. As a part of this effort, NATO force planning adjustments will be identified, addressed, and plans will be made to develop and field weapons and other military systems to meet mission needs. NATO has agreed to begin a two-year trial of CAPS beginning in 1988. We strongly support this initiative. CAPS will provide a much improved framework for harmonizing requirements and setting priorities directed toward strengthening Flexible Response.

The activities described above represent only a small segment of the much larger, comprehensive DoD NATO Defense Program. Included in this major defense effort are much of the DoD Science and Technology Program, numerous advanced tactical weapon and platform development programs, conventional and nuclear weapon modernization programs relevant to the European theater, and a significant fraction of ongoing communication, command, control, and intelligence work. The program also includes extensive planning and training efforts to enable effective use of all of our developing capabilities. Many of the elements of the NATO Defense Program are described in detail in other sections of this report.

Conclusion

Improved cooperative armaments management is, of course, a major way of contributing to Alliance confidence and cohesion by reinforcing efficient coordination of priorities and demands made on limited resources. We must improve NATO military and political management structures across the board to ensure that we also reinforce a clear sense of shared priority and responsibility. Consultations among the military and political leaders of the Alliance remain key in that regard.

The following sections of this report provide further background on strategy, nuclear forces, and conventional forces considerations which bear on support of the NATO Defense Program and strengthening Flexible Response in the next decade. Management of modern munitions, Follow-on Forces Attack, and counter-air operations is also elaborated. Finally, the views of NATO political and military leaders, so critical to our mission, are summarized. These discussions all reflect our confidence that we have the strategic vision, the technical capacity, and the will to carry out our mission for the 1990's. We see very difficult challenges, but we have defined them, and are prepared to face them.

SECTION I: FLEXIBLE RESPONSE STRATEGY

NATO Strategic Concept

The combined military capabilities of NATO exist in order to maintain security by deterring armed attack, the threat of aggression, or intimidation at any level. If deterrence failed NATO forces would seek to deny the enemy's military objectives and terminate any conflict quickly -- restoring deterrence at the lowest level of violence consistent with NATO's objectives.

The military force postures of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact consist of three major elements -- strategic systems, theater nuclear forces, and conventional forces. On the NATO side the posture is sometimes referred to as the NATO Triad.

By maintaining the ability to execute military options across a spectrum of conflict from conventional defense up to a large scale nuclear response, the NATO force posture provides for deterrence. Ultimately deterrence depends on the political cohesion of the Alliance, the credibility of the envisaged response, and the willingness of all of its members to share the risks and responsibilities of collective defense.

INF Treaty and NATO Strategy

The INF Treaty is fully consistent with NATO's strategic concept. The Treaty's main provisions call for the following:

- Elimination of ground-launched INF missiles within three years after the Treaty enters into force.

- A ban on all production and flight testing of Treaty-limited systems.

- Cessation of all training, repair, storage, or deployment of Treaty-limited items after elimination is completed.

- A stringent verification regime, including on-site inspections.

Elimination of a complete class of missiles eliminates Soviet preponderence in those missiles. In addition, Warsaw Pact conventional and chemical warfare capabilities associated with these missiles are eliminated. Although its land-based nuclear missiles are reduced in number, NATO will retain the forces with which to implement its strategy of flexible response and forward defense.

Among the elements of the Treaty which directly support our security objectives are the following:

- Land-based Longer-Range INF Missiles (LRINF). Since the formal talks with the Soviet Union began in November 1981, we have sought to eliminate all U.S. and Soviet missile systems in this category. Achievement of this goal is the main aspect of the INF Agreement.

- Land-based Shorter-Range INF Missiles (SRINF). We have also insisted that an INF Agreement must constrain shorter-range land-based INF missiles to prevent erosion of a LRINF missile accord by Soviet deployment of such systems. The Treaty satisfies this requirement by eliminating all Soviet missiles in this category. The U.S. has no deployed SRINF systems. The Federal Republic of Germany has unilaterally decided to eliminate its PERSHING IA missiles (armed with U.S. nuclear warheads) after elimination of U.S. and Soviet INF missiles has been achieved.

- Reductions on a Global Basis. We have long insisted that any limitations on INF missiles must be worldwide to prevent the transfer of the threat from one region to another. The Soviets have accepted this in the context of global elimination of both longer and shorter-range U.S. and Soviet INF missiles.

- Limits on Only U.S. and Soviet Systems. Throughout the negotiations, we made clear that bilateral agreements between the U.S. and the Soviet Union will not constrain Third Country forces nor affect existing nuclear programs of cooperation with our Allies. The INF Treaty is true to this principle.

- No Involvement of Conventional Forces. No U.S. or NATO conventional capabilities are limited. No limits are imposed on dual-capable (nuclear and conventional) aircraft.

NATO Policy Development

These outcomes will, of course, require policy and planning action to develop detailed target plans, operation concepts, and other actions related to force management. NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) reviewed the implications of the INF Agreement before it was signed, and has further planning and analysis underway. In this regard, nothing in the INF missile reduction regime suggests any change in fundamental requirements for modernization and improvement which have been long established by the Alliance -- prior to, and independent of an INF Agreement. The critical modernization of theater nuclear forces not limited by the Treaty remains a high-priority for NATO. In addition to nuclear planning, some adjustments and changed priorities may prove desirable in NATO's non-nuclear posture. For example, the air defense mission area is certainly no less important as a result of reliance placed on dual-capable aircraft for longer range missions. Support and attention to the Follow-on Forces Attack mission area and associated long-range conventional delivery missions are no less important.

Although many of the Soviet INF systems being eliminated have chemical capabilities, we remain faced with a substantial chemical warfare threat to all of the NATO allies from other Soviet systems. This was a problem before the INF Treaty and will remain a problem independent of the Treaty. In the absence of an adequate modern chemical retaliatory capability we continue to be forced to rely on the threat of nuclear retaliation to deter Soviet chemical attack. With or without the elimination of INF missiles our posture continues to place too much reliance on nuclear weapons to deal with the chemical threat.

Planning for NATO's Future

A new challenge that faces NATO in preparing to support its strategy for the 1990s is how to revitalize the coordinated planning that will be essential to successful force modernization in the face of current budgetary problems. We must ensure that Alliance political will is reinforced by U.S. leadership and that allied solidarity remains as strong as it has been. This can be helped with long-range strategic planning, prioritization, and regular consultation -- among other things.

The U.S. must offer a clear and coordinated position in such approaches. At the same time, every aspect of activity must be founded on allied participation. National program decisions will be increasingly linked through Alliance planning relationships.

We will need new initiatives to make best use of our strengths, our technology, and our limited resources. The sections of this Report which follow address various structural components which will contribute most importantly toward strengthening Flexible Response in the 1990s.

SECTION II: NUCLEAR FORCES FOR EUROPE

NATO Nuclear Planning

For 20 years, NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) has provided a forum for NATO Defense Ministers to discuss and provide strategic direction to the Alliance's nuclear policy and posture. The NPG and its subordinate body, the High-Level Group, worked to help formulate NATO's December 1979 "dual-track" decision on INF deployment and arms control negotiation.

In 1983, the NPG agreed on modernizing NATO's theater nuclear force posture. This included appropriate reductions in NATO's nuclear stockpile in Europe. Specifically, they identified critical modernization needed, independent of the INF Treaty, to maintain a credible deterrent posture. The resulting program is designed to ensure the remaining warheads and their delivery systems will be responsive, survivable, and effective in the modern environment. The associated warhead withdrawals, in conjunction with an earlier reduction of 1,000 warheads, will bring NATO's stockpile in Europe, following INF reductions, to about 4,000 nuclear weapons.

The main elements of this NATO theater nuclear force modernization program are now as follows:

- The development of a Follow-on to the LANCE (FOTL) surface-to-surface missile with increased range, improved accuracy, and improved operating characteristics;
- The development of a standoff Tactical Air-to-Surface Missile (TASM);
- The modernization of NATO's Artillery-Fired Atomic Projectiles (AFAPs); and
- The continued modernization of NATO's dual-capable (nuclear-conventional) aircraft and associated nuclear bombs.

In addition to these measures, the modernization program also provides for correction of maldeployment of nuclear capabilities among and within regions; improvements in the survivability of NATO's nuclear forces; and improvements to their command and control.

For the United States, the Secretary of Defense, as a member of NATO's NPG, has consistently joined NATO Ministers in endorsing this Alliance modernization plan and the "Montebello" framework for the implementation of its range of measures. Many are in progress, but decisions are needed on a number of development programs in order to maintain the momentum of this priority NATO effort.

Strategic Systems Posture

U.S. forces provide the backbone of the strategic deterrent. United Kingdom and French forces are also part of the strategic equation, although France still remains outside of NATO's formal military structure. In addition, the U.S. commits Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) warheads to SACEUR's plans. Continued modernization of strategic systems is essential for support of NATO strategy in the 1990s.

NATO Theater Nuclear Systems Posture

The INF Treaty does not place any limits on nuclear missiles above the range of 5,500 kilometers. Also, Sea-launched and Air-launched Cruise Missiles are not limited. Dual-Capable Aircraft (DCA) which carry nuclear and non-nuclear bombs, and Air-to-Surface Missiles (ASM) are not limited. Short-Range Nuclear Forces (SNF) under 500 kilometers range are not limited. This includes ballistic missiles and artillery capable of firing nuclear projectiles -- Artillery Fired Atomic Projectiles (AFAP). It does eliminate ground-launched Longer-Range INF (LRINF) including the SS-20, and Shorter-Range INF (SRINF) missiles.

Needed improvements in our conventional capabilities would help deal with the threat posed by Soviet systems in all the foregoing categories. Just as ours, Soviet systems in this category are essentially all dual-capable and as much a part of the conventional balance as the nuclear balance. Most of theirs pose a chemical warfare threat, as well.

With this said, the Soviets are expected to maintain their vast numerical superiority in the SNF category of missile systems for the foreseeable future. In addition to the 70 kilometer Soviet FROG, the greater range SS-1 (SCUD B), SS-21, and follow-on missiles will continue to present a formidable threat to many NATO airfields, command and control centers, and other facilities. We are not planning to try to directly match this Soviet superiority with our own force of dual-capable systems. However, we will give priority attention to the quantity and quality of capabilities we do have available, or might have, and to the modernization of all our systems. We will also give priority to conventional forces mission areas which can help to offset this threat. That includes, in particular, the FOFA and air defense mission areas -- including defensive and offensive counter air, survivability measures, and command and control.

At the same time, conventional arms control proposals which might seek to reduce or limit dual-capable armaments also require careful attention in order to protect fundamentally important NATO capabilities which can be conventional as well as nuclear.

Sections III, IV, V, and VI of this Report elaborate on non-nuclear capabilities which address these objectives.

Planning for NATO's Future

The NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) is reviewing how NATO's nuclear force posture might best be readjusted in light of the security situation following implementation of an INF Agreement. This review is aimed at ensuring NATO retains an appropriate spectrum of nuclear capabilities and options.

The Secretary of Defense is prepared to ensure a high-priority for all aspects of the NATO "Montebello" modernization framework, as development programs mature and consultations with our allies proceed. The following views will bear on the evolution of this planning. They address specifically, (1) Follow-on to LANCE, (2) the Tactical Air-to-Surface Missile, and (3) Artillery-Fired Atomic Projectiles.

1. Follow-on to LANCE.

We should seek to lift the Congressional restriction on development of the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) as a nuclear follow-on to LANCE (FOTL), and that we should seek to implement this modernization element. A combination of MLRS and the ATACMS would offer savings in time to develop the program, in force structure, and in overall costs.

2. Tactical Air-to-Surface Missile.

We should make development of Tactical Air-to-Surface Missile (TASM) a high priority.

3. Artillery-Fired Atomic Projectiles.

We should continue to seek legislation to remove the Congressional restriction limiting further production of modern artillery-fired projectiles (AFAPs), which are required, as a minimum, to replace deployed older weapons.

As we proceed to evaluate specific systems and programs to support the NATO requirement for theater nuclear modernization it is increasingly important that our overall planning with respect to theater nuclear capabilities, NATO conventional forces, and any arms control proposals is coordinated.

In that regard, it is crucial that we improve NATO's conventional forces in areas which can counter Warsaw Pact theater nuclear systems. This strengthens the conventional component of the NATO Triad and also helps deal with potent Warsaw Pact dual-capable threats.

Status of Systems

Some relevant U.S. programs which bear on consideration of the NATO theater force posture are outlined below. Many of these systems are dual capable, and therefore can contribute to capability needed in a non-nuclear environment. They include LANCE, TASM, AFAPS, Bombs, DCA, Communications, and SLCM. Allied aircraft and other systems are not included.

1. LANCE and Follow-on to LANCE (FOTL)

The LANCE is a dual-capable, liquid-fueled missile. Deployed with U.S. forces in Europe in 1973, it is also assigned to the ground forces of five NATO allies. The FOTL is a development program to offer increased range, improved safety, force structure savings, and improved survivability and reliability. Survivability would be enhanced as compared to LANCE.

The Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) is a conventional missile to be fielded for use with the MLRS. There is a Congressional restriction that precludes a nuclear warhead for the missile. However, study of a nuclear ATACMS concept is permitted. This system could be used to fulfill the FOTL requirement. However, this would require funding and immediate lifting of all Congressional restrictions.

2. Tactical Air-to-Surface Missile (TASM).

TASM is a development program to provide both U.S. and allied dual-capable aircraft (DCA) with the capability to attack high value, heavily defended targets throughout the theater. Currently, NATO's DCA can deliver several types of gravity bombs, but have no standoff nuclear delivery capability -- that is, the capability to attack targets without having to penetrate enemy air defenses. Development of a TASM compatible with U.S. and Allied DCA would extend the range of target coverage of these aircraft, improve their in-flight survivability, and allow widespread allied participation in NATO's nuclear forces capable of executing longer range missions.

3. Artillery-Fired Atomic Projectile (AFAP).

AFAPs provide a combination of accuracy, low-yield, and responsiveness that could help defeat large enemy force concentrations near friendly troops. They are deployed with ground forces of eight NATO countries. There are currently several types of AFAPs in the NATO stockpile. These include the older 155mm and 8-inch howitzer system projectiles as well as the modern 8-inch AFAP.

Modernized AFAPS provide significant improvements in security, effectiveness and range compared to the older systems. Currently, we are limited in the total number of modernized AFAPs which can be in the U.S. inventory. This is because of legislation placing a ceiling on total production of such new weapons. Due to this restriction a substantial number of the older AFAP systems must be retained indefinitely in the stockpile in order to meet current requirements and deployments.

4. Nuclear Bombs.

The Nuclear Bomb Modernization Program involves replacement of older bombs with modernized bombs. It is directed toward improving the overall safety, security, and effectiveness of the nuclear bomb stockpile. This program is funded, but has been slowed due to Congressional cuts in the DoE and DoD budgets.

5. Dual-Capable Aircraft (DCA)

Three U.S. DCA (the F-111, F-16 and F-15E) are, or will be, available for employment in NATO.

Currently, F-111 aircraft are deployed at two bases in the UK. Additional aircraft are based in the western U.S. All of these continental U.S. (CONUS-based) F-111s could be used in a conventional role; these aircraft also are available for employment by U.S. commanders in other theaters and provide a rotation and reinforcement base for the worldwide F-111 force. The F-111s provide NATO's only conventional interdiction capability at longer ranges.

The F-15E is a new, long-range interdiction fighter-bomber variant of the F-15 air superiority fighter. It will deliver the full range of precision-guided conventional weapons and tactical nuclear weapons in day or night, and under all-weather conditions. The F-15E will begin entering the force in the early 1990s. These aircraft will significantly augment the capabilities of NATO's DCA, albeit at shorter ranges than F/FB-111s.

The F-16 is a multi-role fighter which is capable of performing close air support, interdiction and air superiority tasks. The F-16 has less range than the F-15E. However, like the F-15E, the newest models will have the capability of delivering precision-guided conventional weapons and tactical nuclear weapons by day or night, and under all weather conditions.

6. Command, Control and Communications.

A high priority program to strengthen the survivability of nonstrategic nuclear force communications is deployment of MILSTAR (an EHF satellite system).

7. Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCM).

The U.S. SLCM is a subsonic, winged missile designed for four different configurations: conventional antiship, conventional land-attack, conventional submunition land-attack, and nuclear land-attack. TOMAHAWK variants are capable of being launched from armored box launchers on surface ships, vertical launchers on submarines or surface ships, and torpedo tubes on submarines with the requisite fire control suite. The nuclear variant of the TOMAHAWK Land-attack Missile (TLAM/N) was introduced in 1984.

The mission of TLAM/N is to enhance the U.S. world-wide nuclear deterrent, and deter Soviet nuclear attack on U.S. naval forces. The TLAM/N concept of operations envisions that the system constitutes an important nuclear capability, but one which should not detract from the ability of general purpose naval combatants to execute critical sea control missions in wartime. Ultimately, the responsiveness of the TLAM/N is dependent both upon the degree of prior mission planning and upon coordination in execution.

SECTION III: NON-NUCLEAR FORCES BALANCE

NATO Non-nuclear Force Posture

NATO is a defensive Alliance facing an adversary postured with significant offensive potential. This potential is characterized by in-place force ratios that substantially favor the Warsaw Pact in main battle tanks, artillery, and numerous other categories of capability including dual-capable (nuclear and conventional) missiles and other Warsaw Pact systems. The potential exists for Pact forces to mount an offensive with high relative force ratios that could overwhelm NATO defenses through concentrated attacks at times and places of the attacker's choosing.

NATO nations program conventional forces to successfully counter a limited non-nuclear attack, and to help deter larger non-nuclear attacks by confronting the aggressor with the prospect of non-nuclear hostilities on a scale that would involve a grave risk of escalation to the use of nuclear capabilities. Should aggression occur, NATO's conventional forces are designed to provide a coherent forward defense. They must afford the flexibility necessary for political control and decision-making, under all circumstances.

NATO relies upon the combination of its full range of non-nuclear, nuclear, and dual-capable (nuclear-conventional) capabilities and its flexible response strategy to deter. Risk assessment is ultimately a continuous subjective process that is carried on in the Department of Defense and Alliance planning headquarters, as well as by political authorities. Supporting analytical inputs vary considerably, depending on assumptions about resources, leadership, warning time, training, mobilization, and uncertainties about political decisions as well as the confusion of the battlefield.

Such analysis done in support of force planning and arms control activities does consistently demonstrate the large Soviet advantages in numbers of forces and quantity of armaments. NATO forces are stretched thin, by comparison. Therefore, our focus in evaluating the balance is on (1) what the significant NATO deficiencies are in that regard; and (2) how to prioritize programs to achieve improvements directed at the most critical deficiencies.

The area of conventional capability is quite complex in terms of planning, programming, and budgeting, to say nothing of measuring "the balance". First, many nations are involved in the NATO force planning context. A variety of national capabilities, doctrines, and programs must be fitted into an overall international military structure. Second, for the U.S., planning must cover worldwide requirements and fit into an integrated global strategy, in addition to European Theater needs. Third, planning involves not only force structure (units, systems, and manpower) but must also provide for a balance of capabilities including the state of readiness of the forces; sustaining them in combat; in some cases, moving them to Europe with reinforcement capabilities; and, finally, investing sufficiently in research and development so that future force structure will be sufficiently modernized to be viable in future environments.

Weighing all these factors, and others, our judgment with regard to NATO forces is that although conventional capabilities have improved over the past few years, major limiting factors remain.

Apart from elimination of certain Soviet INF dual-capable missiles, the INF agreement will not affect the current inventory of conventional force capabilities. However, remaining NATO and Warsaw Pact theater nuclear forces (not banned by the INF Treaty) are essentially all dual-capable (nuclear-conventional). Thus, NATO improvements or Warsaw Pact threats in the nuclear area impact on capabilities in the conventional area, and vice versa. Taking dual capability into account, some adjustments among priorities will prove desirable to accord with the evolving military situation.

Planning for NATO's Future

We particularly support current and planned improvement programs in key areas of deficiency and where they provide us leverage. Programs in areas which enhance NATO capability receive high priority in the U.S. Defense Program. To the extent possible, many such programs will be undertaken in cooperation with the allies to take advantage of cost-savings and interoperability benefits realized through cooperative development, production and logistic support.

NATO Defense Ministers, in pursuing Conventional Defense Improvements (CDI), are agreed on planning in accord with nine critical conventional priorities. We are following these baseline priorities carefully, but they will require further refinement and prioritization in planning for the 1990s.

The U.S. must continue its efforts to fulfill security assistance program goals in the Southern Flank Region. These programs support weapons modernization in Greece, Portugal and Turkey as well as help cement cooperative defense arrangements. Security assistance to these NATO allies remains a high priority, even though the programs are under increasing pressure because of overall reductions in the Foreign Assistance Budget.

In reviewing these priorities we also need to consider other factors, for example, the U.S. has a commitment to field ten divisions in Europe within ten days of a mobilization decision. Important to this goal are programs such as POMCUS, strategic lift, host nation support, and unit readiness.

NATO's conventional defense improvements must upgrade NATO's capability to defend both its nuclear and conventional forces. In addition, our chemical modernization program is designed to give NATO a more credible chemical retaliatory capability and reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons to deter a chemical attack. A priority is production of modern binary munitions capable of safe, rapid deployment wherever required. We are also proceeding with important programs to improve our defensive capability for individual and unit protection and decontamination.

We must now seek to further focus well established CDI and other U.S. priorities to ensure we are best investing for the 1990s. In addition to consideration of priorities among these improvements, we intend also to address overall requirements in the context of the recently developed DoD "Competitive Strategy" (CS) initiatives.

Competitive Strategies

Work of the first DoD Competitive Strategies Task Force led to a series of recommendations which could improve NATO's military position in relation to the Warsaw Pact. These proposals can complement the CDI and other priorities for strengthening Flexible Response by guiding our acquisition process so as to align enduring strengths against persistent Soviet weaknesses.

Through analysis we are looking for ways to channel long-term military competition into areas where the Soviets function ineffectively and where they obtain minimum results for given costs in time, effort, and money. To enhance deterrence, the recommendations aim at altering the Soviet perception of the correlation of forces and raising the level of Soviet uncertainty about their ability to conduct a successful offensive in the European theater. Should deterrence fail, the proposed programs and strategies would strengthen Flexible Response.

Recommended competitive strategies which we are actively addressing focus on Soviet command and control operations and countering Soviet air and ground penetration capacity. These concepts take advantage of the Soviet requirement for strict time management and maintenance of high tempo operations. NATO advantages in data automation and processing, target acquisition, and intelligence fusion and dissemination can be used to exploit this dependence and provide a springboard for more effective use of NATO's conventional capability.

Soviet lack of success in redressing this problem would force them to compete in an arena in which they recognize they have serious weaknesses. Proposals from the Task Force which we are examining in this area offer an improved military capability reflecting a combination of new doctrinal and organizational approaches, innovative operational concepts, existing systems, and emerging technologies. The aim is to channel competition into areas in which we can take advantage of core, long-term strengths enjoyed by the Alliance.

Highlights of four initiatives are as follows:

- Countering Soviet Air Operations: The task force recommended that NATO, led by the United States, enhance its offensive capabilities against Soviet sortie generation by developing a phased attack on the Soviets' main operating bases and air infrastructure led by unmanned aircraft. From a defensive air perspective, the task force recommended measures to strengthen the integrity of NATO's air and ground operations.

- Countering Soviet Penetration of NATO Forward Defenses: The task force recommended developing an asymmetric force capability comprised of an integrated network of long-range, mobile weapons platforms and target acquisition and command and control assets capable of engaging Soviet mobile targets beyond the range of Soviet artillery and Multiple Launcher Rocket Systems.

- Stressing the Warsaw Pact Troop Control System: The task force recommended frustrating Soviet tactical operations by blocking preplanned options. This would force communications to the operational level where a replanning capability exists. By use of direct attack, special operations, and deception, NATO could counter the Pact's ability to devise and execute operational responses.

- Countering Soviet Global and Multitheater Operations: Finally, to exploit Soviet aversions to a multitheater, protracted conflict, the task force recommended developing an offensive warfighting capability for conducting large scale joint and combined conventional offensive military campaigns.

As we develop our broad strategic thinking and address the conventional force posture, we must increasingly tie together our strategic perspective focused on flexible response with (1) our approach to conventional and strategic arms control, and (2) the NATO force planning process.

Conventional Arms Control

For two decades NATO has worked at meaningful conventional arms control in Europe directed toward improving the Alliance security posture. The guiding principle is that the Alliance will not settle for essentially cosmetic outcomes which can result in a false sense of security and no real improvement in stability.

From the beginning, it was on this basis that NATO insisted, first, that the Soviet-proposed European Security Conference (now CSCE) address human rights and other fundamental East-West differences along with building confidence and increasing security in Europe. Second, NATO insisted that before any of its members would participate in such a conference, specific military issues must be addressed. Thus, NATO demanded initiation of talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in Central Europe. Both negotiations began in the early 1970s.

In the CSCE arena, in 1975, a "Helsinki Accord" was concluded. It contained inter alia a security "basket" that required prior notice of certain military maneuvers and encouraged participants to invite observers to such exercises. This was a modest approach to improving stability through confidence-building measures (CBMs).

With respect to the sister MBFR talks, the focus has always been on improving stability at negotiated lower levels of forces. In other words, actual force reductions were the aim, as opposed to confidence-building measures being addressed in CSCE.

By 1986 the Stockholm Conference (Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, or CDE), continuing the Helsinki process, reached agreement on a more ambitious, though still modest, package of CBMs. The most significant aspect of this agreement is the inclusion of all Soviet European territory to the Urals. After years of Soviet insistence that Soviet territory must be a sanctuary from the European security equation, that barrier was broken.

This approach to CBMs continues through the CSCE process at the current Vienna Review Conference. NATO countries have agreed that additional confidence-building measures may improve stability. If a balanced outcome at Vienna can be achieved, most importantly including improvement in Soviet human rights performance, it appears that all 35 participating CSCE states will agree to new negotiations in 1988 on more confidence-building measures. We support this.

In the MBFR talks, negotiations have continued for fourteen years. During most of that period the Warsaw Pact refused to discuss current force levels. This meant that there was no way to agree on the size reduction required to reach equal ceilings. In December 1985, NATO proposed dropping its requirement for agreed data, and advanced the idea of taking small asymmetrical reductions. Determining existing force levels through an exchange of data and verification would follow. Then both sides would later reduce to parity within a defined geographic area in Central Europe. The Soviet Union has not yet seriously responded to this proposal.

Having established the principle that all of Europe "from the Atlantic to the Urals" is subject to military measures, NATO called for conventional arms control negotiations covering forces of both alliances in that wider area in 1986. Indeed, continued Warsaw Pact force buildup and modernization, force restructuring, doctrinal changes and considerable improvement in reinforcement capabilities have made it imperative that Soviet forces in the wider zone be addressed if an agreement on conventional forces is to insure security.

By February 1987, all countries of both alliances began meeting in Vienna to negotiate a mandate for these conventional forces negotiations. They are expected to begin in 1988.

At the mandate discussions, NATO and Warsaw Pact nations have agreed on objectives as follows: "to strengthen stability and security in Europe through the establishment of a stable and secure balance of conventional armed forces, which include conventional armaments and equipment, at lower levels; the elimination of disparities prejudicial to stability and security; and the elimination, as a matter of priority, of the capability for launching surprise attacks and for initiating large-scale offensive action."

Difficult work remains to be done in reaching agreement on armaments and forces subject to negotiation. NATO participants have stated that nuclear weapons will not be included. The Warsaw Pact began by insisting upon inclusion, but their position is no longer clear.

The record of the last fifteen years shows how the U.S. and NATO are committed to working at conventional forces arms control which supports NATO's security interests and improved stability in Europe. Because of the large asymmetries in offensive forces, especially in tanks and artillery, such agreements require substantial reductions in Pact combat capability in forward deployed forces. Small reductions even at favorable ratios would not be in NATO's interest because (a) such reductions do not alter the Warsaw Pact's fundamental advantages, and (b) because they immediately and directly affect NATO's already limited conventional capabilities. The likelihood that the Soviet Union will accept the kind of agreement that protects NATO security interests cannot be predicted. For our part, we will place no reliance on the outcome of such negotiations until it is actually achieved, and a treaty ratified.

Negotiations of this type involve 16 sovereign NATO nations. A Western proposal must be agreed upon by all and take into account a range of security and political concerns. The details of Western proposals are being discussed in a High Level Task Force chaired by NATO's Assistant Secretary General. Not all details have been settled, but there is a remarkable convergence of views. All agree that reductions can help improve stability but cannot in themselves achieve stability. All agree that to be acceptable, reductions must be highly asymmetrical and large on the Warsaw Pact side. Moreover, the massive concentration of Soviet invasion forces in Eastern Europe will have to be significantly reduced. All agree that any agreement must be subject to extensive verification measures and other measures that will contribute to stability. Finally, all agree that a negotiated outcome must not weaken our nuclear deterrent capacity.

Our objective is to reduce offensive capabilities, which means the major ground invasion forces of the Warsaw Pact. However, there are substantial risks for NATO in measures in which armaments are involved in such negotiations. Our goal must be strengthened Flexible Response. SACEUR views are an important consideration in our approach to these talks, and are summarized in Section VII.

NATO Force Planning

U.S. planning and programming, NATO's coordinated planning, and the budget processes of all the NATO members are increasingly interconnected. For the 1990s they must be better structured to respond to Alliance consensus on goals, objectives, and specific programs responsive to strategic guidance.

As we proceed in seeking to exploit NATO strength, we will take care to work within these integrated national and international force planning structures but we will and must address new initiatives and approaches to solving our complex security problem. In so doing, we will want to reduce the danger of using our limited resources inefficiently. This is possible if we: (1) avoid acting without adequate international consultation; and (2) seek to strengthen the established strategic planning and program budgeting systems to make them more responsive to integrated strategic thinking. A simple framework for our NATO Defense Program is key to this.

In order to advance and refine CDI priorities as well as new initiatives based on a NATO strategic framework for the 1990s, we must see that they are coordinated and reflected in specific force proposals by the NATO Military Authorities. NATO Military leaders propose force plans based on the senior NATO Military Committee's Annual Military Appreciation, and detailed annual combat-effectiveness reports by each of the three Major NATO Commanders (SACEUR, SACLANT and CINCHAN). NATO force goals for each country, covering a six-year period, are taken into account in those inputs. The goals deemed to be of particular importance for CDI are now "highlighted", and nations have undertaken to make more efforts to implement such "highlighted" goals. The U.S. has been a leader in this process.

We must work to keep this process responsive and modern, tailored to a shared sense of priorities throughout NATO and its supporting organization.

SECTION IV: ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS

Role of Advanced Conventional Munitions (ACM)

Modern technology has permitted great strides in improving conventional system capability and we intend to do more to make best use of our technology. However, in a NATO versus Warsaw Pact confrontation, theater nuclear capabilities form a unique element of the Alliance deterrent. NATO must sustain the capability of forward-based and land-based systems for delivery of nuclear weapons against a wide variety of targets. These include direct defense capabilities with short-range nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons which put massed concentration of Warsaw Pact forces at risk, and weapons which can engage critical targets at longer ranges. At the same time NATO must strengthen its forward conventional forces and give its ground forces greater battle depth and flexibility through modern fire support. It is here that ACM are important, not as substitutes for nuclear fire power.

We believe our allies can cooperate significantly in joint efforts involving ACM in what we call Competitive Strategies. We remain sensitive to NATO's weaknesses and to the Warsaw Pact's established advantages -- its quantitative superiority, in particular. However, new opportunities exist for executing Competitive Strategies which attack Soviet weaknesses rather than attempting to match their strengths. ACM can provide options in this regard, but are certainly not an exclusive solution. In any event they have wide application on the modern battlefield.

Allied Cost-Sharing

Some examples of cooperation among the allies in the application of ACM technology are as follows:

Advanced Conventional Munitions (ACM)	Sharing Allies	Application
o Multiple-Launched Rocket System/Terminally-Guided Warhead (MLRS/TGW)	USA, UK, FRG France	Anti Armor
o 155mm Autonomous Precision-Guided Munition (APGM)	Canada, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, US	Anti Tank

Advanced Conventional Munitions (ACM)	Sharing Allies	Application
o Modular Stand-off Weapon (MSOW)	US, UK, France, FRG, Canada, Italy, Spain	Multiple
o INFRARED Maverick (65-D)	Italy, Denmark, Germany, The Netherlands, Turkey, Spain	Anti Armor
o Anti-Tactical Missile (ATM)	Germany, US	Air Defense
o Under the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD), resides cadre group AC/310, that is presently setting up an information center that will contain technical information that NATO ACM engineers/scientists will be able to draw from when designing insensitive/high performance munitions.	France, The Netherlands, USA, UK, FRG, Norway	All

Cost-sharing with our NATO allies is already an ongoing, integral aspect of advancing ACM programs. These efforts have been given impetus by FY 86 and subsequent NATO Cooperative Research and Development legislation promoting cooperative programs NATO allies are actively engaged in cooperative ACM programs that span the acquisition arena from technology through procurement. The potential exists to do more.

Applications

Many types of munitions and systems fall into the general category of ACM. Thus, applications are not restricted to a single mission area. The foregoing table shows that ACM contribute to the Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA) mission, discussed in Section V; they are part of our modernization of air defense capabilities, discussed in Section VI; and could also be involved in some cases in dual-capable (nuclear-conventional) systems.

Without a doubt ACM contribute in a most important way to the munition, or lethal end of the FOFA capability. However, as is elaborated in Section V, the application of lethal technology to a target involves advanced sensors, fusion capability, and target acquisition means as much as it does an advanced conventional warhead.

Cost-Effectiveness

No general assessment can be made about cost-effectiveness in this area of technology application. It depends on the total concept; strategic and tactical objectives; and on the relative effectiveness of each weapon against specific targets. This becomes more apparent in the discussion of an overall concept employing ACM, such as FOFA, described in Section V.

A potential "effective" application for ACM could focus on a Competitive Strategy based on a "Win Early" concept. Under this concept, if our adversary chooses to strike, our response would be to attack his most vulnerable points using ACM. Our success would be dependent upon our ability to identify critical targets and destroy them through selective application of modern conventional munitions in the early days of the conflict. This solution is directed toward rapid attrition of targets having a high payoff.

If we consider the prospect of converting all of our munitions to ACM, this might well be extremely "cost-effective". However, no sophisticated analysis is needed to show that we could not afford to do this no matter how effective the result. Total ACM substitution of the current US $70B stockpile could well cost hundreds of billions. An affordable option, as called out in a "Win Early" strategy, is to utilize our new modern munitions in a way to allow an early transition to the standard stockpile, thereby limiting the total number of ACMs needed to do the job. This solution envisions significant application of modern munitions during the early days of a conventional conflict in Europe. These modern munitions would attack those enemy targets that pose the greatest threat to the survivability of our delivery systems and maneuver units. By engaging the enemy's critical targets early in the war, we would be able to efficiently transition to the employment of the standard stockpile. As our forces become more survivable and the critical enemy target capabilities are reduced, the mix would shift from the utilization of modern munitions to larger quantities of the standard munition.

Planning for the Future

The US approach to Advanced Conventional Munitions is managed through the Department of Defense Conventional Munitions Master Plan (CMMP). This planning offers integration, and coordination for the development and acquisition of conventional munitions. It provides programmatic information and analyses on munitions-target pair, that is, those modern munitions or combinations of modern munitions that have been designed and are best suited to defeat specific target types. The planning activity ensures that critical issues associated with conventional munitions are given high-level attention. It also calls for trade-off analyses to be conducted between specific ACMs in which one conventional munition is substituted for another with the objective of optimizing our potential on the battlefield.

Development of the Master Plan provides the basis for orchestrating a "Win Early" competitive ammunition strategy and produces a document that addresses the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of applying a proper mix of ACMs to the problem of conventional force imbalance. NATO cooperative programs and opportunities are addressed as part of the overall planning objective.

The CMMP is designed to create an affordable, effective mix of conventional munitions in support of our strategy. The Plan addresses near- to long-term objectives through: (1) procurement and/or product improvement of selected modern munitions; (2) accelerated development and/or preplanned product improvement programs; and (3) acceleration of promising munitions R&D programs which have potential for defeating next generation threats. Output from the Department of Defense Balanced Technology Initiative (BTI) is also used to introduce matured technologies into our conventional munitions, and becomes an integral part of the CMMP.

We anticipate the full implementation of the CMMP by April 1988. It will serve as the basic DoD document to guide and support planning to best utilize conventional munitions of every type to achieve a "Win Early" strategy and support our overall modernization efforts.

SECTION V: FOLLOW-ON FORCES ATTACK

The Concept

The aim of Follow-on-Forces Attack (FOFA) is to significantly strengthen NATO's forward defense. The concept employs non-nuclear systems and capabilities, including advanced conventional munitions, to help stop the advance of enemy forces. It is a technical and military approach, in this case, designed to delay, disrupt and destroy enemy forces. The concept calls for an improved posture to engage the aggressor at longer range by integrating advanced and emerging technologies into established conventional forces.

FOFA should be viewed as a targeting strategy that supports an overall requirement to interdict an enemy's capacity to launch and sustain an attack. It is one means by which numerically inferior NATO forces can counter numerically superior opponents. In this regard it is a primary focus of the interdiction campaign. It is not a new concept. NATO has always faced the need to conduct such interdiction operations to restrict an aggressor's capacity to introduce forces at the Allies' forward line of defense.

Advances in sensor, microprocessing, communications, and munition technologies now make it possible to develop the capabilities to reduce to manageable proportions the number of enemy forces arriving at NATO's battle lines.

FOFA involves operations which employ air-to-surface and surface-to-surface weapons to attack enemy reinforcements and supporting elements enroute to the forward battle area. We combine acquisition, targeting, C^3I and attack systems to mount an integrated interdiction campaign. The FOFA area of operations stretches from just behind the front lines as far into the enemy's rear as our target acquisition and weapon systems capabilities will permit.

Such technologies are now embodied in systems currently in full-scale development and will be entering the inventory starting in 1989. The Advanced Conventional Munitions programs discussed in Section IV support the advance of the FOFA concept.

Employment of conventionally-armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCM) carried on naval combatants in support of SACEUR missions can also contribute to FOFA operations. Employment of SLCMs as well as Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs) and other concepts will be thoroughly explored as part of our Competitive Strategies approach.

U.S. and NATO Planning for the Future

Complementary planning for the FOFA concept is maturing in the U.S. and the Alliance. SACEUR is now developing an operational concept for FOFA in the 1990s and beyond. NATO also has a Long Term Planning Guideline that provides for coordinating armaments and force planning in support of FOFA. SACEUR is focusing on the need for long-range target acquisition and attack requirements, in the context of a conceptual military framework which ties together the various components and prioritizes them.

Most NATO nations have recognized the need to address new and improved FOFA capabilities, and U.S. leadership has provided an important stimulus. The U.S. is developing joint doctrine for FOFA and coordinating the planning for procurement and fielding of FOFA-related systems in an integrated manner among the services and within the Alliance. The Services have jointly identified contributing systems and are working to expedite fielding of key programs.

FOFA Systems

The FOFA concept is essentially operationalized through a "system of systems" approach involving sensors, communications, fusion, munitions, and delivery systems. Some of the programs important to the concept are highlighted below. The systems to support FOFA missions are not being developed as FOFA unique or dedicated elements, but rather are part of our overall effort to modernize conventional capabilities. Many of these systems are being cooperatively developed or produced with our allies. However, the integration of the architecture for special missions characterizing FOFA may eventually require dedicated communications equipment.

The actual numbers and types of systems we procure will depend on further development of the concept of operations for FOFA. This will determine the amount of money dedicated to FOFA in the future. Coordinated planning with regard to all the types of systems outlined below is underway in the Department of Defense, and a full range of delivery system options will be evaluated through Competitive Strategies planning and related analysis. In the interim, the Secretary of Defense is ensuring appropriate funding of the projects, summarized on the following pages, among others, as they relate to supporting the NATO Defense Program.

Sensor Systems

Air Force

The Advanced Synthetic Aperature Radar System II (ASARS II) is an Air Force theater asset employing a high resolution imaging radar system carried aboard the TR1 aircraft. It collects and processes radar imagery in near real time.

Army

GUARDRAIL Common Sensor combines the GUARDRAIL V (COMINT) with QUICKLOOK (ELINT) and the Communications High Accuracy Airborne Location system (CHAALS) on a single platform, the RC-12K.

Intelligence and Electronic Warfare-Unmanned Air Vehicle (IEW-UAV) is a member of an Army family of UAVs. It consists of an air vehicle with a long loiter capability used for reconnoitering areas deep in enemy territory. It can operate in day or night and in all weather environments; it includes several different sensor packages.

Joint

Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) is a multi-mode joint Army/Air Force program, Air Force lead, to provide Moving Target Indicator (MTI) radar surveillance of the Corps area of influence. The single radar system incorporates both wide area (MTI) surveillance and a limited synthetic aperature spot mode radar capability. Cooperative development with our allies is being pursued in both the NATO Air Force and Army Armament Groups.

Communications Systems

Air Force

Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) will provide jam resistant secure information distribution. Through advanced access and counter EW measures JTIDS will conduct rapid, reliable C2 and status information distribution.

Army

The Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) provides secure static and mobile communications to Corps and Division level commanders. Army MSE is based upon the French RITA system and was selected by the U.S. Army after an intensive international competition. MSE allows voice/data/facsimile transmissions which are interoperable with the joint Tactical Communication Systems (TRI-TAC) combat net radios, and commercial telephone systems.

The Army Data Distribution System (ADDS) will assist in near real-time information transmissions using the Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS) User Unit (EPUU), Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS), and Net Control Stations. The combination of EPLRS with JTIDS will capitalize on the previously separated projects to meet the data transfer requirement throughout Division and Corps.

Fusion, Correlation, and Processing Systems

1. Tactical

Air Force

The Battlefield Coordination Element (BCE), in coordination with the Ground Attack Control Center (GACC), will provide air attack planning support to the tactical ground coordinator. The units will coordinate the air attack plan for use of controlled assets, the execution of these plans, and the reporting of the results of the attack.

Army

The Ground Station Module (GSM) for JSTARS and several other sensors will display and report MTI and FTI (Fixed Target Indicator) data on the enemy situation and his movement. Communications with attack coordinators will be provided by JINTACCS, Landline, and FM radio transmission. A downsized GSM will process sensor data for light forces. The Airborne Radar Demonstration System (ARDS) is an active NATO project which will demonstrate interoperability of both British (ASTOR) and French (ORCHIDEE) development systems with the Army's GSM.

Joint

The Limited Operation Capability Europe (LOCE) currently provides intelligence collection, analysis, and distribution to NATO users over secure communications systems, for early warning, situation assessment and targeting activities. Information provided will assist early target nomination for strike or reconnaissance, and support threat analysis.

In 1990, LOCE is to be developed into the Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation Systems (BICES) and will combine U.S. and NATO fused intelligence in support of the NATO Central Region.

All Source Analysis System/Enemy Situation Correlation Element (ASAS/ENSCE) will provide commanders a near real time detailed picture of enemy positions from the fusion of data gathered by organic, theater, and national sensors. Automated processing of high volume data and interoperability between Army Divisions/Corps and Air Force Wings will allow coordinated deep attack planning.

2. National

Army

Electronic Processing and Dissemination System (EPDS) is a ground-based, computer-assisted Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) correlation facility for theater and national sensors.

Enhanced Tactical User Terminal (ETUT) is a processing and visual display for ELINT and Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) support to the Corps.

Imagery Processing and Dissemination System (IPDS), the operational version of the Digital Imagery Test Bed (DITB), will provide the tactical commander with the capability to receive and exploit digital imagery in near real time from national and theater level sensors.

Tactical Radar Correlator (TRAC) is a direct downlink system receiving radar imagery in digital format from the ASARS II.

The Echelon Above Corps (EAC) test bed is a limited, interim, soft copy, digital imagery exploitation capability which has been deployed in advance of fielding the Joint Service Image Processing System (JSIPS) and the Image Processing Dissemination System (IPDS) in Europe.

Weapons Systems

1. Penetrators

Air Force

The B-52G, originally designed to perform strategic, intercontinental, high altitude nuclear strikes, has been modified to provide long-range, deep-attack, conventional missions in some scenarios. It provides a platform for conventional ground attack missions with surface attack missiles as well as conventional bombs in standoff and penetrating modes.

The F-15E (a dual-capable aircraft) will perform interdiction and is capable of carrying guided and unguided conventional weapons and dispensers with various submunitions which will allow it to conduct interdiction and other missions.

In a major standardization effort, the F-16 is in use with five of our NATO allies and is coproduced by them. An advanced model of the F-16, the F-16C/D, is a light weight, multi-role aircraft capable of performing air-to-air, and air-to-ground missions. The aircraft's versatility and its munitions capabilities will enable it to conduct FOFA.

The F-111 is a long-range fighter bomber capable of delivering a range of weapons for deep strike and deep interdiction missions, including FOFA operations.

2. Stand-Off:

Air Force

Modular Stand-Off Weapon (MSOW): The purpose of the MSOW Program is to build a series of both short- and long-range stand-off weapons to attack fixed and running targets using a modular approach. Weapons built under this approach can attack a variety of targets including airfields, air defense units, hardened C^3 nodes, and armor. MSOW is a major codevelopment effort in which six allied NATO nations are participating. The funding for U.S. participation in this program has recently been reduced dramatically.

TACIT RAINBOW is a missile system designed to attack enemy radars and is capable of loitering for an extended time over a target until the radar goes active. The missile is currently designed to be launched from air platforms. Cooperative opportunities for TACIT RAINBOW have been offered to selected NATO allies to promote achievement of this capability on a broad basis in the NATO Central Region.

Army

LANCE is an Army Surface-to-Surface Missile (SSM) with conventional as well as nuclear capabilities. It is deployed in relatively small numbers.

Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) is a tracked, ground launcher for the basic, guided semi-ballistic missiles. MLRS is to be the launch platform for the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS). MLRS is the result of a cooperative development with four NATO nations, and European production is about to begin.

Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) is a short-range Surface-to-Surface Missile (SSM) developed to attack area targets deep in the Corps commander's area of responsibility. Launched from an MLRS platform, the missile is designed to carry various submunitions. It will replace LANCE in the latter's conventional role and is a potential candidate for the Follow-On to LANCE in the nuclear role as well. The U.S. has offered this program for NATO codevelopment and coproduction; it has been offered to all U.S. partners in the MLRS Program.

Navy

The U.S. Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM) is currently budgeted and on schedule. The conventional SLCM, TOMAHAWK Land-Attack Missile (TLAM/C/D) has an extended range, and could contribute significantly to FOFA by providing a conventional deep-attack capability against fixed installations in the Warsaw Pact.

Air Force

Tactical Munitions Dispenser (TMD) is a new general purpose, 1000 lb. class submunition dispenser capable of dispensing SKEET, Boosted Kinetic Energy Penetrator (BKEP), and Combined Effects Munitions (CEM). It is currently available for use with F-15, F-16, F-4 and F-111.

Combined Effects Munitions is a cluster weapon of 202 CEBs. The bomblets consist of armor-penetrating charges, a fragmenting case, and a zirconium incendiary.

The Booster Kinetic Energy Penetrator (BKEP) is a runway attack submunition. When configured for in a TMD for the Direct Attack Combined Munition (DAACM) the system consists of eight BLU-106/B BKEP and twenty-four Hunting HB876 area-denial mines.

SKEET or Sensor Fuzed Weapon (SFW) is an antiarmor warhead, dispensed from a Tactical Munitions Dispenser (TMD). After leaving the dispenser, the submunition detects a tank and fires a self-forging armor-piercing plug at the target.

Laser-Guided Bomb consists of a laser guidance kit attached to a MK-84 warhead. The target is designated from an aircraft, using Forward Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR) or Low-Altitude Night Targeting Infrared Navigation (LANTRIN) targeting pod.

GBU-15/AGM-130 (glider and rocket version) carry MK-84 or I-2000 warheads and are targeted against high value point targets. They are guided either by television or an imaging infrared seeker and deployed from F-4E or F-111 aircraft.

I-2000 Bombs (Improved 2000 lb Bombs) are designed to attack hardened targets such as bridges, bunkers runways, or command posts. Utilizing a redesigned warhead, in a thicker steel casing, they are able to penetrate hardened targets.

Army

Terminally Guided Warhead (TGW) is a submunition for the MLRS rockets; it is designed to search for and destroy enemy armor. TGW development is being undertaken in a cooperative project with France, Germany, and the UK.

Anti-Personnel/Anti-Material (APAM) are air dispensed, high explosive fragmentation submunitions designed for release at a designated height above the ground from LANCE and ATACMS. The APAM submunitions are fuzed to burst on contact with the ground.

SECTION VI: NATO AIR DEFENSE

NATO Air Defense Mission Area

NATO's counter-air capability -- both offensive and defensive -- represents an important and flexible firepower capability which can be employed against fixed installations and against attack from the skies. US air and air defense assets provide a major contribution to NATO, and they also comprise capabilities we need to meet our global defense responsibilities. This mission area will receive continuing high priority.

A significant share of the NATO Conventional Defense Improvement (CDI) effort is already aimed at sustaining a modern and robust air defense capability in the face of an increasingly potent Soviet/Warsaw Pact nuclear, conventional and chemical warfare threat.

The INF Treaty will relieve somewhat the missile threat facing NATO, particularly in the rear areas of Western Europe which are beyond the reach of Warsaw Pact short-range missiles, but the otherwise relentless pace of Soviet weapons modernization continues to threaten critical NATO assets. Increased numbers of attack helicopters, new close air support aircraft, and conventionally-armed, dual-capable, short-range missiles are increassing the threat to our forward fighting forces, key defenses, and certain vital assets. We and our NATO allies have given special emphasis to near term practical steps to defend against the threat through both active and passive defenses. Allied planning has also been quite successful in this mission area.

The Warsaw Pact attaches great importance to the rapid achievement of air supremacy in any conflict. One means available to the Pact to assist in achieving this objective is the use of tactical missiles. In the 1990s, NATO will continue to be threatened by the traditional air threat as well as by remaining theater missiles. The Soviet SS-21s, SS-1s (SCUD Bs), FROGS, SLCMs, ALCMs, and Tactical Air-to-Surface Missiles (TASMs) are not limited under the INF Treaty. NATO's ability to defend against the threat depends on a full range of integrated capabilities and their effective employment. These include modern aircraft, air-to-air and air-to-ground munitions, land-based air defense missiles and guns, tactical missile defenses, as well as command and control, survivability and other passive measures, and electronic warfare systems. Research on new systems and capabilities is also critical to protect against an uncertain future. Investment in all of these areas will be important if we are to achieve needed improvements.

Planning for the Future

We are embarked on a significant improvement of NATO's Command and Control system that is crucial to the Alliance's future air defense posture. NATO's Airborne Early Warning and Control (NAEW&C) Program is proving to be an exceptional performer in this area. However, impacting on our air defense capability is the lack of a modern system for discriminating between friend and foe in the air; this is being addressed in NATO through the development of NATO Identification System (NIS). With respect to air base defense, we are making marked improvements, but our posture remains uneven among allies and among different categories of bases. Continued priority planning and action are needed for air base defense, recovery, chemical protection, and dispersal.

The NATO capacity for Defensive Counter Air (DCA) operations is being significantly upgraded with U.S. and allied deployments of PATRIOT and other modern surface-to-air missiles, increases in more capable aircraft, and deployment of modern air-to-air munitions. However, Allied Command Europe faces shortages in surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and air defense gun systems. To redress these and future shortcomings, we intend to take advantage of a number of technological and other opportunities for building on advances made to date in our defensive stance.

NATO plans now provide for marked improvements in aircraft and munitions to carry the battle to the enemy by attacking his airfields, other sources of his air power, and his follow-on forces, as outlined in Section V. However, we have not yet advanced sufficiently in NATO's capacity for standoff attack and hard target kills. It is here that a number of emerging technology initiatives could have the potential for significant payoff. We are limited in long-range aircraft and must examine the mix of stand-off and direct attack munitions, aircraft, and missile delivery systems, as well as target acquisition capabilities appropriate to conducting Offensive Counter Air (OCA) missions. We intend to pursue this.

Countering Soviet air operations (involving both missile and aircraft attacks) is among our highest priorities for the future.

There are opportunities in this area for exercising competitive strategy operations, in particular. The Secretary of Defense is ensuring appropriate funding of air defense programs as they relate to the NATO Defense Program. Intensive U.S. and NATO planning in this area will continue to be key and an appropriate balance among all areas in the counter air mission area will continue to be important.

Status of NATO Air Defense Improvements

Important ongoing efforts are summarized below:

US Bilateral Efforts: Active Air Defense

- US/UK RAPIER Initiative. This was the first of several US bilateral agreements with NATO allies for improving active air defenses in NATO Europe. This initial US/UK effort, became known as the "RAPIER role model." Under the terms of the 1981 agreement, the US has procured and the UK is manning, operating, and maintaining 32 RAPIER Short-Range Air Defense (SHORAD) fire units for the point defense of seven US air bases in the UK.

- US/FRG PATRIOT/ROLAND Agreement. This initiative provides for Germany to purchase 14 PATRIOT fire units while the US will provide Germany with 14 additional PATRIOT fire units from previously planned US deployments. In return, Germany will man and operate 12 of the 54 US PATRIOT fire units in Germany (providing medium-to-high altitude air defense) and also procure, man, operate, and maintain 27 ROLAND fire units providing short range protection to three US bases. Because of the coverage provided by PATRIOT, six more U.S. bases will also receive air defense coverage.

- US/The Netherlands Agreement. In February 1984, the Dutch Government signed an agreement for the purchase of four PATRIOT fire units. They are planning to buy additional missiles and launchers for these fire units. Moreover, the Dutch have an option to purchase an additional two fire units for a total of six; they are currently studying this option. The Dutch have taken delivery of two fire units and will complete delivery of their four fire units in March 1989.

- US/Turkish RAPIER Agreement. In November 1984, the US and Turkey agreed to enter into a cooperative air base defense program. The US will procure 14 RAPIER fire units and associated equipment from the UK as an extension of the 1981 US/UK RAPIER Agreement, and Turkey will man, maintain, and operate them. US Air Force and the Turkish Air Force Command have jointly produced a comprehensive Turkish air defense master plan for future air defense C^3 and weapon acquisition in Turkey.

Priorities for Active Air Defense

- The PATRIOT Missile System in NATO. NATO's agreed air defense program called for the fielding of PATRIOT fire units by the US and other NATO allies. US deployment began in 1985 and will be completed in the early 1990s. In addition to providing medium-to-high altitude air defense coverage against the traditional air-breathing threat, PATRIOTs will also have a self-defense and a limited capability to defend NATO vital assets against attack by conventionally-armed tactical ballistic missiles.

- The Army's Forward Area Air Defense System (FAADS). With the August 1985 decision to cancel the Army's Division Air Defense (DIVAD) gun weapon system, the Army was forced to reassess just how it would meet its air defense requirements in the forward area. A combination of factors -- the cancellation of DIVAD, the need to address other air defense deficiencies which were independent of the DIVAD decision, and an increased threat capability led the Army to seek a systemic solution. Following several months of study, the Army established its FAADS approach to the problem. FAADS, as formulated, consists of five elements: a non line-of-sight rear system; a line-of-sight forward heavy system; a line-of-sight rear system; a combined arms element; and finally, the FADD C^2I element (command, control, and sensors). The chosen system for the non-line-of sight missile system is the FOG-M (Fiber Optic Guided Missile). This system has gone into advanced system development. The Army recently held a competitive selection process to choose an "off-the-shelf system" to fill the line-of-sight forward heavy role. The Air Defense Anti-Tank System (ADATS) built by Martin Marietta/Oerlikon Buhrle (US/Swiss teaming) was selected and deployment is expected to begin in 1988 and be completed by 1992. Pedestal Mounted STINGER, which is being built by Boeing Aerospace, has been selected as the line-of-sight rear system. FADDS weapons will be added to US corps as an additional or organic capability, providing a capability which does not exist today.

- Fighter Aircraft. With the planned deployment of F-15Es to NATO Europe along with NATO's existing US F-111s and allied TORNADOS, capabilities for conducting Offensive Counter Air missions will be greatly increased. Likewise, improvements to US and allied F-16s and a capability to employ the Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) will serve to improve NATO's traditional Defensive Counter Air operations. Together, these improvements will enhance NATO's ability to gain and maintain a favorable air situation (to conduct offensive and defensive counter-air operations) should the Warsaw Pact choose to attack.

- HAWK and the Medium Surface-to-Air Missile (MSAM). The US and several NATO allies maintain the HAWK medium altitude air defense system. HAWK, originally designed in the 1950s, has undergone several Product Improvement Programs (PIPs) to modernize and upgrade its capabilities. The US HAWKs are currently being upgraded by the phase-3 PIP. This PIP improves the reliability, availability, and the maintainability of the HAWKS. Furthermore, phase-3 will enhance the system's mobility and provides the HAWKs with a low altitude multiple engagement capability. The Army has also proposed a plan to further enhance the capability of the HAWK against cruise missiles. Finally, it should be noted that Norway has decided to retain HAWK, but in a modified and upgraded fashion unique to Norway in a system called NOAH -- Norwegian Adapted HAWK.

The foregoing highlights do not detail every facet of our priorities in the improvements to NATO's active air defenses, but they do offer an overall picture of some important aspects. The following information highlights other air defense initiatives and passive air defense measures which are priorities in NATO.

Other Priorities

- UK and French AWACS Purchase. In December 1986, the UK announced plans to purchase six Boeing AWACS aircraft from the US; in 1987 they further announced that they planned to exercise their option for a seventh AWACS aircraft. In February 1987, the French agreed to purchase three AWACS from the US. Further, France has announced that it expects to exercise its option to acquire a fourth AWACS aircraft. Given their compatibility with US AWACS and NATO's 18 Airborne Early Warning & Control (NAEW&C) aircraft, the French and UK AWACS acquisition should greatly enhance NATO's overall capability in this vital area of airborne early warning and control.

- The NATO Identification System (NIS). NIS consists of two components: the Direct Sub-System (DSS) component which primarily consists of the Question and Answer (Q&A) component, and the Indirect Sub System (ISS) component. While both components are important, the Q&A component has received the greatest NATO cooperative effort to date as well as the most visibility and public attention. In response to the designation of NIS by the Conference of NATO Armament Directors (CNAD) as a cooperative R&D legislation endeavor (Nunn Amendment), a five nation MOU was signed in October 1987 by representatives of the US, Germany, France, Italy, and the UK. In essence, the MOU provides for cooperation and collaboration on the design and development of the Q&A component. In the US, the Q&A component is referred to as the MARK XV. An October 1987 demonstration and validation of the US, UK, French, and German Q&A components was conducted at the Patuxent River Naval Test Center. This test was highly successful and proved that the systems were compatible and interoperable.

- The NATO Air Command and Control System (ACCS). In February 1982, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) tasked the NATO Air Defense Committee (NADC) to undertake a revision of the 1979 Refined Program for Air Defense in Allied Command Europe. The NADC's Panel on Airspace Management and Control Systems (PAMCS) was assigned the task of devising a NATO ACCS Master Plan as part of that revision process. The PAMCS established an ACCS Team to lead and direct the development of the ACCS Master Plan. When fully implemented, the ACCS Master Plan will provide for the total airspace management in NATO, an extremely important undertaking. Of the five volume ACCS Master Plan, Volumes I through IVA have been approved; Volume IVB (the ten regional annexes) are currently out to nations for national staffing. Volume V is the transition/funding plan; it is still being drafted. At the NADC meeting of 17-18 November 1987, national representatives agreed to establishing an Interim ACCS Management Organization under the Defense Support Division of NATO's International Staff (IS). Therefore, an organization will soon be in place to work the difficult issue of ACCS implementation.

- US Bilateral Agreements with NATO Allies. In 1985, USAFE worked out bilateral arrangements with Norway and Denmark for the construction of revetted dispersed aircraft parking at US Collocated Operating Bases (COBs). Under the terms of the agreement, the US would provide material and training for allied teams to manufacture the two-meter square Rapid Runway Repair (RRR) concrete slabs. The allies would then be responsible for manufacturing the slabs and installing them so as to construct dispersed parking pads for US reinforcement aircraft. Additionally they would install four-meter high reinforced concrete revetments (US provided) on three sides of the parking pad to provide some blast and splinter protection to parked aircraft. USAFE personnel are exploring similar arrangements with Turkey and Italy. The revetted dispersed parking pads offer increased protection to reinforcing aircraft (when hardened aircraft shelters are not available) while at the same time increasing the number and availability of concrete slabs required for RRR should airfield attacks occur.

- Hardened Aircraft Shelters. The NATO goal is to provide hardened aircraft shelters for 100% of the aircraft; however, NATO infrastructure funds will only finance shelters for 70% of the aircraft. To provide sheltering above the 70% level requires funding by the nation involved. For the US, CINCUSAFE has established a policy to shelter 100% of in-place and reinforcing aircraft at US Main Operating Bases (MOBs) and 70% of reinforcing aircraft at collocated operating bases. The Air Force currently has aircraft shelter construction programmed in the FYDP to meet the 100% goal for US MOBs.

- Other Passive Measures for NATO Air Defense. The US has been exploring other elements of passive defense with our NATO allies such as the construction of Alternate Launch and Recovery Surfaces (ALARS) for aircraft and the provision of Emergency Landing Strips (ELS) for aircraft; Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception (CCD); Survivable Collective Protection Shelters (SCPS) for chemical/biological warfare protection; Base Recovery After Attack (BRATT) measures to include air base reconnaissance/damage assessment to determine the extent of the damage; Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD); Rapid Runway Repair (RRR); and Mobile Aircraft Arresting Systems (MAAS). Camouflage and concealment involve the use of netting to cover equipment and the use of paint to "tone down" runways and structures. Deception includes the use of aircraft decoys and decoys for radar antennas. The U.S. Air Force and Army regularly conduct exercises during which the use of chemical/ biological protective clothing and procedures are used and evaluated. The Air Force is engaged in installing SCPS at three US MOBs: Spangdahlem, Bitburg, and Ramstein. Hahn Air Base will be next to receive SCPS. France is also installing its chemical/biological protective shelters, AMF-80, at its air bases. The French have conducted discussions with the Belgians, Dutch, and Canadians trying to win support for use of the French AMF-80 system. To date, only the Canadians have purchased a variant of the French system, AMF-82, for their air bases at Lahr and Baden-Sollingen.

SECTION VII: LEADERS' VIEWS

Confidence in NATO Strategy

In their approach to INF, the allies made a solid commitment from which they never deviated. Since 1979 the political and military leaders of NATO in Europe have addressed the Soviet theater nuclear forces buildup directly and unambiguously. In that regard, their actions concerning Alliance security posture speak for themselves.

The decision to deploy INF systems while supporting U.S./Soviet negotiations was taken in the face of considerable political unrest and turmoil which continued to grow for several years. For the European leaders steadfast adherence to this dual-track decision demonstrated the type of political courage so important to the NATO security concept. We should neither presume nor expect anything less in the future.

Both the Ministers of Defense at their December 1987 Defense Planning Committee meeting and the Foreign Ministers at their meeting endorsed the Agreement finally achieved as a result of collective Alliance efforts. The Foreign Ministers said: "We welcome and fully support the Washington INF Treaty. It is fully consistent with the security requirements of the Alliance. It accomplishes an important and longstanding Alliance objective: the elimination of a class of Soviet nuclear weapons threatening the European allies and other regions of the world."

The approach taken in the dual-track process has certainly strengthened NATO because of the confidence demonstrated by the allies in their security policy. NATO ministers, after considering the implications of an INF Agreement, affirmed the viability of NATO's strategy. In November 1987, the Defense Ministers stated that the "strategy of flexible response will continue to be vital to the security of the Alliance."

Support of Modernization

The allies have indicated a clear recognition of the need for modernization of both nuclear and conventional components of NATO's forces in support of the strategy. The issue for the future is how well the U.S. and our allies do in protecting the gains we have made and in building upon them.

Although the real increases in U.S. defense spending exceeded by a wide margin the average growth rates on non-U.S. defense programs in the early through mid-1980s, U.S. spending reflected major efforts to make up for real decreases we experienced in the 1970s. At that time our allies were achieving steady real increases. U.S. real defense spending for the early 1970s through the mid-1980s was equivalent to an annual decline of roughly 1 to 2 percent. Comparable non-U.S. spending for defense was two percent real growth per year.

In the Nuclear Planning Group and its related bodies, our allies have recognized, with us, that NATO must continue to fulfill requirements to modernize and increase the survivability of the nuclear forces remaining after an INF Agreement. Our allies have also recognized that additional adjustments may be necessary to ensure a full spectrum of nuclear deterrent options at all ranges.

Our allies also join in supporting our conviction that coordinated programs to modernize and improve NATO's conventional forces must be revitalized. This was established in NATO's CDI Program to redress key deficiencies in NATO's conventional posture. The European allies have shown generally strong performance in meeting established modernization objectives.

Reports from the EUROGROUP nations indicate they are planning to introduce a wide range of new equipment into their forces in 1988. In that year, 250 main battle tanks, over 1,000 other armored vehicles and over 50 pieces of heavy artillery will be introduced into service. The air forces of those nations will bring 200 new combat aircraft into service in 1988, mostly of the advanced TORNADO and F-16 types. Improvements will continue in existing aircraft, survivability and airfield defense. At sea, the EUROGROUP nations plan to introduce seven escorts, three submarines and five mine-warfare vessels, together with smaller vessels and support ships, as well as 25 new aircraft in a maritime role. Support for new initiatives for the future will certainly be based on the effectiveness of transatlantic consultation.

Conventional Arms Control

Indications are that most of the allies believe the INF accord signals a breakthrough in arms control and security policy. They, of course, support continuing U.S/Soviet START negotiations, and are committed to planning for Conventional Stability Talks (CST) addressing forces in Europe.

Most allies appear to be intent on NATO management of an allied approach to CST negotiations to ensure that these talks complement NATO force improvement initiatives. NATO military authorities will be consulted by political leaders as we prepare for these negotiations, and throughout their conduct. For this reason, SACEUR's criteria for such negotiations are an important consideration. His current views on this subject are as follows:

- Suggestions for initial U.S./Soviet asymmetric reductions have possibilities but need more analysis. All reduction proposals should be accompanied by conventional defense capability improvements.

- Soviet efforts to circumscribe Alliance force modernization goals must be firmly resisted. The likelihood of a new agreement cannot be determined and will depend on Soviet perceptions and willingness to negotiate.

Further SACEUR Views

The NATO commander in Europe, SACEUR, has focused on specific military considerations related to the execution of the flexible response strategy. SACEUR points out the need to differentiate between deterrence of Warsaw Pact aggression and NATO's ability to respond flexibly to restore deterrence if the nuclear threshold is crossed. As long as NATO maintains a credible linkage between European-based theater nuclear forces, conventional forces, and strategic systems, and a viable and unquestioned ability to execute military options across a spectrum up to general nuclear response, we will continue to have credible deterrence, according to SACEUR.

SACEUR believes it is critical that NATO continue to field nuclear systems that provide a credible, visible (European land and sea-based) mix of both short- and long-range systems. These sytems, he believes, must be capable of holding at risk militarily significant targets of the Warsaw Pact to include those in the USSR.

Fundamentally, SACEUR supports the nuclear modernization and CDI programs upon which NATO is embarked. With respect to nuclear forces modernization, SACEUR cites the need for additional dual-capable aircraft (DCA) of longer range, the development of the tactical air-to-surface missile, the LANCE missile follow-on, and modernized artillery munitions and bombs. Also critical, in his view, is the lifting of current congressional restrictions on the number of modernized artillery munitions and also the restrictions on development of a nuclear follow-on to LANCE. According to SACEUR, a nuclear force containing these systems would maintain target coverage while continuing to provide widespread NATO nation participation and the sharing of burdens and risks.

In advancing technology to achieve improvements in non-nuclear deterrence, SACEUR has pointed out that visible nuclear capability has a deterrent value that conventional systems, however high their technology, cannot match.

In the area of conventional capabilities, SACEUR strongly supports the concept of FOFA which is designed to delay, disrupt, and destroy those forces arriving at the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) and thereby enhance significantly the integrity of NATO's forward defense.

SACEUR believes that NATO's air defense picture is improving. His view is that there are several programs both in development and procurement to bring air defense capability to an adequate level. Among specific systems and programs in the air defense area evaluated by SACEUR are the following:

- The introduction of PATRIOT in the central region starting in 1986 greatly enhances NATO's air defense.

- The deployment of an adapted HAWK for Norway starting in 1987 will improve vital point defense in Norway.

Danish deployment of further HAWKS will add to defense of the Danish Islands. The U.S. plans to further enhance the capabilities of its Hawks with the Product Improvement Program (PIP) phase III. Defense of troops and vital assets is being improved by the introduction of new generations of man-carried and short range weapons like ROLAND, Self Propelled RAPIER, JAVELIN and STINGER.

- The provision of aircraft for the NATO Airborne Early Warning (AEW) force is complete. Ground environment tasks are due to be completed in the next two to three years. The decision by the UK to obtain its component of AEW will add considerably to the NATO AEW force. Improved deployment options are planned in the northern region.

APPENDIX

PUBLIC LAW 100-180, NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT, FY 1988-89

TITLE X Matters Relating to NATO Countries and Other Allies

PART A- NATO Deterrence, Section 1001. Report on Requirements for Maintaining NATO's Strategy of Deterrence

(a) Requirement. - The Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report regarding the ability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to maintain its strategy of deterrence through the 1990s. The report shall include a specific discussion of the implications for such deterrence if the United States and the Soviet Union agree to a treaty which requires the elimination of all intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) missiles having a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The report shall be prepared in consultation with the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(b) Form and Content of Report. - The Secretary shall submit the report required by subsection (a) in both CLASSIFIED and UNCLASSIFIED forms and shall include in the report the following:

(1) A discussion of the effect that the elimination under an INF Treaty of intermediate-range missiles deployed by the United States and the Soviet Union would likely have on the ability of NATO to maintain an effective flexible response strategy and credible deterrence.

(2) The appropriate numbers and types of nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable delivery systems of the United States not limited by the proposed INF Treaty which the Secretary of Defense recommends for deployment in or redeployment to the European theater if an INF Treaty is ratified and enters into force, including a description of any nuclear modernization program the Secretary has recommended or proposes to recommend as necessary to ensure that NATO will be able to maintain a credible and effective military strategy.

(3) A discussion of the balance between the nonnuclear forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the European theater, the likelihood of NATO making significant improvements in that balance over the next few years, the potential effect of conventional force balance alternatives currently under consideration by the United States Government, and the likelihood and potential effect of a new agreement between NATO and the Warsaw Pact limiting nonnuclear forces on that balance.

(4) A discussion of the feasibility and cost-effectiness of substituting advanced conventional munitions for nuclear weapons currently deployed by NATO, including a discussion of the costs of such weapons and prospects for sharing such costs among NATO allies.

(5) A description of nonnuclear forces that would be needed to support the operational concept of Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA).

(6) The status of improvements being made in the air defense of NATO in Europe.

(7) A discussion of the views of the leaders of member nations of NATO (other than the United States) and of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), on the matters described in paragraphs (1) through (5).

(c) Deadline of Report. - The Report required by subsecton (a) shall be submitted not later than the earlier of - (1) 90 days after the date of the enactment of this act; or (2) the date on which the President submits to the Senate for its advice and consent a Treaty described in subsection (a).

(3) Troop pullout. If anyone asks about the effect of budgetary constraints on our commitment to the alliance, I suggest you say (a) the ineptitude of the Reagan Administration on budget matters is not going to effect your support forthe alliance at this critical time, and that includes keeping our troops at present strength (around 326,000); (b) reducing troops would help the Soviets argument that the U.S. is an unreliable ally.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD

MR. CHAIRMAN, OVER THE FEBRUARY RECESS PERIOD, I LED A BIPARTISAN SENATE DELEGATION TO 5 NATO COUNTRIES TO CONFER WITH OUR ALLIES ON MATTERS RELATED TO THE INF TREATY AND THE FUTURE OF OUR ALLIANCE. THE DELEGATION WAS COMPOSED, AS YOU KNOW, OF THE CHAIRMEN OF THE 3 SENATE COMMITTEES WHICH ARE DEVOTING THEIR FULL ENERGIES TO EXAMINING THE PROVISIONS OF THE ACCORD, AND ITS RAMIFICATIONS. I APPRECIATE VERY MUCH, MR. CHAIRMAN, THAT YOU GAVE OF YOUR VALUABLE TIME TO THIS SHORT BUT INTENSIVE JOURNEY. AS THE ONE CHARGED WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE COMMITTEE OF JURISDICTION OVER THE TREATY, YOU HAVE THE DIFFICULT TASK OF CONDUCTING A THOROUGH, YET EXPEDITIOUS CONSIDERATION OF THE ACCORD, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

OF THE TWO OTHER COMMITTEES CONCERNED WITH THIS MATTER, AND PROVIDING A COMPREHENSIVE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE FULL SENATE.

THE LAST TIME THAT THE SENATE TURNED ITS ATTENTION TO A MAJOR ARMS CONTROL TREATY WITH THE SOVIET UNION WAS 16 YEARS AGO, WHEN IT GAVE ITS ADVICE AND CONSENT TO THE RATIFICATION OF THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY. I WOULD POINT OUT, MR. CHAIRMAN, THAT 82 OF THE CURRENT 100 INCUMBENT SENATORS WERE NOT IN THE SENATE AT THE TIME THAT THE ABM TREATY WAS APPROVED FOR RATIFICATION. IN FACT, 82% OF BOTH DEMOCRATS AND REPUBLICANS HAVE NO EXPERIENCE IN A FLOOR DEBATE ON AN ARMS CONTROL TREATY. I NOTE IN PASSING AT THIS POINT, MR. CHAIRMAN, THAT EVENTS SINCE THE APPROVAL OF THAT ACCORD HAVE NECESSITATED THAT THE SENATE HANDLE THE QUESTION OF THE AUTHORITATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE TEXT OF THE INF TREATY SOMEWHAT DIFFERENTLY FROM PAST PRACTICE -- A MATTER THE IMPORTANCE OF WHICH WAS REINFORCED TO THE DELEGATION DURING ITS NATO VISIT. I WILL HAVE MORE TO SAY ON THIS ISSUE LATER IN THIS REPORT.

IN ADDITION TO YOURSELF, I WAS PLEASED THAT THE CHAIRMAN OF THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, MR. NUNN, AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE, MR. BOREN, AS WELL AS THE RANKING REPUBLICAN MEMBER OF THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, MR. WARNER, WERE ABLE TO BE PART OF THE DELEGATION. AT THE OUTSET, SOME SAID THAT EUROPEAN LEADERS WOULD NOT REALLY SPEAK THEIR HONEST, FRANK VIEWS ON THE ADVANTAGES OR DISADVANTAGES OF THE TREATY. I AM PLEASED TO SAY, MR. CHAIRMAN, THAT THIS WAS NOT THE CASE AT ALL. THE DELEGATION HAD A VERY FULL, VERY LONG SET OF DISCUSSIONS IN ALL 5 COUNTRIES. INDEED, IT WAS MY DEFINITE IMPRESSION THAT ALL OF THE LEADERS WE MET WERE EAGER TO COMMUNICATE THEIR VIEWS TO US, AND, AT TIMES, THEIR CONCERNS. IN TURN, THEY APPEARED EAGER TO LEARN THE OPINIONS AND ATTITUDES WE WISHED TO CONVEY ABOUT SENATE CONSIDERATION OF THE INF TREATY, OUR PERCEPTIONS OF BOTH

THE STATE OF THE ALLIANCE AND THE CHALLENGE WE FACE WITH A NEW DYNAMIC STYLE OF SOVIET LEADERSHIP NOW IN PLACE IN MOSCOW.

IT WAS OBVIOUS TO ME, MR. CHAIRMAN, THAT THERE WAS MORE THAN A PASSING INTEREST ON THE PART OF EUROPEAN LEADERS AS TO OUR VIEWS ABOUT WHERE THE TREATY AND THE ALLIANCE ARE HEADED, AND A GENUINE DESIRE TO COMMUNICATE THEIR VIEWS TO US. IN ALL THE CAPITALS WE VISITED, THE LEVEL AND QUALITY OF THE DIALOGUE WERE VERY INFORMATIVE AND BENEFICIAL. I HAVE RETURNED WITH A MUCH DEEPER UNDERSTANDING OF THE CLIMATE IN EUROPE AND THE CHALLENGES AHEAD FOR NATO.

FOR THE RECORD, THE DELEGATION FIRST TRAVELED TO MUNICH, TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ANNUAL DEFENSE CONFERENCE KNOWN AS THE WEHRKUNDE CONFERENCE, WHERE A SIZEABLE REPRESENTATION OF OFFICIALS FROM ALL NATO COUNTRIES, AS WELL AS OPINION-MAKERS AND OUTSIDE EXPERTS WERE GATHERED. BOTH SENATOR NUNN AND I DELIVERED ADDRESSES TO THAT GATHERING, AND WE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY AT THE OUTSET OF THE TRIP TO HEAR A VARIETY OF INFORMED OPINIONS AS TO THE FUTURE SECURITY NEEDS AND CHALLENGES FOR THE ALLIANCE. FOLLOWING THAT, WE TRAVELED TO LONDON, BONN, PARIS, ANKARA, AND ROME. IN EACH CAPITAL, WE MET WITH THE HEAD OF STATE OR OF GOVERNMENT: PRIME MINISTER THATCHER, CHANCELLOR KOHL, PRESIDENT MITTERRAND, PRESIDENT EVREN AND PRIME MINISTER OZAL, AND PRIME MINISTER GORIA. ADDITIONALLY WE MET WITH THE DEFENSE AND FOREIGN MINISTERS AT EACH STOP, WITH OPPOSITION LEADERS AND OPINION-MAKERS, AS WELL AS WITH BOTH FOREIGN AND AMERICAN PRESS REPRESENTATIVES. A FULL LISTING OF THOSE INDIVIDUALS, AS WELL AS TRANSCRIPTS OF VARIOUS ROUND TABLE DISCUSSIONS AND MEETINGS WE HAD WITH THE PRESS WILL BE PROVIDED TO THE COMMITTEE IN THE FORM OF A WRITTEN REPORT.

THE DELEGATION WILL ALSO BE DELIVERING OUR REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE PRESIDENT TOMORROW AFTERNOON, WITH THE AIM OF

HELPING THE PRESIDENT TO PREPARE FOR HIS UPCOMING NATO SUMMIT MEETING, ON MARCH 2, IN BRUSSELS -- A MEETING OF SOME IMPORTANCE FOR THE ALLIANCE.

THERE WERE THREE BROAD PURPOSES TO THE TRIP. FIRST, WE SOUGHT TO ACQUIRE A DETAILED AND UNVARNISHED VIEW OF NATO COUNTRY LEADERS OF THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE INF TREATY, AND TO TAKE THOSE VIEWS INTO ACCOUNT IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR CONSIDERATION OF THE TREATY. AFTER ALL, MR. CHAIRMAN, MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE, THIS TREATY IS THE CENTRAL PIECE OF AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES AT THIS TIME. SECOND, WE SOUGHT THEIR VIEWS ON WHERE THE ALLIANCE SHOULD BE GOING FROM HERE, AND THIRD, THEIR PERCEPTIONS OF SOVIET TACTICS AND STRATEGY FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. HOW DO THESE LEADERS EVALUATE THE GORBACHEV REGIME'S STYLE AND APPROACH TO THE WEST. HOW SHOULD WE COLLECTIVELY BEST ADJUST TO THAT NEW STYLE?

MORE SPECIFICALLY, WE PURSUED SEVERAL LINES OF INQUIRY. WHAT WERE THEIR VIEWS ON THE EFFECT ON PUBLIC OPINION OF THE NEW GORBACHEV "CHARM" OFFENSIVE, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE SUCCESSFUL CULMINATION OF THE INF TREATY? DOES THIS ERA OF GOOD FEELING IMPACT ON THE PACE AND TYPE OF FUTURE NATO WEAPON MODERNIZATION PLANNING? DOES THE PERCEPTION OF A DIMINISHED THREAT FROM THE EAST HAVE AN EFFECT ON NATO COHESION? IS THERE AN UNDIMINISHED CONSENSUS IN EUROPE FOR A STRONG DETERRENT POSTURE BASED ON A SUCCESSFUL STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE WITH A ROBUST NUCLEAR COMPONENT? OR IS THERE DEVELOPING A MOMENTUM FOR RUSHING INTO ADDITIONAL ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, PARTICULARLY IN THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AREA, AS A RESULT OF THE INF TREATY AND THE CHANGED STYLE OF THE GORBACHEV DIPLOMACY? DO WE NEED TO REEMPHASIZE THAT ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS ARE NOT ENDS IN THEMSELVES BUT, FIRST AND FOREMOST, A MEANS TO GREATER SECURITY. IN SHORT, WHAT IS THE STATE OF THE PUBLIC MOOD, HOW IS IT BEING FORMED, AND WHAT EDUCATIONAL STRATEGY IS NEEDED ON THE PART OF WESTERN LEADERS TO

RETAIN A STRONG CONSENSUS FOR NATO PROGRAMS, REMEMBERING THAT IT WAS VIGOROUS CONSENSUS-BUILDING BY NATO LEADERS WHICH RESULTED IN THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE INF TREATY?

WE WERE ALSO INTERESTED IN HOW EUROPEAN LEADERS EVALUATE THE VARIOUS PROPOSALS AND PROGRAMS FOR CLOSE BILATERAL MILITARY COOPERATION, PARTICULARLY BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY, BUT ALSO BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF AN HISTORIC SOVIET STRATEGY OF ATTEMPTING TO WEAKEN NATO BY PLAYING ON, AND PROMOTING, DIVISIONS AMONG NATO PARTNERS.

ALSO, WE SOUGHT THEIR VIEWS ON THE MOST ADVANTAGEOUS APPROACH TO NATO PLANNING NOW, IN TERMS OF SETTING PRIORITIES, AND THE PROPER SEQUENCE AND PACING OF ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES AND MODERNIZATION ACTIONS. IS THERE A NEED AT THIS PARTICULAR TIME FOR AN OVERALL EVALUATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF A COMMON COORDINATED CONCEPT ON THESE MATTERS? HOW URGENT IS THIS QUESTION FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE?

THEMES AND MESSAGES THE DELEGATION CONVEYED

BOTH IN MY ADDRESS TO THE WEHRKUNDE CONFERENCE AND IN OUR MEETINGS IN THE INDIVIDUAL CAPITALS, WE SOUGHT TO CONVEY CERTAIN THEMES. BRIEFLY, THEY WERE, FIRST, THE INF TREATY IS A VICTORY FOR THE COHESION OF NATO. WE CONVEYED OUR BELIEF THAT THE ALLIANCE IS HEALTHY, AND INDEED FLUSH WITH PERHAPS ITS GREATEST VICTORY SINCE ITS FOUNDING -- THE TURNING BACK OF SOVIET TACTICS OF INTIMIDATION EMBODIED IN ITS PROVOCATIVE AND UNNECESSARY DEPLOYMENT OF INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILES, THE SS-20'S, IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER. DESPITE A MAJOR PROPAGANDA AND DISINFORMATION PROGRAM IN EUROPE IN THE EARLY 1980'S, AND THE SOVIET'S WALKING OUT OF THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS, THE ALLIANCE DUAL TRACK POLICY WAS ACCEPTED BY EUROPEAN CONSTITUENCIES AFTER COURAGEOUS STANDS WERE TAKEN BY EUROPEAN LEADERS. THUS, THE SOVIETS FACED WITH

GREAT NATO COHESION, WERE GIVEN NO CHOICE BUT TO COME BACK TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE TO CONCLUDE AN ACCORD. SUCH A WINNING STRATEGY NEEDS TO BE CONTINUED IN THE POST-INF PERIOD, AND THE LESSON THAT WE CAN PREVAIL IN OUR STRATEGIES IF WE ACT IN A COORDINATED FASHION SHOULD DIRECT OUR CURRENT PLANNING. IN GENERAL, MOST OF THE EUROPEAN LEADERS WITH WHOM WE MET PRAISED THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS WITH WHICH THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION NEGOTIATORS BROUGHT THE ALLIANCE BEHIND THE INF TREATY.

SECOND, REASSURANCE THAT THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO NATO IS UNDIMINISHED. WE EMPHASIZED THAT OUR COMMITMENT TO THE ALLIANCE IS UNCHANGED. WE HAVE NO PLANS FOR TROOP REDUCTIONS, FOR INSTANCE, AS WE ARE AWARE THAT THIS COULD CONVEY THE WRONG SIGNAL TO THE SOVIETS. THIS U.S. COMMITMENT REMAINS IN SPITE OF BUDGET PRESSURES IN THE UNITED STATES. WE REITERATED OUR SUPPORT FOR THE CONTINUATION OF NATO'S DETERRENT POSTURE OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE, INCLUDING THE MODERNIZATION OF NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL SYSTEMS.

THIRD, TO SUGGEST THAT THE ALLIANCE OUGHT TO DEVELOP NEW INITIATIVES ON ARMS CONTROL, BOTH TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM OF COHESION ENGENDERED BY THE SUCCESS OF THE DUAL TRACK POLICY, AND TO REGAIN THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INITIATIVE VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIETS, SO THAT THE FUTURE DEBATES ON THESE MATTERS ARE FRAMED ON TERMS DEVELOPED BY NATO, NOT BY THE SOVIET BLOC.

FOURTH, TO REAFFIRM THE STABILITY AND CONSTANCY OF THE SENATE IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM. AS LEADERS OF THE SENATE, WE REAFFIRMED OUR UNCHANGED COMMITMENT TO THE ALLIANCE, AND AFFIRMED THAT, WHILE ADMINISTRATIONS MAY COME AND GO IN WASHINGTON, AND A CONFUSION OF NOISE CAN EMANATE FROM THE UNITED STATES DURING AN ELECTION CYCLE, THE SENATE IS A PERMANENT BODY WHICH CAN BE RELIED UPON TO KEEP AMERICA FIRMLY ANCHORED AND COUPLED TO EUROPE. IT WAS ALSO OUR INTENT TO CLARIFY ANY QUESTION AS TO THE SENATE'S COMMITMENT

TO CONCLUDE AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS IS POSSIBLE, WITH DUE REGARD TO THE NEED FOR THOROUGH INVESTIGATION OF ITS PARTICULARS, OUR CONSIDERATION OF THE INF TREATY. WE INDICATED THAT, BARRING UNFORESEEN DEVELOPMENTS, PARTICUARLY IN THE VERIFICATION AREA, WE FELT THAT SENATE APPROVAL OF THE TREATY WAS LIKELY WITHOUT THE NEED FOR THE KIND OF RESERVATIONS WHICH WOULD REQUIRE THE ADMINISTRATION TO RENEGOTIATE THE TERMS OF THE TREATY WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

IT WAS IMMEDIATELY APPARENT THAT OUR THEMES OF STABILITY, STEADFASTNESS, THE CONSTANCY OF OUR COMMITMENT AND OUR UNDERSTANDING OF EUROPEAN PROBLEMS ARE OF CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE AT THIS TIME. THIS IS DUE TO WHAT, TO PUT IT BLUNTLY, ADDS UP TO A PERVASIVE SENSE OF UNEASE IN EUROPE ABOUT, ESSENTIALLY, AMERICAN LEADERSHIP, CONSTANCY, AND RELIABILITY. A SERIES OF EVENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS, SOME OF WHICH HAVE BEEN ONGOING AND SOME OF WHICH OCCURRED DURING OUR JOURNEY, HIGHLIGHTS THE COMPONENTS OF THE PROBLEM.

BACKGROUND TREMORS: UNCERTAINTIES AND AMBIGUITIES REGARDING AMERICAN RELIABILITY

FIRST, THE ADMINISTRATION-SENATE TREATY INTERPRETATION DEBATE. THERE WAS CONSTANT UNCERTAINTY DURING THE TRIP OVER THE POSSIBILITY OF DELAYS IN SENATE CONSIDERATION OF THE TREATY BECAUSE OF A DISPUTE BETWEEN THE SENATE AND THE ADMINISTRATION OVER HOW AN AUTHORITATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF A TREATY IS TO BE ARRIVED AT. THE DISPUTE, AS THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ARE WELL AWARE, STEMS FROM THE DEBATE OVER THE PROPER INTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY PROVISIONS ON THE MATTER OF NEW ABM TECHNOLOGIES. JUST PRIOR TO THE TRIP, AND EXTENDING INTO THE TIME FRAME OF THE TRIP, SENATOR NUNN AND I ENGAGED IN AN EXCHANGE OF LETTERS WITH SECRETARY SHULTZ ON THIS MATTER, AND WHILE VERY CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN REACHING A COMMON UN-

DERSTANDING BETWEEN THE TWO BRANCHES ON HOW SUCH AN AUTHORITATIVE INTERPRETATION IS TO BE REACHED, I BELIEVE THAT THE SENATE WILL HAVE TO TAKE ADDITIONAL FORMAL ACTION ON THE RESOLUTION OF RATIFICATION TO CLARIFY ANY AMBIGUITIES THAT ARE NOW PRESENT. AFTER ALL, THE PROCESS THAT THIS COMMITTEE IS ENGAGED IN, AND THAT THE FULL SENATE WILL SHORTLY BE ENGAGED IN, HAS TO BE GROUNDED IN THE CERTAINTY THAT THE INTERPRETATION THAT THE SENATE ARRIVES AT, SPECIFICALLY OF THE OBLIGATIONS THAT THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ARE UNDERTAKING TO IMPLEMENT AND ABIDE BY, IS FULLY UNDERSTOOD AND WILL NOT BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO CHANGE AFTER SENATE APPROVAL IS GIVEN.

IN PARTICULAR, THE OTHER MEMBERS OF OUR ALLIANCE IN NATO, WHO ARE VERY MUCH DEPENDENT ON THE INTEGRITY OF THE AMERICAN PROCESS IN CONSUMMATING THE INF TREATY, AS WELL, OF COURSE, AS OUR TREATY PARTNER, IN THIS CASE THE SOVIET UNION, HAVE TO HAVE SOME ASSURANCE THAT THE OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN ARE NOT GOING TO BE REPUDIATED BY A FUTURE ADMINISTATION. OTHERWISE, THE VERY VALUE OF NEGOTIATING TREATIES WITH THE UNITED STATES BECOMES DEBASED AND UNDERMINED.

IN ORDER TO REMOVE AMBIGUITIES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE REINTERPRETATION OF THE OBLIGATIONS HEREIN UNDERTAKEN, WE HAVE REACHED AN AGREEMENT WITH THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH ON ACCESS TO NEGOTIATING RECORDS, AND THE SENATE IS NOW IN POSSESSION OF THOSE RECORDS; THEY ARE BEING ANALYZED BY THE APPROPRIATELY CLEARED STAFF MEMBERS AND ARE AVAILABLE FOR EXAMINATION BY ALL SENATORS. A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE TESTIMONY PROVIDED BY ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS AND THE CONTENTS OF THOSE RECORDS WILL BE MADE, SO THAT AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A FUTURE ADMINISTRATION TO CLAIM THAT THE RECORD REVEALS A DIFFERENT INTERPRETATION WILL BE RENDERED NIL. MR. CHAIRMAN, I INDICATED EARLIER THAT WE ASSURED OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES THAT IT WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY, BARRING UNFORESEEN DEVELOPMENTS, TO ATTACH RESERVATIONS TO THIS TREATY WHICH WOULD

REQUIRE RENEGOTIATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION. I DO NOT THINK THAT THE AUTHORITATIVENESS OF THE INTERPRETATION UNDERSTOOD BY THE SENATE IN CONSENTING TO THE RESOLUTION OF RATIFICATION FALLS INTO THAT CATEGORY. SUCH A RESERVATION, WHICH I AM NOW INCLINED TO BELIEVE IS NEEDED, WOULD CONTAIN A STATEMENT: (A) THAT THE SENATE REGARDS THE TESTIMONY PROVIDED BY EXECUTIVE BRANCH WITNESSES AS AUTHORITATIVE FOR PURPOSES OF INTERPRETING THE PROVISIONS OF THE ACCORD; (B) THAT THERE IS NOTHING IN THE NEGOTIATING RECORD WHICH CONTRAVENES THAT TESTIMONY; (C) THAT THE SENATE IS RELYING ON SUCH TESTIMONY AND REPRESENTATIONS AND THAT IT IS THEREFORE UNNECESSARY TO ATTACH ADDITIONAL RESERVATIONS TO THE RESOLUTION OF RATIFICATION WHICH OUTLINE THE SUBSTANCE OF THAT TESTIMONY; AND (D) THAT AN INTERPRETATION OR MEANING GIVEN TO THE TREATY DIFFERENT FROM THE ONE PRESENTED TO THE SENATE PRIOR TO ITS VOTE ON THE RESOLUTION OF RATIFICATION CANNOT BE ADOPTED WITHOUT THE FURTHER ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE.

NATURALLY, MR. CHAIRMAN, I WILL BE PLEASED TO WORK CLOSELY WITH YOU AND THE OTHER CHAIRMEN AND INTERESTED SENATORS IN CONSTRUCTING THIS UNDERSTANDING, SINCE IT WILL CARRY SUBSTANTIAL WEIGHT AND BE AN IMPORTANT PRECEDENT FOR FUTURE ARMS CONTROL TREATIES IF THEY ARE SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE.

ANOTHER MATTER WHICH HAS TENDED TO RAISE QUESTIONS IN THE MINDS OF EUROPEANS ABOUT THE STEADFASTNESS OF AMERICA'S COURSE AND COMMITMENTS, AND SOMETHING MENTIONED FREQUENTLY DURING OUR TRIP, WAS THE REYKJAVIK SUPERPOWER SUMMIT. THE IMPRESSION CONVEYED FROM THAT SUMMIT WAS THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS UNCERTAIN ABOUT THE VALUE OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER, RAISING ALL THE OLD FEARS OF A "DECOUPLING" OF AMERICA FROM EUROPE AND FUELING THE ARGUMENTS OF THOSE WHO BELIEVE THAT THE PROPER GOAL IS TO MAKE EUROPE A SO-CALLED "NUCLEAR FREE ZONE." THE DENUCLEARIZATION OF EUROPE IS CERTAINLY ON THE TOP OF THE SOVIET AGENDA TO DIVIDE THE WEST. IT IS CLEAR THAT WE MUST CONTINUE TO

IMPRESS ON EUROPE THE UNWAVERING COMMITMENT OF THE SENATE TO THE STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE, WITH THE NUCLEAR COMPONENT WHICH MAKES THAT STRATEGY CREDIBLE. AS CHANCELLOR KOHL MENTIONED TO ME IN BONN, AND THEN AGAIN IN HIS INSPIRING SESSION WITH OVER 50 SENATORS JUST LAST WEEK, IT HAS BEEN THE CREDIBILITY OF THE NUCLEAR DETERRENT WHICH HAS BEEN OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE IN BREAKING THE CYCLE OF WARS ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT FOR THE LAST 43 YEARS.

MR. CHAIRMAN, THE ISSUE OF THE FUTURE LOCATION OF THE F-16 FIGHTER WING BASED NOW AT TORREJON AIR FORCE BASE IN SPAIN HAS ARISEN. THE DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT THAT SQUADRON'S FUTURE SHOULD BE DETERMINED BY NATO, AND NOTES THAT THERE ARE SOME AMONG OUR ALLIES WHO WOULD MAKE THE NECESSARY CASE TO PUBLIC OPINION IN THEIR COUNTRY OF THE NEED TO PROVIDE A NEW HOME FOR THE F-16'S.

I BELIEVE IT WOULD SEND THE ABSOLUTELY WRONG SIGNAL TO PROVIDE ANY RATIONALE TO DEACTIVATE THOSE SQUADRONS. SUCH A MOVE WOULD CONSTITUTE A UNILATERAL DISARMING OF AN IMPORTANT COMPONENT OF THE DEFENSE OF NATO'S SOUTHERN FLANK, AND WOULD BE UNWISE. I WOULD ALSO NOTE, MR. CHAIRMAN, THAT PROBLEMS CONTINUE WITH REGARD TO OUR BASING ARRANGEMENTS WITH GREECE, PORTUGAL AND TURKEY, AND WHATEVER ACTIONS THE SENATE CAN TAKE THIS YEAR TO ENSURE THE CONTINUITY OF THOSE BASING ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE TAKEN. WE HAD DISCUSSIONS OF THIS TYPE DURING THE DELEGATION'S BRIEF, BUT VERY PRODUCTIVE VISIT TO TURKEY, AND I BELIEVE THERE IS A VERY HEALTHY UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN US AND THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT ON THESE MATTERS. IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT THERE ARE ALWAYS SENSITIVITIES ON THE PART OF THE OTHER PARTNER, THE BASING COUNTRY, AND IT IS IMPORTANT FOR US TO ASSESS CAREFULLY THOSE SENSITIVITIES BEFORE POINTING THE FINGER.

THIS MATTER OF EUROPEAN SENSITIVITIES BRINGS ME TO ANOTHER POINT. THREATENING EUROPE WITH A DIMINISHED AMERICAN COMMITMENT

IF EUROPE DOES NOT UNDERTAKE CERTAIN SPECIFIC ACTIONS, IS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, MR. CARLUCCI, DELIVERED A SPEECH AT WEHRKUNDE WHICH, RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, WAS WIDELY REPORTED IN EUROPE TO CONTAIN A KIND OF ULTIMATUM. THE HEADLINE ON THE FRONT PAGE OF THE INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE STORY ON HIS ADDRESS ON FEBRUARY 8TH, READ "U.S. WARNS OF TROOP PULLOUT IF BONN BARS NUCLEAR ARMS," AND THE LEAD PARAGRAPH READ THAT HE HAD "WARNED WEST GERMANY... THAT THE UNITED STATES MIGHT CONSIDER WITHDRAWING TROOPS FROM EUROPE IF WEST GERMAN POLICIES LED TO ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS BEING REMOVED FROM ITS TERRITORY." OUR DISCUSSIONS IN GERMANY LED US TO CONCLUDE THAT NO RESPONSIBLE GERMAN OFFICIAL CONTEMPLATES DENUCLEARIZING GERMANY; ALL GERMAN LEADERS REJECT THE CONCEPT OF THE THIRD ZERO, OR REMOVAL OF ALL SHORT RANGE MISSILES FROM GERMAN TERRITORY. THE APPEARANCE OF THE USE OF THREATS BY THE U.S. DOES THE GERMANS A DISSERVICE. IT WAS THE CURRENT GERMAN LEADERSHIP WHICH LED THE FIGHT ON DEPLOYMENT OF INF MISSILES AND MADE THE DIFFERENCE IN MAKING THE DUAL TRACK POLICY A SUCCESS. THEY DESERVE THE KIND OF COMMON PLANNING TO WHICH I WILL REFER IN MORE DETAIL AT THE CONCLUSION OF MY REMARKS.

LAST ON MY LIST OF TREMORS IS THE REPORT RELEASED JUST PRIOR TO OUR TRIP ENTITLED DISCRIMINATE DETERRENCE. THE ESSENCE OF THE REPORT APPPEARS TO BE THAT OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD ARE GAINING IN THEIR IMPORTANCE, AND, CONSEQUENTLY, THE PRIORITY OF THE SPECIAL AMERICAN-EUROPEAN RELATIONSHIP OUGHT TO BE REEXAMINED. ALTHOUGH THIS REPORT OF A BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION APPOINTED BY THE PENTAGON MAY NOT HAVE RECEIVED HIGH BILLING IN THE U.S., IT VERY OBVIOUSLY PLAYED ON EUROPEAN SENSITIVITIES ABOUT THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT. THE DELEGATION DOWNPLAYED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE DOCUMENT, BUT THE LEVEL OF ATTENTION IT HAS BEEN GETTING IN EUROPE IS DISTURBING.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

MR. CHAIRMAN, DESPITE THE TREMORS THAT I HAVE OUTLINED HERE, THE DELEGATION FOUND A GREAT DEAL TO BE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT IN EUROPE. THE ALLIANCE, IN FACT, IS IN GOOD HEALTH, AND IF IT IS RE-EXAMINING THOSE AREAS OF CONCERN AND WEAKNESS, THE ATMOSPHERE WITHIN WHICH SUCH SELF-EXAMINATION IS OCCURRING HAS MANY POSITIVE ASPECTS. THE OPPORTUNITIES TO KEEP THE ALLIANCE VIGOROUS AND PROSPEROUS ARE SUBSTANTIAL.

IN GENERAL, WE FOUND A WIDESPREAD CONSENSUS AMONG THE ALLIES FOR CONTINUING COOOPERATION AND COHESION. THERE IS EVIDENT UNITY, AND INDEED, A DESIRE FOR STRONGER AND MORE ENLIGHTENED AMERICAN LEADERSHIP.

APPROPRIATE APPROACH TO THE NEW SOVIET LEADERSHIP

THERE WAS WIDESPREAD AGREEMENT ON (1) THE NEED TO DEVELOP ALLIED PRIORITIES AND NEW ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES TO DEAL WITH THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP; (2) THE IMPORTANCE OF EDUCATING OUR RESPECTIVE PUBLICS ABOUT ALLIANCE POLICIES AND THE REQUIREMENT TO FORMULATE A SOBER, REALISTIC ASSESSMENT OF OUR WESTERN SECURITY INTERESTS INDEPENDENT OF OUR EVALUATION OF THE "SINCERITY" OF SOVIET INTENTIONS. AS PRESIDENT MITTERRAND TOLD THE DELEGATION, "THE PROBLEM IS NOT WHETHER THESE MEN ARE SINCERE, BUT WHETHER THEY ARE BEHAVING AS IF THEY ARE SINCERE." WE MUST HELP MAKE IT TO GORBACHEV'S ADVANTAGE TO BE SINCERE; (3) THE GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF MR. GORBACHEV AND HIS NEW STYLE IS THAT HE PRESENTS NEW CHALLENGES TO THE WEST, BUT THAT THE SOVIET UNION'S OBJECTIVES HAVE NOT CHANGED. AS CHANCELLOR KOHL INDICATED, THE SOVIET CAMPAIGN OF DISINFORMATION IN WEST GERMANY HAS NOT CHANGED AT ALL AS A RESULT OF THE COMING TO POWER OF MR. GORBACHEV. AS AN ITALIAN OFFICIAL SAID, THEY ARE JUST SELLING THEMSELVES BETTER. SO, THERE IS NOT ANY GREAT ILLUSION THAT THE SOVIET CHALLENGE IS A

THING OF THE PAST. ON THE CONTRARY, THE DESIRABILITY OF CLOSE, UNIFIED NATO DECISION-MAKING, AS THE KEY TO SUCCESS IN DEALING WITH THE SOVIET UNION, IS EVEN MORE DESIRABLE IN HANDLING A STYLISTICALLY-RENEWED SOVIET UNION.

THIS SOBER-MINDED, CAUTIOUS APPROACH MUST BE SUPPLEMENTED WITH A READINESS TO GRASP ANY OPPORTUNITIES PROVIDED BY THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO IMPROVE OUR RELATIONSHIP IN WAYS CLEARLY IN WESTERN INTERESTS, AND TO CONSTRUCT INITIATIVES TO TEST THEIR WILLINGNESS TO AGREE TO ARRANGEMENTS WHICH TRULY ENHANCE OUR SECURITY AND REDUCE THE RISK OF CONFLICT. WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER THE GORBACHEV REFORM PROGRAM WILL BE SUCCESSFUL, AND THERE IS A HEALTHY SKEPTICISM IN EUROPE ON THIS POINT. FURTHER, IF HE SHOULD SUCCEED IN REVITALIZING THE SOVIET ECONOMY, WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER THAT WOULD RESULT IN LONG TERM SOVIET FOREIGN POLICIES BENEFICIAL TO THE WEST.

THE NAVAL INCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED IN THE BLACK SEA DURING OUR TRIP ILLUSTRATES THE WISDOM OF SOBER REALISM. THE INTENTIONAL BUMPING OF AN AMERICAN WARSHIP BY A SOVIET WARSHIP WAS A CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE 1972 INCIDENTS-AT-SEA AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIETS (SPECIFICALLY ARTICLE III, PARAGRAPHS 1, 2 AND 4), AN AGREEMENT DESIGNED TO ELIMINATE SUCH HAZARDOUS BUMPING TACTICS. THAT AGREEMENT HAD BEEN HAILED AS HAVING A 14-YEAR RECORD OF SUCCESS IN MODERATING THE MOVEMENTS OF THE TWO SUPERPOWERS' WARSHIPS WHEN OPERATING IN CLOSE PROXIMITY. IT SHOULD BE INSTRUCTIVE FOR US ALL THAT THE SOVIETS ARE WILLING TO VIOLATE ONE OF THE FEW OPERATIVE AGREEMENTS REDUCING THE RISK OF CONFLICT AT THE VERY TIME THAT THE SENATE IS CONSIDERING WHETHER TO APPROVE AN ARMS CONTROL ACCORD.

I SHALL CONCLUDE WITH FOUR BRIEF OBSERVATIONS:

ON INF TREATY RATIFICATION

FIRST, THE INF TREATY SHOULD BE RATIFIED AND WITHOUT RESERVATIONS REQUIRING RENEGOTIATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE DIFFERING OPINIONS ABOUT THE DETAILS OF HOW THE AGREEMENT WAS HANDLED, AND ABOUT THE SPECIFIC IMPACT ON THE MILITARY BALANCE AND FUTURE NATO PLANNING FOR EUROPE, VIRTUALLY EVERYONE AGREED THE TREATY SHOULD BE RATIFIED. FAILURE TO RATIFY IT WOULD CLEARLY CAUSE A SERIOUS CRISIS IN THE ALLIANCE, AND PROVIDE A FERTILE GROUND FOR SOVIET MISCHIEF-MAKING.

ELEMENTS OF NATO ARMS CONTROL/MODERNIZATION STRATEGY

SECOND, AN OVERALL, COORDINATED NATO STRATEGY ON ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES AND MODERNIZATION QUESTIONS SHOULD BE FORMULATED. THE PRIORITIES OF THE ALLIANCE SHOULD BE DEVELOPED WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF ENHANCING ALLIANCE STABILITY AND MINIMIZING THE POTENTIAL FOR STRAINS OVER, IN PARTICULAR, MODERNIZATION QUESTIONS WHICH ARE PREMATURE. IN DEALING WITH PRIORITY SETTING, THERE MUST BE AN APPRECIATION OF THE SENSITIVITY OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION ON THE MATTER OF SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND, MOST IMPORTANTLY, GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION ON THE ISSUE OF "SINGULARITY", I.E., THE PROPOSITION THAT GERMANY, AS A RESULT OF SOME PARTICULAR NATO NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION PLAN, IS BEING ASKED TO BEAR A DISPROPORTIONATE BRUNT OF ANY FUTURE CONFLICT BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT.

WHILE IT IS NOT NECESSARY OR APPROPRIATE FOR ME TO GO INTO GREAT DETAIL ON THESE ISSUES THIS MORNING, I OFFER THE FOLLOWING SUGGESTIONS AS TO HOW NATO SHOULD NAVIGATE THIS MAZE OF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL ISSUES IN THE COMING MONTHS. THE ALLIANCE AGREED, AT ITS MEETING AT MONTEBELLO IN 1983, TO REDUCE THE STOCKPILE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEPLOYED IN EUROPE AN ADDITIONAL 1400 BEYOND THE REDUCTION OF 1000 AGREED TO IN 1979. ALONG WITH THESE REDUCTIONS, THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES OF NATO WERE DIRECTED

TO RECOMMEND APPROPRIATE MODERNIZATIONS OF THE REMAINING WEAPONS. THE OBJECTIVE OF THIS WAS TO MAINTAIN DETERRENCE AT THE LOWEST LEVEL OF WEAPONS POSSIBLE.

THE REGULAR PLANNING PROCESS OF NATO HAS BEEN IMPLEMENTING THE DECISIONS OF MONTEBELLO, AND SHOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO. WE ARE APPROACHING SOME KEY MODERNIZATION DECISIONS IN THE ALLIANCE, AND THESE SHOULD BE MADE IN A TIMELY FASHION. BUT I WANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT THERE IS NO NEED TO LINK MODERNIZATION OF SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS WITH THE INF TREATY. THE ALLIANCE HAS BEEN EMBARKED UPON THE PROCESS OF REVIEWING ITS REQUIREMENTS IN THIS AREA FOR SOME TIME, AND THERE IS NO NEED TO ALTER THE PROCESS NOW. I BELIEVE, BASED ON MY CONVERSATIONS WITH GENERAL ROGERS, GENERAL GALVIN, AND OTHERS, THAT IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO MODERNIZE CERTAIN SYSTEMS NOT PROHIBITED BY THE TREATY--BUT THOSE DECISIONS ARE SOME MONTHS IN THE FUTURE, AND SHOULD NOT BE AT THE CENTER OF OUR DISCUSSIONS ON THE TREATY AT THIS TIME. INDEED, TO DISCUSS MODERNIZATION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE TREATY COULD CREATE THE FALSE IMPRESSION--I EMPHASIZE THE FALSE IMPRESSION--THAT MODERNIZATION IS SOMEHOW REQUIRED TO COMPENSATE FOR THE ELIMINATION OF THE INF.

THE WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT HAS STATED THAT, IN ITS VIEW, A COMPREHENSIVE WESTERN SECURITY CONCEPT NEEDS TO BE DEVELOPED TO GUIDE NATO IN THE POST-INF ENVIRONMENT OF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL. THIS POSITION IS NOT UNREASONABLE, AND I WOULD URGE OUR NATO ALLIES AND OUR OWN GOVERNMENT TO TAKE IT SERIOUSLY. AT THE SAME TIME, I SEE NO COMPELLING NEED FOR AN "AGONIZING REAPPRAISAL" OF NATO STRATEGY AT THIS TIME.

THE TOP PRIORITY FOR THE PRESENT SHOULD BE TO FORMULATE A COMPREHENSIVE AND DETAILED PROPOSAL ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTIONS AND CONTROL IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER TO PRESENT TO THE SOVIETS THIS YEAR. A CONSENSUS MUST BE BUILT AROUND A SOUND CONVENTIONAL FORCES REDUCTION PROPOSAL, WHICH IS A VERY FOR-

MIDABLE TASK. THERE ARE THOSE IN EUROPE WHO BELIEVE THE ASYMMETRIES BETWEEEN THE WARSAW PACT AND NATO ARE SO LARGE THAT THE CHANCES OF NATO COMING OUT THE LOSER ARE TOO GREAT TO EVEN ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS. NEVERTHELESS, A MAJOR ATTEMPT SHOULD BE MADE. MOREOVER, THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS TALKS MUST BE PURSUED WITH RENEWED ENERGY.

CLEARLY EUROPE WOULD WELCOME THOUGHTFUL, VIGOROUS, AMERICAN LEADERSHIP ON THESE ISSUES. WE SHOULD NOT DISAPPOINT THEM. NO NEGOTIATIONS ON FURTHER TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARMS CONTROL SHOULD BE ENTERED INTO UNTIL AND UNLESS MAJOR PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN NEGOTIATIONS DEALING WITH THE CONVENTIONAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS IMBALANCES.

REGARDING A START AGREEMENT, THE CONSENSUS APPEARS TO BE THAT THE REACHING OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT IS ADVANTAGEOUS, SO LONG AS IT IS DONE WITH APPROPRIATE AND SOUND PROVISIONS, PARTICULARLY ON THE SPECIFIC SUBCEILINGS OF WEAPONS TYPES AND SO LONG AS VERIFICATION PROCEDURES ARE ADEQUATE. SUCH VERIFICATION TECHNIQUES ARE DIFFERENT IN KIND FROM THOSE EMPLOYED IN THE INF AGREEMENT. FURTHERMORE, WE NEED TO HAVE ASSURANCES THAT THE SYSTEMS WHICH WILL PROVIDE THE VERIFICATION WILL DEFINITELY BE IN PLACE WITHIN SPECIFIC NECESSARY TIME FRAMES BEFORE THE SENATE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERS THE TAKING UP OF A START AGREEMENT. FINALLY, SUCH AN AGREEMENT MUST ONLY BE REACHED IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH OUR ALLIES. THUS, A SOUND AGREEMENT, WITH ADEQUATE ABILITY TO VERIFY, SHOULD BE CONCLUDED WHEN IT IS READY, AND ONLY WHEN IT IS READY, BUT NO DEADLINES SHOULD BE IMPOSED WHICH PROVIDE OPPORTUNITIES FOR NEGOTIATING ADVANTAGES TO THE SOVIETS.

POST-INF DETERRENCE REPORT

MR. CHAIRMAN, A REPORT THAT WAS REQUIRED OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE ALONG WITH THE INF TREATY, AND WHICH WAS DESIGNED TO ADDRESS THE MATTER OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ALLIANCE IN THE POST-INF ENVIRONMENT, IS NOW AVAILABLE, AND MAKES AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION ON THE QUESTION OF MODERNIZATION OF THE NUCLEAR DETERRENT IN THIS ENVIRONMENT. I OFFER THIS REPORT TO YOU AT THIS TIME, FOR POSSIBLE INCLUSION INTO THE HEARING RECORD ON THE INF TREATY.

FRENCH-GERMAN BILATERAL BRIGADE

REGARDING BILATERAL MILITARY COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS AMONG NATO ALLIES, SUCH AS THE FRENCH-GERMAN BRIGADE, THESE INITIATIVES ARE DESIRABLE, AND SHOULD BE VIEWED AS AN INGREDIENT IN A HEALTHY WESTERN SECURITY SYSTEM. SO LONG AS THERE IS COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING IN THE ALLIANCE ABOUT THE SPECIFIC NATURE OF THE COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS, THEY SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED. IT SHOULD GO WITHOUT SAYING THAT THIS SPECIFIC INITIATIVE BETWEEN THE FRENCH AND GERMANS WAS GENERALLY WELCOMED IN EUROPE, GIVEN THE HISTORICAL BARRICADES THAT SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT HAS HAD TO OVERCOME.

RELATIONS WITH FRANCE

MR. CHAIRMAN, I REGARD ONE OF THE HIGHLIGHTS OF OUR TRIP THE TWO DAYS WE SPENT IN PARIS CONFERRING WITH FRENCH LEADERS AND OPINION-MAKERS. IT IS EVIDENT THAT THERE IS A HEALTHY FERMENT IN THE FRENCH POLITICAL SYSTEM AND THAT AN IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITY EXISTS FOR THE UNITED STATES AND THE ALLIANCE TO EXPLORE ENHANCEMENTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE FRENCH, DESPITE THEIR RELUCTANCE TO REJOIN THE MILITARY PLANNING ORGANIZATION OF NATO. I WOULD HAVE TO SAY THEIR HOSPITALITY WAS VERY WARM AND EVERY OPPORTUNITY FOR FURTHER DIALOGUE WITH THE FRENCH SHOULD BE EXPLORED. THEY ARE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE UNEASINESS OF THE WEST GERMANS IN A POST-INF ENVIRONMENT AND THE EFFORTS OF SOVIET LEADERS TO PROMOTE EUROPEAN DENUCLEARIZATION.

THE FORMATION OF WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION

NOW, I RETURN TO PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL THE SUBJECTS DISCUSSED ON OUR JOURNEY: PUBLIC OPINION IN THE WEST. THE DELEGATION WAS IMPRESSED WITH THE SENSITIVITY OF VIRTUALLY ALL NATO LEADERS ABOUT THE NEED TO INFORM OUR CONSTITUENCIES IN A COMPREHENSIVE AND PERSUASIVE FASHION OF THE APPROPRIATENESS OF ALLIANCE PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES. ALTHOUGH THE IMPACT OF THE NEW-STYLE SOVIET LEADERSHIP OF THE GORBACHEV ERA IS IN A FORMATIVE PERIOD AND VARIES FROM COUNTRY TO COUNTRY, THERE IS A CONSENSUS ON THE NEED FOR EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN LEADERS TO EDUCATE ACTIVELY OUR RESPECTIVE PUBLICS TO THE FACT THAT SOVIET LONG-TERM OBJECTIVES HAVE NOT CHANGED.

WE MUST, AS CHANCELLOR KOHL TOLD US IN BONN AND STATED AGAIN IN HIS MEETING WITH SENATORS LAST WEEK HERE IN THE CAPITOL, CHALLENGE MR. GORBACHEV TO LIVE UP TO HIS RHETORIC. WE CAN DO THIS BEST, AND MAINTAIN THE SUPPORT OF OUR PUBLICS, BY WORKING IN SOLIDARITY WITH OUR NATO ALLIES, PURSUING A SOUND AND RESPONSIBLE POLICY OF FORCE MODERNIZATION WHERE NECESSARY, AND ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENTS WHERE POSSIBLE.

WEAPONS ACTIVITIES MONITORED

USSR/EASTERN EUROPE TREATY VERIFICATION SITES	Intermediate-range																								Short-range							
	SS-20								SS-4, SS-5								SS-12								SS-12							
	Missile Operating Base	Storage Facility	Repair Facility	Elimination Facility	Training Center	Test Range/Research Site	Launcher Production Plant	Missile Production Plant	Missile Operating Base	Storage Facility	Repair Facility	Elimination Facility	Training Center	Test Range/Research Site	Launcher Production Plant	Missile Production Plant	Missile Operating Base	Storage Facility	Repair Facility	Elimination Facility	Training Center	Test Range/Research Site	Launcher Production Plant	Missile Production Plant	Missile Operating Base	Storage Facility	Repair Facility	Elimination Facility	Training Center	Test Range/Research Site	Launcher Production Plant	Missile Production Plant
1. Akhtyrka	X																															
2. Aluksne									X																							
3. Aral'sk				X																												
4. Balkhash																		X														
5. Barnaul	X	X																														
6. Bataysk			X								X																					
7. Bayram-Ali																									X							
8. Belokorovichi	X	X																														
9. Berezovka																		X								X						
10. Brody	X																															
11. Bronnaya Gora																		X														
12. Chervonograd	X																															
13. Chita				X																												
14. Droyanaya	X	X																														
15. Gezgaly	X	X																														
16. Glukhov	X																															
17. Gorny																	X															
18. Gusev									X																							
19. Jelgava										X		X																				
20. Kamenka																					X								X			
21. Kansk	X	X		X																												
22. Kapushkin Yar					X	X								X																		
23. Karmelava									X																							
24. Kattakurgan																	X															
25. Kazan																					X								X			
26. Kolomya									X																							
27. Kolosovo		X								X																						
28. Korosten	X																															
29. Krasnodar					X																											
30. Ladushkin																		X								X						
31. Lapichi																	X															
32. Lebedin	X	X																														
33. Lesnaya												X																				
34. Lida	X																															
35. Lipniki	X																															
36. Lozovaya																		X														
37. Lutsk	X	X																														
38. Malorita									X																							
39. Mozyr	X	X																														

USSR/EASTERN EUROPE TREATY VERIFICATION SITES	SS-20								SS-4, SS-5								SS-12								SS-23							
	Missile Operating Base	Storage Facility	Repair Facility	Elimination Facility	Training Center	Test Range/Research Site	Launcher Production Plant	Missile Production Plant	Missile Operating Base	Storage Facility	Repair Facility	Elimination Facility	Training Center	Test Range/Research Site	Launcher Production Plant	Missile Production Plant	Missile Operating Base	Storage Facility	Repair Facility	Elimination Facility	Training Center	Test Range/Research Site	Launcher Production Plant	Missile Production Plant	Missile Operating Base	Storage Facility	Repair Facility	Elimination Facility	Training Center	Test Range/Research Site	Launcher Production Plant	Missile Production Plant
40. Novosibirsk	☒	☒																														
41. Novosysoyevka																	☒															
42. Ostrov									☒																							
43. Pashino																	☒															
44. Petrikov	☒																☒															
45. Petropavlovsk																															☒	
46. Pinsk									☒																							
47. Plesetskaya						☒								☒								☒								☒		
48. Polotsk	☒																															
49. Postavy	☒	☒																														
50. Rechitsa	☒																															
51. Ruzhany	☒																															
52. Saratov																					☒								☒			
53. Sarny				☒																												
54. Saryozek																	☒			☒								☒				
55. Semipalatinsk																									☒							
56. Serphukov					☒																											
57. Skala-Podol'skaya									☒																							
58. Slavuta	☒																															
59. Slobudka																									☒							
60. Slonim	☒																															
61. Slutsk	☒																															
62. Smorgon'	☒																															
63. Sovetsk									☒																							
64. Stan'kovo																				☒					☒			☒				
65. Stryl									☒																							
66. Sverdlovsk															☒																	
67. Taurage									☒																							
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69. Udmurt								☒																☒								☒
70. Ukmerge									☒																							
71. Vetrino	☒																															
72. Volgograd							☒																☒									
73. Vyru									☒																							
74. Vysokaya Pech'	☒																															
75. Zaisimovichi	☒																															
76. Zherebkovo	☒	☒								☒																						
77. Zhitokovichi	☒																															
78. Bischofswerda (GDR)																	☒															
79. Jena-Forst (GDR)																									☒							
80. Konigsbrueck (GDR)																	☒															
81. Waren (GDR)																	☒															
82. Weissenfels (GDR)																									☒							
83. Wokhul (GDR)																	☒															
84. Hranice (Czech.)																	☒															

Sources: Betty G. Lall-Council on Economic Priorities and Treaty Between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Short-range Nuclear Weapons.

UNITED STATES/WESTERN EUROPE
TREATY VERIFICATION SITES

		Pershing II, IA								GLCM							
		Missile Operating Base	Storage Facility	Repair Facility	Elimination Facility	Training Center	Test Range/Research Site	Launcher Production Plant	Missile Production Plant	Missile Operating Base	Storage Facility	Repair Facility	Elimination Facility	Training Center	Test Range/Research Site	Launcher Production Plant	Missile Production Plant
1.	Barking Sands, HA						☒								☒		
2.	Cape Canaveral, FL						☒										
3.	Cape Cod, MA						☒								☒		
4.	Davir Air Force Base, AR													☒			
5.	Dugway Proving Grounds, UT														☒		
6.	Eastern Test Range, FL						☒								☒		
7.	Eglin Air Force Base, FL						☒								☒		
8.	Fort Huachuca, AR													☒			
9.	Fort Sill, OK			☒		☒											
10.	Green River, UT						☒								☒		
11.	Huntsville, AL		☒	☒													
12.	Kearney Mesa, CA																☒
13.	Magna, UT								☒								
14.	Marshall, TX								☒								
15.	Middle River, MD							☒									
16.	Poker Flats, AK						☒										
17.	Pueblo, CO		☒	☒													
18.	San Diego, CA															☒	
19.	Titusville, FL																☒
20.	Wallops Island, VA						☒								☒		
21.	Western Test Range, CA						☒								☒		
22.	White Sands, NM						☒								☒		
23.	Roi Namur, Kwajelein						☒										
24.	Wake Island						☒								☒		
25.	Comiso (Italy)									☒							
26.	Florennes (Belgium)									☒							
27.	Frankfurt (FRG)			☒													
28.	Gosselies (Belgium)											☒					
29.	Greenham Common (UK)									☒							
30.	Molesworth (UK)									☒							
31.	New Ulm (FRG)	☒															
32.	Schwabisch Gemuend (FRG)	☒															
33.	Waldheide-Neckarsulm (FRG)	☒															
34.	Weilerbach (FRG)		☒														
35.	Woensdrecht (Netherlands)									☒							
36.	Wuescheim (FRG)									☒							

STATEMENT OF
MORRIS B. ABRAM
CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SOVIET JEWRY

I welcome this opportunity to present our views before the Foreign Relations Committee, and would like to express my gratitude that the members of the Committee, under the able chairmanship of Mr. Claiborne Pell, have indicated a sincere concern on the issue of human rights.

The National Conference on Soviet Jewry, is the central coordinating body for policy and action in this country on behalf of more than two million Jews in the Soviet Union. Fifty national member agencies and nearly 300 local community councils, federations and committees are affiliated with the NCSJ, mobilizing the resources, energies and talents of millions of private citizens in this campaign for human rights. This was the same coalition of agencies which touched the heartstrings of nearly a quarter of a million Americans who demonstrated on the Mall in Washington, last December 6th, on the eve of the third summit meeting between President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev.

The NCSJ has worked for nearly two decades to help enable Jews to leave the Soviet Union in accordance with international law, to help those who choose to remain in the USSR to live with the same rights accorded every other Soviet nationality and religious minority. These are rights which they do not now have.

Soviet Jews comprise the third largest Jewish population in the world. They are fighting for basic human rights: the right to maintain their own religion, language, and culture, and the right to leave a country that denies them their heritage. This right of any individual to leave any country, including one's own, is an internationally recognized human right upheld by the Helsinki Final Act and other international agreements ratified but disregarded by the Soviet Union.

No one will deny that 1987 was a year of change in U.S.-Soviet relations. The summit meeting provided an important opportunity for the two leaders to engage in constructive dialogue, and ultimately agree upon a reduction in Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces. It was also a year which included some positive changes in the status of Soviet Jews. These include an increase in emigration levels, the release of the last Jewish Prisoner of Conscience, and a slight improvement in the possibility for limited Jewish cultural expression.

Of immediate concern to this committee is consideration of the INF treaty. The Jewish community knows too well the potential for mass destruction of our planet. The events of this century have sensitized us to the ultimate destructive potential of nuclear war. The National Conference on Soviet Jewry, therefore, does not advocate that freedom for Soviet Jews and other human rights concerns should be formally linked to arms control agreements with the USSR.

We are mindful, however, that on October 8, 1986, a few days before the opening of the Reykjavik summit, Secretary of State George Shultz said that the U.S. has "fiercely resisted Soviet attempts to limit our dialogue to arms control." In our view the policy of the United States government to continue to pursue a four part agenda for discussion with the Soviet Union is a fundamental one. Substantial progress in all four of those areas -- arms reduction, human rights, resolution of regional conflicts, and bilateral exchanges -- is necessary to allow a truly qualitative improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations. Indeed, the President, himself, stated in his 1988 report on National Security Strategy that "our emphasis on human rights is directly relevant to our security strategy because we believe that the manner in which a government treats its own people reflects upon its behavior in the international community of nations."

In our view United States negotiators must take into account American public opinion which, at the present, lacks confidence in Soviet promises. The gathering in Washington of nearly 250,000 Americans, who demonstrated on behalf of Soviet Jews, bears witness to this viewpoint. While there may be dispute as to Soviet compliance with existing arms arrangements, there is no doubt that the Soviets have flagrantly violated the 1975 Helsinki Accords.

Nearly three months have elapsed since the December summit. During that time we have been given further evidence of the reason for questioning Soviet credibility. In January and early February, the NCSJ received reports that Soviet emigration authorities were more strenuously applying the first-degree relative provision of the emigration law that went into effect on January 1, 1987. Our research indicated that if this provision was to be applied on a consistent basis, Jewish emigration would be virtually shut down. Seven weeks later, on February 21, U.S. officials stated that the Soviets had given assurances that they will not apply the first-degree relative requirement, but only during the remainder of 1988. We must ask whether Soviet Jews are to be subject to this kind of flip-flip policy on an issue of basic human rights? Surely, only a systematic procedure that will result in sustained and substantial emigration can demonstrate genuine Soviet credibility.

We recognize that Jewish emigration in 1987 reached 8,155 -- substantially higher than the 914 Jews permitted to leave in 1986. Yet, this is still far less than the 51,370 Jews who left in 1979.

Despite the modest increases in exit visas, the USSR remains alone among major developed nations in routinely concluding that ordinary citizens possess "state secrets" to justify preventing their leaving the country. A report, recently conducted by the international law firm of White and Case, found that this point contradicts the Soviet claim that their policies restraining the right to leave on grounds of state secrecy are in accord with international law and the policy of western powers.

The supposed possession of "state secrets," however, has not been the only barrier to emigration. Provisions of a law on entry and exit, which became effective January 1, 1987, has severely restricted the possibility to even apply for emigration permits. As I have noted, until recently only those Soviet Jews with first-degree relatives had been able to apply to emigrate, a factor which provided the Soviets with the spurious argument that fewer Jews want to leave the Soviet Union.

We want to believe that the much heralded Soviet policy of glasnost applies to Jews. Yet, immediately following the last summit meeting, Mr. Gorbachev repudiated, on American television, the right to leave the Soviet Union - a fundamental right to which his predecessor Leonid Brezhnev pledged the Soviet Union, at Helsinki.

We want to believe that the release of highly visible refuseniks is not a publicity stunt, but we observe that in 1979 Brezhnev released six times as many Jews as did Gorbachev in 1987.

We want to believe that the Soviets will honor their agreements with the United States, and especially their commitment in the October 10th summons to the Washington Summit, to make "significant headway" on human rights at the Summit meeting. But we know that the Soviet government continues to violate its human rights commitments.

Mr. Chairman, in the interest of world peace, we desire good relations with the Soviet Union. We are confident that such will inevitably follow when the Soviet Union's practices, especially in terms of the right to leave, are no longer, in the words of White and Case, "outside what may be safely regarded as the common core on which civilized nations agree."

At the Washington Summit, Mr. Gorbachev told the President, "What right does the United States have to question human rights policies. Who gave it the moral right."

The simple answer is that this right came from the pledges made by the Soviet Union in various international agreements. When Gorbachev went on to say "you are not the prosecutor and I am not the accused" he was mistaken. Since the President was not speaking for himself, but for the international community to which the Soviet Union had given its pledges, there is no reason that Moscow shouldn't be judged by these pledges.

As Secretary Shultz pointed out in an address on October 8, 1986 the Soviet Union does not consider it an interference with their domestic affairs for us to insist on verification and performance on arms agreements. And there is no logical basis for not insisting on compliance with other agreements. Beyond all arms reduction agreements -- INF, Strategic Nuclear Forces, or conventional forces, lies the hope of a normalization of relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. But, these relations will never be normal until the Soviet Union respects what Thomas Jefferson once referred to as the "decent opinion of mankind."

The Soviets have thrice signed onto the norm of conduct, repeated in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, those concepts which provide "Everyone has the right to leave any country including his own." Whatever may be the state of compliance with previous arms control agreements we know that the Soviets are in flagrant violation of Basket III of the Helsinki Final Act. That is a situation which only the Soviet Union, in its pursuit of normal relations with the United States and our Western allies, can change.

Mr. Chairman, for information purposes I have attached to my testimony a statistical summary of Jewish emigration from the USSR and the NCSJ's 1987 Year-End Report on the status of Soviet Jewry. We trust our views will be of help in your deliberations.

Work Disk #2/009

NATIONAL OFFICE OF
JESUIT SOCIAL MINISTRIES
1424 16th Street NW/Room 300/Washington, D.C. 20036/(202) 462-7008

February 25, 1988

Senator Claiborne Pell, Chairman
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
U. S. Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Pell:

We offer the following written statement to be included as part of the Congressional Record on the INF TREATY hearings.

After much prayer and discussion on this matter, WE THE UNDERSIGNED JESUITS, STRONGLY URGE THE MEMBERS OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE TO APPROVE THE INF TREATY WITHOUT ANY AMENDMENTS.

The signing of the INF TREATY by President Reagan and Secretary Gorbachev was a major step toward nuclear disarmament, and amending the treaty would only reverse this process. We believe that nuclear disarmament must be built through the process of dialogue and political activities and not by military means.

Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

Joseph R. Hacala, S.J.

Rev. Joseph R. Hacala, S.J.
Director, National Office of
Jesuit Social Ministries

Louis H. Quihuis, S.J.

Mr. Louis Quihuis, S.J.
Associate Director, National
Office of Jesuit Social
Ministries

cc: Bill Ashworth

SCA NEWS
SYNAGOGUE COUNCIL OF AMERICA
אהבתי מעון ביתך
327 LEXINGTON AVENUE, NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10016 • (212) 686-8670

FOR RELEASE: Tuesday, March 15

NEW YORK, NY--The major organizations of the Jewish religious community have endorsed the U.S.-Soviet INF treaty and called upon the U.S. Senate to "promptly" ratify the treaty.

The Synagogue Council of America, representing the rabbinic and congregational bodies of Conservative, Orthodox and Reform Judaism -- four million members -- further asked President Reagan to proceed with new Soviet arms negotiations prior to the next U.S.-Soviet Summit saying "it is our prayer that these talks will result in a treaty to further limit the spread of nuclear weapons.

"We recognize the dangers inherent in unilateral disarmament. It is our desire, therefore, that both sides develop and extend the mutual verification procedures established in the INF treaty. Such procedures will add additional credibility to a new treaty and will help work to the day where mutual honor and trust will govern the affairs of states."

Rabbi Gilbert Klaperman, SCA president considered the reduction of nuclear arms a major Jewish concern. "Commitment to peace represents a basic teaching of Judaism. I dread to think that the push of a button can destroy human life. We cannot stand by silently and permit the arms race to escalate."

Rabbi Klaperman presented the SCA statement to Ambassador Max Kampelman at a private briefing of SCA rabbinic and lay leaders at the Princeton Club on Monday afternoon, March 14. Ambassador Kampelman indicated that he would bring the resolution to the attention of President Reagan and other government leaders.

Rabbi [illegible] Kollin of Boston, SCA Domestic Affairs chairman said that the nuclear document would be used in the 3500 U.S. synagogues to educate laity and to encourage congregations to participate in community activities. Rabbis will be called upon to preach on the topic and lead adult study forums.

The SCA statement said:

"The Synagogue Council of America hails the achievements of the recently concluded U.S.-Soviet summit meeting in Washington as an important first step in efforts towards reducing the threat of a U.S.-Soviet nuclear confrontation. The Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) agreement signed by President Ronald Reagan and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev demonstrated a clear commitment by both countries to pursue further elimination of the terrible threat to humankind posed by continuation of the production and placement of nuclear weapons. We call upon the Senate to move ahead now with prompt ratification of the Treaty."

SCA is the national coordinating agency for the Conservative, Orthodox and Reform rabbinic and congregational organizations.

CONSTITUENT AGENCIES

Conservative	RABBINICAL ASSEMBLY	UNITED SYNAGOGUE OF AMERICA
Orthodox	RABBINICAL COUNCIL OF AMERICA	UNION OF ORTHODOX JEWISH CONGREGATIONS OF AMERICA
Reform	CENTRAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN RABBIS	UNION OF AMERICAN HEBREW CONGREGATIONS

"As religious people we recognize the extent to which the arms race has sapped humankind's ability to deal with such horrible problems as hunger, disease, and suffering. It is incumbent upon all civilized persons to strive to enhance the quality of life on earth and not to use human knowledge and creativity to destroy it. Our Jewish tradition proclaims our duty as expressed by the prophet Isaiah: 'The earth was created to be settled for life, and not for the mass extinction of humanity who bear the image of God.'"

"Now that the superpowers have committed themselves to this limited first stage of nuclear disarmament, we urge the President and the United States Government to move ahead with further discussions with the Soviet Union. We hope that reconvened U.S.-Soviet Geneva strategic arms reduction talks produce an additional agreement prior to the next forthcoming U.S.-Soviet Summit this spring. It is our hope that these talks will result in a treaty to further limit the spread of nuclear weapons."

The Synagogue Council of America's previous nuclear disarmament statement said (in part):

"As Jews, we are most deeply concerned with the ominous threat which nuclear arms race poses to the survival of humanity. We are survivors of Hitler's Holocaust and experience a special sense of responsibility to raise our voices against the drift into a nuclear holocaust. At a time when the superpowers possess strength enough to wipe humankind off the earth, it is the height of folly to develop ever deadlier weapons in a futile search for spurious security.

It is our sacred duty not to allow familiarity with the nuclear threat to lead to indifference towards the ever increasing dangers of a nuclear war either by design or by accident. It is our religious duty to speak out when humankind's survival is at stake. We must raise our voices against those experts who believe the myth that a nuclear war is winnable. Time is running out. We must convey our sense of urgency concerning the need to help bring about a mutual reduction of nuclear arms and stockpiles."

3/15/88